24CA0105 Peo v Spector 03-12-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0105 Douglas County District Court No. 22CR1185 Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Joseph Michael Spector,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Brown and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 12, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mackenzie R. Shields, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Joseph Michael Spector, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered in Douglas County District Court pursuant to a
plea agreement resolving cases against him in three separate
counties. Spector raises one issue on appeal: Did the district court
err by denying a motion to continue his sentencing hearing so that
recently appointed counsel could have additional time to investigate
the possibility of withdrawing his guilty plea based on ineffective
assistance of counsel? We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion and therefore affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In a global disposition of three cases in which he was charged
with sexual offenses against several children, Spector agreed to the
following:
• In Douglas County case number 22CR1185 — the case
appealed here — Spector pleaded guilty to (1) one count
of sexual exploitation of a child with a stipulated
determinate ten-year prison sentence and (2) one count
of sexual assault on a child with a stipulated sentence of
ten years to life on sex offender intensive supervision
probation (SOISP).
1 • In Denver case number 22CR5083, Spector pleaded
guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child with a
stipulated sentence of ten years to life on SOISP.
• In Arapahoe County case number 22CR2122, Spector
pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child
with a stipulated sentence of ten years to life on SOISP.
¶3 Each agreement stipulated that the three SOISP sentences
were to be served consecutive to the prison sentence and
concurrent with each other.
¶4 After the district courts in all three counties accepted
Spector’s guilty pleas but before any sentencing hearings, Spector’s
private attorney, Colin Bresee, withdrew due to irreconcilable
differences. Public defender Lauren Sposa was appointed to
represent Spector in Douglas County.
¶5 Three weeks later and one day before the scheduled
sentencing hearing in this case, Sposa moved to continue so she
could investigate “whether or not Mr. Spector has a claim to
withdraw his plea” under Crim. P. 32(d) due to “potential ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.” The People objected, argued that
Spector was “playing games,” and said the victims wanted closure.
2 The Douglas County district court denied the motion, finding,
among other things, that (1) the victims objected to a continuance;
(2) any ineffective assistance claims could be raised in a
postconviction motion; (3) the case had been pending for over a
year; and (4) Spector had been “playing games” as a tactic to delay
proceedings. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court
sentenced Spector to ten years in prison plus a consecutive ten
years to life on SOISP.
II. Discussion
¶6 On appeal, Spector contends that the district court erred by
denying his motion to continue so that Sposa could adequately
advise him about whether to move to withdraw his guilty plea. We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶7 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to continue for
abuse of discretion. People v. Ahuero, 2017 CO 90, ¶ 11. “There
are no ‘mechanical tests’ for determining whether a [district] court
abuses its discretion by denying a continuance.” People v. Brown,
2014 CO 25, ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Hampton, 758 P.2d 1344, 1353
(Colo. 1988)).
3 ¶8 On review, we consider (1) the prejudice to the moving party if
the continuance was denied versus the prejudice to the opposing
party if a continuance was granted, see People v. Smith, 275 P.3d
715, 721-22 (Colo. App. 2011); (2) the circumstances confronting
the district court when the motion was made, see Ahuero, ¶ 11; and
(3) the reasons presented for the continuance, see id. Because a
request for a continuance requires the court to balance many
factors, “only an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates
the right to the assistance of counsel.” Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)).
¶9 Crim. P. 32(d) permits a defendant to move to withdraw his
guilty plea before a sentence is imposed. See Crumb v. People, 230
P.3d 726, 730 (Colo. 2010). The rule “provides a vehicle” for a
defendant to present “a fair and just reason for discretionarily
permitting withdrawal” of the plea, People v. Figueroa-Lemus, 2020
CO 59, ¶ 12, but the defendant has the burden of demonstrating
that fair and just reason, People v. Chippewa, 751 P.2d 607, 609
(Colo. 1988), and whether the defendant met that burden is an
assessment within the sound discretion of the trial court, People v.
4 Lopez, 12 P.3d 869, 871 (Colo. App. 2000). One fair and just
reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea under Crim. P. 32(d) is the
ineffective assistance of counsel. Lopez, 12 P.3d at 871.
B. Application
¶ 10 The record shows that the district court appropriately
considered the balance of prejudice to the parties before denying
Spector’s continuance. The prosecutor objected to a continuance
on behalf of the “more than four victims” in this global plea, who
wanted closure. The court weighed the victims’ interest in closure
against Spector’s interest in a potential ineffective assistance claim,
noting that (1) the case had been pending for over a year; and (2) if
there was a basis for an ineffective assistance claim, Spector could
pursue relief in a postconviction motion.
¶ 11 These circumstances, in addition to those revealed at the
providency hearing, support the district court’s finding that Spector
was simply “playing games” to delay sentencing. At the hearing, the
court engaged in a robust discussion with Spector about whether
he was satisfied with Bresee’s representation. When the court
made clear it would not accept a plea that day unless Spector was
fully satisfied, Spector insisted that he wanted to keep Bresee as his
5 attorney and to accept the plea deal. He “absolutely” did not want
to go to trial. This discussion, suggesting that Spector had no
interest in going to trial, reasonably informed the district court’s
finding that Spector’s continuance motion was a delay tactic.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
24CA0105 Peo v Spector 03-12-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0105 Douglas County District Court No. 22CR1185 Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Joseph Michael Spector,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Brown and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 12, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mackenzie R. Shields, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Joseph Michael Spector, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered in Douglas County District Court pursuant to a
plea agreement resolving cases against him in three separate
counties. Spector raises one issue on appeal: Did the district court
err by denying a motion to continue his sentencing hearing so that
recently appointed counsel could have additional time to investigate
the possibility of withdrawing his guilty plea based on ineffective
assistance of counsel? We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion and therefore affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In a global disposition of three cases in which he was charged
with sexual offenses against several children, Spector agreed to the
following:
• In Douglas County case number 22CR1185 — the case
appealed here — Spector pleaded guilty to (1) one count
of sexual exploitation of a child with a stipulated
determinate ten-year prison sentence and (2) one count
of sexual assault on a child with a stipulated sentence of
ten years to life on sex offender intensive supervision
probation (SOISP).
