Peo v. Stevens

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 24CA1551
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1551 Peo v Stevens 03-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1551 Jefferson County District Court No. 23CR527 Honorable Philip J. McNulty, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Corey Nash Stevens,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Grove and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 19, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Lindsey Parlin, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Corey Nash Stevens appeals the judgment of conviction

entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of felony menacing,

failure to leave premises or property upon request of a peace officer,

and obstructing a peace officer. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that a neighbor,

while walking his dog in front of Stevens’s house at around 2:00

a.m., saw Stevens step onto his front porch. Stevens’s pants were

down around his ankles, and he was holding his erect penis in one

hand and a metal pipe in the other. He began running back and

forth on the porch, shouting at the neighbor to leave. The neighbor

testified that Stevens yelled that he was “going to slash, slash,

slash, cut and kill [him].” Stevens then chased after the neighbor,

who ran home and called the police.

¶3 When the police arrived, Stevens had barricaded himself inside

his house and refused to come out. Eventually, officers broke down

Stevens’s door and arrested him.

¶4 At trial, Stevens defended on the theory that the neighbor’s

accusation was not supported by the evidence and that law

enforcement’s investigation was deficient such that the prosecution

1 had not proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury

acquitted Stevens of indecent exposure and public indecency

charges but convicted him of felony menacing, failure to leave

premises or property upon request of a peace officer, and

obstructing a peace officer.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶5 Stevens argues that the prosecution presented insufficient

evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of

felony menacing. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 We review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence was sufficient both in quantity and quality to sustain a

conviction. Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010). To

determine whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to

support a conviction, we consider “whether the relevant evidence,

both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient

to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is

guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting

People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (Colo. 1973)). In doing so, we

2 give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences

supported by a logical connection between the facts established and

the conclusion inferred. Id. at 1292.

¶7 In making this determination, we recognize that “it is the jury

which should decide the difficult questions of witness credibility

and the weight to be given to conflicting items of evidence,” People v.

Gibson, 203 P.3d 571, 575 (Colo. App. 2008) (quoting People v.

Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588, 592 (Colo. 1982)), and we do not sit as a

thirteenth juror to reassess witness credibility or to reweigh the

evidence presented to the jury, see Clark, 232 P.3d at 1293;

People v. Franklin, 645 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1982) (“The determination of

the credibility of witnesses is a matter solely within the province of

the jury.”).

B. Analysis

¶8 As relevant here, a person commits the crime of menacing “if,

by any threat or physical action, he or she knowingly places or

attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily

injury.” § 18-3-206, C.R.S. 2025. Menacing is a class five felony “if

committed by the use of a . . . bludgeon.” Id.

3 ¶9 Stevens argues that there was insufficient evidence to support

his conviction for felony menacing because (1) contrary evidence

undermined the credibility of the neighbor’s testimony; (2) law

enforcement failed to obtain evidence that could have corroborated

the neighbor’s claims; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to

prove that he acted “knowingly.” We are not persuaded.

1. Neighbor’s Testimony

¶ 10 Stevens first argues that the evidence presented at trial

contradicts the neighbor’s testimony, rendering it “incredible.”

Specifically, Stevens points to evidence suggesting that (1) the lack

of light in the area would have made it impossible for the neighbor

to see him and (2) the neighbor’s statements to law enforcement

showed that the neighbor was not in fear but instead harbored

“prejudice and intolerance” toward him.

¶ 11 Concerning the lighting condition, the neighbor testified that

while the neighborhood lacked many streetlamps, he was able to

see using “basic ambient light” and “moonlight.” He further

testified that when Stevens stepped outside, he was “fully lit by [his]

front porch light.” Beyond this, police officers testified that even

4 though it was “pitch black” they could see with “night vision” and

that “the snow on the ground . . . brightened things up a little bit.”

¶ 12 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]estimony is

incredible as a matter of law only when a witness testifies to events

that he or she could not possibly have seen or are not possible

under the laws of nature.” People v. Plancarte, 232 P.3d 186, 192

(Colo. App. 2009). Thus, inconsistencies in testimony regarding the

lighting condition do not render the neighbor’s testimony incredible

as a matter of law. The jury heard all of this evidence at trial and

resolved any conflicting evidence in favor of the prosecution. See

People v. Mollaun, 194 P.3d 411, 413 (Colo. App. 2008)

(“Determinations of witness credibility as well as the weight given to

all parts of the evidence are solely within the province of the fact

finder.”). We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the

jury. See People v. McIntier, 134 P.3d 467, 471-72 (Colo. App. 2005)

(“An appellate court is not permitted to act as a thirteenth juror and

set aside a verdict because it might have drawn a different

conclusion had it been the trier of fact.”).

¶ 13 Nor do we agree with Stevens’s argument that the neighbor’s

statements to law enforcement — that he would “go chase [Stevens]

5 out if you want to catch him” and would “go fucking knock on his

door if you want him to run out” — render the neighbor’s testimony

incredible by showing that the neighbor was not actually in fear but

rather harbored “prejudice and intolerance” toward Stevens. The

menacing statute requires the defendant to place or attempt to

place another person in fear of “imminent serious bodily injury,”

focusing on whether the defendant was aware that his conduct was

practically certain to cause fear. § 18-3-206; People v. Margerum,

2018 COA 52, ¶ 56. The neighbor’s reaction after-the-fact is not

dispositive of Stevens’s mental state. See People v. Saltray, 969

P.2d 729, 732 (Colo. App. 1998). Even if the neighbor’s willingness

to help apprehend Stevens had any relation to the fear the neighbor

experienced as the incident unfolded — he testified he “fear[ed] for

[his] life” — that does not render the evidence insufficient. Further,

as discussed above, it was for the jury to assess the neighbor’s

credibility, consider any potential ulterior motive from past

disagreements, and determine what weight, if any, to give that

evidence. See Mollaun, 194 P.3d at 413.

