23CA1937 Peo v Valles-Dominguez 12-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1937 Arapahoe County District Court No. 21CR2121 Honorable Michelle Jones, Judge Honorable LaQunya Baker, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Rigoberto Valles-Dominguez,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, ORDER VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Welling, J., concurs Sullivan, J., concurs in part and dissents in part
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 24, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Kimberly Alderman Rufe, Alternate Defense Counsel, Chelsey Bradley, Alternate Defense Counsel, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 After a shootout with two police officers and a carjacking,
defendant, Rigoberto Valles-Dominguez, was charged with and
convicted of attempted first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and
other offenses. In addition to being sentenced to a total of 128
years in the Department of Corrections, he was ordered to pay
nearly $350,000 in restitution. Valles-Dominguez now appeals the
judgment of conviction and the restitution order. He contends that
there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction on the
attempted murder and aggravated robbery charges. He also
contends that the restitution order must be vacated because it was
entered after the statutory deadline. We disagree with his first
contention but agree with the second. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of conviction but vacate the restitution order and remand
the case to the trial court to amend the mittimus to reflect that no
restitution is owed.
I. Background
¶2 One night, Valles-Dominguez and his then-girlfriend, B.A.,
visited a laundromat and a 7-Eleven. The two then drove back
toward B.A.’s Littleton apartment in her car, a gold Chevrolet
Impala. On the way, they parked on a street near her apartment,
1 where they talked about their relationship. At one point, Valles-
Dominguez, who was sitting in the front passenger seat, got upset,
pulled out a gun, and fired a few times out the passenger window.
¶3 After receiving a report of gunshots, Corporal Jeff Farmer,
Officer David Snook, and another officer from the Littleton Police
Department responded to the area. While they were on their way,
they received a second report that someone had witnessed a person
in a car matching the description and license plate number of B.A.’s
car reach out the window and shoot a gun.
¶4 Corporal Farmer arrived at B.A.’s apartment building and
pulled up next to Valles-Dominguez and B.A., who had by then
parked at the apartment, gotten out, and started walking. Corporal
Farmer asked the two if they had heard any gunshots. Valles-
Dominguez responded that they had heard shots about twenty
minutes earlier. This was suspicious to Corporal Farmer, as he had
received the report of gunshots only two to three minutes earlier.
¶5 Then, Officer Snook, who had arrived in a separate patrol car,
quickly walked toward them, saying that Valles-Dominguez was the
suspect and was under arrest. Valles-Dominguez took off running
toward the back door of the apartment building. The two officers
2 followed on foot. As Valles-Dominguez ran, he pulled out a gun.
Officer Snook followed him inside the building. Valles-Dominguez
ran up a stairwell and fired repeatedly at Officer Snook, who was hit
seven times. Corporal Farmer went inside to rescue Officer Snook,
and Valles-Dominguez started firing at Corporal Farmer, too, but
didn’t hit him. Eventually, Corporal Farmer and the other officers
who had arrived on the scene were able to get Officer Snook to a
patrol car and take him to the hospital. He survived. Valles-
Dominguez evaded capture that night.
¶6 In the early hours of the next morning, Valles-Dominguez ran
up to a man, I.A., as he was getting into his car in a parking lot
near B.A.’s apartment. Valles-Dominguez pointed a gun at him and
demanded to be driven somewhere. I.A. refused. Valles-Dominguez
then shot into the driver’s side window, hitting the seat next to I.A.,
and got in the back seat of the car. I.A. got out and ran off. Valles-
Dominguez drove away in the car.
¶7 The next day, Valles-Dominguez contacted B.A. and asked her
to meet him at a location across town. When she arrived, he asked
her to buy him a new cell phone and a change of clothes, which she
3 did at a nearby Walmart. I.A.’s car was later recovered near the
location where Valles-Dominguez and B.A. had met up.
¶8 Investigators eventually found Valles-Dominguez hiding in a
house in Brighton. He was arrested at the house following a seven-
hour standoff. A dismantled gun was recovered from under the
floorboards in the attic of the house.
¶9 Valles-Dominguez was charged with, and ultimately convicted
of, multiple offenses.
¶ 10 After merging some of the offenses, the trial court entered
judgment on two counts each of attempted first degree murder and
first degree assault (as to Corporal Farmer and Officer Snook); one
count each of aggravated robbery (as to I.A.) and prohibited use of a
weapon; and multiple crime of violence sentence enhancers.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 11 Valles-Dominguez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the attempted murder and aggravated robbery
convictions. We reject both challenges.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 12 We review claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
de novo, determining whether the evidence presented was sufficient
4 in both quantity and quality to support the defendant’s conviction.
McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63.
¶ 13 In doing so, we assess whether the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, supports a reasonable
conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Tomaske, 2022 COA 52, ¶ 17. However, we may not
“serve as a thirteenth juror and consider whether [we] might have
reached a different conclusion than the jury.” People v. Harrison,
2020 CO 57, ¶ 33. Thus, we will disturb the verdict only if, despite
drawing every reasonable inference in favor of the prosecution, the
record is unsubstantial and insufficient to support a guilty verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thomas v. People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 10;
Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291-92 (Colo. 2010).
B. Attempted Murder
¶ 14 As to the attempted murder charges, Valles-Dominguez
asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he was the person
who shot at the two officers. We disagree.1
1 Although it appears that Valles-Dominguez challenges only the
attempted murder conviction concerning Officer Snook, and not the conviction concerning Corporal Farmer, the same evidence supports both convictions. Accordingly, we address them both here.
5 ¶ 15 The People presented ample evidence at trial pointing to
Valles-Dominguez as the shooter.
¶ 16 First, B.A. testified that Valles-Dominguez said things to her
after the shooting that came close to confessions, such as that “he
didn’t mean to,” and “[h]e was just trying to get away.” She further
testified that on the night in question, she was with Valles-
Dominguez at a laundromat and a 7-Eleven and then on a street
near her apartment building, where he shot a gun out of her car
window. She also testified that police officers stopped her and
Valles-Dominguez as they were walking back to her apartment
building, Valles-Dominguez ran off toward the building, the officers
ran after him, and she heard gunfire after they went inside.
Surveillance video from the laundromat and the 7-Eleven, as well as
shell casings found in the area where B.A. said Valles-Dominguez
shot outside the car, corroborated B.A.’s description of the events of
that night. The video also showed B.A. and Valles-Dominguez in
the gold Impala that officers were looking for in connection with the
initial shooting and that they later found B.A. and Valles-
Dominguez walking away from outside the apartment building.
6 ¶ 17 Also, although by the time of trial Officer Snook couldn’t
identify Valles-Dominguez or remember having identified him as the
shooter, another witness testified that shortly after the shooting,
Officer Snook identified Valles-Dominguez in a photo array. And
Corporal Farmer testified that he was shown a screen shot from the
7-Eleven surveillance video and identified the man in it as the
person who had shot at him. He also identified Valles-Dominguez
at trial as the shooter.
¶ 18 Additionally, ballistics evidence tied the bullets and shell
casings collected from the location of the shooting, as well as other
shell casings associated with the shooting outside of B.A.’s car, to
the gun police recovered from the house where Valles-Dominguez
was arrested. And Valles-Dominguez’s DNA was found on the gun.
¶ 19 Finally, there was evidence presented at trial that Valles-
Dominguez acted in ways indicating consciousness of guilt following
the shooting. B.A. testified that Valles-Dominguez asked her to get
him a new phone and a change of clothes, which was corroborated
by surveillance video showing her buying those things at Walmart.
Further, Valles-Dominguez engaged in a seven-hour standoff with
officers at the house in Brighton before surrendering.
7 ¶ 20 Valles-Dominguez contends that this evidence is insufficient,
identifying some weaknesses in the evidence. For instance, he
points out that Officer Snook wasn’t able to identify him at trial,
that Corporal Farmer was shown only a photo of him (not a full
array including other individuals) and admitted to not having gotten
a clear view of the shooter, and that DNA from three other persons
(two of whom were never identified) was also found on the gun.
¶ 21 But it was up to the jury to weigh these issues and determine
Valles-Dominguez’s guilt. See Harrison, ¶ 33. And even if we were
to disregard the evidence Valles-Dominguez takes issue with, there
was still ample evidence that he was the shooter. Giving the People
the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn from
the evidence, the evidence supports a fair-minded jury’s finding that
Valles-Dominguez was the person who shot at the officers. See
Thomas, ¶ 10; Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291-92.
C. Aggravated Robbery
¶ 22 Similarly, as to the aggravated robbery charge, Valles-
Dominguez asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he was
the person who carjacked I.A. Again, we disagree.
8 ¶ 23 The People presented evidence that, although I.A. and Valles-
Dominguez didn’t know each other, Valles-Dominguez’s DNA was
found on the steering wheel of I.A.’s car. Additionally, I.A.’s car was
recovered near the location where Valles-Dominguez met with B.A.
the day after the carjacking. Further, a ballistics expert determined
that the bullet fired into the car came from the same gun that was
used in the earlier shooting and was recovered in the house where
Valles-Dominguez had been hiding. And I.A. identified Valles-
Dominguez as the carjacker from a photograph.
