23CA1123 Peo v Spain 06-04-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1123 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CR770 Honorable Ericka F.H. Englert, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Cameron T. Spain,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Lipinsky and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 4, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, James S. Hardy, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Cameron T. Spain appeals the judgment of conviction entered
after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder. He contends
that the district court (1) violated his due process rights by
improperly instructing the jury on reasonable doubt and
(2) erroneously excluded evidence concerning the victim’s toxicology
report. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The jury heard evidence that would support the following
facts.
¶3 Spain shot the victim five times near the RV where Spain was
living. The below diagram illustrates the number and location of
the victim’s gunshot wounds:
1 The forensic pathologist testified that the victim died of gunshot
wounds to the torso and the manner of death was homicide.
¶4 Police identified Spain as the shooter based on leads obtained
at a nearby Salvation Army shelter, surveillance video from nearby
businesses, and data from the ankle monitor that Spain wore at the
time. The video footage of the shooting is blurry, with the figures
appearing small and indistinct. However, one figure can be seen
backing away, after which another figure wearing a headlamp fires
a handgun at the retreating person. Video footage from a different
camera shows a figure wearing a headlamp riding away from the
scene on a bicycle.
¶5 Five days after the shooting, police found Spain at his RV.
They observed no injuries to his face — no scratches, cuts, bruises,
or other signs of injury. Police recovered a headlamp from the RV
and a knife wrapped with yarn or string at the crime scene. The
victim’s “DNA was on the knife,” which was found “right next to his
clothing and where he went down on the ground.”
¶6 After his arrest, Spain told his cellmate he shot the victim after
a drug deal went bad, saying that he became angry because the
victim “said something or did something funny.” Spain also claimed
2 the victim struck him with a padlock on a chain before the
shooting. (Police did not find a chain or padlock — other than the
padlock on Spain’s RV — at the crime scene.) Spain told his
cellmate he had used a .45 caliber firearm that he later sold. He
also said that after the shooting, he fled on his bicycle, called his
girlfriend, and met her in an alley, where she advised him to burn
his clothes.
¶7 At trial, defense counsel did not dispute that Spain was the
shooter and asserted a self-defense theory. Defense counsel argued
that the victim struck Spain in the face and threatened him with a
knife. However, no testimony or other evidence indicated that the
victim used a knife. At defense counsel’s request, the court
instructed the jury on the self-defense theory. The jury rejected
this defense and convicted Spain of first degree murder after
deliberation.
¶8 Spain now appeals.
II. Jury Instructions
¶9 Spain contends that the district court reversibly erred by
giving the 2022 model criminal jury instruction on reasonable
3 doubt because that instruction lowered the prosecution’s burden of
proof. We disagree.
A. Applicable Facts
¶ 10 In 2022, the Model Criminal Jury Instructions Committee
revised the model instruction for reasonable doubt. People v.
Melara, 2025 COA 48, ¶ 12. In addition to modifying the
reasonable doubt instruction, the committee combined it and the
presumption of innocence instruction into a single new instruction.
See COLJI-Crim. E:03 (2022).
¶ 11 Before the 2022 revision, the model reasonable doubt
instruction read as follows:
Reasonable doubt means a doubt based upon reason and common sense which arises from a fair and rational consideration of all of the evidence, or the lack of evidence, in the case. It is a doubt which is not a vague, speculative or imaginary doubt, but such a doubt as would cause reasonable people to hesitate to act in matters of importance to themselves.
If you find from the evidence that each and every element of a crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty of that crime. If you find from the evidence that the prosecution has failed to prove any one or more of the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, you
4 should find the defendant not guilty of that crime.
COLJI-Crim. E:03 (2021).
¶ 12 At trial, defense counsel tendered the pre-2022 instruction for
the burden of proof and definition of reasonable doubt and objected
to the 2022 instruction. Defense counsel argued that the 2022
instruction lowered and shifted the burden of proof and “does not
maintain the burden fully with the prosecution.”
