Peo v. Townsend

Opinion

26CA0005 Peo v Townsend 08-20-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0005 El Paso County District Court No. 25CR5223 Honorable Frances Johnson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sanorio Townsend, Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V

Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Yun and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 20, 2026

Michael J. Allen, District Attorney, Doyle Baker, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Reid Ostrom, Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kayla N. Boyd, Deputy State Public Defender, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

¶1 Pursuant to section 16-12-102(1), C.R.S. 2025, the People appeal the district court’s order dismissing, after a preliminary hearing, the second degree burglary and first degree criminal trespass charges against Sanorio Townsend. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Officer Katherine Cox was the only witness at the preliminary hearing. She testified that, on October 23, 2025, Townsend spoke on the phone with his then-eleven-year-old daughter, S.R., who lived with her mother, Jacqueline Ramos (Townsend’s ex-wife). Townsend told S.R. that she was disrespectful during the call and said he was coming to Ramos’s home to discipline her.

¶3 Officer Cox testified that video footage showed Townsend entering Ramos’s house through a “wide open” door, following another child who apparently lived there. Townsend then went into S.R.’s room and “pinched” her shoulders to discipline her.

¶4 On November 13, 2025, an employee of the El Paso County Department of Human Services reported the pinching incident to Officer Cox. Officer Cox and her partner, Officer Joel Splawn, met with S.R. and Ramos at Ramos’s home. Officer Cox spoke with S.R., and Officer Splawn spoke with Ramos. Officer Cox testified

2

that, according to Officer Splawn, Ramos told Townsend “[a]pproximately[] three times” that he was not permitted in her home. Officer Cox clarified that she was not present when Officer Splawn interviewed Ramos, did not know “exactly when” Ramos told Townsend he was not allowed to be in her home, and could not even say whether Ramos informed Townsend before October 23, 2025, that he was not permitted in her home. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Cox, “[G]enerally, all you know is that [Ramos] was saying, I don’t want him in my house?” Officer Cox replied, “Yes.”

¶5 The prosecution charged Townsend with second degree burglary, first degree criminal trespass, and misdemeanor child abuse. (The preliminary hearing did not involve the child abuse charge. In addition, the court acknowledged that there is no right to a preliminary hearing on a first degree criminal trespass charge but said it would rule on both the burglary and trespass charges at the hearing because they were “so intertwined.” The People do not argue that the court erred by dismissing the trespass charge at the preliminary hearing. Nothing in this opinion should be read to

3

suggest that courts are authorized to dismiss first degree criminal trespass charges at preliminary hearings.)

¶6 At the end of the preliminary hearing, the court acknowledged that “apparently [Ramos] told Officer Cox that [Townsend] didn’t have permission to be in the home,” but it found that the prosecution had not met its burden to show probable cause for the burglary and trespass charges without “some information that [Townsend] knew” before October 23, 2025, that he was not permitted to enter Ramos’s house. Lacking such evidence, the court dismissed the second degree burglary and first degree criminal trespass charges.

¶7 On appeal, the People contend that the court erred by dismissing those charges because the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.

¶8 We affirm the order dismissing the charges.

II. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Dismissing the Burglary Charge

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶9 Generally, “[w]e review a trial court’s probable cause determination at a preliminary hearing for an abuse of discretion.”

4

People v. Dilka, 2026 CO 12, ¶ 12, 584 P.3d 564, 567. “Under the abuse of discretion standard, our review is narrowly circumscribed, and we can only reverse if the district court’s ruling was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if the court misapplied the law.” People v. Taylor, 2026 COA 50, ¶ 14, ___ P.3d ___, ___. “[A] reviewing court doesn’t ask whether it would have ruled as the trial court did, but instead considers ‘whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.’” People v. Tippet, 2023 CO 61, ¶ 64, 539 P.3d 547, 559 (quoting Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 2012 CO 54, ¶ 74, 285 P.3d 986, 1008).

¶ 10 But to the extent the district court’s probable cause finding rested on interpreting a rule of law, we review that interpretation de novo. Dilka, ¶ 12, 584 P.3d at 567. If we determine that the district court “applied an erroneous construction of law at the preliminary hearing, we review the record and determine whether the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would induce a reasonably prudent and cautious person to entertain the belief that the defendant committed the crime charged.” Taylor, ¶ 15, ___ P.3d at ___. “Thus, we must first

5

consider whether the district court based its rulings on correct conclusions of law.” Id.

¶ 11 A preliminary hearing is “a screening device, designed to determine whether probable cause exists to support charges that an accused person committed a particular crime or crimes.” People v. Romero, 2025 COA 91, ¶ 8, 583 P.3d 449, 451 (quoting People v. Treat, 568 P.2d 473, 474 (Colo. 1977)). “[W]here the evidence is sufficient to establish probable cause as a matter of law, reversal is required.” People v. Jensen, 765 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Colo. 1988). At a preliminary hearing, it is “unnecessary for the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, or even the probability of the defendant’s conviction.” Taylor, ¶ 13, ___ P.3d at ___. Furthermore, at a preliminary hearing, the court may not “accept the defendant’s version of the facts over the legitimate inferences which can be drawn from the People’s evidence.” People v. Villapando, 984 P.2d 51, 55 (Colo. 1999) (quoting People v. Holder, 658 P.2d 870, 872 (Colo. 1983)).

