Peo v. Strong-Dalton

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 1, 2024
• Docket: 22CA0149
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

22CA0149 Peo v Strong-Dalton 08-01-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0149

Jefferson County District Court No. 20CR2540

Honorable Robert Lochary, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Matthew Martin Strong-Dalton,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE KUHN

Tow and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 1, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney

General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, M. Shelby Deeney, Deputy

State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

1

¶ 1 Defendant, Matthew Martin Strong-Dalton, appeals the

revocation of his deferred judgment. We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 In June 2020, a car wash replaced some equipment and

stacked the old items in its parking lot. Surveillance video showed

a car registered to Strong-Dalton arrive and two men take the old

equipment. The prosecution charged Strong-Dalton with class 4

felony theft in connection with this incident. In December 2020, he

entered into a plea agreement to a class 5 felony charge of first

degree criminal trespass of a dwelling. Strong-Dalton and the

prosecution stipulated to a two-year deferred judgment and

sentence under the supervision of probation.

¶ 3 As part of his deferred judgment, Strong-Dalton was, as

relevant here, required to not commit any further offenses, “refrain

from any use of alcohol or unlawful use or possession of controlled

substance,” “submit to monitored drug and alcohol scans,” and pay

restitution to the car wash. In February 2021, the probation

department filed a revocation complaint, alleging that Strong-Dalton

had failed to submit an oral swab drug test, tested positive for an

illicit substance, and picked up a new criminal charge. To resolve

2

this complaint, the parties agreed that Strong-Dalton would admit

to the technical violations of his deferred judgment conditions to

make a record of them but that the court would not revoke the

deferred judgment.

¶ 4 Then, in September 2021, probation filed another revocation

complaint, alleging that Strong-Dalton had again violated the terms

and conditions of his deferred judgment and sentence. As grounds

for revocation, the probation officer alleged that Strong-Dalton had

failed to submit nine oral swabs for drug testing since late April

2021, hadn’t provided verification of his employment or schooling,

and had failed to enter into a payment agreement or make

restitution payments. But prior to the revocation hearing,

Strong-Dalton connected with the owner of the car wash, reached a

settlement, and resolved the outstanding restitution he owed.

¶ 5 The prosecution then moved forward with the revocation

hearing solely on the grounds of failure to submit the required drug

tests. At the hearing, the prosecutor called Strong-Dalton, who

acknowledged that he had “had a string of missed tests.” He

explained that he had experienced a death in his family in May and

another family death prior to that. He also explained that he had

3

had to put his dog down two days before the hearing.

Strong-Dalton testified that he “fell into a deep depression being

unemployed. [He] kind of gave up for a while.” On

cross-examination, Strong-Dalton offered to do a hair follicle test to

demonstrate his sobriety.

¶ 6 The trial court found credible Strong-Dalton’s testimony that

he suffered a family tragedy that made things difficult and

commended him on completing the ultimate goal of making the

victim whole. However, the court also found that the prosecution

met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence

that Strong-Dalton missed oral swabs on at least the three different

dates cited in the complaint and determined that “accordingly,

pursuant to operation of law, the deferred judgment and sentence is

revoked.”

¶ 7 The trial court then proceeded to sentencing and, ultimately,

declined to impose any further sentence. In doing so, it noted that

— because of a different case — Strong-Dalton would still be under

supervision until the next May. Giving credence to his equitable

argument that he had satisfied the primary purpose of the deferred

4

judgment by resolving restitution, the court closed the case with no

further sanction.

II. Analysis

¶ 8 Strong-Dalton argues that the trial court erred by (1) violating

his due process rights when it failed to find that he had the ability

to pay for his drug tests and (2) finding that he failed to comply with

the conditions of his deferred judgment. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 9 A deferred judgment is a privilege. McCulley v. People, 2020

CO 40, ¶ 12. As an alternative to a traditional guilty plea, it allows

a defendant to plead guilty but defers entry of the judgment and

sentence for a specified period of time. Williams v. People, 2019 CO

101, ¶ 20. The district attorney may enter a written stipulation

requiring the defendant to comply with certain conditions, similar

to those permitted as part of probation. Id. (citing § 18-1.3-102(2),

C.R.S. 2023).

