23CA0396 Peo v Sparkman 03-12-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0396 Mesa County District Court No. 21CR281 Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Boyd Newton Sparkman,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Harris and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 12, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Boyd Newton Sparkman appeals his convictions for six counts
of sexual assault on a child (pattern), four counts of sexual assault
on a child (position of trust), three counts of aggravated incest, and
one count each of bribing a witness, retaliation against a witness,
and child abuse.
¶2 Sparkman contends that the district court erred by (1)
excluding evidence under Colorado’s rape shield statute, section 18-
3-407, C.R.S. 2022;1 (2) excluding evidence about marijuana use;
and (3) admitting improper expert testimony. Sparkman also
contends that the cumulative effect of these errors requires
reversal. And, finally, he challenges the constitutionality of his
indeterminate prison sentence. We affirm.
I. Background
¶3 Before one Valentine’s Day, Sparkman drove his thirteen-year-
old stepdaughter, A.S., and her friend, S.M., to a store to get some
treats. While parked, Sparkman reached into the back seat and
1 Although the rape shield statute was amended after Sparkman’s
trial, see § 18-3-407, C.R.S. 2025; Ch. 123, sec. 2, § 18-3-407, 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws 408-10, we apply the version of the statute in effect at the time of trial, People v. Ramcharan, 2024 COA 110, ¶ 2.
1 touched S.M.’s vagina over her clothes. S.M. pushed Sparkman’s
hand away. A.S. saw what happened. Later that day, A.S.
admitted to S.M. that Sparkman had done similar things to her.
¶4 Later that weekend, Sparkman “rubb[ed]” S.M.’s hips and
“slapped [S.M.’s] butt.” S.M. told a friend that Sparkman had
touched her. S.M.’s outcry soon reached S.M.’s mother, who then
called T.R. (A.S.’s mother and Sparkman’s wife).
¶5 When they were alone, T.R. asked A.S. about the allegations.
A.S. eventually told her mom that Sparkman had touched S.M. in
the car and that Sparkman had been sexually assaulting A.S. for
years. A.S. also told her mom that Sparkman had condoms in his
fishing bag.
¶6 After A.S.’s disclosure, T.R. confronted Sparkman and went to
check his fishing bag. Before she could get to the bag, Sparkman
admitted that A.S. was not lying and fled. Soon after, T.R. and
Sparkman exchanged text messages, which said, in relevant part:
[T.R.:] . . . [W]hy would u hurt her like that . . . .
[Sparkman:] I’m sorry I did anything to hurt you and the family I know I’m a worthless piece of shit . . . .
2 [T.R.:] . . . I just dont understand why u would fuck our daughter u even bought condoms . . . .
[Sparkman:] . . . I am sorry there’s nothing I can do to change myself . . . I don’t belong in this world anymore and I don’t know what I’m doing I don’t know why I did it I just wish I never done it.
¶7 Over the course of several more text messages, Sparkman
added, among other things:
• “Well I’m at the end right now tell my babies I love them I
will always love them and I won’t be able to see me in
heaven because I’ll be in hell for all the fuckedupshit I’ve
ever done”;
• “I can’t live with anything I’ve done I wish none of this was
ever existing”;
• “You have to understand she had me trapped no matter
what I did I was still going to be in trouble there was
nothing I could do to stop it”;
• “I didn’t want to tell you cuz I didn’t want you to hate your
daughter”;
• “This is something that can never be fixed I can’t live with
myself”;
3 • “Just so you know she was never scared . . . she was more
willing than anything I never had to force myself on her
because I didn’t have to she thought that’s what our
relationship was supposed to be because she didn’t know
anything else to do and I didn’t want to turn away because
I didn’t want her to hate me but now all I see is all I could
do”;
• “I didn’t mean to fuck up everybody’s life”; and
• “I’m sorry.”