¶ 24 Valles-Dominguez again points to weaknesses in the evidence,
such as I.A.’s inability to identify Valles-Dominguez in a photo array
or in court, I.A.’s identification of him in only one of the two photos
of him shown by investigators, the possibility that his DNA in I.A.’s
car could have come from secondary transfer, and the absence of
any evidence of his fingerprints in I.A.’s car. But again, giving the
People the benefit of every reasonable inference, we conclude that
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Valles-
Dominguez was the person who committed the carjacking. See
9 III. Restitution
¶ 25 Finally, Valles-Dominguez contends that the trial court erred
by imposing restitution after expiration of the ninety-one-day
deadline in section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023. We agree.
A. Additional Facts
¶ 26 At Valles-Dominguez’s sentencing hearing on September 25,
2023, the prosecution made an initial request for about $2,000 in
restitution, payable to the Victim Compensation Fund in relation to
Corporal Farmer. The prosecution also requested forty-five days to
supplement its motion with additional amounts relating to Officer
Snook. Valles-Dominguez, in turn, asked for fourteen days after
the prosecution’s filing to lodge an objection to both the amount
initially requested and any additional amounts. The court agreed to
reserve ruling on the amount of restitution and entered a minute
order establishing the deadlines for the amended motion and any
objections to it.
¶ 27 The prosecution filed a timely amended motion requesting a
total of about $355,000 in restitution. That same day, the court
held a status conference at which the parties discussed scheduling
a restitution hearing. Aware of the ninety-one-day statutory
10 deadline for determining the final amount of restitution, which was
December 25, the court set the hearing for December 13. However,
for reasons unstated in the record, that hearing was vacated and
rescheduled outside the deadline. After the restitution hearing,
which was ultimately held on February 2, 2024, the court entered
an order awarding $349,998.68 in restitution. There was no
discussion at that hearing of the deadline for ordering restitution
having passed.
B. Waiver
¶ 28 As a preliminary matter, the People assert that Valles-
Dominguez waived this issue because he didn’t object to the
restitution hearing being set outside the statutory ninety-one-day
deadline.
¶ 29 We review de novo whether a claim is waived. Babcock v.
People, 2025 CO 26, ¶ 28. In doing so, we “indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver,” as we don’t presume
acquiescence in the loss of a defendant’s rights. People v. Garcia,
2024 CO 41M, ¶ 29 (quoting People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39).
¶ 30 Waiver of a statutory right, as is argued here, “must be
voluntary, but need not be knowing and intelligent.” People v.
11 Roberson, 2025 CO 30, ¶ 13 (quoting Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38,
¶ 16). Waiver may be explicit, such as “when a party expressly
abandons an existing right or privilege,” or implied, such as “when
a party engages in conduct that manifests an intent to relinquish a
right or privilege or acts inconsistently with its assertion.” Forgette
v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 28. Waiver extinguishes error and therefore
any appellate review. Rediger, ¶ 40.
¶ 31 Although it doesn’t appear that Valles-Dominguez objected to
the restitution hearing being held after the ninety-one-day deadline,
his failure to object, standing alone, doesn’t constitute waiver. See
Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 21 (“the mere failure to raise an
issue” isn’t sufficient to establish an unequivocal act indicative of
waiver or a clear manifestation of an intent to relinquish a claim,
both of which are necessary to establish waiver). And there is no
indication in the record that Valles-Dominguez consented to —
much less requested — a hearing date beyond the ninety-one day
deadline. Cf. Babcock, ¶ 30 (the defendant waived his right to have
the court determine the amount of restitution within ninety-one
days where he requested a hearing date that fell after expiration of
the deadline); Roberson, ¶ 17 (the defendant waived her right to
12 have the court determine the amount of restitution within ninety-
one days where she didn’t object to the trial court’s suggestion to
hold a hearing after expiration of the deadline and then requested
four additional continuances of that hearing).
¶ 32 Accordingly, we conclude that while Valles-Dominguez’s
actions equate to forfeiture, they don’t amount to waiver. See
Rediger, ¶¶ 39-40 (distinguishing the two doctrines).
¶ 33 While waiver extinguishes error, and thus appellate review,
forfeiture does not. Id. at ¶ 40. And while we ordinarily review
forfeited claims for plain error, claims that could be brought as
illegal manner claims under Crim. P. 35(a) don’t need to be
preserved and may be raised for the first time on direct appeal.
