People ex rel. Holbrook v. Treasurer of Detroit

Michigan Supreme Court

People ex rel. Holbrook v. Treasurer of Detroit

8 Mich. 14, 1860 Mich. LEXIS 2

CourtMichigan Supreme Court

DecidedJanuary 5, 1860

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 8 Mich. 14 (People ex rel. Holbrook v. Treasurer of Detroit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People ex rel. Holbrook v. Treasurer of Detroit, 8 Mich. 14, 1860 Mich. LEXIS 2 (Mich. 1860).

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Opinions

Campbell J.:

The only question in this case is, whether an owner of an undivided interest in a piece of property which has been assessed without division, can redeem his share from a sale for city taxes.

The city charter, providing' for the assessment of property, is silent as to its details, but as the 'same roll is the basis of all taxation, the general statutes apply so far as not modified by the charter. Under these, no doubt can exist concerning the right to assess undivided interests. And the law expressly provides for the redemption of any undivided interest whatever.

I think the charter very clearly recognizes the right of owners of part interests, to pay their share of taxes to the collectors before sale, whether separately assessed or not. Section 14 of the charter (D. 1857, p. 144-5) makes the tax a lien upon the property assessed, and renders the owners, occupants, and parties in interest, liable on demand to pay it. The statute could not have intended such an absurdity as that a part owner should be bound to pay the whole tax. Such a construction would avoid the statute, as beyond the power of the Legislature. And in the very next clause provision is made, that in. [16]*16case of default in paying the same “ or any part thereof ” the council may proceed to enforce it by the usual process, which is there set forth. In providing' for the sale of “real estate,” we must hold that the term applies not to whole lots, but to such interests as are not paid upon, or else we must hold that the city may lawfully receive and demand a portion from each part owner, and yet sell the whole estate for the default' of one, although the rest have paid, and without allowing the amount of such payments to be deducted. This would be a monstrous doctrine.

The language of section 15, in relation to redemptions, is the same (so far as it refers to property) with that of section 14. And although section 16 uses language somewhat different, yet there is no such difference - as would justify us in assuming a different construction when we look at the reason of the matter, and regard the provisions of section 17. The latter section provides means whereby any person in possession, who has been obliged to pay taxes, may recover them back of the owner. But no provision is made whereby a tenant in common may recover of his co-tenant; and in the absence of such a provision, unless a tenant in common can redeem his own share, he may be compelled* either to lose it, or pay more than its entire value to retain it.

An undivided interest is just as much a separate estate as a divided one, and the law so regards it. No tenant in common can restrain his co-tenant from disposing of his interest to absentees or irresponsible persons. And such estates are created more frequently by intestacy than by grant. It should be a very clear provision of law which can be construed to apply to these estates a burden of liability for taxes beyond others. And for my own part I am not prepared to admit that the law can validly make any such distinction. No property can be subjected to more than its share of general taxes, without infringing on [17]*17principles of great moment; and I am not willing to apply to any statute a meaning which will render it obnoxious to such consequences, if any other can be reasonably arrived at.

A mandamus must issue as prayed for.

Martin, Ch. J. concurred.

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Campbell J.:

The only question in this case is, whether an owner of an undivided interest in a piece of property which has been assessed without division, can redeem his share from a sale for city taxes.

The city charter, providing' for the assessment of property, is silent as to its details, but as the 'same roll is the basis of all taxation, the general statutes apply so far as not modified by the charter. Under these, no doubt can exist concerning the right to assess undivided interests. And the law expressly provides for the redemption of any undivided interest whatever.

I think the charter very clearly recognizes the right of owners of part interests, to pay their share of taxes to the collectors before sale, whether separately assessed or not. Section 14 of the charter (D. 1857, p. 144-5) makes the tax a lien upon the property assessed, and renders the owners, occupants, and parties in interest, liable on demand to pay it. The statute could not have intended such an absurdity as that a part owner should be bound to pay the whole tax. Such a construction would avoid the statute, as beyond the power of the Legislature. And in the very next clause provision is made, that in. [16]*16case of default in paying the same “ or any part thereof ” the council may proceed to enforce it by the usual process, which is there set forth. In providing' for the sale of “real estate,” we must hold that the term applies not to whole lots, but to such interests as are not paid upon, or else we must hold that the city may lawfully receive and demand a portion from each part owner, and yet sell the whole estate for the default' of one, although the rest have paid, and without allowing the amount of such payments to be deducted. This would be a monstrous doctrine.

The language of section 15, in relation to redemptions, is the same (so far as it refers to property) with that of section 14. And although section 16 uses language somewhat different, yet there is no such difference - as would justify us in assuming a different construction when we look at the reason of the matter, and regard the provisions of section 17. The latter section provides means whereby any person in possession, who has been obliged to pay taxes, may recover them back of the owner. But no provision is made whereby a tenant in common may recover of his co-tenant; and in the absence of such a provision, unless a tenant in common can redeem his own share, he may be compelled* either to lose it, or pay more than its entire value to retain it.

An undivided interest is just as much a separate estate as a divided one, and the law so regards it. No tenant in common can restrain his co-tenant from disposing of his interest to absentees or irresponsible persons. And such estates are created more frequently by intestacy than by grant. It should be a very clear provision of law which can be construed to apply to these estates a burden of liability for taxes beyond others. And for my own part I am not prepared to admit that the law can validly make any such distinction. No property can be subjected to more than its share of general taxes, without infringing on [17]*17principles of great moment; and I am not willing to apply to any statute a meaning which will render it obnoxious to such consequences, if any other can be reasonably arrived at.

A mandamus must issue as prayed for.

Martin, Ch. J. concurred.

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8 Mich. 14, 1860 Mich. LEXIS 2, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-holbrook-v-treasurer-of-detroit-mich-1860.

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