¶8 The prosecution charged Sparkman with multiple counts of
sexual assault on a child and multiple counts of aggravated incest
as to A.S.; two counts of sexual assault on a child as to S.M.;
bribing a witness and retaliation against a witness as to T.R.; and
one count of child abuse for striking A.S.’s brother.
¶9 At trial, though Sparkman didn’t testify, defense counsel
argued that the sexual assault allegations began as a prank but
“spun out of control, and became a way to get rid of [A.S.’s]
stepfather.”2
2 Defense counsel admitted the child abuse charge and didn’t
address the retaliation and bribery charges.
4 ¶ 10 The jury found Sparkman guilty. The district court sentenced
Sparkman to a controlling indeterminate prison sentence of 136
years to life plus a determinate eighteen-year prison sentence.
II. Rape Shield Statute
¶ 11 Sparkman contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to admit evidence about an
investigation into possible sexual abuse by A.S.’s biological father
and, as a result, violated his constitutional rights to confrontation
and to present a defense to A.S.’s allegations.3 We aren’t
persuaded.
A. Additional Background
¶ 12 Before trial, Sparkman filed a notice seeking to admit evidence
under the rape shield statute that “A.S. was a victim of a sexual
assault investigation of her biological father . . . which was
ultimately not prosecuted.” Sparkman asserted that regardless of
whether the abuse allegation was “true or false,” the evidence was
relevant:
3 Sparkman does not contend that this argument impacts his
convictions that do not involve A.S.
5 • to explain A.S.’s familiarity with the investigative process,
particularly a forensic interview;
• to explain A.S.’s statements to the forensic interviewer in
this case that she knew her allegation against her
biological father was not previously believed and to
impeach her credibility with respect to her allegations
against Sparkman;
• to explain a possible alternative source of historical injury
found by the sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE); and
• as a specific act of dishonesty.
¶ 13 The district court denied Sparkman’s motion without a
hearing.
¶ 14 At trial, the prosecution called the SANE, who testified about
injuries to A.S.’s hymen that were “consistent with blunt force
trauma.” The SANE also testified that she could not say when the
injuries occurred.
¶ 15 After that trial ended in a mistrial, the district court sua
sponte revisited its rape shield ruling. Based on the SANE’s
testimony that the hymenal injuries could not be dated, the court
granted Sparkman a hearing to consider whether the defense could
6 show that the alleged sexual assault by A.S.’s biological father
“could have caused this injury to the hymen.”
¶ 16 At the hearing, defense counsel argued that the 2013 forensic
interviews and police reports were sufficient to show that the injury
could have been caused by A.S.’s biological father. After
considering those materials, the court found that “at absolute best,
there is simply - - a lot of conflicting information - - as it relates to
whether there was any inappropriate touching at all” and “at most,
if there was inappropriate touching, it - - falls far short of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that - - such
inappropriate touching . . . could have caused the injury that - - is
at issue for trial.” The court therefore denied the motion, finding
that the defense had not met its burden to show that the injury
suffered “was a result of anything other than what” was alleged in
this case.
¶ 17 At the retrial, the SANE again testified that A.S. had “two well
healed hymenal transections which are consistent with blunt force
trauma . . . consistent with her report of the events associated with
her assaults.” The SANE admitted that she couldn’t say when the
hymenal injuries occurred.
7 B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 18 Under the rape shield statute, most evidence of specific
instances of a victim’s prior sexual conduct — which includes prior
sexual victimization — is presumptively irrelevant. See § 18-3-
407(1); People v. Weiss, 133 P.3d 1180, 1185 (Colo. 2006).
Generally, such evidence is admissible at trial only after a pretrial
procedure that requires a written motion, an affidavit, an offer of
proof as to the relevancy and materiality of the evidence, and an in
camera hearing on disputed facts. See § 18-3-407(2).
