25CA0783 Peo v Tague 06-18-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0783 Arapahoe County District Court No. 04CR3399 Honorable David Karpel, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Daniel Duane Tague,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Lipinsky and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 18, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Daniel Duane Tague, Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, Daniel Duane Tague, appeals the postconviction
court’s order denying his motion to modify the mittimus. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2006, a jury convicted Tague of first degree murder (felony
murder), conspiracy to commit robbery, second degree kidnapping,
robbery, and aggravated motor vehicle theft. He was twenty years
old at the time of the offenses. The trial court sentenced him to life
in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) without the
possibility of parole for felony murder, with lesser sentences for the
other convictions, all to run consecutively to the life sentence.
¶3 On direct appeal, a division of this court affirmed Tague’s
convictions. People v. Tague, (Colo. App. No. 06CA0553, July 3,
2008) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). The mandate issued
in 2008.
¶4 In 2010, Tague filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion, which his
appointed counsel later supplemented. The postconviction court
denied Tague’s motion after a hearing. A division of this court
affirmed the postconviction court’s order. People v. Tague, (Colo.
App. No. 20CA0092, July 14, 2022) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(e)).
1 ¶5 In 2021, the General Assembly passed House Bill 21-1209. As
relevant here, the bill amended section 17-34-101, C.R.S. 2020, to
allow individuals who were under the age of twenty-one at the time
they committed their felonies and were serving a DOC sentence
(except those serving life without the possibility of parole) to petition
the DOC for placement in a “specialized program.” See Ch. 448,
sec. 2, § 17-34-101(1)(a), (2), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 2949-50. This
program is designed to equip juveniles and young adults with skills
for successful reintegration into society and to allow them to
petition for early release. See § 17-34-102(2), (7), C.R.S. 2025.
Relatedly, House Bill 21-1209 also amended section 18-1.3-404,
C.R.S. 2020, to require courts — when sentencing to DOC custody
a defendant who was under twenty-one at the time of the offense —
to “make a statement that there is the possibility of the defendant
being eligible to serve a portion of the defendant’s sentence in the
[DOC] specialized program created pursuant to section 17-34-102.”
Ch. 448, sec. 5, § 18-1.3-404(2.5), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 2952.
¶6 In 2025, Tague filed a pro se motion to modify the mittimus,
requesting that the postconviction court apply the provisions of
House Bill 21-1209 “to his sentence.” He asserted that these
2 provisions applied to him because he was twenty years old at the
time of his offenses. Tague asked the court to issue an amended
mittimus “reflecting the cited provisions to his sentence” and to
appoint counsel.
¶7 The postconviction court denied both Tague’s motion and his
request for counsel. The court found that, because statutes are
presumed to apply prospectively, and House Bill 21-1209 does not
expressly provide for retroactive application of section 17-34-101,
the statute does not apply to Tague’s case.
II. Discussion
¶8 Tague contends that the postconviction court erroneously
denied his motion to modify the mittimus because (1) “House Bill
21-1209, specifically the ‘Plain Language’ of both section 17-34-101
and 18-1.3-404, C.R.S. (2021)[,] has a clear expression of
retroactive intent,” and (2) “the statutory language of both of these
statutes do not expressly limit its application.” We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶9 We review de novo whether a statute applies retroactively. See
People v. Chavarria-Sanchez, 207 P.3d 902, 904 (Colo. App. 2009);
3 see also People v. Castillo, 2022 COA 20, ¶ 15 (de novo review
applies to the denial of a postconviction motion without a hearing).
B. Analysis
¶ 10 We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Tague’s motion
on two alternative grounds.
¶ 11 First, House Bill 21-1209 does not apply retroactively. Absent
express legislative intent to the contrary, we presume that a statute
operates prospectively — that is, it applies only to events occurring
after its effective date. § 2-4-202, C.R.S. 2025; People v. Di Asio,
2022 COA 140, ¶ 15. “To overcome this presumption, a statute
must reveal a clear legislative intent that it be applied retroactively.”
