People ex rel. Cornell University v. Davenport

37 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 177
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMay 15, 1883
StatusPublished

This text of 37 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 177 (People ex rel. Cornell University v. Davenport) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Cornell University v. Davenport, 37 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 177 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883).

Opinion

Learned, P. J.:

In considering the duties of the comptroller we can look only to the statutes of this State. Whatever may be the terms of the act of congress; whether, or not, the State promised by its statute to comply with those terms; whether the statutes of the State are, or are not, a substantial compliance therewith; all these are questions with which we have nothing to do. The comptroller is an officer-of the State and must obey its laws. He cannot disobey them, on the ground that, by the contract with the United States, the State should have passed a different law. That is a matter between the United States and this State. Perhaps the statute of the State does not conform to the conditions of the grant. But whether it does, or not, we must be governed by it.

The first clause of section 5 of the act of congress declares, as a condition of the grant, that if any portion of the fund invested or any portion of the interest shall, by any action of contingency be diminished or lost, it shall be replaced by the State; so that the capital shall remain undiminished and the annual interest shall be regularly applied without diminution. Now, it is urged by the relator that that condition, accepted by the State, constructively imposes on the State an obligation to make good the interest at the rate of five per cent at all hazards. If this [182]*182be so, tbe question whether the comptroller should have charged premiums against the revenue account is of little consequence; since, on that theory, he is to pay the relator five per cent without any reference to his receipts. Rut certainly the comptroller has no right to compel the State to perform this contract, which it is supposed to have made with the United States. If such a'contract was made by the act of 1863, it is for the legislature alone to carry it out, by providing for deficiencies of income. The comptroller can only obey the laws already passed.

Further still, the relator stands in no position to insist on the benefit of the conditions contained in the act of congress. The relator is a mere volunteer, to which the legislature, by chapter 585, Laws of 1865, appropriated “the income, revenue and avails which shall be received from the investment of the proceeds of the sale.” The legislature did not, by that, act, or by the provisions of chapter 511, Laws of 1863, agree with the beneficiary that the income should be five per cent on the principal. It appropriated the income, such as it might be. If the State had agreed with the United States that it would replace any deficiency of the interest, lost by action or contingency, it could appropriate the amount thus replaced to any college within the intention of the act of congress. What it appropriated to the relator was only the actual income. To give the construction claimed by the relator would be to carry the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox to a more mischievous extent than has yet been done. The legislature said to the relator we will give you the income which shall be received. The relator now says to the comptroller, give me the income which has not been received; because the State promised the United States to replace any deficiency.

We think, then, that the relator is not entitled to require the comptroller to pay five per bent on the principal, without regard to the actual income.

Another question is presented; and that is, what is the actual income ? The comptroller insists that the sums paid for premiums, -commissions and accrued interest must be made good out of the ■earliest receipts of income; and that, not until these sums shall have been made good, will there be any income from which to pay the relator. The relator insists that these sums are not chargeable [183]*183against income, but that they must be taken from the principal; thus imposing an obligation upon the State to replace the deficiency, which must arise therein.

And just at this point we may say what was in substance said above. The relator has no right to ask 'the comptroller to do any act which shall diminish the principal. Even if we were to assume that, whenever premiums are paid on the purchase of investments, the State ought to pay them, as it might pay expenses of taking care of the fund, still the State has not done this. And the comptroller has no right to do it. That is, he cannot treat the premiums as an éxpenditure, which the State ought to make good, and which he will, therefore, compel the State to make good, or else to leave the principal impaired.

The sums thus charged against the income, or revenue account, are •of three kinds, viz., accrued interest, commissions and premiums.

First. Accrued interest. That is properly charged against the income account. It is the interest already earned by the security purchased, and the amount of it will be returned to the interest account when the purchased security makes its next payment of interest.

Second. Commissions.

The act of the State (chap. 460, Laws 1863, § 3) requires that all •expenses in the management and'disbursement of the moneys which shall be received from the sale of the land scrip, shall be .paid out •of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated; so that the entire proceeds without any diminution whatever shall be applied to the purposes mentioned in the act of congress. Commissions paid on the purchase of securities are expenses incurred in the management of the moneys. They are not chargeable to the income account, nor to the principal.

Third. Premiums. These present the most important and most difficult question. When- the law of 1863 was passed it was evidently thought that a safe stock, yielding five per cent on the par value, could be purchased at par. Einancial afEairs have so changed ■that a four per cent stock of the United States is worth, and was worth at the time referred to in the present papers, more than nineteen per cent premium. It has become impossible' to do what was contemplated by the act of congress and by the statute of this [184]*184State, viz., to invest the fund in safe stocks at par bearing five per cent interest.

As between the State and the United States we do not think that it was intended that the State should guaranty that the fund, safely invested,- would forever produce five per cent. All that could have been intended was that the State should replace the loss of the fund,, or of part of it, arising from inability to collect and like causes. And, so far as the present question is concerned, there is nothing in the statutes, which the relator can insist upon, as a guaranty to-it that the fund shall be preserved inviolate.

The question for the relator is what, under the circumstances, is-the actual income of the fund. The income from an investment is that which it earns, remaining itself intact. Now it is plain that,, so far as the present question goes, it matters not whether the comptroller bought these United States stocks in the market, or bought them directly from the government itself. But the matter to be decided will appear more clear, if we consider the dealing to have been directly with the government. Viewed in that light the transaction was this: The comptroller loaned to the government (in round numbers) $238,000, receiving therefor its agreement to-repay, in the year 1907, $200,000, and meantime to pay four per cent annually on the latter sum. This does not present the case-of a loss, or accident, or failure to collect.

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Related

Farwell v. Tweddle
10 Abb. N. Cas. 94 (New York Supreme Court, 1881)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
37 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 177, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-cornell-university-v-davenport-nysupct-1883.