People ex rel. Holmes v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co.

122 N.E. 792, 288 Ill. 70
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 15, 1919
DocketNo. 12401
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 122 N.E. 792 (People ex rel. Holmes v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Holmes v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co., 122 N.E. 792, 288 Ill. 70 (Ill. 1919).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Duncan

delivered the opinion of the court:

Judgment was rendered in the county court of Crawford county for the sum of $201.01, the amount of a tax levied by the board of education of the non-high-school district in that county, including interest, penalties and costs, against the property of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company,' appellant, for the year 1917-

Appellant’s objections to the tax were based on the ground that sections 93, 94 and 96 of “An act to establish and maintain a system of free schools,” as amended by an act of the legislature of the State of Illinois approved June 22, 1917, are void. (Laws of 1917, pp. 741-744.) One of the several grounds urged by appellant against the validity of said sections of the School law is, that the territory embraced in the “so-called non-high-school district need not be, and in most instances cannot be, compact territory lying contiguous, but ordinarily must, of necessity, consist of the isolated and less populous parts of the several counties,” entirely separated from each other by territory of intervening high-school districts. No such' an objection was made by appellant to the taxes, and it is not even shown or contended that the non-high-school district in question is composed of territory that is not contiguous and compact. The contention of appellant in this regard, not being based upon any facts disclosed in the record or upon such specific objection to the validity of the taxes objected to, cannot be considered by this court.

Other specific objections made by the appellant to said taxes are, that said sections of the School law contravene and violate the provisions of the constitution of Illinois, particularly section 2 of article 2, section 22 of article 4 and sections 9 and 10 of article 9 thereof. The same objections were made by appellant in the case of People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. 286 Ill. 414, and were decided by this court in that case against appellant for the reasons given in the case of People v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. 286 Ill. 384. Those cases are conclusive in this case, and for the same reasons appellant’s objections are overruled.

The final objection to the validity of sections 93 and 96 made by appellant is, that all territory not included in a high-school district maintaining a recognized four-year high school is included in the non-high-school districts, and pupils from any part of the non-high-school districts, including the local districts embraced therein that conduct a two or three-year high school, may attend any recognized two, three or four-year high school. It is urged that these provisions compel tax-payers who reside in a local district included in a nón-high-schooi district to contribute, without their consent, to the support of other high schools maintaining only a two or three-year course, thus permitting two taxing bodies to exercise jurisdiction over the same territory for the same purpose.

The material part of section 93 in the consideration of this objection provides thus: “In each county of the State, all the territory of the county not included in a township high-school district, or a community high-school district, or a district maintaining a recognized four-year high school, shall be organized into a non-high-school district for the purpose of levying a tax to pay the tuition of all eighth grade graduates residing in such non-high-school district, including pupils attending a recognized two or three-year high school conducted by a local school district. * * ■* None of the provisions of this act regarding the establishment of non-high-school districts shall be construed to prevent the organization of any territory of such non-high-school districts, into township or community ■ high school, school districts.”

By section 94 the board of education of a non-high-school district is given the following powers and duties: (1) To levy a tax, annually, upon all the taxable property of such non-high-school district, not to exceed one per cent upon the valuation, to be ascertained by the last assessment for State and county purposes, for the purpose of paying the tuition of all eighth grade graduates residing within such non-high-school district attending any two, three or four-year recognized high school; (2) to issue orders on the county treasurer, payable out of any funds belonging to said non-high-school district, on or before the first Tuesday of May of each year, for the payment of the tuition of eighth grade graduates residing within such non-high-school district attending a recognized high school, provided such attendance shall be certified to said board by the board of education of the high school attended; (3) to make such reports as may be required by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and by the county superintendent of schools; and (4) to pay election expenses and other necessary incidental expenses out of the funds of the non-high-school district.

Section 95 designates who shall be selected as treasurer of the non-high-school district and prescribes his duties. Section 96 provides as follows:

“Upon the approval of the county superintendent of schools any high school pupil may attend a recognized high school more convenient in some district other than the high-school district in which he resides and the board of education of the high-school district in which said pupil resides shall pay the tuition of. such pupil, provided, said tuition shall not exceed the per capita cost of maintaining the high school attended. Any eighth grade graduate residing in a non-high-school district may attend any recognized two, three or four-year high school, and his tuition shall be paid by the board of education of the non-high-school district in which he resides.

“An eighth grade graduate in the meaning of this act is any person of school age who gives satisfactory evidence of having completed the first eight grades of school work by presenting a certificate of promotion issued by the home school board, or by passing an examination given by the county superintendent of schools or by passing an examination given by the school attended.

“A recognized high school in the meaning of this act is any public high school providing a course of two or more years of work approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction.

“The tuition paid shall in no case exceed the per capita cost of maintaining the high school attended, excluding therefrom interest paid on bonded indebtedness which shall be computed by dividing the total cost of conducting and maintaining said high school by the average number of pupils enrolled, including tuition pupils.”

Section 89 of the act entitled “An act to establish and maintain a system of free schools,” approved and in force June 12, 1909, as subsequently amended, is the act which enables local school districts to establish and maintain high schools, and it provides as follows: "Any school district having a population of two thousand (2000) inhabitants or more may, in the manner herein provided for establishing and maintaining a township high school, establish and maintain a high school for the benefit of the inhabitants of such school district, and elect a board of education therefor with the same powers conferred on township high school boards of education.

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Related

People Ex Rel. Vaughan v. Thompson
36 N.E.2d 351 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1941)
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180 N.E. 858 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1932)
People Ex Rel. Swingle v. Pinari
163 N.E. 385 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1928)

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Bluebook (online)
122 N.E. 792, 288 Ill. 70, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-holmes-v-cleveland-cincinnati-chicago-st-louis-railway-ill-1919.