¶ 19 But there are exceptions to the rape shield statute, one of
which is for “[e]vidence of specific instances of sexual activity
showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or any
similar evidence of sexual intercourse offered for the purpose of
showing that the act or acts charged were or were not committed by
the defendant.” § 18-3-407(1)(b). Such evidence is neither
presumptively irrelevant nor subject to the procedural safeguards of
the rape shield statute. See Pierson v. People, 2012 CO 47, ¶¶ 10-
14. It is, however, still subject to the “required balancing of
probativeness and countervailing considerations enumerated in
CRE 403.” Id. at ¶ 14.
8 ¶ 20 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” CRE 401. Even if relevant, however, “evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury.” CRE 403.
¶ 21 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings, including
rulings under the rape shield statute, for an abuse of discretion.
See People v. Buckner, 2022 COA 14, ¶ 63. A court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair, or when it misconstrues the law. See id.
C. The Court Didn’t Err by Excluding the Evidence
¶ 22 We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion
by excluding the evidence of the prior investigation of possible
sexual assault by A.S.’s biological father.
¶ 23 Starting with Sparkman’s argument that the proffered
evidence “explained the source or origin” of A.S.’s hymenal injuries,
we agree that Sparkman failed to show that A.S.’s father committed
sexual abuse, let alone digital penetration. At most, the prior
9 investigation showed that A.S.’s biological father may have touched
A.S. either outside or inside her vagina, but how and where were
not established. Because Sparkman did not make a sufficient offer
of proof of any prior abuse (or penetration), we can hardly say that
the proffered evidence was relevant to establish that it was more or
less probable that Sparkman caused the hymenal injuries. See
People v. Prentiss, 172 P.3d 917, 924 (Colo. App. 2006) (concluding
that the defendant “did not make a sufficient offer of proof that the
victim’s hymenal injury was caused by any prior sexual activity”).4
And even assuming otherwise, the risk of unfair prejudice, issue
confusion, or misleading the jury from such evidence about
speculative events in 2013 outweighed any minimal relevance. See
CRE 403; Fletcher v. People, 179 P.3d 969, 974 (Colo. 2007)
(“[E]vidence which is too remote either in time or logical relation to a
4 Though not addressed by the parties, the district court erred by
evaluating the alternate source evidence under the rape shield statute. See Pierson v. People, 2012 CO 47, ¶¶ 10-14; People v. Prentiss, 172 P.3d 917, 921-26 (Colo. App. 2006). Even so, because Sparkman failed to make a sufficient offer of proof that A.S.’s hymenal injury was caused by her biological father, we conclude the court did not err by excluding the irrelevant evidence. See Prentiss, 172 P.3d at 926.
10 matter in dispute should not be admitted.”). Thus, the court did
not err by excluding the proffered evidence.
¶ 24 We next reject Sparkman’s various arguments that the
evidence was admissible because it was “relevant and material to
[his] defense.” See § 18-3-407(2)(e). First, we don’t see — and
Sparkman doesn’t explain — how A.S.’s purported knowledge of the
prior investigative process (which ended without charges) had any
bearing on her “motive to lie” or “falsely accuse” Sparkman. After
all, Sparkman defended on the theory that A.S. fabricated the
allegations because he was physically abusive, she didn’t like him,
and she wanted to get rid of him. Defense counsel fully explored
these topics on cross-examination. The prior investigation and
forensic interview added nothing to this motive.
¶ 25 Second, for similar reasons, we see no link between purported
“evidence that A.S. was not believed” during the prior investigation
and her “motive to falsely accuse Sparkman.” To the extent that
A.S. wasn’t believed during the prior investigation, Sparkman
doesn’t explain how that would make A.S. more motivated to accuse
11 Sparkman.5 If anything, it offers some explanation as to why she
may have delayed her outcry.
