Peo v. Vigil

Opinion

23CA1653 Peo v Vigil 02-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1653 El Paso County District Court No. 19CR8294 Honorable Erin Sokol, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Isaac Vigil,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDERS AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Kuhn and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 26, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Isaac Vigil, appeals the district court’s orders

denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion and his motion to reconsider. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 As part of a plea agreement, Vigil pleaded guilty to sexual

assault and unlawful sexual contact. The district court sentenced

him to a controlling sentence of ten years to life of sex offender

intensive supervised probation (SOISP) with four years of

community corrections as a condition of probation. Two years later,

the probation department filed a complaint to revoke Vigil’s

probation. Vigil admitted the alleged violations, and the court

resentenced him to two years to life in the custody of the

Department of Corrections (DOC).

¶3 With counsel’s assistance, Vigil filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion

alleging that the Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) was

unconstitutional as applied to him. Vigil alleged that because

SOLSA mandates sex offender treatment before a person can be

released on parole, and because there are not currently enough

available treatment options for eligible offenders like himself, he

was effectively serving a life sentence. Vigil also alleged that the

1 lack of available treatment options results from the method the

DOC uses to determine which inmates are referred for sex offender

treatment. This method, he argued, violated his rights to

procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and his

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Last, he

alleged that by not allowing access to treatment, the DOC violated

the separation of powers doctrine by increasing his sentence beyond

what the district court imposed. To remedy these constitutional

violations, Vigil requested “his immediate release from the DOC.”

¶4 The district court denied Vigil’s motion in a written order. The

court found that “[w]hile it is certainly possible that Defendant may

be entitled to some relief from the DOC, Crim. P. 35(c) is not the

proper avenue for seeking that relief.”

¶5 Days later Vigil’s counsel filed a motion to reconsider the

district court’s denial of his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. Counsel

maintained that Crim. P. 35(c) was “the correct avenue for his

claims” because his assertion is that “the sentence was imposed in

violation of the Constitution.” The district court disagreed. In

denying the reconsideration request, the court reiterated that Vigil’s

claims were not cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c) because he was

2 challenging the manner in which the DOC was implementing the

court-ordered sentence and not the constitutionality of the sentence

itself.

II. Discussion

¶6 On appeal, Vigil concedes, and we agree, that the claims

raised in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion sounded in habeas corpus —

namely, that the DOC’s deprivation of his opportunity to participate

in the treatment required for parole eligibility caused an unlawful

restraint on his liberty and fundamental rights. See § 13-45-101,

C.R.S. 2025; see also Naranjo v. Johnson, 770 P.2d 784, 787 (Colo.

1989) (The defendant’s argument “that he is being

unconstitutionally denied the opportunity to be considered for

parole” is not cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c) but, rather, “review is

provided under the habeas corpus statutes.”). Consequently, the

district court was correct when it concluded that Vigil’s claims were

not cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c).

¶7 Nevertheless, Vigil argues that the district court should have

construed his motion as a habeas corpus petition. He points out

that all district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to consider

habeas petitions. Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 9. And a

3 document’s substance, not its appellation or a defendant’s

characterization of the pleading, determines the legal nature of the

claim. See White v. Denv. Dist. Ct., 766 P.2d 632, 634 (Colo. 1988)

(treating a habeas corpus petition as a Crim. P. 35 motion based on

the substantive issues raised in — rather than the label placed on

— the pleading).

¶8 But we are aware of no authority, and Vigil provides none, that

a court may convert a Crim. P. 35(c) motion to a habeas corpus

petition when the substance of the motion raises claims that arise

under habeas corpus and not under Crim. P. 35(c). And Crim. P.

35(c) motions and habeas corpus petitions are not interchangeable.

See Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 378 (Colo. 1994). Rather, habeas

proceedings are civil actions, Graham v. Gunter, 855 P.2d 1384,

1385 (Colo. 1993), that require the petitioner to file a case in the

district court where the petitioner is being confined, Naranjo, 770

P.2d at 787, naming as the defendant the person in whose custody

the petitioner is detained, Duran, 868 P.2d at 378, with

corresponding service to that defendant such that the district court

can acquire personal jurisdiction over the parties (as a court cannot

4 confer personal jurisdiction upon itself), Zabroski v. Colo. Dep’t of

Corr., 812 P.2d 236, 238 (Colo. 1991).

¶9 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly

denied Vigil’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion and motion to reconsider.

III. Disposition

¶ 10 The orders are affirmed.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.