25CA0136 Peo v Top Dollar Pawn 07-16-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0136 El Paso County District Court No. 22CR3298 Honorable David A. Gilbert, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Top Dollar Pawn, LLC,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Yun and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 16, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C., Jeffrey S. Pagliuca, Adam Mueller, Jacob B. McMahon, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Top Dollar Pawn, LLC appeals the district court’s order
awarding the Colorado Springs Police Department (the Department)
$37,152 in restitution for the Department’s cost of acquiring
storage containers to hold the substantial amount of stolen goods
seized from Top Dollar. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 A grand jury indicted Top Dollar and four individuals (the
individual defendants) who were actively engaged in Top Dollar’s
business on one count of violating the Colorado Organized Crime
Control Act (COCCA), one count of theft, and twenty-seven counts
of money laundering. In support of the COCCA count, the
prosecution alleged that the individual defendants knowingly
purchased stolen items, resold those items in Top Dollar’s stores or
online, and used the laundered funds to operate Top Dollar and buy
more stolen property.
¶3 Top Dollar pleaded guilty to the COCCA count in exchange for
dismissal of the remaining counts against it. As relevant here, Top
Dollar stipulated to causation for restitution purposes. The district
court imposed a $25,000 fine and set a hearing to address Top
1 Dollar’s objection to the prosecution’s request that the court order
Top Dollar to pay $37,152 in restitution to the Department.
¶4 At the restitution hearing, the Department’s evidence manager
explained that her job included ensuring there is sufficient space to
store evidence collected during the Department’s investigations.
She said that the Department’s facilities only “have storage space
for the typical amount that we get from a case.”
¶5 The evidence manager further testified that the Department’s
facilities were insufficient to accommodate the extensive amount of
stolen goods seized from Top Dollar, and, for that reason, the
Department was required to purchase four storage containers and
rent four additional containers to hold the stolen goods. She
explained that the Department used the rented containers as
overflow storage until it could organize the stolen goods and
condense them into the purchased containers.
¶6 Further, the evidence manager agreed that storing evidence
collected during a criminal investigation into theft and fencing was
a function of the Department’s normal course of business. But she
explained that, during her twenty-one years working for the
Department, she never before had to acquire containers to store
2 evidence collected in a single case, and that, but for the stolen
goods seized from Top Dollar, she would not have needed to obtain
the additional containers.
¶7 In addition, the evidence manager testified that if the
Department had rented rather than purchased containers to store
the stolen goods, the Department would have paid approximately
$95,000. The evidence showed that the Department incurred
$37,152 by purchasing the four containers and temporarily renting
the four other containers.
¶8 Top Dollar asserted that the Department’s costs for obtaining
the storage containers were not recoverable as restitution. The
district court disagreed and granted the prosecution’s restitution
request.
¶9 The district court found that the Department would not have
needed to store such a large volume of evidence absent Top Dollar’s
criminal activity and that the Department’s solution “was a
reasonable way . . . to approach the problem of the amount of items
that it found itself laden with, that it would be required to store for
purposes of a trial, for purposes of this case.” The court found that
“this was an extraordinary situation where the [D]epartment . . .
3 made a reasonable economic decision to purchase some of those
[containers] and to rent some other of those [containers]” and said
that the restitution statute “makes clear that when you have this
type of situation where [a] police department determines the only
way to carry out [its] responsibility is to purchase large containers,
and/or rent large containers, then that’s what they’ll do.”
II. Restitution Statute
¶ 10 Every order of conviction must include consideration of
restitution. § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2025; People v. Weeks, 2021
CO 75, ¶ 3, 498 P.3d 142, 147-48. Restitution is generally defined
as “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim.” § 18-1.3-602(3)(a),
C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 11 In restitution cases, “[t]he prosecution must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s conduct
proximately caused the victim’s loss and the amount of that loss.”
People v. Babcock, 2023 COA 49, ¶ 19, 535 P.3d 981, 987, aff’d,
2025 CO 26, 569 P.3d 850. Proximate cause means that an event
“in the natural and probable sequence of things . . . produced the
claimed injury.” Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 30, 542 P.3d
4 675, 682 (quoting Schneider v. Midtown Motor Co., 854 P.2d 1322,
1327 (Colo. App. 1992)).
