23CA0981 Peo v Webster 05-21-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0981 Adams County District Court No. 18CR2394 Honorable Priscilla J. Loew, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jeremy Webster,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Yun and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Esteban A. Martinez, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Jeremy Webster appeals his convictions for one count of first
degree murder, six counts of attempted first degree murder, four
counts of first degree assault, one count of attempted first degree
assault, and ten crime of violence sentence enhancers. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 A jury could have reasonably found the following facts from
the evidence introduced at trial.
¶3 On June 18, 2018, following a road rage incident, Webster
shot a mother, two of her children, and a bystander in a dental
office parking lot. One of the children died from the gunshot
wound, while the other victims survived. Webster was charged with
the counts noted above.
¶4 At trial, defense counsel argued that Webster was not guilty by
reason of insanity (NGRI). The jury found Webster guilty as
charged, however. The trial court sentenced him to a mandatory
controlling sentence of life without the possibility of parole in the
custody of the Department of Corrections.
¶5 Webster rests his appeal on three Sixth Amendment
arguments, asserting that the trial court (1) denied his right to
counsel at a critical stage; (2) violated his right to counsel of choice
1 by removing his original public defenders; and (3) infringed his right
to conflict-free counsel by creating a conflict between him and the
public defenders. We disagree.
II. Analysis
A. Additional Facts
¶6 Webster’s initial advisement took place three days after the
shootings. But the case did not go to trial for another five years.
¶7 The initial wave of the COVID-19 pandemic struck during the
pretrial proceedings and delayed the completion of Webster’s NGRI
evaluation. As a result, Webster did not enter his NGRI plea until
April 6, 2020.
¶8 The COVID-19 pandemic also caused problems for Webster’s
lawyers. In January 2021, during a virtual hearing at which the
trial court said it was prepared to set the case for trial, Webster’s
two public defenders, Kimberly A. Gonzalez and Stuart I.
Rubinstein (jointly, initial defense counsel), informed the court that
they did not intend to appear at trial due to their high risk for
COVID-19 infections. Gonzalez said that health issues placed her
at high risk and that Rubinstein was at high risk because he had a
2 young child and his wife was pregnant. Nonetheless, the court set
Webster’s trial for July 7, 2021.
¶9 Although that trial began as scheduled, it ended in a mistrial
due to the unavailability of a critical prosecution witness. At a July
9 hearing to reset the trial, Rubinstein informed the trial court that
he would not appear on a new trial date that coincided with his
pregnant wife’s due date — September 25, 2021. He said he would
withdraw as Webster’s counsel if the court scheduled the trial on
that date. The parties and the court agreed to schedule the new
trial for October 25, 2021, with a pretrial conference set for October
12.
¶ 10 On September 23, 2021, during a hearing at which Gonzalez
appeared in person and Rubinstein appeared remotely, initial
defense counsel requested a continuance due to the risks posed by
COVID-19 to Rubinstein’s family if he became infected while
participating in the October 25 trial. The court did not address the
requested continuance because the prosecution had not yet spoken
with the victims about the possibility of another continuance.
¶ 11 At the next hearing in the case, conducted on September 29,
the trial court said that, although it appreciated Rubinstein’s
3 concerns regarding his family’s health, it was denying the
continuance request because, among other considerations, the
victims objected to a continuance, the case had been pending for an
“extremely lengthy” time, and all parties had previously agreed to
the October 25 trial date.
¶ 12 Rubinstein did not appear at the October 12 pretrial
conference. At that conference, Gonzalez appeared in person and
again asked the trial court to continue the October 25 trial date
because Rubinstein “made the choice to remain on [family and
medical leave] for the protection of his family” and would not appear
at the October 25 trial, and she could not “effectively represent
[Webster]” alone. The court granted the continuance but postponed
setting a new trial date to allow the parties time to discuss possible
trial dates with their witnesses.