¶ 26 Finally, we reject Sparkman’s generic argument that the
proffered evidence was relevant to sexual knowledge and sexual
acts. Sparkman doesn’t develop this argument or explain how the
allegation in the prior investigation (that her biological father
touched her inside or outside her vagina) gave A.S. any knowledge
about vaginal and oral sex. See Pierson, ¶¶ 18-20 (discussing ways
in which a defendant might make a sufficient offer of proof
concerning the “sexual sophistication” of a child victim). And
without some argument about how an allegation of touching
translates to knowledge of oral and vaginal sex, we decline to
further address this conclusory assertion. See People v. Liggett,
2021 COA 51, ¶ 53, aff’d, 2023 CO 22.
¶ 27 For all these reasons, we conclude that the court didn’t abuse
its discretion by excluding the evidence of the investigation into the
alleged abuse by A.S.’s biological father. And because the evidence
5 Sparkman points us to nothing in the record to suggest that A.S.
“was not believed” during the prior investigation. The record shows only that her statements were not consistent, and that the prosecution didn’t bring charges.
12 was not relevant or admissible, we also conclude that its exclusion
did not violate Sparkman’s constitutional right to present a defense.
See People v. Sims, 2019 COA 66, ¶ 52.
III. Evidence of Marijuana Use
¶ 28 During direct examination of T.R., defense counsel established
that T.R. was the “favorite” parent and that she would let her kids
do “fun things.” Pursuing that topic, defense counsel then asked,
“For example, you would let [A.S.] smoke marijuana, right?” The
district court sustained the prosecution’s objection, finding the
evidence “extremely prejudicial.”
¶ 29 Sparkman maintains that this was reversible error because
the evidence that T.R. allowed A.S. to use marijuana was relevant to
“demonstrate bias and motive for falsely accusing” him.
¶ 30 As before, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Miller, 2024 COA 66, ¶ 40.
¶ 31 Even assuming the evidence that T.R. allowed A.S. to use
marijuana had some minimal probative value — and that is
generous — we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion by finding that the evidence was unduly prejudicial
under Rule 403. After all, defense counsel had already thoroughly
13 established that A.S. didn’t like Sparkman and that he was
physically abusive. Thus, admission of evidence that T.R. allowed
thirteen-year-old A.S. to use marijuana simply risked diverting the
jury’s attention to a collateral issue — whether T.R. engaged in
criminal conduct — and inviting a decision on an improper basis,
such as anger or contempt directed at T.R. See, e.g., People v.
Clark, 2015 COA 44, ¶¶ 18, 47 (explaining that a district court has
discretion to exclude evidence that has little bearing on credibility,
places undue emphasis on collateral matters, has the potential to
confuse the jury, or has an undue tendency to suggest a decision
on an improper basis); see also Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 468-
69 (Colo. 2009) (excluding evidence where the collateral issues had
the potential to confuse the jury and lead it astray).
¶ 32 We therefore conclude that the district court didn’t abuse its
discretion by excluding evidence that T.R. allowed A.S. to use
marijuana.
IV. Expert Testimony
¶ 33 Sparkman next argues that the district court “reversibly erred
by allowing inadmissible expert testimony.” He says that the expert
14 improperly testified beyond her expertise and improperly bolstered
A.S.’s credibility. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 34 At trial, the prosecution qualified a generalized expert to testify
about “all aspects of child sexual assault,” including “the process of
memory.” Though Sparkman generally objected on the grounds of
improper bolstering, he did not challenge the expert’s qualifications
or object to the scope of her expertise.
¶ 35 The expert then testified generally about child abuse outcry
and disclosure patterns, delayed reporting, and memory. On
redirect examination, in response to the prosecutor’s question
regarding how multiple similar events affect the memory, the expert
added:
[W]e could assume that if something is difficult or traumatic or stressful that those events . . . would all stand out. And they don’t. They, the human you know mind has to be efficient because there’s just so much material that happens, right? Across any given day. When something is repeated if it’s a positive thing or a difficult or even a stressful or traumatic thing, the mind will script those together if they’re highly similar in terms of those kinds of salient details.