Fransua v. People, 2019 CO 96, ¶ 13. A claim that the defendant
was ordered to pay restitution in violation of the deadlines and
procedures set forth in section 18-1.3-603 may be raised under
Rule 35(a). See People v. Tennyson, 2023 COA 2, ¶ 33, aff’d, 2025
CO 31. Thus, despite the lack of preservation, we review this issue
de novo. See People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 24; People v. Martinez
Rubier, 2024 COA 67, ¶¶ 23, 25.
13 C. Timeliness of the Restitution Order
¶ 34 At the time of Valles-Dominguez’s sentencing, section 18-1.3-
603(1)(b) required that when a trial court ordered restitution at
sentencing but left the amount open, the court had to resolve the
amount within ninety-one days, absent an extension of that
deadline for good cause. A trial court “lack[s] authority” to order
restitution when it neither determines the restitution amount
within ninety-one days nor expressly finds good cause to extend the
deadline before the deadline has expired. Weeks, ¶¶ 5, 45.
¶ 35 The trial court here did not determine the restitution amount
within the ninety-one-day deadline, and there is no indication in
the record that the court found good cause to extend the deadline.
Therefore, the court lacked authority to order restitution.
¶ 36 While Valles-Dominguez asks us to vacate the restitution order
based on the violation of the statutory deadline, the People dispute
whether vacatur is the proper remedy. But in a recent opinion, our
supreme court reaffirmed that the appropriate remedy for entry of
an untimely restitution order is to vacate the order. See Snow v.
People, 2025 CO 32, ¶¶ 4, 30-40; accord Weeks, ¶ 47.
14 ¶ 37 Accordingly, we vacate the restitution order and remand the
case to the trial court to amend the mittimus to reflect that no
IV. Disposition
¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed, the restitution order is vacated, and
the case is remanded for amendment of the mittimus to reflect that
no restitution is owed.
JUDGE WELLING concurs.
JUDGE SULLIVAN concurs in part and dissents in part.
15 JUDGE SULLIVAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 39 I agree with the majority’s well-reasoned decision that
sufficient evidence supported Valles-Dominguez’s convictions for
attempted murder and aggravated robbery. As a result, I agree that
the convictions should be affirmed. I part ways, however, from the
majority’s conclusion that Valles-Dominguez didn’t waive his
argument based on the statutory deadline for imposing restitution.
In my view, the majority’s waiver analysis (1) doesn’t align with the
record or the supreme court’s precedent and (2) will incentivize
gamesmanship in restitution proceedings. I therefore respectfully
dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the trial court’s
restitution order.
¶ 40 First, the majority rejects the People’s argument that Valles-
Dominguez waived the ninety-one-day deadline in section 18-1.3-
603(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023.2 But in my view, that conclusion doesn’t
line up with either the record or the supreme court’s recent
2 In 2025, the General Assembly amended the deadline to sixty-
three days following the later of (1) the prosecution’s presentation of restitution information or (2) the order of conviction. Ch. 307, sec. 1, § 18-1.3-603(1)(b), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1606. Like the majority, I cite to the 2023 version of section 18-1.3-603 that was in effect at the time the trial court ordered restitution.
16 decisions on waiver. At the November status conference to set the
restitution hearing, defense counsel said she “defer[red] to the
[p]rosecution” and to “when the other parties are available” because
she anticipated waiving Valles-Dominguez’s appearance. The
prosecutor then raised the ninety-one-day deadline; said it expired
on December 25, 2023; and twice requested the court set the
restitution hearing “within that time period . . . to make sure the
[c]ourt is preserving” its ability to order restitution. Although the
court initially set the restitution hearing within the statutory period,
it later postponed the hearing for unexplained reasons to February
2, 2024, a date beyond the ninety-one-day deadline.
¶ 41 Despite being made aware of the ninety-one-day deadline at
the status conference, defense counsel never filed an objection to
the court postponing the restitution hearing beyond the deadline.
Nor did the defense attorney who represented Valles-Dominguez at
the restitution hearing — the same attorney who was present at the
status conference and heard the prosecutor repeatedly mention the
ninety-one-day deadline — verbally object at the February hearing
to the court imposing restitution beyond the deadline. See Finney
17 v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 16 (“Counsel may waive a defendant’s
statutory rights.”).
¶ 42 Our supreme court has recently made clear that a defendant
impliedly waives their objection, and thus extinguishes appellate
review, when they are fully aware of an alleged error but decline to
request corrective action. See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶¶ 30,
34. In Forgette, the prosecutor alerted the court and defense
counsel that one of the jurors appeared to be asleep. Id. at ¶ 25.
Although defense counsel suggested that the trial court try to
“rouse” the juror, which the court attempted, defense counsel
sought no further relief from the court. Id. at ¶ 26. Because
defense counsel was “fully aware” of the sleeping juror but didn’t
object or ask the court to take further corrective action, the
supreme court concluded that the defendant had waived his right to
object on appeal. Id. at ¶ 34.
