Peo v. Watkins

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 29, 2025
• Docket: 22CA1455
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

22CA1455 Peo v Watkins 05-29-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1455 City and County of Denver District Court No. 13CR2776 Honorable Brian R. Whitney, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jamal Watkins,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Tow and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 29, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Allison S. Block, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrea R. Gammell, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Jamal Watkins appeals the postconviction court’s order

denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion after an evidentiary hearing.

Watkins contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to (1) introduce evidence of a threat made by

the victim in the courtroom and (2) cross-examine a witness to

attack his credibility. We disagree with these contentions and

therefore affirm the postconviction court’s order.

I. Background

¶2 Watkins and the victim were best friends growing up who did

“[e]verything” together — “good and bad.” That changed in late

2009 when the victim provided a tip to the police identifying

Watkins as a suspect in a nightclub shooting. The victim learned

that a recording of his police call “was being passed around the

neighborhood” and that Watkins had heard the recording. From

then on, the victim was “classified as a snitch” and feared that

“Watkins was after him.”

¶3 Three and a half years later, in May 2013, at least two

individuals entered the victim’s apartment in the early morning.

The victim was in the bathroom when he heard a thump; turning

around, he saw Watkins standing in the bathroom doorway with a

1 gun. Watkins said, “You snitch. You bitch. I found you.” As

Watkins raised the gun, the victim heard another voice say, “Don’t

shoot.” The victim reached up to block the gun, and the first shot

went through his hand. He slammed the bathroom door shut,

dropped to the floor, and screamed as several more shots were fired

through the door to make the shooter think they were hitting him.

The intruders eventually left, and the victim called 911.

¶4 Watkins was charged with, as relevant here, attempted first

degree murder, witness retaliation, and first degree assault. A jury

acquitted him of attempted first degree murder but convicted him of

witness retaliation and first degree assault, and the trial court

sentenced him to twenty-eight years in prison.

¶5 Watkins appealed, and a division of this court affirmed. He

then moved for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c), raising

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After holding an

evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied Watkins’s

claims.

II. Standard of Review and Governing Law

¶6 A postconviction court’s ruling on a Crim. P. 35(c) motion after

an evidentiary hearing presents a mixed question of fact and law.

2 People v. Sharp, 2019 COA 133, ¶ 12. We review the court’s legal

conclusions de novo but defer to its findings of fact unless they are

clearly erroneous, meaning that they have no support in the record.

People v. Smith, 2024 CO 3, ¶ 16. “The postconviction court

determines the weight and credibility to give to the testimony of

witnesses at a Crim. P. 35(c) hearing.” People v. Hardin, 2016 COA

175, ¶ 39.

¶7 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a

defendant must show that (1) trial counsel’s performance was

deficient and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Ardolino v.

People, 69 P.3d 73, 76 (Colo. 2003). An ineffective assistance claim

fails if the defendant does not satisfy either prong. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697.

¶8 To establish deficient performance, a defendant must prove

that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88. “[J]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s

performance must be highly deferential, evaluate particular acts

and omissions from counsel’s perspective at the time, and indulge a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

3 range of reasonable professional assistance.” Ardolino, 69 P.3d at

76.

¶9 To establish prejudice, in turn, the defendant must

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Id.

III. Courtroom Threat

¶ 10 Watkins contends that the postconviction court erred by

finding that his trial counsel’s representation was neither deficient

nor prejudicial when counsel failed to develop and introduce

evidence of a threat made by the victim in the courtroom. We

disagree that the postconviction court erred by finding no prejudice

under Strickland.

A. Additional Background

¶ 11 After the victim testified at trial, the court announced a brief

recess. As both the victim and the jury were leaving the courtroom,

two spectators in the gallery — Watkins’s mother and the woman

sitting next to her, whose children had also grown up with the

4 victim and Watkins — had a noticeable reaction. The court

admonished them, “[I]f you so much as gesture or do anything

again in the presence of this jury, you will be removed from the

courtroom and not allowed back in.”

¶ 12 After the recess but before the jury returned, defense counsel

explained the women’s reaction to the court. He informed the

court, “[A]s [the victim] was exiting the courtroom, he made a

statement to Mr. Watkins’ mother and the woman who was sitting

next to Mr. Watkins’ mother and that statement contained a

threat. . . . [H]e apparently said, ‘You stupid bitch, I’m going to kill

you.’” The court asked if it was “being requested to do anything,”

and defense counsel said that he was “not requesting the [c]ourt to

do anything but . . . just wanted to make a record.”

¶ 13 In his Crim. P. 35(c) motion, Watkins argued that defense

counsel performed deficiently and prejudiced his case by failing to

make any effort to bring the victim’s courtroom threat to the jury’s

attention. Specifically, Watkins argued that defense counsel should

have (1) recalled the victim and cross-examined him about “whether

he had just threatened to kill one or more spectators” and (2) called

the two women to testify about the threat. (At the postconviction

5 hearing, both women testified that the victim threatened to kill

them as he left the courtroom.) And by failing to introduce evidence

of the threat, Watkins argued, defense counsel missed an

opportunity to attack the victim’s credibility by contradicting the

victim’s portrayal of himself as having given up criminal behavior.

¶ 14 The postconviction court found that Watkins had

demonstrated neither deficient performance nor prejudice.

B. Discussion

¶ 15 Even if we assume that defense counsel performed deficiently

when he did not attempt to introduce evidence of the threat, we

conclude that the postconviction court’s findings on the second

prong of Strickland are supported by the record.

