Peo v. Walton

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 24CA1721
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1721 Peo v Walton 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1721 Adams County District Court No. 16CR1398 Honorable J. Robert Lowenbach, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Patrick Walton,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Yun and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 12, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Robert Borquez, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Patrick Walton, appeals the order denying his

motion for postconviction relief after a hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In exchange for the dismissal of two class 3 felony charges and

eight habitual criminal counts, Walton pleaded guilty to two counts

of aggravated robbery and agreed to an aggregate thirty-two-year

prison sentence. At the providency and sentencing hearing, the

district court repeatedly advised Walton that if he pleaded guilty, he

would receive a thirty-two-year sentence. Before pleading guilty,

Walton repeatedly said that he understood the agreed-upon

sentence. In accord with the plea agreement, the court sentenced

him to two consecutive terms of sixteen-years in prison.

¶3 Walton timely filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion seeking to withdraw

his guilty plea and claiming, as relevant here, that he received

ineffective assistance from his plea counsel, Emily Lieberman. The

postconviction court denied the motion without a hearing, and

Walton appealed. A division of this court affirmed the district

court’s order in part but reversed and remanded the case for an

evidentiary hearing on one claim — that Lieberman had provided

ineffective assistance by advising Walton that he would receive

1 concurrent sixteen-year sentences and to “simply agree with the

judge” about the stipulated thirty-two-year sentence. See People v.

Walton, slip op. at ¶¶ 7, 14, 22 (Colo. App. No. 21CA1408, Sep. 29,

2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶4 Walton and Lieberman testified at the evidentiary hearing on

remand. Considering the witnesses’ testimony and the providency

hearing transcript, the postconviction court found that

(1) Lieberman’s testimony was more credible than Walton’s;

(2) Lieberman had not advised Walton that he would receive two

concurrent sixteen-year sentences; and (3) Lieberman had not told

Walton to simply agree with the judge even if he was confused

about the sentence. The court ultimately found that Walton had

failed to establish a right to postconviction relief and denied his

Crim. P. 35(c) claim.

II. Discussion

¶5 On appeal, Walton contends that the postconviction court

erred because his testimony, which supported the factual

allegations underlying his claim, was more reliable than the

evidence to the contrary. He specifically asserts that because

Lieberman did not clearly recollect all the facts of his plea — which

2 occurred eight years before the postconviction hearing — and he

did, the court should not have credited Lieberman’s testimony

above his own. We reject this contention.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 In a Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding, we presume the validity of a

conviction, and the defendant bears the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to postconviction

relief. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo. 2007). When a

postconviction court’s ruling follows an evidentiary hearing, we

review the denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion as a mixed question of

fact and law. People v. Corson, 2016 CO 33, ¶ 25.

¶7 We defer to the court’s assessment of the weight and

credibility of witness testimony. Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1061-62; see

also Kailey v. Colo. State Dep’t of Corr., 807 P.2d 563, 567 (Colo.

1991) (“It is . . . the province of the court, as the trier of fact, to

determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given

their testimony.”). And we defer to the court’s factual findings

unless “they are so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the

record.” People v. Beauvais, 2017 CO 34, ¶ 22. But we review de

3 novo the court’s ultimate legal conclusions. Dunlap, 173 P.3d at

1063.

¶8 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, the defendant must

show that counsel’s acts or omissions fell outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance. Id. at 687-89. Second, the

defendant must show prejudice from counsel’s deficient

performance. Id. at 694. An ineffective assistance claim fails if the

defendant does not satisfy either Strickland prong. Id. at 697.

B. Application

¶9 The record supports the postconviction court’s factual

findings. The transcript of the providency hearing shows that

Lieberman was the one to tell the court that Walton had agreed to

“a stipulated sentence of thirty-two years.” And at the

postconviction hearing, Lieberman testified that there was “no way”

she would have told Walton that he was agreeing to concurrent

sixteen-year sentences “and then walked in and said something

completely contrary to the court.” She also testified that she would

4 “absolutely not” tell Walton to just agree with the judge even if he

was confused, because to do so would be “highly unethical.”

¶ 10 Because we defer to the district court’s finding that

Lieberman’s testimony was more credible than Walton’s, see

Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1061-62, and to its resolution of factual

disputes, see Beauvais, ¶ 22, we necessarily reject Walton’s

argument that his testimony was more reliable than Lieberman’s.

And because the factual allegations underlying Walton’s remaining

ineffective assistance claim are contradicted by the record, his claim

fails. Cf. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV) (permitting summary denial of

postconviction claims when the record shows that the factual

allegations are untrue.)

III. Disposition

¶ 11 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.