Di Asio, ¶ 15. Neither House Bill 21-1209 nor sections 17-34-101
or 18-1.3-404 contain retroactivity language. And the bill’s effective
date was September 7, 2021.1 Therefore, the amendments in House
Bill 21-1209 apply only to events occurring on or after September 7,
1 The General Assembly did not include a specific effective date for
the amendments in House Bill 21-1209. Instead, it provided that the amendments would take effect “on the day following the expiration of the ninety-day period after final adjournment of the general assembly.” Ch. 448, sec. 7, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 2952. Because the General Assembly adjourned on June 8, 2021, the amendments took effect on September 7, 2021.
4 2021. Because Tague was sentenced in 2006, the amendments do
not apply to him.
¶ 12 The only exception to the general presumption of prospectivity
under section 2-4-202 is provided by section 18-1-410(1)(f), C.R.S.
2025, and Crim. P. 35(c)(1). See 18-1-410(1)(f)(1) (permitting a
postconviction motion alleging “[t]hat there has been significant
change in the law, applied to the applicant’s conviction or sentence,
allowing in the interests of justice retroactive application of the
changed legal standard.”); see also Crim. P. 35(c)(1) (providing the
same). However, this exception applies only if, before the motion is
filed, “judgment on that conviction has not then been affirmed upon
appeal.” Crim. P. 35(c)(1); see also § 18-1-410(1)(f)(II) (containing
the same limitation); People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66, ¶ 37
(“[R]elief under an amended statute is available only to those
defendants whose convictions were not final when the amendment
was enacted.” (citing § 18-1-410(1)(f)(II))). Tague’s conviction was
affirmed on direct appeal and his conviction became final in 2008.
See Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO 83, ¶ 36 (when, as here, a
defendant filed a direct appeal, the defendant’s conviction becomes
5 final upon the issuance of the mandate). But Tague did not file his
motion until 2025, well after his conviction became final.
¶ 13 Second, aside from the lack of retroactivity, the amendments
to sections 17-34-101 and 18-1.3-404 are, by their terms,
inapplicable to Tague because he is serving a life sentence without
the possibility of parole.
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25CA0783 Peo v Tague 06-18-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0783 Arapahoe County District Court No. 04CR3399 Honorable David Karpel, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Daniel Duane Tague,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Lipinsky and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 18, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Daniel Duane Tague, Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, Daniel Duane Tague, appeals the postconviction
court’s order denying his motion to modify the mittimus. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2006, a jury convicted Tague of first degree murder (felony
murder), conspiracy to commit robbery, second degree kidnapping,
robbery, and aggravated motor vehicle theft. He was twenty years
old at the time of the offenses. The trial court sentenced him to life
in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) without the
possibility of parole for felony murder, with lesser sentences for the
other convictions, all to run consecutively to the life sentence.
¶3 On direct appeal, a division of this court affirmed Tague’s
convictions. People v. Tague, (Colo. App. No. 06CA0553, July 3,
2008) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). The mandate issued
in 2008.
¶4 In 2010, Tague filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion, which his
appointed counsel later supplemented. The postconviction court
denied Tague’s motion after a hearing. A division of this court
affirmed the postconviction court’s order. People v. Tague, (Colo.
App. No. 20CA0092, July 14, 2022) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(e)).
1 ¶5 In 2021, the General Assembly passed House Bill 21-1209. As
relevant here, the bill amended section 17-34-101, C.R.S. 2020, to
allow individuals who were under the age of twenty-one at the time
they committed their felonies and were serving a DOC sentence
(except those serving life without the possibility of parole) to petition
the DOC for placement in a “specialized program.” See Ch. 448,
sec. 2, § 17-34-101(1)(a), (2), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 2949-50. This
program is designed to equip juveniles and young adults with skills
for successful reintegration into society and to allow them to
petition for early release. See § 17-34-102(2), (7), C.R.S. 2025.
Relatedly, House Bill 21-1209 also amended section 18-1.3-404,
C.R.S. 2020, to require courts — when sentencing to DOC custody
a defendant who was under twenty-one at the time of the offense —
to “make a statement that there is the possibility of the defendant
being eligible to serve a portion of the defendant’s sentence in the
[DOC] specialized program created pursuant to section 17-34-102.”
Ch. 448, sec. 5, § 18-1.3-404(2.5), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 2952.
¶6 In 2025, Tague filed a pro se motion to modify the mittimus,
requesting that the postconviction court apply the provisions of
House Bill 21-1209 “to his sentence.” He asserted that these
2 provisions applied to him because he was twenty years old at the
time of his offenses. Tague asked the court to issue an amended
mittimus “reflecting the cited provisions to his sentence” and to
appoint counsel.
