Peo v. Williams

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 11, 2024
• Docket: 23CA1445
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

23CA1445 Peo v Williams 07-11-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1445

City and County of Denver District Court No. 97CR3503

Honorable Darryl F. Shockley, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jimmy Williams,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN*

Gomez and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced July 11, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Megan C. Rasband, Senior Assistant

Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jimmy Williams, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.

1

¶ 1 Defendant, Jimmy Williams, is serving consecutive sentences

totaling 112.5 years, having been convicted in 1997 of first degree

sexual assault and attempted first degree murder. Williams has

filed numerous postconviction motions and has appealed to this

court on at least five prior occasions. But only one of those appeals

is relevant to the current case.

¶ 2 In People v. Williams, (Colo. App. No. 21CA0121, Mar. 31,

2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Williams V), a

division of our court decided that Williams had timely filed a motion

under Crim. P. 35(a) claiming that he was sentenced in an illegal

manner to a consecutive term of imprisonment for the attempted

first degree murder. The motion suggested that the district court

may have thought consecutive sentencing was mandatory when in

fact it was discretionary. Id. at ¶ 15. The division noted the

statement of the sentencing court in 2005:

Someone who beats a small child into

insensibility with a baseball bat . . . [,] who

participated in a dual rape of a young teenager

in various fashions and then . . . picks her up

and drops her on her head so hard it fractures

her skull, is not inclined to get a lot of mercy

from me.

Id. (alterations in original).

2

¶ 3 However, as the division reasoned, this statement was “not

enough to resolve the issue” even if the district court knew it had

discretion to sentence Williams to consecutive terms. Id. The

division remanded the case to the postconviction court for “further

consideration” and stated the court “may, in its discretion, hold an

evidentiary hearing.” Id. at ¶¶ 16, 31.

¶ 4 While the case was on remand, Williams filed two pro se

motions. The first, filed February 16, 2023, and captioned “motion

for evidentiary hearing,” requested a hearing to (1) allow Williams to

“submit evidence regarding brain development in young adults”;

(2) allow him to testify regarding responsibility, remorse, and

rehabilitation; and (3) inform the court regarding missing

transcripts. The second motion, filed May 19, 2023, requested the

status of the pending action on remand.

¶ 5 On July 11, 2023, the postconviction court entered an order

captioned “Order re: Defendant’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing,”

which concluded that no hearing was necessary because a request

for transcripts was not justified based on the circumstances,

Williams had not established an entitlement to postconviction relief,

3

and his postconviction requests were outside the time limitation

imposed by the legislature, citing to section 16-5-402, C.R.S. 2023.

¶ 6 On appeal, Williams argues the postconviction court abused

its discretion in denying his motions, and he requests as a sanction

the vacatur of his sentence. The People acknowledge that the

district court did not address the remand order of Williams V and

suggest the appeal should be dismissed for lack of a final

appealable order or remanded again. The People also contend there

is no basis for the sanction requested by Williams.

¶ 7 We agree with the People that the postconviction court did not

comply with the scope of the remand ordered in Williams V because

it did not address whether the district court entered the consecutive

sentences with an awareness that consecutive sentencing was not

mandatory, and whether, having such discretion, it would

nonetheless have imposed consecutive sentences. Thus, we reverse

the order and again remand this case to the postconviction court to

address those two questions and consider whether a hearing is

required to address those two questions. We deny Williams’s

request for a sanction vacating his sentence, as he offers no legal

basis for such relief.

4

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE KUHN concur.