¶ 10 If the defendant complies with these conditions throughout the

deferral period, then the court must withdraw the guilty plea and

dismiss the charges underlying the deferred judgment. Id. at ¶ 21.

“But, if the defendant violates ‘any condition regulating the conduct

5

of the defendant,’ the court ‘shall enter judgment and impose

sentence upon the guilty plea.’” Id. at ¶ 22 (quoting

§ 18-1.3-102(2)). The violation need only be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Adair v. People, 651 P.2d 389,

391 (Colo. 1982). And “a trial court does not have discretion in

revoking a deferred judgment once it finds that the defendant has

violated the terms of a deferred judgment and sentence.”

1

People v.

Wilder, 687 P.2d 451, 453 (Colo. 1984).

¶ 11 Whether a defendant violated the terms of the deferred

judgment is a question of fact for the trial court to resolve. See

Adair, 651 P.2d at 391. Strong-Dalton challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting the court’s finding. In such a case, we

review the record de novo to determine whether sufficient evidence

supported the trial court’s finding. See id.; see also Dempsey v.

People, 117 P.3d 800 (Colo. 2005).

¶ 12 Strong-Dalton also asserts that his due process rights have

been violated. This presents a question of law, see People v. Nave,

1

The exception to this mandatory imposition rule is not argued or

applicable to Strong-Dalton’s claim. See § 18-1.3-102(2), C.R.S.

2023.

6

689 P.2d 645, 647 (Colo. App. 1984), which we review de novo, see

People v. Calderon, 2014 COA 144, ¶ 23.

B. Strong-Dalton’s Due Process Claim

¶ 13 Strong-Dalton argues that the trial court violated his due

process rights when it revoked his deferred judgment because it

was required to first find whether he had the ability to pay for his

required drug testing. We discern no error.

2

¶ 14 As part of this assertion, Strong-Dalton points us to case law

demonstrating that a deferred judgment revocation receives the

same procedural safeguards as a parole or probation revocation.

See Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 15 (“A defendant facing

revocation of a deferred judgment is entitled to the same procedural

safeguards as a defendant facing revocation of parole or

probation.”); People v. Loveall, 231 P.3d 408, 414 (Colo. 2010) (there

are minimum requirements revocation hearings must follow to

comply with due process).

2

The People and Strong-Dalton dispute whether he preserved his

due process claim. But because we discern no error, we need not

resolve this dispute.

7

¶ 15 In doing so, Strong-Dalton first contends that “violations of

probation must be voluntary” and argues that the trial court did not

make a finding of voluntariness. It’s true that “the trial court [could

not] revoke probation and impose imprisonment without first

determining whether [Strong-Dalton] failed to comply with

probation willfully or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to

acquire resources to comply with probation.” Sharrow v. People,

2019 CO 25, ¶ 42 (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668

(1983)). But here the trial court did not impose imprisonment or

any other deprivation of freedom. So the voluntary or willful finding

requirement that Strong-Dalton relies on is inapplicable to this

matter. See id.; Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668; Strickland v. People, 197

Colo. 488, 490, 594 P.2d 578, 579 (1979).

¶ 16 Strong-Dalton next argues that before revoking his deferred

judgment, the court first had to determine whether he had an

ability to pay for his drug testing. But Colorado law treats payment

conditions, such as restitution, differently than nonpayment

conditions, such as drug testing.

[U]nlike the failure to discharge a fine or

restitution . . . a defendant’s indigency will not

always be relevant where, as here,

8

nonpayment conditions of probation are

alleged to have been violated. Therefore, when

the condition of probation allegedly violated is

not a required payment, the trial court is

under no obligation to inquire sua sponte

about the reasons for the defendant’s alleged

failure to comply with probation. Rather, it is

incumbent on the defendant to assert that his

lack of financial means prevented him from

complying with a nonpayment condition of

probation.

