Peo v. Yeager

Opinion

23CA1436 Peo v Yeager 08-20-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1436 City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CR861 Honorable Darryl F. Shockley, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry J. Yeager, Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I

Opinion by JUDGE DUNN

J. Jones and Fox, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 20, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rachel Lieb, Assistant Attorney General II, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Taylor J. Hoy, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

¶1 Defendant, Henry J. Yeager, appeals his convictions for sexual assault on a child and sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. He argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support one of his convictions and (2) the district court reversibly erred by allowing the prosecutor to commit misconduct in closing argument. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 One night, the then-thirteen-year-old victim and her mother stayed the night at Yeager’s parents’ home, where Yeager also lived. During the night, the victim’s mother woke up and went to the room where the victim was sleeping. There, she saw Yeager on top of the victim, kissing her. Both of their pants were down, and Yeager had an erection. The victim’s mother screamed and pulled Yeager off the victim. Yeager asked the victim’s mother to forgive him and fled. The victim’s mother called the police and took the victim to the hospital where she underwent a sexual assault nurse examination.

¶3 The prosecution charged Yeager with sexual assault on a child and sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. Yeager didn’t testify at trial. His counsel defended on the theory that the

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victim and her mother fabricated the allegations. In addition to the mother’s and victim’s testimony, the prosecution presented forensic evidence that matched Yeager’s DNA to swabs collected from the victim’s neck and genitals.

¶4 The jury found Yeager guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Yeager to twelve years to life in prison.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶5 Yeager first challenges his conviction for sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. He argues that we must vacate the conviction because the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he was in a position of trust to the victim. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record de novo to determine whether the relevant evidence — both direct and circumstantial — when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. People, 2023 CO 7,

¶ 13.

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¶7 In conducting our review, we give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that could fairly be drawn from the evidence. People v. Poe, 2012 COA 166, ¶ 14. It is the jury’s role to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight to give the evidence, and resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. Id.

B. Position of Trust

¶8 A person commits sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust when that person “knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual contact[,] . . . the victim is a child less than eighteen years of age[,] and the actor committing the offense is one in a position of trust with respect to the victim.” § 18-3-405.3(1), C.R.S. 2025.

One in a “position of trust” includes, but is not limited to, any person who is a parent or acting in the place of a parent and charged with any of a parent’s rights, duties, or responsibilities concerning a child, including a guardian or someone otherwise responsible for the general supervision of a child’s welfare, or a person who is charged with any duty or responsibility for the health, education, welfare, or supervision of a child, including foster care, child care, family care, or institutional care, either independently or through another, no matter how brief, at the time of an unlawful act.

§ 18-3-401(3.5), C.R.S. 2025.

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¶9 This definition is “broad” and the listed relationships are “illustrative” and nonexclusive. Pellman v. People, 252 P.3d 1122, 1125 (Colo. 2011). The definition encompasses “those offenders who are entrusted with special access to a child victim and who exploit that access to commit an offense against the child.” People v. Roggow, 2013 CO 70, ¶ 15. Thus, the offender needn’t be “expressly charged with a particular duty or responsibility.” Id. Rather, “special access to the victim by virtue of an existing relationship is evidence of an implied duty or responsibility for the welfare or supervision of the victim during those periods of special access.” Manjarrez v. People, 2020 CO 53, ¶ 36.

¶ 10 The evidence showed that Yeager and the victim’s mother worked together and were best friends. The victim’s mother introduced Yeager to her children, and he would come to her house and “spend time with [her] kids.” The victim’s mother testified that she trusted Yeager with her children. She and her children also spent time at Yeager’s home and with his parents.

¶ 11 The victim’s mother further testified that Yeager treated the victim “differently” than her other children and bought her a cell phone when she turned thirteen. The victim testified that Yeager

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would call and text her on the cell phone and addressed her as “baby girl.”

¶ 12 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we have no trouble concluding that the jury could reasonably infer that Yeager’s close relationship with the victim’s mother and her family gave him “special access” to the victim — and thus an implied duty of responsibility for her supervision during those periods of special access. See id. at ¶ 34 (holding that the defendant “was entrusted with special access to the victim” where he “frequently socialized” with her family and they “trusted him to be alone with their daughter”).

¶ 13 Yeager argues that he was not in a position of trust with the victim because he was not a “parent or person who regularly cared for [the victim],” was not “an authority figure for [the victim],” and did not have “an ongoing supervisory role over [the victim].” But a person doesn’t have to be a parent or charged with a particular supervisory duty to be in a position of trust. See Roggow, ¶ 15; Pellman, 252 P.3d at 1126. It is enough that Yeager had “special access” to the victim and was able to exploit that access to abuse her. Roggow, ¶ 15.

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¶ 14 Because the evidence was sufficient to support Yeager’s conviction for sexual assault on a child by a person in a position of trust, we may not disturb the verdict.

