24CA1342 Peo v Stine 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1342 Jefferson County District Court No. 23CR1594 Honorable Jason Carrithers, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael Stine,
Defendant-Appellant.
SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE GROVE J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Stuart & Ward LLP, Thomas R. Ward, Megan Bishop, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Michael Stine, appeals the $120,000 fine imposed
by the district court. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Stine, a licensed marijuana business owner, was indicted on
nineteen offenses related to his involvement in the illegal
distribution of marijuana and his failure to pay taxes associated
with the lawful sale of marijuana.
¶3 As part of a plea agreement, Stine pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate, distribution of
marijuana or marijuana concentrate, and evasion of taxes
administered by the Colorado Department of Revenue. The
remaining counts were dismissed and the parties agreed to leave
sentencing open to the district court.
¶4 The parties also agreed to distribute $260,000 in funds that
had been seized from Stine by law enforcement as follows:
(1) restitution in the amount of $168,948.20 would be distributed to
the Colorado Department of Revenue for unpaid taxes; (2) $30,000
would be forfeited by Stine and distributed equally among three law
enforcement agencies for training and related operations; and
(3) $61,015.80, the remaining amount, would be returned to Stine.
1 ¶5 The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced
Stine to five years of probation and imposed a $120,000 punitive
fine.
II. Discussion
¶6 Stine contends that the district court’s imposition of the
$120,000 fine as a punitive sanction violated his constitutional
rights against excessive fines because the court failed to consider
his ability to pay the fine. Because the record before us reflects
that the court did consider Stine’s ability to pay when it imposed
the fine, we disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Preservation
¶7 Generally, a district court is afforded broad discretion in
sentencing, and we will not overturn its decision absent an abuse of
that discretion. Villanueva v. People, 199 P.3d 1228, 1231 (Colo.
2008). However, whether a sentence is constitutionally excessive is
a question of law that we review de novo. Sharrow v. People, 2019
CO 25, ¶ 27; see also Melton v. People, 2019 CO 89, ¶ 9 (reviewing
de novo whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article II, section 20 of the Colorado
Constitution).
2 ¶8 To begin, we note that the parties dispute whether Stine
preserved this constitutional claim. But we do not need to resolve
the dispute because, even if the claim was preserved, we conclude
that the district court did not err.
B. Analysis
¶9 A fine is a form of a sentence, and a district court may impose
a fine in addition to, or in lieu of, any other sentence provided by
law. § 18-1.3-401.5(2)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025; People v. Turner, 644 P.2d
951, 953 (Colo. 1982). However, the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the imposition of “excessive fines.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see
also Colo. Const. art. II, § 20 (same).
¶ 10 Divisions of this court have held that a sentencing court, when
determining the amount of any fine to be imposed, must consider
the severity of the offense, the defendant’s character and
background, the defendant’s financial status, and any other
appropriate circumstances of the case. See People v. Malone, 923
P.2d 163, 166 (Colo. App. 1995); People v. Pourat, 100 P.3d 503,
507 (Colo. App. 2004). The Malone division also held that a fine is
excessive when it is so disproportionate to the defendant’s
3 circumstances that there can be no realistic expectation that the
defendant will be able to pay it. Id.
¶ 11 Relying on the reasoning of Malone, Stine asserts that the
district court’s findings do not adequately address his ability to pay
the fine imposed. In particular, he points to the absence of the
court’s consideration of his monthly expenses, such as taxes,
mortgage, insurance, food, and other necessities, or his financial
circumstances related to his son. Assuming that Malone remains
good law,1 we agree that findings based on these considerations
1 Although the People do not argue the point on appeal, the
division’s approach in People v. Malone, 923 P.2d 163, 166 (Colo. App. 1995), is not a universal rule. Some courts have held that a defendant’s ability to pay is a relevant consideration in deciding whether a fine is “excessive.” See, e.g., People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 (2005); United States v. Viloski (2d Cir. 2016) 814 F.3d 104, 111. Others have held that a defendant’s ability to pay has no bearing on the question. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 656 F.3d 821, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999). The United States Supreme Court left the question open in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339-40 n.15 (1998). The Colorado Supreme Court has not resolved it either, although in Colo. Dep’t of Labor and Emp. v. Dami Hospitality, LLC, 2019 CO 47M, ¶ 31, the court observed that, “[f]or some types of criminal or regulatory infractions,” a fine that would bankrupt a person “might be warranted, whereas for others the severity of that outcome may be out of proportion to the gravity of the offense for which the fine is imposed.”