¶ 13 Over defense counsel’s objections, the district court gave the
2022 instruction at trial:
Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent. This presumption of innocence remains with the defendant throughout the trial and should be given effect by you unless, after considering all the evidence, you are convinced that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The burden of proof in this case is upon the prosecution. The prosecution must prove to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of each and every element necessary to constitute the crime charged. This burden requires more than proof that something is highly probable, but it does not require proof with absolute certainty.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s
5 guilt. If you are firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt, then the prosecution has proven the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. But if you think there is a real possibility that the defendant is not guilty, then the prosecution has failed to prove the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
After considering all the evidence, if you decide the prosecution has failed to prove any one or more of the elements of a crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty of that crime.
After considering all the evidence, if you decide the prosecution has proven each of the elements of a crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty of that crime.[1]
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 14 We review de novo whether a district court accurately
instructed the jury on the law. Johnson v. People, 2019 CO 17, ¶ 8.
¶ 15 The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
“protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.” Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1, ¶ 23
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
1 In the pattern instruction, this paragraph precedes the previous
one. See COLJI-Crim. E:03 (2022).
6 ¶ 16 The district court must properly instruct the jury on the
reasonable doubt standard. Id. at ¶ 25. Although the court has
some flexibility in how it defines reasonable doubt, an instruction
that lowers the prosecution’s burden of proof below that standard
constitutes structural error requiring automatic reversal. People v.
Schlehuber, 2025 COA 50, ¶ 13.
¶ 17 To determine whether an instruction impermissibly lowered
the burden of proof, we apply a “functional test, asking whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood [the]
contested instruction, in the context of the instructions as a whole
and the trial record, to allow a conviction based on a standard lower
than beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tibbels, ¶ 36. The district court
has broad discretion to determine the form and style of instructions
as long as they properly inform the jury of the law. McDonald v.
People, 2021 CO 64, ¶ 54. Thus, there is no due process violation if
the instructions as a whole correctly inform the jury of the
prosecution’s burden to prove the charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Johnson, ¶ 14.
7 C. Analysis
¶ 18 Like the defendant in Schlehuber, Spain challenges four
aspects of the 2022 model jury instruction given by the district
court: (1) the instruction did not inform the jury that it could
consider the “lack of evidence” supporting the prosecution’s case;
(2) it omitted the “hesitate to act” phrase found in the previous
version of the reasonable doubt instruction; (3) it equated
reasonable doubt with “a real possibility that the defendant is not
guilty”; and (4) it used the phrase “firmly convinced” in contrast to
“real possibility” to define proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2
Schlehuber, ¶ 16.
¶ 19 We first reject Spain’s argument that removing the “lack of
evidence” language from the 2022 model instruction lowered or
shifted the burden of proof or undermined the presumption of
innocence. Three divisions of this court have concluded that
removing the “lack of evidence” instruction from the 2022 model
2 Spain also asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors
lowered and shifted the prosecution’s burden of proof. See People v. Schlehuber, 2025 COA 50, ¶ 35. For the same reasons we conclude that none of the claimed errors individually lowered the burden of proof, we conclude they did not do so cumulatively. See id.
8 instruction did not lower the prosecution’s burden of proof.
Schlehuber, ¶ 20; Melara, ¶ 24; People v. Berumen, 2025 COA 93,
¶ 33. And contrary to Spain’s assertion, while the Melara division
stated that a district court “should inform the jury, as part of the
reasonable doubt instruction, that it may consider the lack of
evidence in the case,” the omission of the “lack of evidence”
language did not alter the division’s conclusion that the 2022
instruction “did not impermissibly lower the prosecution’s burden
of proof.” Melara,¶ 24. Further, the return of “lack of evidence” in
the 2023 model instruction does not mean that its omission from
the 2022 model instruction “unconstitutionally lower[ed] the
prosecution’s burden of proof below the reasonable doubt
standard.” Schlehuber, ¶¶ 18 n.2, 25.
¶ 20 Moreover, Spain’s argument that, without the “lack of
evidence” language, the jury had no guidance about how to address
evidentiary gaps in the prosecution’s case does not withstand
scrutiny when the instruction is read as a whole. Id. at ¶¶ 19-23.
As the Schlehuber division explained, the 2022 model instruction
does not preclude the jury from considering the prosecution’s lack
of evidence because this concept is incorporated within the 2022
9 instruction. Id. at ¶ 22. The jury was told that “the prosecution
bears the burden of proof” and that the defendant is “presumed
innocent unless the prosecution meets its burden.” Id.