¶ 13 At an in-person hearing on October 28, which Gonzalez
attended but Rubinstein did not attend, the court reset the trial for
January 19, 2022.
¶ 14 On January 3, 2022, the chief judge of the judicial district in
which the case was pending suspended all jury trials set in the
district from January 3 through January 28, 2022, citing the
4 “alarming and continuing rise over the last week in COVID[-19]
positivity rates due to outbreak of the Omicron variant.”
Seventeenth Jud. Dist., Addendum to Ninth Amended
Administrative Order Regarding Court Operations Under COVID-19
Effective November 23, 2020 Until Further Notice and Order (Jan.
3, 2022). The chief judge said that the court would consider
exceptions to the moratorium if, “due to unique and compelling
circumstances, . . . cases . . . need to be tried within the next
[thirty] days.” Id. The prosecution asked the trial court to allow the
trial in Webster’s case to proceed as scheduled on January 19
under the exception.
¶ 15 At a pretrial conference on January 7, Gonzalez, who appeared
in person, and Rubinstein, who appeared remotely, objected to the
January 19 trial date due to COVID-19 health concerns. They
stated that they did not intend to appear for trial even if ordered by
the court. Nonetheless, the trial court found that the trial could
proceed safely on the scheduled date and granted the prosecution’s
request for an exception to the chief judge’s moratorium on jury
trials.
5 ¶ 16 On January 13, the court ordered the parties to disclose how
many individuals planned to be physically present in the courtroom
during trial. The next day, initial defense counsel informed the trial
court that Rubinstein had tested positive for COVID-19 and was
“actively symptomatic,” and that the defense would have “[zero]
individuals present to proceed to trial on January 19, 2022.”
¶ 17 On January 16, initial defense counsel filed a motion seeking
a mistrial and continuance or, alternatively, leave to withdraw as
Webster’s counsel of record “due to a conflict of interest” (the
conflict motion). Initial defense counsel said that the choices
Gonzalez would “have to make during trial to protect herself, her
family, [Webster,] and her community [were] in direct conflict with
her ethical obligations to [Webster] and create[d] a conflict of
interest pursuant to [Colo. RPC] 1.7.” In addition, initial defense
counsel said that Rubinstein’s positive COVID-19 test result and
his family situation created a similar conflict.
¶ 18 Initial defense counsel also said in the conflict motion that,
“[s]hould the court decline to declare a mistrial,” they “hereby
move[d] to withdraw pursuant to [Colo. RPC] 1.7 based on personal
conflicts of interest,” and they requested that the court “appoint
6 conflict-free counsel to advise [Webster] regarding his rights and
choices with respect to counsel’s request to withdraw.” Initial
defense counsel based their requests on Webster’s “right to counsel,
due process, right to trial, equal protection, compulsory process,
confrontation, right to silence, and right to appeal clauses of the
United States and Colorado Constitutions and pursuant to the
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.”
¶ 19 The court held a hearing on the conflict motion on January
18, with Gonzalez present in person and Rubinstein appearing
remotely. At the hearing, initial defense counsel reiterated their
request for a mistrial or continuance due to Rubinstein’s COVID-19
infection. The trial court denied the mistrial but said its “posture
analysis” was “different on a motion to continue.” Accordingly, in
recognition of Rubinstein’s “health circumstances,” the trial court
granted a continuance. It did not reset the trial at that time.
¶ 20 In addition, at the same hearing, the court acknowledged
initial defense counsel’s potential conflict of interest with Webster,
“especially if the case [could not] be tried.” The trial court noted
that its role in presiding over Webster’s trial included “effectively
and safely running its courtroom,” while “tak[ing] into account the
7 [victims’] position, the efficiency of the proceedings, the length of
proceedings, [and] the pendency of the case.” At the conclusion of
the hearing, the court set a status conference “to address what [it
saw] as the three pending issues[:] [c]hoice of counsel, conflict of
counsel, and resetting the jury trial.”