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 15 Yeager next contends that the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor to make improper comments during closing and rebuttal closing arguments. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 16 We apply a two-step analysis to claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010). We first determine “whether the prosecutor’s questionable conduct was improper based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. If it was improper, we then determine whether the misconduct warrants reversal. Id.

¶ 17 Where, as here, the prosecutorial misconduct claims are unpreserved, we review for plain error. See People v. Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27, ¶ 88. We will reverse only if the error was obvious and so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 48. Only misconduct that is

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“flagrantly, glaringly, or tremendously improper” warrants reversal under the plain error standard. Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1053 (Colo. 2005) (citation omitted); see also People v. Smalley, 2015 COA 140, ¶ 37 (“Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument rarely constitutes plain error.”).

B. Improper Appeals

¶ 18 Yeager objects that the prosecutor made the following arguments that were either improper appeals to the jury’s emotions or unsupported by the record:

• “[T]here were a couple of things that [the victim] felt in her heart that [she] wanted to clear up. One was that she at some point hugged [Yeager]. So she feels guilty about that, that she may have misled — that she thinks — this poor child. She thinks that she misled him by putting her arm around him . . . . [S]he thinks that she’s somehow responsible. She wants to be sure that that part gets out and is in the interview.”

• “I would submit to you [the victim] lost her innocence. . . . [Y]ou could tell she was terrified. . . . [I]n front of a room full of strangers, she had [to] tell just one

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of the most embarrassing things that’s ever happened to her in her young life. . . . Her life is never the same. Her first sexual experience that she’s going to carry with her for the rest of her life was at the hands of someone she thought she trusted.”

¶ 19 While the reference to “poor child” may have been a bit beyond an oratorical embellishment, we cannot say it was obviously improper. And we see no error, let alone plain error, in the prosecutor’s other comments, which were tied directly to the victim’s testimony and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it.

¶ 20 Specifically, the victim testified that she “didn’t want to be misunderstood” in her first forensic interview and asked for a second interview to clarify that Yeager may have “took it the wrong way” when she hugged him. That the victim felt guilty about possibly being responsible was a reasonable inference for the prosecutor to make from this testimony. Likewise, since the victim also said that she was “scared” during the assault, it was “one of her worst fears,” she “felt dirty” and embarrassed during her forensic interview, and she was “nervous” and uncomfortable at

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times when testifying, the prosecutor’s other comments were reasonable inferences from this evidence.

¶ 21 Thus, the prosecutor’s arguments did not invite the jury to decide the case on an improper basis.1 C. Specialized Knowledge

¶ 22 Yeager next argues that the prosecutor expressed improper specialized knowledge by commenting that a sexual assault nurse examination is “very traumatic for a child victim.” But the sexual assault nurse examiner testified in detail about the examination that the victim underwent, including swabbing the victim’s genitals. And the victim’s mother said that the victim “wasn’t talking” while at the hospital. A fair inference from this testimony is that such an intrusive examination was traumatic for the victim. We therefore see no misconduct.

1 Though Yeager claims in a footnote that the prosecutor’s

comments were also improper “because victim-impact evidence is inadmissible at trial,” he doesn’t explain how the prosecutor’s argument was somehow tethered to inadmissible victim-impact evidence. We therefore don’t consider this assertion further. See People v. Gingles, 2014 COA 163, ¶ 29 (declining to address cursory and undeveloped arguments).

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D. Personal Belief

¶ 23 During closing argument, the prosecutor commented that the victim, “when she testified, had a very calm demeanor. You could tell she was not exaggerating what happened to her. She just wanted to tell you the truth and tell you what happened to her.” The prosecutor also later said that the jury should find Yeager guilty on both counts “because he is guilty on both counts.” Yeager now says that these statements were improper expressions of the prosecutor’s personal belief about the victim’s truthfulness and his guilt.

¶ 24 First, while we agree that a prosecutor may not “throw onto the scales of credibility the weight of his own personal opinion,” Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415, 418 (Colo. 1987) (citation omitted), a prosecutor may “argue from reasonable inferences anchored in the facts in evidence about the truthfulness of a witness’ testimony,” Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1051. That’s what happened here. The prosecutor did not opine that the victim was truthful; rather, he simply pointed to the victim’s demeanor to argue why the jury should find her credible. See id.

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¶ 25 Second, it isn’t improper for a prosecutor to argue — as he did here — that the evidence shows that a defendant “is guilty” of the charged crimes. See People v. Merchant, 983 P.2d 108, 115 (Colo. App. 1999) (concluding that it was not misconduct for the prosecutor to argue, “I think the evidence is clear that [defendant] is guilty, and I’d ask you to return . . . with that verdict”); see also People v. Villa, 240 P.3d 343, 358 (Colo. App. 2009) (construing a prosecutor asking the jury to find a defendant guilty “because he is guilty” as “asking the jury to make a reasonable inference that defendant was guilty based on the evidence presented at trial”).

E. Cumulative Misconduct

¶ 26 Because we conclude that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, to the extent Yeager claims that cumulative prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal, we disagree. See Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 24.

IV. Disposition

¶ 27 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE FOX concur.