Peo v. Wright

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 19, 2024
• Docket: 22CA1427
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

22CA1427 Peo v Wright 09-19-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1427 La Plata County District Court No. 16CR224 Honorable Kim S. Shropshire, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Daniel Nelson Wright,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Welling and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 19, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Tracy C. Renner, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Daniel Nelson Wright, appeals the trial court’s

order denying his postconviction motion. We affirm.

¶2 The State charged Wright with two counts of first degree

murder, five counts of first degree burglary, conspiracy to commit

first degree burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, conspiracy to

commit aggravated robbery, four counts of menacing, and eight

crime of violence counts. He agreed to plead guilty to a first degree

burglary count and a crime of violence count in exchange for the

dismissal of the remaining charges and a stipulated sentencing

range of ten to twenty-four years in prison. In April 2017, the trial

court sentenced Wright to seventeen years in prison followed by five

years of mandatory parole.

¶3 In July 2022, Wright filed a letter with the court, arguing that,

pursuant to a Weld County District Court decision, “[t]he period of

parole must be applied within the scope of the sentence imposed by

the court” and that “the 17 years [he was] sentenced to[,] which

includes 5 years parole[,] is essentially a 22[-]year sentence[,]

[w]hich is not what [his] plea deal state[d].” He therefore requested

that he be resentenced to twelve years in prison followed by five

1 ¶4 The postconviction court construed Wright’s letter as a Crim.

P. 35(a) and (c) motion alleging that his sentence was “illegal or

improper” and denied it. The court reasoned that the parole term

was not a component of Wright’s sentence and thus did not create

an aggregate twenty-two-year sentence.

¶5 As an initial matter, “the substantive issues raised in a

motion, rather than the label placed on such motion, . . . determine

how the matter should be characterized.” People v. Knoeppchen,

2019 COA 34, ¶ 6, overruled on other grounds by People v. Weeks,

2021 CO 75, ¶ 47 n.16. And we are not convinced that Wright’s

motion asserted a Crim. P. 35(a) challenge to the legality of his

sentence. Indeed, he did not allege that his sentence of seventeen

years in prison followed by five years of mandatory parole was not

authorized by law. See Crim. P. 35(a); People v. Jenkins, 2013 COA

76, ¶ 11 (“An illegal sentence is one that is not authorized by law,

meaning that it is inconsistent with the sentencing scheme

established by the legislature.”).

¶6 Instead, Wright substantively asserted a Crim. P. 35(c) claim

that his seventeen-year prison sentence followed by a five-year

parole period was contrary to the terms of his plea agreement. See

2 St. James v. People, 948 P.2d 1028, 1030-32 (Colo. 1997) (a claim of

breach of the plea agreement is cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c));

see also People v. Fritz, 2014 COA 108, ¶¶ 6, 17 (interpreting the

terms of a plea agreement as part of a Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding).

¶7 A defendant must file a Crim. P. 35(c) motion within three

years of their conviction for an offense other than a class 1 felony.

§ 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2024; Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I). “For purposes of

[section] 16-5-402 and postconviction review, if there is no direct

appeal, a conviction occurs when the trial court enters judgment

and sentence is imposed.” People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 671

(Colo. App. 2006).

¶8 Because Wright’s July 2022 letter raising a substantive Crim.

P. 35(c) claim was filed more than three years after his April 2017

sentencing, the claim is untimely. See § 16-5-402(1.5) (an appellate

court may deny relief if it determines that a collateral attack is

untimely, regardless of whether timeliness was considered by the

trial court).

¶9 Nevertheless, we note that (1) the plea agreement stated that

Wright “shall be sentenced to 10 to 24 years in the Department of

3 Corrections”;1 (2) the agreement advised Wright that the possible

penalties for a first degree burglary conviction included

imprisonment of up to “twenty[-]four years confinement in the

Department of Corrections” and that “[a]ny period of imprisonment

must be followed by a mandatory parole period of five years”;

(3) Wright repeatedly acknowledged and agreed that he would

receive a prison sentence within the stipulated range and that any

such prison sentence would be followed by a five-year period of

mandatory parole; and (4) consistent with those advisements, the

trial court sentenced Wright “to 17 years in the Department of

Corrections, to be followed by five years of mandatory parole.” The

only reasonable interpretation of the plea agreement and the court’s

advisements is that Wright would serve seventeen years in the DOC

followed by five years of parole. See People v. Johnson, 999 P.2d

825, 829 (Colo. 2000) (“We interpret plea agreements pursuant to

an objective standard, focusing on the meaning a reasonable person

would have attached to the agreement under the circumstances.”);

1 Even accepting Wright’s argument as true, a twenty-two-year

prison sentence would fall within the plea agreement’s stipulated ten to twenty-four-year sentencing range.

4 see also People v. Johnson, 13 P.3d 309, 314 (Colo. 2000) (“[A]

reasonable person would understand that [a plea agreement’s

stipulation to] a sentence to ‘5 years DOC’ refers only to the

imprisonment component of the sentence and does not include any

consideration of mandatory parole, which is a separate element of

the sentencing regime.” (citing Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 962

(Colo. 1999))).

¶ 10 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.