¶ 21 On January 26, the trial court held a virtual status conference
to address those issues. As relevant to this appeal, to determine
whether the trial could be reset for a date when initial defense
counsel could appear in court, the court asked initial defense
counsel whether the conflict described in the conflict motion was
“permanent or ha[d] been remedied.” Gonzalez responded that,
because of her health situation, she could not guarantee that she
could appear at a new trial setting: “If COVID[-19] is not better by
the time this case is slated to start trial, I can’t represent to the
[c]ourt that I won’t have a big concern or that I won’t think that
same [conflict] motion [would be] necessary.”
¶ 22 The trial court then reviewed the factors set forth in People v.
Brown, 2014 CO 25, ¶ 24, 322 P.3d 214, 220-21, for determining
whether to grant a continuance. Applying the Brown factors, the
8 court found that initial defense counsel had a conflict in
representing Webster. It said,
Given the length of the case and the impact on the prosecution and potential prejudice, given the position that the victims have objected and this does have an impact and the age of the case — I recognize that this will delay a trial setting into a few months away but the permanent nature of COVID[-19] from this [c]ourt’s perspective, this is the most appropriate decision because the permanency of COVID[-19] and the permanency of the circumstances of counsel and the [c]ourt cannot continue to risk what the status is with the pandemic in order to get this case tried.
¶ 23 The court specifically found that:
• Webster understood the “nature of the conflict,” that “it
affect[ed] [initial defense counsel’s] ability to effectively
represent him at a trial moving forward,” and that
Webster “would choose to have [initial defense counsel]
as counsel.”
• The COVID-19 pandemic was ongoing with “no end in
sight,” and Gonzalez’s health situation and Rubinstein’s
family concerns were also “not going away,” as initial
defense counsel “conce[ded] in [the conflict] motion and
the record in court.”
9 • Therefore, the record did not allow the court to “make a
specific finding” as to whether initial defense counsel
would be available for trial “at any date in the future
based on [their] circumstances.”
• “[T]he length of the continuance necessary to
accommodate” initial defense counsel was “completely
unknown and speculative.”
• Further delay of the trial “potential[ly] prejudice[d] . . .
the prosecution,” given the “number of witnesses in the
case” and because “multiple witnesses ha[d] moved out of
state.”
• There had been multiple previous trial settings, and the
continuances had inconvenienced the witnesses “both
professionally and personally.”
• The case was 1,318 days old.
• Initial defense counsel had already requested four
continuances.
• Initial defense counsel made their most recent request for
a continuance on “the eve of trial.”
10 • Another continuance would impact the court’s docket
because Webster’s case would require “a two and a half
to three week trial depending on jury selection” and
would require the court to “request senior judge coverage,
request coverage from other judges, . . . move dockets,
and delay other trials.” The court noted that, not only
was it “digging out of the pandemic with multiple jury
trials,” but that “set[ting] aside time for this trial
continually [had] an impact on the [c]ourt’s functioning[,]
. . . the [c]ourt’s availability[,] . . . [and] . . . the court
system.”
• The victims and their families had objected to each
continuance.
• Other cases were proceeding to trial. The court explained
that, in October 2021, when Webster’s case was
previously set for trial, the district had conducted ten
felony trials. In addition, at the time of the status
conference, other trials, including criminal felony jury
trials with large jury panels, were proceeding to trial.
11 ¶ 24 After finding that initial defense counsel had a conflict with
Webster, the court permitted initial defense counsel to withdraw
and appointed alternate defense counsel (ADC) to represent
Webster. The court then scheduled a status conference.
¶ 25 But ADC did not appear at the February 1 status conference.
Gonzalez attended with Sarah Quinn, the head of the public
defender’s office handling the case. Rubinstein was absent. The
court noted that initial defense counsel had not yet filed a notice of
withdrawal.
¶ 26 Quinn said that the public defender’s office did not see a
conflict between initial defense counsel and Webster, and that
initial defense counsel would not be filing a motion to withdraw.