4 would have been appropriate. However, so long as the court
considers a defendant’s ability to pay with “sufficient specificity to
allow an appellate court to determine the bases for the sentence
imposed,” it will withstand a constitutional challenge. Id.
¶ 12 The district court here did so. The court imposed the fine
based on its finding that Stine “worked in this business for a very
long time, made lots of money (the grand jury indictment alleged
that Stine and his company failed to report more than $2.5 million
in taxable sales, and in the plea agreement, Stine stipulated to pay
approximately $169,000 in past due taxes), and didn’t follow the
rules.” See Pourat, 100 P.3d at 508 (income earned from illegal
activity can be considered in deciding whether a fine is excessive).
¶ 13 The court also looked to Stine’s particular financial
circumstances when structuring the penalty. Specifically, it
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24CA1342 Peo v Stine 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1342 Jefferson County District Court No. 23CR1594 Honorable Jason Carrithers, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael Stine,
Defendant-Appellant.
SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE GROVE J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Stuart & Ward LLP, Thomas R. Ward, Megan Bishop, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Michael Stine, appeals the $120,000 fine imposed
by the district court. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Stine, a licensed marijuana business owner, was indicted on
nineteen offenses related to his involvement in the illegal
distribution of marijuana and his failure to pay taxes associated
with the lawful sale of marijuana.
¶3 As part of a plea agreement, Stine pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate, distribution of
marijuana or marijuana concentrate, and evasion of taxes
administered by the Colorado Department of Revenue. The
remaining counts were dismissed and the parties agreed to leave
sentencing open to the district court.
¶4 The parties also agreed to distribute $260,000 in funds that
had been seized from Stine by law enforcement as follows:
(1) restitution in the amount of $168,948.20 would be distributed to
the Colorado Department of Revenue for unpaid taxes; (2) $30,000
would be forfeited by Stine and distributed equally among three law
enforcement agencies for training and related operations; and
(3) $61,015.80, the remaining amount, would be returned to Stine.
1 ¶5 The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced
Stine to five years of probation and imposed a $120,000 punitive
fine.
II. Discussion
¶6 Stine contends that the district court’s imposition of the
$120,000 fine as a punitive sanction violated his constitutional
rights against excessive fines because the court failed to consider
his ability to pay the fine. Because the record before us reflects
that the court did consider Stine’s ability to pay when it imposed
the fine, we disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Preservation
¶7 Generally, a district court is afforded broad discretion in
sentencing, and we will not overturn its decision absent an abuse of
that discretion. Villanueva v. People, 199 P.3d 1228, 1231 (Colo.
2008). However, whether a sentence is constitutionally excessive is
a question of law that we review de novo. Sharrow v. People, 2019
CO 25, ¶ 27; see also Melton v. People, 2019 CO 89, ¶ 9 (reviewing
de novo whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article II, section 20 of the Colorado
Constitution).
2 ¶8 To begin, we note that the parties dispute whether Stine
preserved this constitutional claim. But we do not need to resolve
the dispute because, even if the claim was preserved, we conclude
that the district court did not err.
B. Analysis
¶9 A fine is a form of a sentence, and a district court may impose
a fine in addition to, or in lieu of, any other sentence provided by
law. § 18-1.3-401.5(2)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025; People v. Turner, 644 P.2d
951, 953 (Colo. 1982). However, the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the imposition of “excessive fines.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see
also Colo. Const. art. II, § 20 (same).
¶ 10 Divisions of this court have held that a sentencing court, when
determining the amount of any fine to be imposed, must consider
the severity of the offense, the defendant’s character and
background, the defendant’s financial status, and any other
appropriate circumstances of the case. See People v. Malone, 923
P.2d 163, 166 (Colo. App. 1995); People v. Pourat, 100 P.3d 503,
507 (Colo. App. 2004). The Malone division also held that a fine is
excessive when it is so disproportionate to the defendant’s
3 circumstances that there can be no realistic expectation that the
defendant will be able to pay it. Id.
