Peo v. Valdovinos Cardenas

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 17, 2025
• Docket: 23CA2066
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA2066 Peo v Valdovinos Cardenas 04-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2066 Eagle County District Court No. 21CR141 Honorable Rachel J. Olguin-Fresquez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jose Guadalupe Valdovinos Cardenas,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Freyre and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 17, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, Leo T. Nguyen, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Defiance Law Firm, Peter A. Rachesky, Lara L. Horst, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jose Guadalupe Valdovinos Cardenas, appeals the

district court’s order directing the parties to set a hearing regarding

his “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.” Because we conclude that

the district court’s order is not a final appealable order, we dismiss

the appeal.

I. Background

¶2 As part of a global disposition resolving three cases,

Valdovinos Cardenas pleaded guilty in this case to child abuse and

attempted unlawful sexual contact. The plea agreement stipulated

that in exchange for his guilty plea, the remaining counts would be

dismissed. As part of his agreement, Valdovinos Cardenas

acknowledged, “I understand that all charges dismissed as part of

any plea bargain can be considered for restitution and sentencing

purposes.” However, at the time of the plea colloquy, the parties

informed the court that they “do not have a stipulation regarding

any restitution that may be owed to [the victim]” and if they “are

unable to reach a stipulation by the time of sentencing, they will

request a restitution hearing.”

¶3 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution informed the

district court that the parties were “unable to reach a stipulated

1 restitution amount for the lost wages of [the victim],” which

stemmed from one of the dismissed counts. The prosecution

requested that the court “find that there is restitution in this case,”

allow “two weeks to file a motion for restitution,” and then “set this

matter for a restitution hearing . . . within 90 days of today’s date.”

Defense counsel objected “to a determination that there is

restitution regarding withheld wages” and likewise requested a

hearing.

¶4 Based on this record, the district court found “[t]here is

restitution” and granted the prosecution fourteen days to file a

restitution request and the defense fourteen days to respond. The

court explained that this would “giv[e] the parties a chance to

resolve [this] matter without a hearing. But if we do need a hearing,

we’ll get that set.”

¶5 Twenty-one days later the prosecution filed a motion

requesting $198,744 in restitution for the victim’s lost wages.

Valdovinos Cardenas did not object. Sixteen days later, having

received no objection, the district court ordered restitution to the

victim in the amount requested (the June order).

2 ¶6 Valdovinos Cardenas did not appeal the June order. However,

approximately three months after the June order was entered, he

filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” requesting the district

court to vacate the June order based on “the untimely Motion of the

People,” or, alternatively, to set an evidentiary hearing. The district

court granted the motion in part, ordering that the matter be set for

a restitution hearing (the August order). In the August order, the

court noted that while “[r]estitution was ordered within the

statutory time frames . . . a hearing to determine the exact amount,

whether that results in zero or another amount is appropriate.”

¶7 Before a hearing was set, Valdovinos Cardenas filed a “Brief in

Support of Objection to Restitution” additionally asserting that he

had not agreed to pay restitution for the dismissed charges. The

prosecution filed a response, and the district court issued an order

on October 12, 2023 reiterating its earlier ruling that Valdovinos

Cardenas was entitled to a restitution hearing and instructing

defense counsel to contact the court to “set the matter for an

evidentiary hearing” and ordering that the hearing occur “within the

next 28 days.” On October 31, 2023, the court issued a notice of

evidentiary hearing, setting a hearing for December 8, 2023.

3 However, before the restitution hearing was held, Valdovinos

Cardenas filed a notice of appeal with this court seeking to appeal

the district court’s October ruling.

II. Analysis

¶8 Valdovinos Cardenas alleges that the district court erred when

it ordered restitution for a dismissed charge and that the

prosecution and the court failed to comply with their various

statutory obligations under section 18-1.3-603, C.R.S. 2024.

Because we agree with the People that the district court’s October

order was not a final appealable order, however, we dismiss the

appeal.

¶9 Pursuant to C.A.R. 1, an appeal may be prosecuted only from

a final appealable order. “A final appealable order is one that

effectively terminates the proceedings in the court below and is a

jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review.” People v. Thomas,

116 P.3d 1284, 1285 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 10 The district court’s October ruling, although titled an order,

did not deny any specific relief. See People v. Curren, 228 P.3d 253,

257 (Colo. App. 2009) (a final judgment ends the particular action,

leaving nothing further for the pronouncing court to do to

4 completely determine the involved parties’ rights). Additionally, the

court’s instructions to defense counsel to “contact the court and set

the matter for an evidentiary hearing,” as well as its notification to

the parties to hold an evidentiary hearing on December 8, suggest a

lack of finality. Accordingly, because the October order did not

terminate the proceedings, it is not a final appealable order. And

without a final order before us, we lack jurisdiction to address any

of the claims raised in Valdovinos Cardenas’s opening brief. See

Thomas, 116 P.3d at 1285. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

III. Disposition

¶ 11 The appeal is dismissed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.