Peo v. Weston

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 23CA2042
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA2042 Peo v Weston 03-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2042 Adams County District Court No. 21CR446 Honorable Courtney Lee Dinnel, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Morgan Cory Weston,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK Grove and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 26, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joshua J. Luna, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Patrick R. Henson, Alternate Defense Counsel, Andrew Gargano, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Morgan Cory Weston, appeals the district court’s

order denying her Crim. P. 35(c) motion to vacate the restitution

order. She argues that (1) her sentence is illegal because the court

did not, at sentencing, enter one of the four required restitution

orders set forth in section 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2025; and

(2) alternatively, she was entitled to a hearing on her claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with restitution.

¶2 Because we agree with Weston’s first contention, we vacate the

restitution order and remand the case to the district court to enter

an order that no restitution is owed. We therefore do not address

Weston’s restitution-based claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

I. Background

¶3 Weston was charged with several counts after leading police

on a high-speed chase in a stolen vehicle that ended when she

crashed into a parked police vehicle. She pleaded guilty to one

count of vehicular eluding and one count of obstructing a police

officer and stipulated to a sentence of three years of probation, fifty-

eight days in jail, and a one-year suspended prison sentence.

¶4 The plea agreement included the following provision on

restitution:

1 I agree to pay any Court-ordered restitution. The restitution amount I must pay is (RESERVED). I agree that I must pay restitution as it is defined in this agreement. Restitution is any pecuniary loss resulting from the conduct alleged in all of the counts in this case, including any conduct related to charges that are dismissed as part of the plea bargain in this case. I understand that restitution means any pecuniary loss suffered by any victim, as “victim” is defined in [section] 18-1.3-602[, C.R.S. 2025], and it includes but is not limited to all out-of-pocket expenses, interest, loss of use of money, anticipated future expenses, rewards paid by victims, money advanced by law enforcement agencies, adjustment expenses, and other losses or injuries proximately cause by my conduct and that can be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money, pursuant to C.R.S. 18- 1.3-602(3). Further, I understand and agree that the restitution amount will not be limited by the classification or monetary amount of the charge I am pleading guilty to. I understand and agree that restitution may be more than the amount indicated in the charge or classification of the charge.

¶5 The district court held a combined plea and sentencing

hearing in this case and two others. As relevant to this case, the

court accepted Weston’s pleas and confirmed that she had read and

2 understood the plea agreement. But the court made no mention of

restitution in connection with this case.1 Nor did the prosecution.

¶6 The court then proceeded to sentencing. Consistent with the

parties’ stipulation, the court sentenced Weston to three years of

probation, fifty-eight days in jail (with credit for time served), and

one year in prison suspended. Again, neither the prosecution nor

the court mentioned restitution. And the probation order left blank

the line for payment of restitution as a condition of supervision.

¶7 Six weeks later, the prosecution filed a motion for restitution,

requesting $25,923.21: $2,523.21 for losses to the owner of the

vehicle Weston stole and $23,400 for damage to the police vehicle

she hit. Weston did not object or request a hearing, and the district

court ordered her to pay restitution in the requested amount.

¶8 Several months later, at a probation revocation hearing,

Weston’s counsel told the court that Weston had not been advised

of the restitution order. She asserted that plea counsel’s failure to

advise Weston regarding restitution or object to the restitution

request was ineffective assistance of counsel, and she requested the

1 In addressing the possible penalties in one of the other cases, the

district court stated that “[r]estitution will be reserved for 91 days.”

3 appointment of new counsel to represent Weston with respect to a

potential Crim. P. 35(c) motion. The court granted the request.

¶9 Weston then filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, asking the court to

set aside the restitution order and grant her a restitution hearing

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. She alleged that her

counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to notify her of

the motion for restitution, file an objection, or request an

evidentiary hearing. She also alleged that, as a result of her

counsel’s ineffective assistance, she “was never given the

opportunity to exercise her right to challenge the restitution

requested.” The district court denied the motion without a hearing.

II. Illegal Sentence

¶ 10 For the first time on appeal, Weston contends that her

sentence was illegal because it did not include one of the four

restitution orders required by section 18-1.3-603(1). Although she

did not raise this argument in her postconviction motion, “there is

no preservation requirement” for an illegal sentence claim because

such a sentence may be corrected at any time. Snow v. People,

2025 CO 32, ¶¶ 14, 24. We therefore consider this issue de novo,

id. at ¶ 19, and agree with Weston that her sentence was illegal.

4 ¶ 11 Every judgment of conviction must contain one of four orders

regarding restitution: (1) an order setting a specific amount of

restitution; (2) an order requiring restitution but reserving

determination of the amount; (3) an order requiring the defendant

to pay restitution covering the actual costs of specific future

treatment of a victim; or (4) an order that no restitution is required.

§ 18-1.3-603(1)(a)-(d); Snow, ¶ 20; People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75,

¶ 3. A sentence that does not include one or more of these four

enumerated restitution orders is an illegal sentence. Snow, ¶ 21.

¶ 12 In Snow, the supreme court concluded that the district court

had entered an illegal sentence when it said at sentencing that it

“reserve[d] restitution for [sixty] days.” Id. at ¶¶ 7, 23. At the

sentencing hearing, the prosecution did not “request restitution or

give any indication that it intended to seek restitution”; it asked

only that the court “reserve restitution at this point in time” — a

request the district court granted. Id. at ¶ 7. The supreme court

held that such an order — which it characterized as “the mere

reservation of the issue of restitution in its entirety” — violated

section 18-1.3-603(1), making the sentence illegal. Id. at ¶ 22.