The trial court pointed out that it had already found a conflict
“pursuant to the rule and pursuant to case law,” and it reiterated
that initial defense counsel’s request in the alternative to withdraw
based on a conflict “didn’t change facts before the [c]ourt as to the
basis for the conflict.” Moreover, the court observed that “the fact[s]
before the [c]ourt in [the] last trial setting may very well be the same
facts moving forward with the COVID[-19] pandemic and the health
conditions of the counsel on the record from [Quinn’s] office.”
12 ¶ 27 The court asked Quinn whether she wanted the case to
proceed under such circumstances. Quinn asked the court to “set
it over” for initial defense counsel, who were “still the attorneys
[whom she] would assign to the case.” She underscored that she
would “not chang[e] counsel” in Webster’s case. Quinn further
expressed concern that Webster “ha[d] no attorney” present at the
hearing.
¶ 28 The trial court responded that, “on paper, ADC [was] on the
case,” although it agreed to allow the public defender’s office to file
a motion to reconsider its ruling that initial defense counsel was
conflicted from further representation of Webster. The court added
that it was “completely inappropriate that [Webster was] not
represented” at the time and set a further status conference.
¶ 29 On February 2, the court ordered initial defense counsel,
Quinn, and ADC to appear at a status conference the next day.
Also on February 2, Gonzalez filed a motion to reconsider the
appointment of ADC (the motion to reconsider), asserting that the
granted continuance had mooted any conflict with initial defense
counsel. In addition, the same day, Lindy Frolich, the Director of
13 the Office of Alternate Defense Counsel, through counsel, filed a
motion objecting to ADC’s appointment for Webster.
¶ 30 Initial defense counsel, Quinn, Frolich, Frolich’s counsel, and
several ADC attorneys all attended the in-person status conference
on February 3. At the beginning of the status conference, the court
explained the pending motions to Webster and noted there was “no
counsel with [Webster] at this time,” given the court’s previous
finding that initial defense counsel had a conflict of interest and the
ongoing objections from initial defense counsel and Frolich to the
appointment of ADC for Webster.
¶ 31 As relevant to this appeal, at the February 3 status
conference, the court asked Gonzalez whether she would appear at
trial if the court reset the trial for that day and determined it was
“safe to proceed and [it brought] in 200 more people for jury service
and ma[de] the [COVID-19] accommodations[:] ordering . . . N95
masks and socially distancing the courtroom and picking the jury
[over] four days.” Gonzalez responded that her answer would
depend “on the circumstances at the time.”
¶ 32 The court then asked Gonzalez whether there would continue
to be a conflict of interest “[i]f the [COVID-19] pandemic d[id] not
14 continue to go in a positive direction, or if there [was] a
disagreement with the way the [c]ourt organize[d] the [reset]
trial . . . ?” Gonzalez replied, “[I]f there [was] a suspension order in
place and the positivity rate [was] similar to where [it was] right
now[,] then” she thought there would be a conflict if the court forced
initial defense counsel “to go to trial in those circumstances.”
Quinn then reiterated that, so long as initial defense counsel
remained employed at the public defender’s office, she would not
appoint new attorneys from the office to represent Webster. The
court denied the motion to reconsider from the bench.
¶ 33 On July 2, the trial court entered a detailed order confirming
its denial of the motion to reconsider.
¶ 34 ADC continuously represented Webster following the entry of
the July 2 order, including at his trial, which began on April 7,
2023.
B. The Court Did Not Deny Webster His Right to Counsel at a Critical Stage
1. Standard of Review
¶ 35 We “review an alleged violation of a constitutional right de
novo.” People v. Cuevas, 2024 COA 84, ¶ 21, 558 P.3d 1041, 1046.