¶ 12 “[W]hen a law enforcement agency ‘does not fall within the
defining scope of the underlying criminal statute as a primary
victim,’ its pecuniary losses cannot be recompensed as restitution
unless the legislature has ‘specifically enumerate[d]’ them ‘within
the restitution statute.’” People v. Hollis, 2025 CO 54, ¶ 21, 576
P.3d 147, 152 (quoting People v. Padilla-Lopez, 2012 CO 49, ¶ 11,
279 P.3d 651, 654). As relevant here, the General Assembly
specified that restitution includes “money advanced by law
enforcement agencies,” § 18-1.3-602(3)(a); “extraordinary direct
public and all private investigative costs,” § 18-1.3-602(3)(b); and
“costs incurred by a government agency . . . to . . . [s]tore . . .
evidence of a controlled substance violation,”
§ 18-1.3-602(3)(c)(I)(B).
¶ 13 For purposes of restitution, a “[v]ictim” is “any person
aggrieved by the conduct of an offender,” § 18-1.3-602(4)(a),
including “[a]ny person who had to expend resources for the
purposes described in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of subsection (3)
of this section,” § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(VI). Because the restitution
5 statute does not define “person,” we apply the word’s general
statutory definition: “any individual, corporation, government or
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust,
limited liability company, partnership, association, or other legal
entity.” § 2-4-401(8), C.R.S. 2025 (emphasis added); see also
Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41, 45-46 (Colo. 2009) (applying section
2-4-401(8) when interpreting the restitution statute).
III. Standard of Review
¶ 14 We review for clear error the factual findings underlying a
court’s restitution order. Martinez, ¶¶ 3, 21, 32, 542 P.3d at 678,
680, 682-83. Under the clear error standard, we must affirm the
court’s findings unless they lack record support. Id. at ¶ 34, 542
P.3d at 683.
¶ 15 In addition, “[w]e review questions of law involving statutory
interpretation de novo.” People v. Gallegos, 2013 CO 45, ¶ 7, 307
P.3d 1096, 1099; People v. Le, 2022 COA 32, ¶ 15, 512 P.3d 146,
148-49.
IV. Undeveloped Arguments
¶ 16 As a threshold matter, we note that, throughout its opening
brief, Top Dollar makes conclusory statements regarding the
6 underlying proceeding and the restitution order. These include Top
Dollar’s assertions that the prosecution did not file a restitution
motion and that the Department created the storage problem
because there was no legitimate need for it to retain all the stolen
goods seized from Top Dollar.
¶ 17 We do not address these arguments because they are neither
developed nor supported by legal authority. See C.A.R. 28(a)(4),
(a)(7)(B); People v. Liggett, 2021 COA 51, ¶ 53, 492 P.3d 356, 365
(declining to address the defendant’s “additional but cursory”
challenges because they were presented “without sufficient
development of the argument for us to decide the issue”), aff’d,
2023 CO 22, 529 P.3d 113.
V. The District Court Did Not Err by Ordering Top Dollar to Pay Restitution in the Amount of the Department’s Storage Costs
¶ 18 Top Dollar contends that the district court erred by ordering it
to pay restitution to the Department because (1) Top Dollar’s
conduct did not “aggrieve[]” the Department and (2) the storage
costs that the Department incurred to hold the stolen goods seized
from Top Dollar do not constitute “money advanced by law
enforcement agencies” or “extraordinary” direct public investigative
7 costs. Top Dollar specifically asserts that the Department’s storage
costs do not fall within section 18-1.3-602(3)(a)’s reference to
“money advanced by law enforcement agencies,” see Hollis, ¶¶ 20-
37, 576 P.3d at 151-54, and that the Department’s expenditure of
funds to store the stolen goods seized from Top Dollar does not
mean that Top Dollar’s conduct “aggrieved” it, see Padilla-Lopez,
¶ 18, 279 P.3d at 655.