5 ¶ 13 In this case, the district court did not even say it was reserving

the issue of restitution; it did not mention restitution at all. Nor did

the prosecution ever mention restitution at sentencing. Thus, like

in Snow, “the district court failed to enter at least one of the four

restitution orders authorized by [section 18-1.3-603(1)].” Id. at

¶ 23. And like in Snow, Weston “received an illegal sentence.” Id.

¶ 14 The only arguable distinction between this case and Snow is

that the plea agreement in this case did address restitution. See id.

at ¶ 6 (noting that the plea agreement did not mention restitution).

That agreement provided that Weston agreed to pay “any Court-

ordered restitution” and that the restitution amount was

“RESERVED.” It also generally described the categories of losses for

which restitution can be imposed. The People contend that, by

accepting Weston’s guilty plea, the court implicitly entered an order

that Weston was “obligated to pay restitution.” § 18-1.3-603(1)(b);

see also Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 45 (holding that district

court entered valid restitution order at sentencing where it

“implicitly found [the defendant] generally liable for restitution”).

¶ 15 We disagree. The plea agreement said only that Weston would

pay any court-ordered restitution — that is, if the court ordered

6 restitution, Weston would pay it. But the problem, as in Snow, is

that the court never ordered any. See People v. Mazzarelli, 2019 CO

71, ¶¶ 20-21 (holding that district court’s acceptance of guilty plea

does not bind court to sentencing agreements in plea agreement).

¶ 16 Nor did the plea agreement provide that Weston was, or would

be, liable for restitution. Rather, it did little more than recite the

legal definition of restitution and other applicable law. Thus, even if

a district court’s acceptance of a plea agreement assigning liability

for restitution could constitute a valid restitution order under

section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), that did not happen here. That leaves us

in the same place as the supreme court in Snow — with a record

that is “barren of an explicit or implicit finding of restitution liability

either before or during the sentencing hearing.” Snow, ¶ 29.

¶ 17 The People liken the plea agreement in this case to the plea

agreement in Tennyson, in which the supreme court concluded

there was a valid restitution order. See Tennyson, ¶ 41. In

Tennyson, the defendant stipulated in the plea agreement “that

there was restitution and that he was liable for it.” Id. at ¶ 9. And

the prosecution agreed to provide information establishing the

amount of restitution within ninety days of sentencing. Id.

7 ¶ 18 But unlike Tennyson, Weston did not stipulate that “there was

restitution and that [she] was liable for it.” Id. Nor did the

prosecution make any representation that it would provide

information regarding the restitution amount. Id. Instead, Weston

simply agreed to comply with any court order and applicable law.

¶ 19 Moreover, in Tennyson, the plea agreement was not all there

was. The prosecution “specifically asked for restitution” at

sentencing, and the district court gave it ninety days to determine

“not whether there would be restitution, but rather ‘what restitution

is due and owing.’” Id. at ¶ 10. The supreme court inferred from

the terms of the plea agreement and this exchange at the sentencing

hearing that the district court had “found [the defendant] liable for

restitution but deferred until after sentencing” only the amount. Id.

¶ 20 In contrast, the only reference to restitution in this case was in

the plea agreement. The district court itself did not say anything

about restitution from which we could infer an order that Weston

was obligated to pay it. Section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) requires a district

court order, not simply the defendant’s stipulation. See Snow,

8 ¶ 21; see also People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410, 414 (Colo. 2005)

(explaining that an illegal sentence claim cannot be waived).2

¶ 21 Thus, because the district court did not enter an order at

sentencing that Weston was obligated to pay restitution (or any of

the other orders in section 18-1.3-603(1)), Weston’s sentence was

illegal. See Snow, ¶ 23. We therefore do not address Weston’s

argument that her sentence was also illegal under section 18-1.3-

603(2)(a) because the prosecution did not move for restitution or

present available restitution information at or before sentencing.

III. Remedy for an Illegal Sentence

¶ 22 When the district court fails to enter one of the four

enumerated restitution orders in section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) at

sentencing and later enters a post-sentencing restitution order, “the

2 The People also cite Johnson v. People, 2025 CO 29, and People v.

Roberson, 2025 CO 30, for the proposition that a restitution order may be inferred from a plea agreement. Setting aside that the existence of a restitution order was not at issue in either case, both cases involved orders expressly requiring the defendant to pay restitution. See Johnson, ¶ 8 (noting district court’s finding that the defendant “would be obligated to pay restitution”); Roberson, ¶ 4 (“[D]uring the sentencing hearing . . . the district court stated that it would ‘order restitution, reserving the amount . . . .’”).

9 sole remedy . . . is vacatur of the untimely restitution order and

entry of an order . . . that there is no restitution owed.” Snow, ¶ 38.

¶ 23 That is the proper remedy in this case. Because the district

court did not enter a restitution order at sentencing, its post-

sentencing restitution order was “necessarily untimely.” Id. at ¶ 34.

We therefore vacate the restitution order and remand the case to

the district court to enter an order that no restitution is owed.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

¶ 24 The only remedy Weston sought by her ineffective assistance

of counsel claim was the vacatur of the restitution order. And on

appeal, she asks us to either vacate the restitution order and direct

the entry of an order that no restitution is due or remand the case

for an evidentiary hearing on her ineffective assistance claim. Thus,

because we vacate the restitution order based on Weston’s illegal

sentence claim, we need not address her argument that her counsel

provided ineffective assistance in connection with restitution.

V. Disposition

¶ 25 The restitution order is vacated, and the case is remanded for

entry of an order that no restitution is owed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE YUN concur.