Sharrow, ¶ 44 (emphasis added).

¶ 17 The trial court found that Strong-Dalton successfully

completed restitution, which was the payment provision of his

deferred judgment. But as he admitted during the revocation

hearing, he didn’t complete his nonpayment condition of drug

testing — not because of an inability to pay, but because “[he] had a

death in the family. [He] fell into a deep depression being

unemployed. [He] kind of gave up for a while.” Strong-Dalton never

asserted “that his lack of financial means prevented him from

complying with a nonpayment condition of probation.” Id.

¶ 18 Additionally, the record demonstrates that the probation

officer had funding available for Strong-Dalton, was “more than

happy to provide funding for [him],” and did submit funding

requests for his drug testing. However, Strong-Dalton began

9

missing tests regardless. So even if he had claimed an inability to

pay for the tests, the record wouldn’t support his claim.

3

¶ 19 Because Strong-Dalton didn’t assert that his lack of financial

means prevented him from complying with the nonpayment

condition of his deferred judgment, and because the record doesn’t

support that conclusion in any case, we conclude that the trial

court did not violate his due process rights.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

to Support Revocation

¶ 20 We now turn to Strong-Dalton’s argument that the trial court

erred by revoking his deferred judgment because there is

insufficient evidence to show that he violated its terms and

conditions. We disagree.

¶ 21 In support of this argument, Strong-Dalton points to his

probation officer’s testimony that drug testing was not ordered by

the court. As the People point out, it is somewhat unclear what the

3

Additionally, we note that the availability of funding for drug

testing wholly undercuts Strong-Dalton’s argument that his failure

to drug test was involuntary. See Williams v. People, 454 P.3d 219,

228 n.7 (Colo. 2019) (explaining that “in proving that a defendant

has the ability to pay and failed to make a good-faith effort to pay,

the prosecution necessarily establishes that any failure to pay

was willful or at least unreasonable”).

10

probation officer was referring to in his testimony on this point.

But regardless, the testimony can’t overcome the plain language of

the executed deferred judgment agreement in the record. In it,

Strong-Dalton agreed to the terms and conditions of his deferred

judgment, including requirements that he would “refrain from any

use of alcohol or unlawful use or possession of a controlled

substance without a prescription” and that he would “submit to

monitored drug and alcohol scans.” And as noted above,

Strong-Dalton testified that he “had a string of missed tests.”

¶ 22 Thus, this record shows that sobriety monitoring was a

condition of the deferred judgment agreement. And Strong-Dalton’s

own testimony is direct relevant evidence that, “when viewed as a

whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is

substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable

mind that [he violated his deferred judgment agreement].” McCoy v.

People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence

to support the court’s finding that he violated his deferred judgment

agreement, and thus to support revocation.

¶ 23 Strong-Dalton’s final contention is equitable: he argues that he

substantially complied with the deferred judgment because he met

11

the ultimate goal of making the victim whole. The trial court

recognized this and exercised its discretion during sentencing when

it declined to impose any further sentence on Strong-Dalton and

noted his successful payment of restitution.

4

See People v. Muckle,

107 P.3d 380, 380 (Colo. 2005) (“Traditionally, the trial court has

broad discretion at sentencing.”). Regardless, “if the defendant

violates ‘any condition regulating the conduct of the defendant,’ the

court ‘shall enter judgment and impose sentence upon the guilty

plea.’” Williams, ¶ 22 (emphasis added) (quoting § 18-1.3-102(2)).

Given the facts of this case, Strong-Dalton’s equitable argument

doesn’t change our conclusion that the court didn’t err by revoking

his deferred judgment.

III. Disposition

¶ 24 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

4

While we don’t think Strong-Dalton challenges that sentencing

decision in his favor, we also see no basis to disturb it if he were.

See DeBella v. People, 233 P.3d 664, 666 (Colo. 2010).