15 2. The February 1 Status Conference Was Not a Critical Stage of the Proceeding
¶ 36 We initially note that Webster’s opening brief fails to comply
with C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A) because it does not, “under a separate
heading placed before the discussion of each issue,” contain
“statements of the applicable standard of review with citation to
authority, whether the issue was preserved, and if preserved, the
precise location in the record where the issue was raised and where
the court ruled.” It is not our responsibility to comb through the
voluminous record to determine whether Webster’s arguments were
preserved or to identify the applicable standards of review. See
Black v. Black, 2018 COA 7, ¶ 67, 422 P.3d 592, 604.
¶ 37 It appears to us that Webster’s counsel never argued in the
trial court that Webster was denied the right to counsel at a critical
stage — the February 1, 2022, status conference, as Webster
asserts on appeal.
¶ 38 Webster’s argument that he was unrepresented at the status
conference, which he characterizes as a critical stage of his criminal
proceeding, fails for two reasons. First, three days before the status
conference, the trial court entered an order saying that, because it
16 found “a conflict of interest existed with [initial defense counsel],
Colorado law require[d] the appointment of an [ADC] attorney” and,
accordingly, it “order[ed] that an [ADC] attorney be assigned to
[Webster’s] case.” As a result, Webster had counsel of record —
ADC — at the time of the February 1 status conference.
¶ 39 Webster does not cite any authorities holding that a
represented defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated when
defense counsel fails to appear at a status conference.
¶ 40 Second, and more importantly, even if Webster lacked counsel
at the February 1 status conference, his Sixth Amendment rights
were not implicated because the status conference was not a critical
stage of the case. Nothing of substance occurred: the trial court did
not rule on any pending motions and merely announced that it
would consider the merits of those motions at another status
conference later that week. Notably, Webster does not argue that
he lacked counsel at the rescheduled status conference.
¶ 41 “Stages of criminal proceedings have been held to be ‘critical’
where there exists more than a ‘minimal risk’ that the absence of
the defendant’s counsel might impair the defendant’s right to a fair
trial.” Key v. People, 865 P.2d 822, 825 (Colo. 1994) (quoting
17 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967)). Even if, at the
February 1 status conference, the trial court engaged in a
substantive discussion regarding replacing initial defense counsel
with ADC, courts in other jurisdictions have held that hearings on
counsel replacement are not critical. See, e.g., LaGrand v. Stewart,
133 F.3d 1253, 1277 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A motion to replace a
criminal defendant’s trial counsel admittedly creates a delicate
situation for the lawyer, the defendant[,] and the court. But
bringing in a new lawyer is not required to protect the defendant’s
rights.”); see also United States v. Franklin, 547 F.3d 726, 734 (7th
Cir. 2008) (explaining that a defense counsel’s motion to withdraw
does not “qualify as a critical stage of the proceedings for Sixth
Amendment purposes, as the proceeding is simply not the sort of
trial-like confrontation between the accused and the [S]tate that
gives an accused a Sixth Amendment right to counsel”).
¶ 42 For these reasons, the trial court did not violate Webster’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage of his case.
18 C. The Court Did Not Violate Webster’s Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice
¶ 43 There is no legal basis for Webster’s argument that the trial
court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by denying him counsel
of choice. “The right to the effective assistance of counsel is
constitutionally guaranteed for all criminal defendants. The right to
choice of counsel is not. It is well settled that the right to counsel of
choice does not extend to defendants for whom the court appoints
counsel.” People v. Rainey, 2023 CO 14, ¶ 19, 527 P.3d 387, 392.
Rainey firmly rested on United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “does not extend to
defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.” United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006); Rainey, ¶ 19,
527 P.3d at 392. Similarly, indigent criminal defendants like
Webster have no right to continued representation by their initial
appointed counsel. Rainey, ¶ 2, 527 P.3d at 390.
¶ 44 Although indigent criminal defendants have no right to select
or retain their appointed counsel, they have a due process interest
in continuing to be represented by the lawyer the court initially
appointed. See id. at ¶¶ 23, 34, 527 P.3d at 393-94, 396. But that
19 interest is not implicated unless the defendant “can demonstrate
that prejudice would result from substitution with a different
court-appointed attorney.” Id. at ¶ 23, 527 P.3d at 394. A court
does not violate a defendant’s interest in continued representation
by appointed counsel in the absence of a showing of actual
prejudice. See People v. Gardenhire, 903 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Colo.