¶7 The postconviction court denied both Tague’s motion and his
request for counsel. The court found that, because statutes are
presumed to apply prospectively, and House Bill 21-1209 does not
expressly provide for retroactive application of section 17-34-101,
the statute does not apply to Tague’s case.
II. Discussion
¶8 Tague contends that the postconviction court erroneously
denied his motion to modify the mittimus because (1) “House Bill
21-1209, specifically the ‘Plain Language’ of both section 17-34-101
and 18-1.3-404, C.R.S. (2021)[,] has a clear expression of
retroactive intent,” and (2) “the statutory language of both of these
statutes do not expressly limit its application.” We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶9 We review de novo whether a statute applies retroactively. See
People v. Chavarria-Sanchez, 207 P.3d 902, 904 (Colo. App. 2009);
3 see also People v. Castillo, 2022 COA 20, ¶ 15 (de novo review
applies to the denial of a postconviction motion without a hearing).
B. Analysis
¶ 10 We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Tague’s motion
on two alternative grounds.
¶ 11 First, House Bill 21-1209 does not apply retroactively. Absent
express legislative intent to the contrary, we presume that a statute
operates prospectively — that is, it applies only to events occurring
after its effective date. § 2-4-202, C.R.S. 2025; People v. Di Asio,
2022 COA 140, ¶ 15. “To overcome this presumption, a statute
must reveal a clear legislative intent that it be applied retroactively.”
Di Asio, ¶ 15. Neither House Bill 21-1209 nor sections 17-34-101
or 18-1.3-404 contain retroactivity language. And the bill’s effective
date was September 7, 2021.1 Therefore, the amendments in House
Bill 21-1209 apply only to events occurring on or after September 7,
1 The General Assembly did not include a specific effective date for
the amendments in House Bill 21-1209. Instead, it provided that the amendments would take effect “on the day following the expiration of the ninety-day period after final adjournment of the general assembly.” Ch. 448, sec. 7, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 2952. Because the General Assembly adjourned on June 8, 2021, the amendments took effect on September 7, 2021.
4 2021. Because Tague was sentenced in 2006, the amendments do
not apply to him.
¶ 12 The only exception to the general presumption of prospectivity
under section 2-4-202 is provided by section 18-1-410(1)(f), C.R.S.
2025, and Crim. P. 35(c)(1). See 18-1-410(1)(f)(1) (permitting a
postconviction motion alleging “[t]hat there has been significant
change in the law, applied to the applicant’s conviction or sentence,
allowing in the interests of justice retroactive application of the
changed legal standard.”); see also Crim. P. 35(c)(1) (providing the
same). However, this exception applies only if, before the motion is
filed, “judgment on that conviction has not then been affirmed upon
appeal.” Crim. P. 35(c)(1); see also § 18-1-410(1)(f)(II) (containing
the same limitation); People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66, ¶ 37
(“[R]elief under an amended statute is available only to those
defendants whose convictions were not final when the amendment
was enacted.” (citing § 18-1-410(1)(f)(II))). Tague’s conviction was
affirmed on direct appeal and his conviction became final in 2008.
See Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO 83, ¶ 36 (when, as here, a
defendant filed a direct appeal, the defendant’s conviction becomes
5 final upon the issuance of the mandate). But Tague did not file his
motion until 2025, well after his conviction became final.
¶ 13 Second, aside from the lack of retroactivity, the amendments
to sections 17-34-101 and 18-1.3-404 are, by their terms,
inapplicable to Tague because he is serving a life sentence without
the possibility of parole. To be eligible to petition for placement in
the specialized program described in section 17-34-102, an offender
must be “serving a sentence in the department for a felony offense
that was committed when the offender was under twenty-one years
of age and that sentence is not a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole.” § 17-34-101(1)(a) (emphasis added).
¶ 14 Accordingly, the postconviction court properly denied Tague’s
motion. See People v. Cooper, 2023 COA 113, ¶ 7 (“We may affirm
the postconviction court’s ruling on any ground supported by the
record, whether or not the postconviction court relied on or
considered that ground.”).
III. Disposition
¶ 15 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.