6 2. Investigation

¶ 14 We also reject Stevens’s assertion that law enforcement’s

failure to recover certain evidence to substantiate the neighbor’s

claims — such as surveillance video footage from nearby houses or

the pipe used in the commission of the offense — renders the

evidence insufficient.

¶ 15 As to Stevens’s claim concerning law enforcement’s failure to

obtain any video footage of the incident, a police officer was

questioned at trial about why they did not canvass the

neighborhood for video footage that might corroborate the

neighbor’s account. The officer testified that they decided against

canvassing because it was determined that it would not yield

anything of evidentiary value. The officer explained that outdoor

cameras are “[p]rimarily . . . motion activated,” and since the

incident occurred around Stevens’s residence and on the street

directly in front of it, it was unlikely that a nearby camera would

have captured anything useful. Ultimately, it was up to the jury to

assess the adequacy and scope of the investigation and determine

what weight, if any, to give that evidence. And to the extent Stevens

points to other evidence that he says supports a different inference,

7 it is not our role to reweigh the evidence and second guess the jury.

See Butler v. People, 2019 CO 87, ¶ 20.

¶ 16 Relatedly, Stevens argues that because no pipe or similar

object was ever recovered or introduced into evidence, the evidence

was insufficient to sustain a conviction for felony menacing. But

officers testified that they could not collect the specific pipe that the

neighbor described because there “were numerous objects” in

Stevens’s yard matching that description. Instead, officers

photographed the yard, and after reviewing these photographs, the

neighbor testified that a pipe depicted in one of them was consistent

with the pipe he saw Stevens holding — an object the neighbor had

previously described in detail.

¶ 17 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution and affording the prosecution the benefit of every

reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom, we conclude

that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Stevens used a pipe in committing the offense of menacing. See

Saltray, 969 P.2d at 732 (concluding evidence was sufficient to

show the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon during the

8 commission of menacing even when no weapon was introduced into

evidence as long as the witness described the weapon in detail).

3. Evidence of “Knowingly”

¶ 18 Finally, Stevens argues that there was insufficient evidence

that he acted “knowingly,” relying on the neighbor’s testimony that

Stevens appeared “unhinged,” “beyond upset,” “not capable of

understanding what was going on in the environment he was in,”

and was “screaming hatred to the world.”

¶ 19 Under Colorado law, a person acts “knowingly” with respect to

conduct or circumstances described by statute when he is aware

that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result.

§ 18-1-501(6), C.R.S. 2025. A defendant’s mental state may be

established through circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence.

See People v. Collie, 995 P.2d 765, 773 (Colo. App. 1999) (“Evidence

of a defendant’s intent can ‘rarely be proven other than by

circumstantial or indirect evidence.’” (quoting People v. Valenzuela,

825 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Colo. App. 1991))). And the mental state can

be inferred from a defendant’s conduct and the circumstances

surrounding the commission of a crime. See People v. Grant,

174 P.3d 798, 812 (Colo. App. 2007). Such circumstances include

9 what the victim saw or heard, and how the victim reacted. People v.

Zieg, 841 P.2d 342, 343 (Colo. App. 1992).

¶ 20 The neighbor testified that as he walked by Stevens’s house,

Stevens was holding a two-to-three-foot-long piece of galvanized

three-quarter-inch pipe, “like a weapon,” above his shoulder in his

left hand. Stevens screamed at his neighbor to leave the area and

threatened to “cut, cut, cut,” “slash [his neighbor] open,” and “kill

[him].” The neighbor testified that Stevens then “aggressively” and

“angrily” came down from his front porch and chased him, stopping

about ten feet into the street. All the while, Stevens was yelling, “I

want to cut you,” “I want to stab you,” and “I want to kill you.” The

neighbor also testified that Stevens repeated these threats and,

although some words were “slightly . . . unintelligible,” his intent

was clear. Later, officers testified that Stevens told them “he was

going to wait in the bushes all night to kill his neighbor.”

¶ 21 Given the description of the pipe, Stevens’s act of brandishing

it as a weapon, yelling threats at his neighbor, and chasing the

neighbor with the pipe, a rational jury — drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the prosecution — could find that Stevens was

aware his actions were practically certain to place his neighbor in

10 fear of imminent serious bodily injury by the use of the pipe. See

Margerum, ¶ 56 (“The defendant’s subjective awareness may be

inferred from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances;

direct evidence need not be presented.”). And it was for the jury to

determine the credibility of Stevens and the neighbor and to resolve

any conflicts in the evidence. See People v. Kessler, 2018 COA 60,

¶ 12.

¶ 22 Accordingly, we conclude the prosecution presented sufficient

evidence to establish the elements of felony menacing.

III. Disposition

¶ 23 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.