App. 1995) (holding that “[a]bsent any evidence of prejudice based
on the public defender’s replacement with another public defender,”
there is “no reversible error in the trial court’s ruling”).
¶ 45 Webster appears to contend that the substitution of counsel
prejudiced him by forcing him to choose between “his statutory
right to a speedy trial and his constitutional right to effective and
conflict-free counsel.” But Webster does not argue that the trial
court violated his statutory speedy trial right or that ADC was
ineffective. Although he asserts he was prejudiced because his new
attorneys were “unprepared, lacked adequate time to review
extensive discovery, and requested continuances,” Webster does not
point to any errors following the appointment of ADC, nor does he
identify any error during his fourteen-day jury trial.
20 ¶ 46 Lastly, because Webster’s counsel of choice argument in his
opening brief solely rests on the Sixth Amendment, he has waived
any argument that the court violated his due process rights by
removing initial defense counsel and appointing ADC to represent
him. See People v. Owens, 2024 CO 10, ¶ 90, 544 P.3d 1202, 1224
(treating contentions not raised in the opening brief as waived).
¶ 47 For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not violate
Webster’s Sixth Amendment rights by ordering ADC to represent
him in place of initial defense counsel.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Webster’s Sixth Amendment Right to Conflict-Free Counsel
¶ 48 “The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel encompasses a defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel.”
People v. Shari, 204 P.3d 453, 457 (Colo. 2009). When defense
counsel informs the court of a “probable risk of a conflict of
interest[],” a court errs if it fails “to appoint separate counsel or to
take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk [is] too remote to
warrant separate counsel.” Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,
484 (1978).
21 ¶ 49 Initial defense counsel repeatedly advised the court that their
health and family circumstances precluded their in-person
appearance in court during the COVID-19 pandemic. Those
concerns led initial defense counsel to file the conflict motion, in
which they asked the court to allow them to withdraw as Webster’s
counsel if the court did not strike the January 19, 2022, trial date.
When initial defense counsel informed the court of their conflict of
interest, the court would have erred if it had failed to address it.
See id. But Webster contends that the court erred by addressing
their conflict of interest.
¶ 50 Further, Webster incorrectly blames the court for allegedly
creating the conflict. But initial defense counsel admitted they had
a conflict with Webster if the trial court scheduled the trial for a
date when they believed that the COVID-19 pandemic placed them
and their families at risk if they appeared in court in person.
¶ 51 In addition, continuing the January 19, 2022, trial date did
not resolve initial defense counsel’s conflict because Gonzalez and
Rubinstein could not guarantee their availability for any future trial
date. In early 2022, it was impossible to predict how long the
COVID-19 pandemic would pose health risks for vulnerable
22 individuals such as initial defense counsel. If COVID-19 positivity
rates remained high over the coming weeks and months, the trial
court would have had to repeatedly set and continue multiple trial
dates if it did not find new counsel for Webster. Such a course of
action would have been untenable, particularly given the
extraordinarily long period the case had been pending. See People
v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo. 2006) (explaining that a
defendant cannot delay his trial indefinitely while seeking counsel).
¶ 52 Moreover, Webster does not contend that ADC had a conflict of
interest in representing him. The trial court provided Webster with
conflict-free counsel after correctly finding that initial defense
counsel had an ongoing conflict.
¶ 53 Because the trial court properly granted the alternate relief
requested in the conflict motion to protect Webster’s Sixth
Amendment rights, and Webster does not argue that the court
compelled him to proceed with conflicted counsel, the court did not
violate his right to conflict-free representation, much less create
initial defense counsel’s conflict with Webster.
III. Disposition
¶ 54 The judgment is affirmed.
23 JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.