15 B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 36 Expert witness testimony is governed by CRE 702 and is
admissible when (1) the scientific principles at issue are reasonably
reliable; (2) the expert is qualified to offer the testimony; (3) the
testimony is helpful to the jury; and (4) the testimony’s probative
value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury. People v. Cooper, 2021
CO 69, ¶ 47; see CRE, 403.
¶ 37 We review a district court’s admission of expert testimony for
an abuse of discretion and will reverse only if the court’s decision
was manifestly erroneous. Cooper, ¶ 44.
C. Scope of Expertise
¶ 38 Though Sparkman contends that the generalized expert
testified beyond her expertise when she opined about “the
functioning of a person’s brain during a traumatic or stressful
event, including the recording of memories,” the court specifically
qualified the expert in “the process of memory.” We therefore
construe Sparkman’s contention as an unpreserved objection to the
expert’s qualifications.
16 ¶ 39 An expert witness is not required to hold a “specific degree,
training certificate, [or] accreditation” to testify on a particular
issue. Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Colo. 2008) (citation
omitted). Rather, a witness may be qualified to offer expert
testimony based on one, or more, of the five factors in Rule 702 —
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. See id.
¶ 40 Before the court qualified the expert, she described her
educational background, training, and significant experience
working with child sex assault victims. The expert also testified
about her training and education in child development. And she
testified that she had taught a course at Mesa University “once a
semester for about nine years” focused on “cognitive development,
memory, those types of developmental changes [from] birth through
actually adulthood.”
¶ 41 Sparkman’s complaint seems to be that the expert — a trained
therapist — lacked a medical degree. But the lack of a specific
degree doesn’t make an expert unqualified. See id. Because
experience and training are sufficient to qualify an expert, see CRE
702, Sparkman’s complaint goes to the weight of the expert’s
testimony, not its admissibility, see People v. Lehmkuhl, 117 P.3d
17 98, 104 (Colo. App. 2004) (observing that when an expert lacks
certain additional qualifications within a field of expertise, such
deficiency goes to the weight of the testimony).
¶ 42 We therefore conclude that the court did not err by qualifying
the expert to testify about memory processing.
D. Bolstering
¶ 43 We next reject Sparkman’s contention that the generalized
expert’s “neurological explanations for inconsistent statements . . .
improperly bolstered” A.S.’s credibility.
¶ 44 A generalized expert witness may not bolster the credibility of
a victim by implying that they are telling the truth. See Cooper,
¶ 95. But that didn’t happen here. Indeed, the expert’s general
testimony about the effects of stress and trauma on memory
processing said nothing about whether A.S. was telling the truth.
Because the expert testimony did not improperly bolster A.S.’s
credibility, we conclude the court properly admitted it.
V. Cumulative Error
¶ 45 Sparkman contends that even if none of the alleged errors
individually require reversal, the “cumulative effect of these errors
requires reversal of [his] convictions.” Because we don’t agree that
18 the district court committed multiple errors, we necessarily reject
Sparkman’s cumulative error contention. See People v. Allgier,
2018 COA 122, ¶ 70 (“[T]he doctrine of cumulative error requires
that numerous errors be committed, not merely alleged.”).
VI. Constitutionality of the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA)
¶ 46 Finally, Sparkman challenges his indeterminate sentence
imposed under SOLSA. He argues that SOLSA is facially
unconstitutional for multiple reasons.
¶ 47 Because Sparkman didn’t raise any constitutional challenges
before the district court, we review for plain error. See Hagos v.
People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 22. And given the many decisions that have
rejected similar constitutional challenges to SOLSA, see, e.g., People
v. Sabell, 2018 COA 85, ¶ 47 (collecting cases), the district court
didn’t plainly err by not sua sponte finding SOLSA unconstitutional,
see People v. Pollard, 2013 COA 31M, ¶ 39 (“To qualify as ‘plain’
error, an error must be so clear-cut, so obvious, that a trial judge
should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection.”).
VII. Disposition
¶ 48 We affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
19 JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.