People ex rel. Danielson v. City of Rockford

87 N.E.2d 660, 338 Ill. App. 347, 1949 Ill. App. LEXIS 337
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedSeptember 1, 1949
DocketGen. No. 10,336
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 87 N.E.2d 660 (People ex rel. Danielson v. City of Rockford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Danielson v. City of Rockford, 87 N.E.2d 660, 338 Ill. App. 347, 1949 Ill. App. LEXIS 337 (Ill. Ct. App. 1949).

Opinion

Mr. Presiding Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.

On March 4,1948, the appellee, Axel Danielson, made application to Fritz Oberg, the building inspector of the City of Rockford, for permits to erect four buildings in that city and each designated for use and occupancy by four families, and commonly known as four-family apartments. The buildings were to be constructed on three lots which are located in the territory, or area designated by the zoning ordinance of the city as, “B— Residential Districts.” Applicable to “B— Residential Districts,” the zoning ordinance provided at the time the permits were requested, in part, that, “no building shall be erected or altered except for one or more of the following uses.” . . . "2. Two Family Dwellings. ’ ’

It appears from the pleadings that the building inspector refused to issue the permits on the sole ground that the zoning ordinance allowed only two-family dwellings to be erected in the zoning district where the buildings were to be erected.

The appellee on April 5, 1948, filed his petition in the circuit court of Winnebago county for a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Rockford and Oberg to issue building permits for the erection of the' buildings. The petition in substance alleges that plans and specifications of the buildings in compliance with the ordinance of the city, were submitted to Oberg and that he refused to issue the permits. The appellee hereinafter, will be referred to as the petitioner and the City of Rockford and Fritz Oberg as the respondents..

Respondents filed their answer admitting petitioner’s ownership of the lots and that the plans and specifications for the buildings complied with the applicable building code of the city. The answer alleges that the permits were refused, because the area wherein the lots are located is zoned as “B — Residential District” under the Zoning Ordinance then in force and that as such “Residential” classification four-family apartments were not permitted.

The petitioner filed his reply to the answer admitting that there is and was on March 4, 1948, a certain alleged" or pretended Zoning Ordinance of the City of Rockford in alleged or pretended force and effect in and by which said alleged or pretended ordinance the lots described in the complaint were classified as “B— Residential District,” as set forth in the answer of the respondents. Admits that petitioner’s application for building permits was made to Oberg for the purpose of construction and erection upon the lots four-family apartment buildings. The reply further alleges that the Zoning Ordinance is void and of no force and effect; that the said ordinance insofar as it attempts to define Class “A,” “B” and “C” Residential Districts is purely capricious, arbitrary and discriminatory, and that the same bears no relation whatsoever to the preservation of the public health, morals, comfort and welfare; that said ordinance is an invalid exercise of the City of Rockford of its police power and constitutes a taking of petitioner’s property without just compensation contrary to sec. 13 of art. II of the Constitution of the State of Illinois, and further that said ordinance constitutes a taking of the property of the petitioner without due process of law, contrary to sec. 2 of art. II of the Constitution of the State of Illinois; that said ordinance deprives petitioner of his property and renders the same of little or no value to him; that by reason of the foregoing, the matters and things set forth in the respondents’ answer constitutes no reason for the denial of the writ of mandamus as prayed in petitioner’s complaint.

The respondents filed their answer to the reply denying -each allegation of the reply.

There was a hearing before the court and a decree rendered awarding the writ as prayed in the complaint. The trial judge refused to certify that the validity of a city ordinance is involved. The respondents have appealed.

It does not appear from the decree that the trial court held that the ordinance, or any part thereof, as being so arbitrary and unreasonable as to result in confiscation of petitioner’s property without just compensation, or without due process of law. In other words, the court did not decide that the ordinance, or any part thereof, is an unreasonable or improper exercise of the police power contrary to constitutional limitations on .the police power delegated to cities of this State by our legislature to enact zoning ordinances. This court does not have jurisdiction to determine the question of the validity of an ordinance of a municipal corporation where the construction of a constitutional provision is involved. (City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84; Harmon v. City of Peoria, 373 Ill. 594; City of Chicago v. Krema Trucking Co., 401 Ill. 411; City of Greenville v. Nowlan, 279 Ill. App. 311; Pollack v. County of Du Page, 371 Ill. 199.)

It is contended by the respondents that the court assumed and exercised a legislative function in rendering the decree. In the case of Welton v. Hamilton, 344 Ill. 82, the Supreme Court held that section 3 of the Zoning Act of 1923, which authorized the board of appeals, created by the Act, to vary or modify the application of a zoning ordinance in particular cases, where in the opinion of the board there were practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in carrying the ordinance out, is a delegation of a legislative power, and is unconstitutional delegation of authority. (See also, Speroni v. Board of Appeals of City of Sterling, 368 Ill. 568.)

In the case of Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338, on page 356, the Supreme Court states: “When set in motion by the institution of suits for the settlement of difficulties, it is the province of courts to declare what the law is, and apply it to the controversies before them. They have no power to make law. That is a legislative function, which must he exercised exclusively by the legislative branch of the government. They are only permitted to declare what the law is, and apply it to existing controversies, when brought before them by some appropriate proceeding.”

A summary of the decree follows. The court finds that the proposed four-family apartments will be of two-story construction with four separate dwelling units, each unit intended for occupancy for not more than two persons. That the buildings will be modern in every respect, well constructed, and the grounds well landscaped.

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Bluebook (online)
87 N.E.2d 660, 338 Ill. App. 347, 1949 Ill. App. LEXIS 337, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-danielson-v-city-of-rockford-illappct-1949.