¶ 11 Relying on the reasoning of Malone, Stine asserts that the
district court’s findings do not adequately address his ability to pay
the fine imposed. In particular, he points to the absence of the
court’s consideration of his monthly expenses, such as taxes,
mortgage, insurance, food, and other necessities, or his financial
circumstances related to his son. Assuming that Malone remains
good law,1 we agree that findings based on these considerations
1 Although the People do not argue the point on appeal, the
division’s approach in People v. Malone, 923 P.2d 163, 166 (Colo. App. 1995), is not a universal rule. Some courts have held that a defendant’s ability to pay is a relevant consideration in deciding whether a fine is “excessive.” See, e.g., People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 (2005); United States v. Viloski (2d Cir. 2016) 814 F.3d 104, 111. Others have held that a defendant’s ability to pay has no bearing on the question. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 656 F.3d 821, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999). The United States Supreme Court left the question open in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339-40 n.15 (1998). The Colorado Supreme Court has not resolved it either, although in Colo. Dep’t of Labor and Emp. v. Dami Hospitality, LLC, 2019 CO 47M, ¶ 31, the court observed that, “[f]or some types of criminal or regulatory infractions,” a fine that would bankrupt a person “might be warranted, whereas for others the severity of that outcome may be out of proportion to the gravity of the offense for which the fine is imposed.”
4 would have been appropriate. However, so long as the court
considers a defendant’s ability to pay with “sufficient specificity to
allow an appellate court to determine the bases for the sentence
imposed,” it will withstand a constitutional challenge. Id.
¶ 12 The district court here did so. The court imposed the fine
based on its finding that Stine “worked in this business for a very
long time, made lots of money (the grand jury indictment alleged
that Stine and his company failed to report more than $2.5 million
in taxable sales, and in the plea agreement, Stine stipulated to pay
approximately $169,000 in past due taxes), and didn’t follow the
rules.” See Pourat, 100 P.3d at 508 (income earned from illegal
activity can be considered in deciding whether a fine is excessive).
¶ 13 The court also looked to Stine’s particular financial
circumstances when structuring the penalty. Specifically, it
imposed the $120,000 fine in recognition of (1) Stine’s agreement to
forfeit $30,000 to law enforcement; and (2) $61,015.80 of seized
funds that would be returned to Stine. And the fine was only a
fraction of the maximum amount — $750,000 — that the court
could have imposed under the governing statute. See § 18-1.3-
401.5(2)(b)(I); see also Pourat, 100 P.3d at 508 (noting that a fine
5 that was ten percent of the maximum amount that could have been
imposed was not excessive).
¶ 14 Further, the exchange regarding the fine between defense
counsel and the district court confirms that, while Stine lacked the
funds to pay the fine at the moment it was imposed, it was
nonetheless realistic to expect that he would eventually be able to
do so under a payment plan. See Malone, 923 P.2d at 166.
Defense counsel told the court, “He doesn’t have that. He’s going to
have to be set up on a payment plan. But he’s got that Probation.”
The court replied, “Absolutely.” Cf. People v. Bolt, 984 P.2d 1181,
1184 (Colo. App. 1999) (the record reflected consideration of the
defendant’s ability to pay where counsel “conferred with defendant
and then informed the court that defendant would be able to make
whatever ‘reasonable payments’ his probation officer required” and
otherwise “did not object to the amount of the [surcharge] or ask
the court to reduce it”).
¶ 15 The district court also considered the severity of the offenses
and found that Stine was “postured differently” — i.e., more
culpable — than his co-defendants because, unlike them, Stine
held a marijuana license issued by the Colorado Department of
6 Revenue. See Malone, 923 P.2d at 166 (courts should consider the
severity of the offense to determine the appropriate amount of any
fine to be imposed). And the court found that a punitive sanction
was warranted, “given the unique relationship [Stine] had [as] a
licensee and the trust and privilege that came with that.”
¶ 16 Finally, we reject Stine’s assertion that the district court “did
not contemplate” that the imposition of the fine would result in a
$44,400 victims assistance surcharge pursuant to section 24-4.2-
104(1)(a)(I). Courts are presumed to know the law. See People v.
Abu-Nantambu-El, 2017 COA 154, ¶ 30, aff’d, 2019 CO 106. And
section 24-4.2-104(1)(a)(I) explicitly requires “[a] surcharge equal to
thirty-seven percent of the fine imposed for each felony” to benefit
the victim assistance fund.2
¶ 17 Because the factors considered by the district court included
Stine’s ability to pay the fine and were otherwise appropriate, we
discern no error in the imposition of a $120,000 fine. See, e.g.,
Pourat, 100 P.3d at 508 (affirming $100,000 fine based on findings
2 On appeal, the People note that the surcharge may be waived if
the sentencing court finds that Stine is indigent. See Waddell v. People, 2020 CO 39, ¶¶ 24-27. But Stine did not request that relief on appeal, so we do not address it further.
7 that the criminal enterprise “had to have been lucrative,” “the
offense was severe,” and the defendant’s role “was major”).
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The sentence is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.