People Ex Rel. Heartburg v. Interstate Engineering & Construction Co.

75 P.2d 997, 58 Idaho 457, 1937 Ida. LEXIS 48
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 17, 1937
DocketNo. 6477.
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 75 P.2d 997 (People Ex Rel. Heartburg v. Interstate Engineering & Construction Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People Ex Rel. Heartburg v. Interstate Engineering & Construction Co., 75 P.2d 997, 58 Idaho 457, 1937 Ida. LEXIS 48 (Idaho 1937).

Opinion

*460 G-IVENS, J.

Appellant Interstate Engineering & Construction Company constructed a bridge across Salmon Eiver on U.S.P.W.H.P. No. H.E.H. 9-1 (1935) and in connection therewith appellant and respondent Triplett cut, and respondent Heartburg furnished a tractor and driver for skidding, logs used in the false work on the bridge.

The company appealed from the portion of the judgment adverse to it in favor of Heartburg, and Triplett from the portion against him in favor of the company. For clarity and brevity we will refer to the company as appellants in both appeals and to Triplett and Heartburg simply by name.

Triplett contends he was employed as foreman at $15 per day and that on that basis there is due him $377.60, and under sec. 44 — 606, I. C. A., a penalty of $192. Heartburg claimed he was to receive $20 a day for his tractor, driver, oil and gas, and filed a lien on the logs delivered to protect his *461 claim of $446.65 and penalty of $600 under sees. 44 — 401 and 44-606,1. C. A. et seq., making a total of $1046.65.

Appellant defended against both causes of action on the assertion that Triplett was to receive, and the court found in accordance with appellant’s contention—

“ .... 7 cents per foot for round timbers, with 10 to 12 inch tops; 4 cents for those with 5 to 9 inch tops; for shorter lengths up to 60 feet, and for lengths up to 70 feet with 10 inch tops 8 cents; and for lengths up to 80 feet with 10 inch tops 9 cents; and for lengths up to 90 feet with 10 inch tops 10 cents; and for timbers 30 feet in length with 14 inch tops, 10 cents; .... the 4 cents (being) changed to five cents, all computations to be on the basis of lineal feet, .... ”

voluntarily increased 50 per cent by appellant after the work started because Triplett complained he could not perform for the above amount; and that Triplett was overpaid on this basis $114.28.

The court found appellant did not hire or employ respondent Triplett as foreman or superintendent but that he was a sub-contractor. Appellant Triplett in his appeal ingeniously argues he could not have legally been a sub-contractor because the main contract between respondent company and the state provided in part as noted below:

“If any bidder shall state in his proposal the particular item or items of work which he proposes to sublet and shall name therein the subcontractor to whom he proposes to sublet such work in the event of an award to him, such item or items of work may be performed by such subcontractor notwithstanding the 80 per cent limitation above mentioned, provided that the subcontractor named in the proposal is a contractor of recognized standing, has a record of satisfactory performance, and the work proposed to be sublet does not constitute the major item or items of work embraced in the contract. Any bidder who shall name a subcontractor in his proposal shall attach thereto a certificate that the use of the name of such subcontractor was with his knowledge and consent. Any subcontractor so named in any bid may be required to submit questionnaires to establish his experience and financial ability. The naming of a subcontractor in any *462 such proposal will not insure approval of the proposed subletting of work to him, and in the event of disapproval of such subletting, the contractor shall perform such item or items of work with his own organization, in full compliance with all applicable terms of his contract.”
“SUBLETTING OR ASSIGNING THE CONTRACT:
“The contractor shall perform with his own organization and with the assistance of workmen under his immediate superintendence, work of a value not less than eighty (80) per cent of the value of all work embraced in the contract, exclusive of items not commonly found in contracts for similar work, or which require highly specialized knowledge, craftsmanship and/or equipment not ordinarily available in the organizations of contractors performing work of the character embraced in the contract.
“No portion of the contract shall be sublet, assigned or otherwise disposed of except with the written consent of the contracting officer or his authorized representative. Requests for permission to sublet, assign or otherwise dispose of any portion of the contract shall be in writing and accompanied by a showing that the organization which will perform the work is particularly experienced and equipped for such work. The contractor shall give assurance that the minimum wage for labor and the maximum amount to be deducted for board, if furnished, as stated in his proposal, shall apply to labor performed on all work sublet, assigned or otherwise disposed of in any way. Written consent to sublet, assign or otherwise dispose of any portion of the contract shall not be construed to relieve the contractor of any responsibility for the fulfillment of the contract.”

and that the evidence is not sufficient to show a sale under this provision of the contract:

“Incidental or minor quantities of material such as lumber, long lengths of reinforcing steel or other materials usually hauled with a type of vehicle not ordinarily available in a contractor’s organization may be purchased on a job delivery basis and delivered to the work without regard to these provisions.”

*463 and therefore, he was perforce an employee and his wages could not be less than specified in the contract, more than the schedule of payment asserted by appellant.

There is no evidence explaining the scope, meaning or application of these provisions of the contract and in the absence of such evidence, the burden being on Triplett to prove the application of these provisions of the contract as supporting his contention, the trial court may have justifiably concluded that since the total claims of Triplett and Heartburg, including the amounts paid them and sued for being $3,459.65, hence less than 20 per cent of the amount of the main contract, $68,605.75, there was no application of the provisions above noted because clearly more than 80 per cent of the contract was, so far as Triplett and Heartburg are concerned, performed by the respondent company.

Or the court may have concluded that since the contract or bid of respondent company, so far as the record shows, did not indicate any part was to be sub-contracted, the above provisions did not apply, in line with the reasoning in In re Howell, 27 Ida. 590, 150 Pac. 19, in that only after the contract was let did the company decide it necessary or advisable to get the timber by sub-contract and not directly, and since such work did not exceed 80 per cent of the total, there was no violation of the main contract. There is no showing that the cutting, skidding or delivery of logs used only in the false work and not as a permanent part of the structure of the bridge was of such a nature as was contemplated, or barred by the main contract from being sublet or contracted for.

The crucial point is what Triplett was to receive not what his exact status was. The rule so strenuously contended for by appellant Triplett that:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
75 P.2d 997, 58 Idaho 457, 1937 Ida. LEXIS 48, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-heartburg-v-interstate-engineering-construction-co-idaho-1937.