1 • In Denver case number 22CR5083, Spector pleaded
guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child with a
stipulated sentence of ten years to life on SOISP.
• In Arapahoe County case number 22CR2122, Spector
pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child
with a stipulated sentence of ten years to life on SOISP.
¶3 Each agreement stipulated that the three SOISP sentences
were to be served consecutive to the prison sentence and
concurrent with each other.
¶4 After the district courts in all three counties accepted
Spector’s guilty pleas but before any sentencing hearings, Spector’s
private attorney, Colin Bresee, withdrew due to irreconcilable
differences. Public defender Lauren Sposa was appointed to
represent Spector in Douglas County.
¶5 Three weeks later and one day before the scheduled
sentencing hearing in this case, Sposa moved to continue so she
could investigate “whether or not Mr. Spector has a claim to
withdraw his plea” under Crim. P. 32(d) due to “potential ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.” The People objected, argued that
Spector was “playing games,” and said the victims wanted closure.
2 The Douglas County district court denied the motion, finding,
among other things, that (1) the victims objected to a continuance;
(2) any ineffective assistance claims could be raised in a
postconviction motion; (3) the case had been pending for over a
year; and (4) Spector had been “playing games” as a tactic to delay
proceedings. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court
sentenced Spector to ten years in prison plus a consecutive ten
years to life on SOISP.
II. Discussion
¶6 On appeal, Spector contends that the district court erred by
denying his motion to continue so that Sposa could adequately
advise him about whether to move to withdraw his guilty plea. We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶7 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to continue for
abuse of discretion. People v. Ahuero, 2017 CO 90, ¶ 11. “There
are no ‘mechanical tests’ for determining whether a [district] court
abuses its discretion by denying a continuance.” People v. Brown,
2014 CO 25, ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Hampton, 758 P.2d 1344, 1353
(Colo. 1988)).
3 ¶8 On review, we consider (1) the prejudice to the moving party if
the continuance was denied versus the prejudice to the opposing
party if a continuance was granted, see People v. Smith, 275 P.3d
715, 721-22 (Colo. App. 2011); (2) the circumstances confronting
the district court when the motion was made, see Ahuero, ¶ 11; and
(3) the reasons presented for the continuance, see id. Because a
request for a continuance requires the court to balance many
factors, “only an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates
the right to the assistance of counsel.” Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)).
¶9 Crim. P. 32(d) permits a defendant to move to withdraw his
guilty plea before a sentence is imposed. See Crumb v. People, 230
P.3d 726, 730 (Colo. 2010). The rule “provides a vehicle” for a
defendant to present “a fair and just reason for discretionarily
permitting withdrawal” of the plea, People v. Figueroa-Lemus, 2020
CO 59, ¶ 12, but the defendant has the burden of demonstrating
that fair and just reason, People v. Chippewa, 751 P.2d 607, 609
(Colo. 1988), and whether the defendant met that burden is an
assessment within the sound discretion of the trial court, People v.
4 Lopez, 12 P.3d 869, 871 (Colo. App. 2000). One fair and just
reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea under Crim. P. 32(d) is the
ineffective assistance of counsel. Lopez, 12 P.3d at 871.
B. Application
¶ 10 The record shows that the district court appropriately
considered the balance of prejudice to the parties before denying
Spector’s continuance. The prosecutor objected to a continuance
on behalf of the “more than four victims” in this global plea, who
wanted closure. The court weighed the victims’ interest in closure
against Spector’s interest in a potential ineffective assistance claim,
noting that (1) the case had been pending for over a year; and (2) if
there was a basis for an ineffective assistance claim, Spector could
pursue relief in a postconviction motion.
¶ 11 These circumstances, in addition to those revealed at the
providency hearing, support the district court’s finding that Spector
was simply “playing games” to delay sentencing. At the hearing, the
court engaged in a robust discussion with Spector about whether
he was satisfied with Bresee’s representation. When the court
made clear it would not accept a plea that day unless Spector was
fully satisfied, Spector insisted that he wanted to keep Bresee as his
5 attorney and to accept the plea deal. He “absolutely” did not want
to go to trial. This discussion, suggesting that Spector had no
interest in going to trial, reasonably informed the district court’s
finding that Spector’s continuance motion was a delay tactic.
¶ 12 As to the reasons presented for a continuance, Spector
expressed only one specific concern about Bresee’s representation
— that Bresee could have sent more emails to the district attorney.
In response, the district attorney argued that she had “never
received so many emails on one case . . . . [She had] never had to
spend so much time responding to emails of the defendant’s
questions, explaining to him why my offer will never change.”
Spector conceded that sending more emails would not have resulted
in a better plea offer. Counsel’s written motion to continue asserted
only a vague and speculative claim of ineffective assistance — she
did not allege a specific fair and just reason for withdrawing
Spector’s plea that could be developed with further investigation.
Cf. id. at 871 (concluding that a Crim. P. 32(d) motion may be
denied if a claim of ineffective assistance is conclusory or
contradicted by the record).
6 ¶ 13 For these reasons, we perceive nothing arbitrary or
unreasonable about the district court’s decision to deny Spector’s
motion to continue. We conclude that the court acted well within
its discretion.
III. Disposition
¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.