¶ 19 But we need not address these arguments because (1) we are
convinced that the Department’s expenditure of funds to acquire
containers to store the significant amount of stolen goods seized
from Top Dollar is recoverable under section 18-1.3-602(3)(b); and
(2) as the party that expended the moneys for such purpose, the
Department is a “victim” for purposes of section
18-1.3-602(4)(a)(VI).
¶ 20 Importantly, Top Dollar concedes in its appellate briefs that
the storage costs are “investigative” and argues only that they were
not “extraordinary.” Accordingly, we offer no opinion on whether
the Department incurred the costs for investigative purposes; we
assume that the Department did so. See People v. Lulei, 2026 CO
17, ¶¶ 28-29, 586 P.3d 184, 194 (Under the party presentation
8 principle, “courts ‘rely on the parties to frame the issues for
decision’” because we presume “that the parties know what is best
for them[] and are responsible for advancing the facts and
arguments entitling them to relief”; therefore, “[f]idelity to the party
presentation principle . . . generally precludes a court from
spontaneously deciding an issue that the parties have not raised or
had the opportunity to address.” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States,
554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008))).
¶ 21 We now turn to Top Dollar’s developed arguments. In two
recent decisions, the Colorado Supreme Court analyzed whether a
law enforcement agency is entitled to recover certain investigative
costs under the “extraordinary direct public and all private
investigative costs” prong of section 18-1.3-602(3)(b).
¶ 22 In Teague v. People, the supreme court held that a law
enforcement agency’s payment for a sexual assault nurse examiner
(SANE) examination was an extraordinary restitution cost
recoverable under section 18-1.3-602(3)(b). 2017 CO 66, ¶¶ 2, 16,
395 P.3d 782, 783, 786. As part of its analysis, the court looked to
the dictionary definition of “extraordinary” — “‘more than ordinary,’
‘not of the ordinary order or pattern,’ and ‘going beyond what is
9 usual, regular, common, or customary.’” Id. at ¶ 15, 395 P.3d at
786 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 807
(2002)). Applying this definition, the court noted that SANE
examinations serve “not only as an evidence-gathering tool for law
enforcement but also as a source of comprehensive care for
victims.” Id. at ¶ 12, 395 P.3d at 785. “This dual nature . . .
separates SANE exams from more workaday investigative processes
and renders them not simply extraordinary, but unique.” Id. at
¶ 16, 395 P.3d at 786.
¶ 23 The supreme court reached a different result in the second
recent case. In People v. Hollis, the court concluded that losses
associated with use of “buy money” to conduct an undercover drug
transaction were not extraordinary because, in 2025, an officer’s
payment of buy money during a drug investigation was “certainly
not beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary.” 2025
CO 54, ¶¶ 43, 45, 576 P.3d 147, 155-56.
¶ 24 In Teague and Hollis, the supreme court focused on the
extraordinary nature of the investigative activity to determine
whether the costs at issue were extraordinary. See Teague, ¶ 16,
395 P.3d at 786. In neither case did the supreme court consider
10 the issue presented here — whether a law enforcement agency may
recover restitution in the form of an extraordinarily large amount of
expenses that the agency reasonably incurred for a “usual, regular,
common, or customary” category of investigative activity. Id.
(quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at 807).
¶ 25 In this case, we agree with Top Dollar that, because storing
evidence is not an extraordinary investigative measure, the
associated costs would not be deemed extraordinary based solely on
the type of investigative activity for which the costs were incurred.
See Hollis, ¶ 42, 576 P.3d at 155; Teague, ¶ 16, 395 P.3d at 786.
But our inquiry does not end here.
¶ 26 We read the plain language of section 18-1.3-602(3)(b) to allow
for restitution awards when the amount of investigative costs is
“extraordinary,” even if the costs were expended for an ordinary
category of investigative activity. See Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96,
¶ 12, 431 P.3d 215, 218 (When interpreting a statute, “[t]he starting
point in this endeavor is to examine the plain meaning of the
statutory language. . . . Consequently, if the language in a statute
is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to its plain meaning and
look no further.”).
