Peo v. Tafoya

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 18, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0715
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0715 Peo v Tafoya 09-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0715 Pueblo County District Court No. 22CR759 Honorable Thomas B. Flesher, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

James Matthew Tafoya,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 18, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Esteban A. Martinez, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, James Matthew Tafoya, appeals his sentence for

second degree murder. We dismiss the appeal in part and

otherwise affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Tafoya pleaded guilty to second degree murder in exchange for

the dismissal of a first degree murder charge. Though second

degree murder carries a sentencing range of sixteen to forty-eight

years in prison, Tafoya stipulated in the plea agreement to a sixteen

to twenty-four-year prison sentence.

¶3 Consistent with the agreement, the district court sentenced

Tafoya to twenty-four years in prison. In doing so, the court

considered defense counsel’s mitigation argument, but it

nonetheless concluded that twenty-four years was an appropriate

sentence for shooting the victim in the back of the head, which the

court characterized as “an execution.”

II. Discussion

¶4 As we understand it, Tafoya contends that the district court

abused its sentencing discretion and violated his due process rights

by (1) imposing an “irrational and unfair” sentence, and (2)

sentencing him “for conduct, unproven to a jury, constituting first-

1 degree murder.” We decline to address the first contention and

disagree with the second one.

A. The Sentence

¶5 A defendant convicted of a felony has “the right to one

appellate review of the propriety of the sentence, having regard to

the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the

public interest.” § 18-1-409(1), C.R.S. 2025. But if the sentence is

within an agreed-upon range under a plea agreement, the

defendant “shall not have the right of appellate review of the

propriety of the sentence.” Id. The propriety of the sentence

“involves the intrinsic fairness or appropriateness of the sentence

itself.” People v. Sullivan, 2020 CO 58, ¶ 13 (citation omitted).

¶6 In his plea agreement, Tafoya stipulated to a prison sentence

in the sixteen to twenty-four-year range. Because his

twenty-four-year sentence is within that range, Tafoya is precluded

from challenging the fairness of the sentence. See § 18-1-409(1);

Sullivan, ¶ 13. Accordingly, we won’t address Tafoya’s claim that

his sentence is “irrational and unfair.”

2 B. The Sentencing Proceeding

¶7 While section 18-1-409(1) bars review of the propriety of a

sentence that is within an agreed-upon range in a plea agreement,

it allows review of “the manner in which the sentence was imposed,

including the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which

it was based.” A review of the manner in which the sentence was

imposed “involves the extrinsic factors and procedures which affect

the determination of the sentence.” Sullivan, ¶ 13 (citation omitted).

¶8 Tafoya says that, in selecting its sentence, the court erred by

relying on facts not found by a jury. He complains that — due to

the court’s statement about the execution-style nature of the killing

— he was sentenced for committing first degree murder. To the

extent this argument challenges the manner in which the sentence

was imposed, we see no abuse of the court’s sentencing discretion.

¶9 The court sentenced Tafoya in the presumptive range for a

class 2 felony. See § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), C.R.S. 2025. We are

aware of no authority — and Tafoya cites none — that requires a

jury to find any facts before a court sentences a defendant in the

presumptive range. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481

(2000) (“[N]othing . . . suggests that it is impermissible for judges to

3 exercise discretion — taking into consideration various factors

relating both to offense and offender — in imposing a judgment

within the range prescribed by statute.”).

¶ 10 Insofar as Tafoya challenges the court’s characterization of his

conduct — shooting the victim in the back of the head — as an

execution, Tafoya doesn’t claim that the court’s statement was

inaccurate. Cf. People v. Tallwhiteman, 124 P.3d 827, 837 (Colo.

App. 2005) (noting that a court may not base a sentence on

“materially untrue evidence”). And the court was within its

discretion to consider the nature of the offense and Tafoya’s “actual

conduct in committing the charged offense.” People v. Newman, 91

P.3d 369, 371 (Colo. 2004).

¶ 11 For similar reasons, because Tafoya doesn’t challenge the

truthfulness of the information, the court acted within its discretion

when it considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances,

including Tafoya’s failure to take advantage of family support to

help him “negotiate” his drug addiction.

¶ 12 We therefore reject Tafoya’s challenge to the manner in which

his sentence was imposed.

4 III. Disposition

¶ 13 The appeal is dismissed in part, and the sentence is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.