¶ 12 In addition, “[t]he lack of a perceiving witness is [not] fatal to the prosecution’s case at this stage of the proceedings.” Jensen, 765 P.2d at 1031. And “most, but not all, of the evidence may be

6

hearsay.” People v. Huggins, 220 P.3d 977, 979 (Colo. App. 2009). But “at a preliminary hearing[,] the prosecution may not rely solely upon hearsay evidence to establish probable cause when a perceiving witness is available to testify.” Id. (quoting People v. Horn, 772 P.2d 108, 109 (Colo. 1989)). “[T]he prosecution satisfies the minimum requirement for nonhearsay if it (1) presents some competent nonhearsay addressing essential elements of the offense, and (2) presents hearsay testimony through a witness who is connected to the offense or its investigation and is not merely reading from a report.” Id. at 980.

B. The Elements of Second Degree Burglary and First Degree Criminal Trespass

¶ 13 A person commits second degree burglary “if the person knowingly breaks an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a crime against another person or property.” § 18-4-203(1), C.R.S. 2025 (emphasis added). Second degree burglary is a class 3 felony if the building or occupied structure is a dwelling. § 18-4-203(2)(b)(I). “A person ‘enters unlawfully’ or ‘remains unlawfully’ in or upon premises

7

when the person is not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to do so.” § 18-4-201(3), C.R.S. 2025. “The law of burglary was designed to protect the dweller . . . .” People v. Johnson, 906 P.2d 122, 125 (Colo. 1995).

¶ 14 “A person commits the crime of first degree criminal trespass if such person . . . [k]nowingly and unlawfully enters or remains in a dwelling of another . . . .” § 18-4-502(1), C.R.S. 2025. If the dwelling is inhabited or occupied, the offense is a class 6 felony. § 18-4-502(2)(a).

¶ 15 The “knowingly” mental state applies to every element of burglary and trespass. See Oram v. People, 255 P.3d 1032, 1037-38 (Colo. 2011); § 18-1-503(4), C.R.S. 2025. “A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such a nature or that such circumstances exist.” Oram, 255 P.3d at 1038; § 18-1-501(6), C.R.S. 2025. “The mental state of knowingly is a subjective rather than an objective standard . . . .” Oram, 255 P.3d at 1038.

¶ 16 Thus, at a preliminary hearing involving burglary or trespass charges, the prosecution must present evidence that, when viewed

8

in its favor, would induce a reasonably prudent and cautious person to believe that the defendant knew his entry into a dwelling was unlawful. See id.; Taylor, ¶ 15, ___ P.3d at ___; § 18-4-502(1).

C. The People Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence to Establish Probable Cause

¶ 17 The People contend that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to show that Townsend knew his entry into Ramos’s home on October 23, 2025, was unlawful. The People argue that the court failed to “properly evaluate” the evidence and erred by drawing inferences from the evidence “in Townsend’s favor.”

¶ 18 We disagree and hold that the court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the second degree burglary charge against Townsend because the prosecution failed to present evidence on a critical element — that Townsend had actual knowledge at the time that he was not permitted to enter Ramos’s house.

¶ 19 The prosecution’s evidence at the hearing demonstrated the following:

• S.R. knew that Townsend was coming to Ramos’s house but did not pass along this information to Ramos.

9

• Ramos entered a “wide open” door with another child who apparently lived in the house.

• The other children in Ramos’s house when Townsend arrived did not “show any kind of alarm” that he was entering it.

• S.R. did not tell Officer Cox that Townsend was not allowed in the home on the date of the incident.

• Officer Cox could not confirm whether, at any time before October 23, 2025, Ramos told Townsend that he was not allowed in her home.

¶ 20 Thus, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the only evidence suggesting that Townsend knew that he was not permitted to enter Ramos’s home was Ramos’s statement (relayed through Officer Splawn to Officer Cox) that he was not permitted in the home. But Ramos did not specify when she first told Townsend that he was not permitted to enter her home. Even assuming, without deciding, that Officer Cox’s hearsay testimony was admissible, it did not establish that Ramos told Townsend before October 23, 2025, that he was not permitted in her home. Thus, we cannot say, based on the record, that the court

10

abused its discretion by finding there was insufficient evidence to establish that Townsend knowingly entered Ramos’s home unlawfully on that date.

¶ 21 The People also argue that Townsend was “not licensed or privileged to enter [Ramos’s] house absent a possessory right to the premises.” We do not reach this argument, however, because at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution neither raised it nor introduced evidence showing that Ramos did not have the right to enter the house, and the court did not consider whether Townsend was licensed or privileged to enter Ramos’s house. See People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 507 (Colo. 1998) (“It is axiomatic that issues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.”).

¶ 22 At the preliminary hearing, the court specifically asked the prosecutor what evidence showed that Townsend lacked permission — and knew he lacked permission — to enter Ramos’s home on October 23, 2025. The prosecution responded that “[Ramos] telling the officer . . . he doesn’t have permission to be in the house. . . . [was] sufficient for knowingly.” The prosecutor did

11

not argue at the preliminary hearing that Townsend lacked a license, invitation, or privilege to enter the house.

¶ 23 In sum, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the second degree burglary charge against Townsend. And because the People do not challenge the court’s authority to dismiss the first degree criminal trespass charge, we affirm the dismissal of that charge as well.

III. Disposition

¶ 24 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.