11 ¶ 27 We acknowledge Top Dollar’s argument, without the benefit of
legal support, that neither the district court nor the People
articulated a meaningful analytical framework for determining when
ordinary storage costs rise to the level of extraordinary and are thus
recoverable under section 18-1.3-602(3)(b). Top Dollar argues that
the absence of a clear demarcation line between ordinary and
extraordinary cost amounts creates uncertainty and an incentive for
law enforcement agencies to overspend on ordinary costs at the
expense of defendants ordered to pay restitution. Because we do
not consider undeveloped arguments, see Liggett, ¶ 53, 492 P.3d at
365, we do not reach the merits of Top Dollar’s line-drawing
argument.
¶ 28 Nevertheless, we do not mean to suggest that the amount of
money expended on an ordinary investigative activity is, by itself,
dispositive of whether the costs are extraordinary. Instead, the
inquiry must focus on whether the investigative activity’s costs are
“‘more than ordinary,’ ‘not of the ordinary order or pattern,’ and ‘. . .
beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary.’” Teague,
¶ 15, 395 P.3d at 786 (quoting Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary at 807).
12 ¶ 29 Moreover, when applying section 18-1.3-602(3)(b), courts must
consider, as in other restitution contexts, the reasonableness of the
extraordinary investigative cost and the causal connection between
the cost and the underlying criminality. See Martinez, ¶ 27, 542
P.3d at 681 (In assessing proximate cause, the fact finder must
determine whether the underlying facts “constitute the ‘natural and
probable sequence [that] produced the claimed injury,’ based on
‘the common sense consideration of the risks created by various
conditions and circumstances’ and ‘the policy consideration of
whether a defendant’s responsibility should extend to the results in
question.’” (citations omitted)); see also People v. Shifrin, 2014 COA
14, ¶ 87, 342 P.3d 506, 522 (holding that a court must use a
reasonable method to calculate an amount of restitution); People v.
Stafford, 93 P.3d 572, 575-76 (Colo. App. 2004) (when a defendant
causes the loss of property, the court can consider, in certain
situations, the reasonable replacement value for the property when
awarding an amount of money that will make the victim whole).
And, as explained above, the prosecution must prove
reasonableness and causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Babcock, ¶ 19, 535 P.3d at 987.
13 ¶ 30 We are convinced that the record in this case supports the
district court’s finding that the Department’s costs of renting and
purchasing the storage containers were indeed extraordinary.
Although the evidence manager agreed that storing a “typical”
amount of evidence is a common police function, she also said that,
during her twenty-one years working for the Department, it had
never been required to spend so much money to acquire additional
space to store evidence collected in a single case. The manager’s
testimony thus demonstrates that the Department’s costs
associated with storing the unusually large amount of evidence
collected in this case were neither common nor customary of its
usual practice.
¶ 31 The district court also found that the Department’s acquisition
of the storage containers was “a reasonable way” for it to store the
unusually large amount of evidence in anticipation of Top Dollar’s
trial, despite the cost of the containers. See Martinez, ¶ 34, 542
P.3d at 683. As noted above, Top Dollar does not present a
developed challenge to this finding. See Liggett, ¶ 53, 492 P.3d at
365. In addition, Top Dollar does not explain why, as it suggests,
14 the Department did not need to retain all the stolen goods before
the trial in this case.
¶ 32 So we conclude that the record supports the district court’s
findings that the Department’s storage costs were extraordinary and
that Top Dollar’s criminal conduct proximately caused the
Department to incur those costs. And because the Department
expended the extraordinary costs to acquire the containers, the
Department falls within the definition of “victim” under
¶ 33 In addition, Top Dollar asserts that, under the canon of
statutory construction known as expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, section 18-1.3-602(3)(c)(I)(B)’s reference to “costs incurred
by a government agency or private entity to . . . [s]tore, preserve, or
test evidence of a controlled substance violation” means that the
General Assembly intended to exclude from restitution awards the
cost of storing all other types of evidence. We are not persuaded.