¶ 16 The victim testified that, although he used to “get into trouble”

in his “youth days” and had a felony conviction for attempted

robbery, he had changed his ways. After the birth of his son, he

explained, he gave up “the gang banging and all the wrong that [he]

was doing.” In light of this testimony, Watkins argues, evidence of

the victim’s courtroom threat would have undermined the victim’s

credibility by “impeach[ing] his claim that he was a reformed man.”

6 ¶ 17 But the postconviction court found that evidence of the threat

would not have had a significant “impact” on the outcome of the

trial because it was already apparent that the victim’s rehabilitation

was not “complete.” The record supports the postconviction court’s

finding. Specifically, during direct examination, the victim testified

that he initially did not want to tell the police who shot him because

he “fell back into [his] old ways” and wanted to “take it into [his]

own hands” by killing Watkins himself. We thus agree with the

postconviction court that evidence of the threat would not have had

a significant impact on the trial.

¶ 18 Nor are we persuaded by Watkins’s argument that evidence of

the threat would have undermined the victim’s credibility by

showing that the victim was biased against Watkins and thus was

motivated to falsely identify him as the shooter. At the

postconviction hearing, both Watkins’s mother and the woman

seated next to her testified that the victim’s threat was directed at

them. Had defense counsel argued that the threat was against

Watkins’s mother and that it reflected animus against Watkins, this

would have been consistent with the victim’s own testimony that he

“wanted to kill” Watkins for shooting him.

7 ¶ 19 And had defense counsel argued that the threat was against

the other woman, Watkins does not explain why any animus the

victim felt toward her would have motivated him to falsely accuse

Watkins.

¶ 20 We thus conclude that, even if defense counsel performed

deficiently, the postconviction court did not err by finding that there

is no reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694.

IV. Witness’s Credibility

¶ 21 Next, Watkins contends that the postconviction court erred by

finding that his trial counsel did not perform deficiently when he

failed to cross-examine a witness and challenge his credibility. We

are not persuaded.

¶ 22 The witness was a longtime friend of Watkins’s who lived in

the same apartment complex as the victim and spoke with police

after the shooting. After expressing serious reservations about

cooperating with the investigation, the witness told a detective that

Watkins came over to his apartment at about 4 a.m. on the morning

8 of the shooting. Approximately two hours later, Watkins left the

witness’s apartment and met up with two other people who were

standing outside. The witness saw Watkins climb onto the balcony

of the victim’s apartment while the other two walked up the stairs.

He heard several gunshots and then saw the group run from the

area.

¶ 23 At trial, the witness recanted his statements to the detective.

He denied ever saying that Watkins was at his apartment on the

morning of the shooting or that he saw Watkins climb onto the

victim’s balcony. He testified that he “had a bad habit of smoking

spice [and] was up getting high” that morning when he heard

gunshots, but he otherwise claimed to know nothing about the

shooting. He said that he had never wanted to be involved in the

case, that he only spoke with the police because he was on parole

and they “made [him],” and that he had never said anything

implicating Watkins. Defense counsel chose not to cross-examine

the witness. The detective then testified to the witness’s prior

inconsistent statements.

¶ 24 In his Crim. P. 35(c) motion, Watkins argued that defense

counsel performed deficiently by failing to cross-examine the

9 witness to “impeach [him] with his extensive criminal history.”

Watkins argued that the lack of cross-examination prejudiced him

because, although the witness recanted on the stand, his account

of having seen Watkins climb onto the victim’s balcony nonetheless

came in through the detective.

¶ 25 At the postconviction hearing, defense counsel explained that

he chose not to cross-examine the witness because, “when he

testified and essentially recanted every statement that he had made

up to that point, he had done as good a job at . . . undercutting his

own previous statements as I could have done cross-examining

him.” The postconviction court found that defense counsel did not

perform deficiently by declining to cross-examine the witness

because

the [witness’s] testimony was harmful to the People’s case. It is not surprising that no defense questions were asked of him, [since] to do so would have undermined a viable source of reasonable doubt. Similarly, to impeach his defense[-]positive testimony would have undermined rather than improved the defense case. . . . It is hard to determine how he could have been more helpful to [Watkins] if he had been . . . cross-examined.

10 B. Discussion

¶ 26 We agree with the postconviction court that Watkins has not

shown that defense counsel performed deficiently under Strickland

by choosing not to cross-examine the witness.

¶ 27 During his direct examination, the witness explicitly denied

saying that Watkins had been at his apartment on the morning of

the shooting or that he saw Watkins climb onto the victim’s

balcony. Under these circumstances, when attacking the witness’s

credibility could have weakened Watkins’s case, defense counsel’s

decision not to cross-examine the witness was a reasonable trial

strategy.

¶ 28 Further, the witness’s credibility was already undermined by

his testimony that he had a “bad habit of smoking spice,” that he

was high on the morning of the shooting, and that he was on parole

at the time. We thus cannot agree with Watkins that defense

counsel’s decision not to cross-examine the witness left counsel

“with no evidentiary basis to argue that [the witness’s] statements

to the police lacked credibility.”

¶ 29 We agree with the postconviction court that it was reasonable

for defense counsel not to cross-examine the witness and that,

11 accordingly, Watkins has not demonstrated deficient performance

V. Disposition

¶ 30 The postconviction court’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.