People ex rel. Cameron v. Flynn

265 Ill. 414
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 16, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 265 Ill. 414 (People ex rel. Cameron v. Flynn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Cameron v. Flynn, 265 Ill. 414 (Ill. 1914).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Craig

delivered the opinion of the court:

The office of city treasurer is created by section 1 of article 6 of the Cities and Villages .act of 1872, and his powers and duties are fixed and prescribed by sections 5 to 12, inclusive, of article 7 of the same act. (Hurd’s Stat. 1913, chap. 24, p. 280.) By section 5 it is made the duty of the treasurer to receive all moneys belonging to the corporation and keep his books and accounts in such manner as may be prescribed by ordinance, etc. By section 6 he is required to keep separate accounts of each fund or appropriation, etc. By section 9 of the act he is made custodian of the city’s money, which is to be deposited in such depositaries as the city council may select and designate. That section reads as follows:

“Sec. 9. The treasurer may be required to keep all moneys in his hands belonging to the corporation, in such place or places of deposit as may be designated by ordinance: Provided, however, no such ordinance shall be passed by which the custody of such money shall be taken from the treasurer and deposited elsewhere than in some regularly organized bank, nor without a bond to be taken from such bank, in such penal sum and with such security as the city council or board of trustees shall direct and approve, sufficient to save the corporation from any loss; but such penal sum shall not be .less than the estimated receipts for the current year from taxes and special assessments levied, or to be levied, by the corporation.”

By a subsequent act, passed in 1905,. the duties of the treasurer and comptroller and the power of the city council were more clearly defined. (Hurd’s Stat. 1913, chap. 24, art. 12, p. 291.) By section. 5 of part 2 of that act it is made the duty of the comptroller to advertise for bids for interest on the city’s deposits and to report the bids received to the city council, whereupon the city council is to designate as many depositaries for the city’s funds as it deems necessary for the protection of the city’s interests and may award bids accordingly. A bond, also, is required to be taken from such depositary in such sum and with such sureties as the cify council may approve, and the city council is given power to pass all ordinances necessary to carry the provisions' of the act into effect and provide rules applicable thereto, and the treasurer is relieved from responsibility for all moneys deposited by him pursuant to the order or ordinance of the city council. The act further provides that in fixing the amount of the bond of the treasurer due regard shall be had of the effect of any such deposits upon the actual amount of money for which the city treasurer may from time to time be held responsible, and that when once deposited the moneys shall not be withdrawn except upon warrants -drawn in accordance with the provisions of article 7 of the Cities and Villages act. This act does not repeal the former act but is supplementary to it, and its provisions are to be read in connection with the provisions of the former act, the same as if it were a part of that act.

It is to be observed that the power to designate depositaries is vested in the city council and that the. city treasurer has no voice in the matter; that he is made the custodian of the money and is not responsible for such corporate funds as are deposited in city depositaries in accordanee with the ordinances, rules and regulations prescribed by the city council; that the money is to be deposited in ■ such “place or places” as may be designated by ordinance, and that the city council may “designate as many depositaries as it deems necessary for the protection of the city’s interests,” and “shall have power to pass all necessary ordinances” to carry the provisions of the statute into effect and “provide rules applicable thereto.” (Hurd’s Stat. 1913, chap. 24, pars. 96, 193a/.) If the law is as contended by appellant, that as soon as the city council designates one or more depositaries its power is exhausted and the city treasurer may then, at his option, deposit the corporate funds in such one or more of the depositaries named as he pleases, then substantially all of the foregoing provisions of the statute are idle and meaningless. No force or effect whatever can be given to the provisions authorizing the city council to designate “as many depositaries as it deems necessary,” if, when in the exercise of that discretion the city council designates seventy-two different banks as city depositaries, the treasurer can nullify such act of the city council and at his option deposit all of the city’s funds in but one of such seventy-two banks so designated by the city council as city depositaries. Nor would there be any rules and regulations which the city council could provide, other than those which should govern the treasurer in making deposits of the city’s funds in the various depositaries designated by it, as the method for withdrawing funds from the city treasury is fixed and prescribed by the statute, and the city council has no power to prescribe additional rules and regulations in respect to that matter. The only matter open and subject to regulation by the city council, within the provisions of this act, is the deposit of the city’s corporate funds. If the city-council has no jurisdiction over the city treasurer and the deposits of the •city’s funds after the depositaries have been named by it, then there is nothing for it to provide rules and regulations for, pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by these various provisions of the statute above referred to. Such a construction would be to render the act, in some of its essential provisions, meaningless and to give to the language of the statute a construction which is always to be avoided, as it is a cardinal rule in construing statutes that they are to be so construed as to give effect to each word, clause and sentence, SO' that no word, clause or sentence shall be rendered superfluous or void, (36 Cyc. 1128; Crozer v. People, 206 Ill. 464;) and at the same time that construction is to be adopted which will give effect to the intention and object of the legislature in adopting the enactment.

One of the objects sought to be accomplished by the act of 1905 was to' enable cities to secure interest on their deposits of corporate funds. In order to do this and to secure the highest rate obtainable the statute requires the comptroller to advertise for bids on such deposits, and vests m the city council authority" to designate as many banks as city depositaries as it shall deem necessary and proper and for the best interests of the city. This provision was essential to enable the city to> secure the highest rate of interest obtainable on its funds. The revenues derived by the city of Chicago from general taxation and other sources are by far too large to be handled successfully, at a reasonable rate of interest, by any one banking institution. The petition shows that the tax levy for school purposes alone for the year 1913 was $18,941,250, and that the monthly receipts and deposits of the city are, in the aggregate, from $2,000,000 to $5,000,000 per month. But few, if any, banking institutions could be found which would undertake to pay interest at the rate of two and one-half per cent upon such a large amount of money, which might be very much in excess of its demands and more than it could use to advantage, while, on the other hand, if the same amount were distributed among several banks in accordance with their needs or demands quite the reverse might be true.

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Bluebook (online)
265 Ill. 414, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-cameron-v-flynn-ill-1914.