¶ 34 Under this rule of interpretation, “the inclusion of certain
items implies the exclusion of others.” Beeghly v. Mack, 20 P.3d
610, 613 (Colo. 2001). But the canon “applies only when [a] list is
exhaustive,” and “it must yield where its application would render
15 other statutory language meaningless.” Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
2018 CO 17, ¶ 17, 413 P.3d 711, 716.
¶ 35 The General Assembly intended for “restitution [to] be ordered,
collected, and disbursed to the victims of crime and their immediate
families” and mandated that the restitution statute “be liberally
construed to accomplish . . . such purpose[].” § 18-1.3-601(2),
C.R.S. 2025. Moreover, section 18-1.3-602(3) consistently states
that restitution “includes” the enumerated losses. See People v.
Rieger, 2019 COA 14, ¶ 14, 436 P.3d 610, 613 (The word “includes”
“‘denotes that the examples listed are not exhaustive or exclusive,’
but only illustrative.” (citation omitted) (quoting Preston v. Dupont,
35 P.3d 433, 439 (Colo. 2001))). The plain language of section
18-1.3-602(3)(c)(I)(B) reflects the General Assembly’s intent to
permit law enforcement agencies to recover through restitution
awards their costs incurred in “[s]tor[ing], preserv[ing], or test[ing]
evidence of a controlled substance violation,” even if the amount of
such costs is not extraordinary.
¶ 36 Thus, because the application of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius to the statutory definition of restitution would undermine
the General Assembly’s intent reflected in the plain language of
16 subsections (3)(b) and (3)(c)(I)(B), and because the statute’s
enumerated list of recoverable costs is not exhaustive, we conclude
that the canon does not preclude a court from awarding as
restitution a law enforcement agency’s extraordinary cost of storing
a large volume of stolen goods unrelated to a controlled substance
offense.
¶ 37 Lastly, Top Dollar argues that the district court’s restitution
award was improper for the additional reason that the court
ordered Top Dollar to pay a surcharge of $9,250 pursuant to
section 24-4.2-104(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025, in addition to the
restitution award. Such surcharges are applied toward the judicial
district’s “victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement
fund.” Id. The proceeds of these surcharges can be applied toward
law enforcement agencies’ “purchase of equipment, training
programs, and additional personnel,” among other purposes.
§ 24-4.2-105(2), (3), C.R.S. 2025. Top Dollar appears to suggest
that the district court ordered it to reimburse the Department twice
for the cost of the storage containers — once through the restitution
award and once through the surcharge.
17 ¶ 38 But while there are certain enumerated circumstances when a
defendant is entitled to a setoff against a restitution award, see
§ 18-1.3-603(6), (8), Top Dollar does not sufficiently develop the
apparently novel argument that a surcharge can be used as a setoff
against a restitution award. See Liggett, ¶ 53, 492 P.3d at 365; see
also People v. Gregory, 2019 COA 184, ¶ 25, 469 P.3d 507, 512
(noting that the defendant bears the burden of proving a setoff
against a restitution order). It is the role of the General Assembly,
and not this court, to make the public policy decision as to whether
restitution awards and surcharge proceeds can be applied toward
the same categories of costs. “[W]e will not second-guess the policy
preferences of the legislature.” Prairie Mountain Publ’g Co., LLP v.
Regents of Univ. of Colo., 2021 COA 26, ¶ 25, 491 P.3d 472, 477.
¶ 39 And, even if a setoff is permitted, Top Dollar does not argue
that storage containers fall within the category of “equipment” or
that the Department’s cost of the storage containers was the type of
expense for the benefit of crime victims for which the proceeds of
the section 24-4.2-104(1)(a)(I) surcharge can be applied under
section 24-4.2-105(3). And Top Dollar does not show that the
Department received any portion of its surcharge. Indeed, it is
18 unclear whether the surcharge proceeds can be used to reimburse a
law enforcement agency for past expenses. See § 24-4.2-105(3)
(authorizing the victims and witnesses assistance and law
enforcement board to award a grant of money for a law enforcement
agency to purchase equipment).
VI. Disposition
¶ 40 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.