¶ 43 Thus, under Forgette, a defendant’s inaction, when coupled
with their full awareness of a potential error, amounts to an implied
waiver of the error. Accord Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48,
¶¶ 10-16 (concluding defendant waived his right to argue that he
18 was denied a public trial when defense counsel was aware of the
courtroom closure but failed to object).
¶ 44 Admittedly, some tension exists between Forgette and the
earlier supreme court cases cited by the majority that say a
defendant’s failure to raise an issue, without more, isn’t enough to
constitute a waiver. See Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 21; People
v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶¶ 42, 46. But those cases are
distinguishable. Unlike Forgette, the supreme court perceived no
evidence that the defendants in those cases were fully aware of the
unobjected-to errors. See Phillips, ¶ 26; Rediger, ¶ 43.
¶ 45 Given these recent developments in the supreme court’s case
law, whether a defendant is fully aware of the unobjected-to error
becomes critical to the waiver analysis. This begs the question:
How does an appellate court suss out whether the defendant was
fully aware of the error or whether they simply overlooked it
through mere inadvertence? The supreme court has recently
provided guidance on that question, too.
¶ 46 In People v. Roberson, 2025 CO 30, ¶ 4, the trial court at
sentencing ordered the defendant to pay restitution but reserved
the amount. In doing so, the trial court mentioned section 18-1.3-
19 603(1)(b)’s ninety-one-day deadline. Id. The trial court later
proposed a restitution hearing date that fell outside the ninety-one-
day window, which date defense counsel accepted. Id. at ¶ 1. On
appeal, the supreme court held that the defendant had waived her
objection to the timeliness of the court’s restitution order. Id. at
¶ 17. Applying Forgette, the supreme court explained that the
defendant’s failure to object to the court’s proposed hearing date,
“when it fell outside of the ninety-one-day deadline and when the
statutory deadline had been expressly mentioned at the sentencing
hearing, constituted a voluntary waiver of a statutory right.”3 Id.
(emphasis added).
¶ 47 Accordingly, based on Roberson and Forgette, a defendant is
deemed fully aware of — and impliedly waives their right to object to
any noncompliance with — the statutory deadline for imposing
restitution when their defense counsel is informed at sentencing of
3 The majority points out that the defendant in Roberson did more
than merely accept the court’s proposed restitution hearing date; she also requested four continuances of the hearing after the ninety-one-day deadline had already passed. People v. Roberson, 2025 CO 30, ¶ 16. But again, Forgette makes clear that such affirmative acts aren’t essential to show an implied waiver; defense counsel’s inaction when they are fully aware of the error is enough. See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶¶ 26, 34.
20 the deadline but nonetheless accepts a restitution hearing date
beyond the deadline. Cf. People v. Franco, 74 P.3d 357, 359 (Colo.
App. 2002) (“[A] defendant cannot stand mute and allow a trial
schedule to be adopted without registering his complaint that such
schedule violates his speedy trial rights.” (citation omitted)).
Because those are the exact facts of this case, I would hold that
Valles-Dominguez impliedly waived his right to object to the
timeliness of the trial court’s restitution order.
¶ 48 Second, I worry that the version of the waiver rule applied by
the majority will encourage sandbagging and gamesmanship. As
the majority notes, a trial court’s error in entering an untimely
restitution order requires that we automatically vacate the order,
even when the defendant failed to object below to the delay. See
Snow v. People, 2025 CO 32, ¶¶ 4, 30-40. Unlike most unpreserved
errors, no plain error analysis applies.
¶ 49 Given this strict rule, I have difficulty imagining a scenario in
which a defendant will ever object to the trial court scheduling a
restitution hearing beyond section 18-1.3-603(1)(b)’s deadline.
They will instead await the outcome of the (untimely) restitution
hearing and, if adverse, seek automatic vacatur on appeal. In my
21 view, a defendant who chooses to refrain from objecting to an
untimely restitution hearing, despite being fully aware of the
applicable deadline, shouldn’t receive such a windfall. See, e.g.,
Stackhouse, ¶ 16 (“Allowing a defense attorney who stands silent
during a known [courtroom] closure to then seek invalidation of an
adverse verdict on that basis would encourage gamesmanship”); cf.
Phillips, ¶ 29 (finding no waiver, in part, because “no real danger of
sandbagging” exists when the defendant must show plain error
through a sufficiently developed factual record).
¶ 50 For these reasons, although I agree with the majority that
Valles-Dominguez’s convictions should be affirmed, I respectfully
dissent from its decision to vacate the trial court’s restitution order.