People ex rel. Cross v. Martin

32 N.Y.S. 933, 66 N.Y. St. Rep. 362, 85 Hun 343
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 15, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 32 N.Y.S. 933 (People ex rel. Cross v. Martin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Cross v. Martin, 32 N.Y.S. 933, 66 N.Y. St. Rep. 362, 85 Hun 343 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1895).

Opinion

VAN BRUNT, P. J.

On the 13th day of August, 1894, certain charges, 46 in number, were presented to the respondents against the relator, who was then a captain of the police force of the city of New York. Notice of the preference of said charges, and of the time and place when the same would be publicly examined, was served upon the relator; and thereafter, on the 15th day of August, 1894, and subsequent days, a trial was had, and on the 31st day of August it was by the said police commissioners “resolved, declared, ordered, and adjudged that the said charges are true, and that the said Adam A. Cross be, and he hereby is, dismissed from the police force of the police department of the city of New York.” It appears upon an inspection of the record of the trial that upon charges 13 to 23, inclusive, and 25 to 35, inclusive, no evidence was offered, and it would seem that the police commissioners had dismissed such charges; but in their judgment they And the same to be true, notwithstanding such dismissal. It might be a subject of interesting inquiry, perhaps, to know whether, in the punishment of the relator, the whole of the charges had not been considered, instead of those only in respect to which proof had been offered. The first 12 of the charges relate to the accepting of money for permitting to be kept open a disorderly house at No. 144 Christie .street, kept by one Katie Schubert. The thirteenth charge was [934]*934founded upon alleged neglect of duty in permitting said house to be kept open. The twenty-fourth charge was founded upon alleged neglect of duty in allowing a similar house to be kept open at No. 28 Bayard street. The thirty-sixth charge was founded on an alleged neglect of duty in allowing a similar house to be kept open at No. 6 Delancey street. The thirty-seventh to the forty-fourth charges were founded upon the alleged taking of money for permitting a similar house to be kept open at No. 24 Bayard street, by one Bhoda Sanford. The forty-fifth charge was founded upon alleged neglect of duty in permitting said house No. 24 Bayard street to be kept open. And the forty-sixth charge was founded upon an allegation of a complaint having been made by one Hendrickson to the relator of money being taken by a patrolman of the police force named Kelly to influence him in the performance of his duty, and a failure and omission upon the part of the relator to report said dereliction of duty upon the part of said patrolman to the inspectors of his district, and a failure or omission to take any steps or measures to investigate said dereliction of duty upon the part of the patrolman, or to punish him therefor.

It appears from the evidence in the case that some time in April, 1892, the relator became a captain in command of the eleventh precinct in the city of New York, and remained in such command until some time in February, 1893,—a period of about nine months; and it is claimed to have been established by proof produced upon the trial of these charges that during said times he received as a bribe, from said Katie Schubert, the sum of $500, and $50 a month for each of the months while he was in command of the precinct, he, in consideration thereof, agreeing to permit said Katie Schubert to carry on her business of maintaining a house of prostitution. It is also claimed to have been established by the evidence that some time in October, 1892, the said Rhoda Sanford paid the relator $500, and $50 a month thereafter, in order that she might be permitted to carry on her business, which was of a similar character, at the premises No. 24 Bayard street. And it is also claimed that the evidence establishes the charge in respect to dereliction of duty in reference to permitting these houses to exist, and also in respect to the complaint which was made against the patrolman Kelly. There is no evidence that the woman Sanford had anything to do with the relator, Cross. According to her testimony, all her business relations in reference to protection from police interference were had with one Smith, who was thewardman in the precinct. The evidence connecting Smith with the relator is that of Katie Schubert, the keeper of the house of prostitution at No. 144 Christie street; and consequently, if her evidence is of such a character that conviction cannot be predicated upon it, there is no evidence whatever against the relator in respect to the premises No. 24 Bayard street, except that of a general character in reference to the business being permitted to be carried on. The witnesses to the bribery in reference to No. 144 Christie street were the proprietress of the establishment, claimed by the prosecution to be a very respectable married woman, and one Alice Ryder, another respectable married [935]*935woman, who for a period of 18 months was an inmate of the premises No. 144 Christie street, and furnished part of the material with which business in that house was carried on. As has already been suggested, the claim was made before the police commissioners that, whatever idiosyncrasies these ladies had indulged in for the period under consideration, they had since that time led creditable and respectable lives, both the ladies in question having married and settled down. When the counsel for the defense endeavored to get some information from these witnesses in regard to their present surroundings, their present location, their names and history, he was prevented from obtaining any information whatever upon this subject; and hence it was impossible for him to make any investigation in respect to the verity of these pretensions to virtue upon the part of these women, who acknowledged that they had been engaged in this immoral business. Their evidence was placed before the tribunal in which the relator was being tried, as that of credible and respectable witnesses; the board was asked to believe such evidence because they were credible and respectable; and the relator was given no opportunity, as already suggested, to identify the witnesses, so as to be able to ascertain to what extent these pretensions were true. It is perfectly clear that in a trial before a civil court no judgment could possibly stand which was founded upon evidence of witnesses in respect to whose identity such rulings had been made.

It is, however, to be considered that, in proceedings before the board of police, entirely strict and accurate rulings in regard to questions of evidence are not always to be expected; and, in determining the question as to whether a conviction should be sustained or not, the record generally should be examined, and the appellate court should determine upon such examination whether it discloses reasonable grounds for the conclusion arrived at, and one which has not been the result of the erroneous rulings in respect to the admission or exclusion of evidence. Therefore, if, upon an examination of this record, notwithstanding this extraordinary position in regard to the protection of witnesses from the ordinary investigation to which such witnesses are subjected in order that their credibility may be properly weighed, we should be satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion at which the board arrived, we should not disturb the same.

When we come to examine the evidence of Katie Schubert, the principal witness for the prosecution, we are confronted with the fact that there is hardly a circumstance alleged to have surrounded the taking of this money in respect to which this witness Schubert has not given two diametrically opposite versions, or has not been contradicted pointedly by incontrovertible evidence.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
32 N.Y.S. 933, 66 N.Y. St. Rep. 362, 85 Hun 343, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-cross-v-martin-nysupct-1895.