Additionally, the penultimate paragraph of the court’s instruction
told the jury to consider “all the evidence” when determining
whether the prosecution met its burden of proof: “After considering
all the evidence, if you decide the prosecution has failed to prove
any one or more of the elements of a crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty of that
crime.” Id. at ¶ 9. Thus, the “fail[ure] to prove” language informed
the jury that it should return a not guilty verdict if a material gap
existed in the prosecution’s proof.
¶ 21 Likewise, removing the “hesitate to act” language did not
deprive the jury of necessary context to understand and apply the
concept of reasonable doubt. We, like the Schlehuber division, do
not see why it would be error to remove the “hesitate to act”
language “so long as the instruction otherwise correctly defines the
reasonable doubt standard.” Id. at ¶ 28. The 2022 instruction
defines reasonable doubt using the phrases “firmly convinced” and
“real possibility.” As the Schlehuber court explained, “‘[F]irmly
10 convinced’ correctly connotes a standard of ‘near certitude’ — one
that is higher than ‘highly probable’ but stops short of absolute
certainty” — and the phrase “real possibility” instructs the jury not
to acquit “simply because it can conceive of some fanciful possibility
that the defendant is not guilty.” Id. at ¶ 31 (citation omitted). Like
the Schlehuber division, we disagree that
the two challenged phrases are “contradictory” or “create two different standards.” Rather, the phrases work together to give the jury a complete picture of the reasonable doubt standard. The first — “firmly convinced — describes what it means to have no reasonable doubt. The second — “real possibility” — contrasts that with what it means to have a reasonable doubt. In other words, the jury could either be “firmly convinced” of Schlehuber’s guilt (and find him guilty) or “think there is a real possibility” that Schlehuber was not guilty (and find him not guilty). Both things could not be true.
Id. at ¶ 33. We therefore conclude that the 2022 model instruction
did not impermissibly lower the prosecution’s burden to prove the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 22 We are not persuaded otherwise by Spain’s argument that
referencing a “real possibility” that the defendant was not guilty
lowered or shifted the burden of proof or undermined the
11 presumption of innocence. As the Schlehuber division concluded,
equating reasonable doubt with a “real possibility” does not shift
the burden to the defendant to prove that real possibility. Id. at
¶ 34. The court’s instruction stated that if the jury believes “there
is a real possibility that the defendant is not guilty, then the
prosecution has failed to prove the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Additionally, the instruction correctly informed
the jury that it was required to presume that the defendant was
innocent, that the burden of proof lay with the prosecution, and
that the prosecution had to prove every element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 23 We further disagree with Spain’s contention that the “firmly
convinced” language defines a level of certitude below the standard
of beyond a reasonable doubt or permits a juror to be “firmly
convinced” by impermissible, nonevidentiary considerations — such
as counsel’s arguments, personal bias, or a gut-level impulse.
Three divisions of this court have already concluded that the “firmly
convinced” phrase does not lower the burden of proof. Melara,
¶ 30; Schlehuber, ¶¶ 30-32; Berumen, ¶¶ 22-25. And Spain’s
related argument overlooks the court’s other instructions. The
12 court also instructed the jury that it had to presume the
defendant’s innocence and that it had “received all of the evidence”
it could “properly consider in deciding the case.” Further, the
instructions stated that the jury’s verdict “must be made by
applying the rules of law . . . to the evidence presented at trial” and
could not be “influenced by sympathy, bias, or prejudice.”
¶ 24 Because we conclude that the 2022 model jury instruction did
not lower the prosecution’s burden of proof, it follows that the
district court did not violate Spain’s due process rights by giving
this instruction to the jury.
III. Evidence of the Victim’s Toxicology Report
¶ 25 Spain contends that the district court erred by excluding
evidence concerning the victim’s toxicology report. We are not
persuaded.
¶ 26 The prosecutor informed the court that the coroner’s report
showed that the victim had 440 nanograms of methamphetamine in
his system. The prosecutor indicated that he had provided the
coroner’s report to defense counsel but argued that the portion of
13 the report discussing the victim’s methamphetamine level should
not be admitted into evidence.
¶ 27 The prosecutor argued that this information would invite
speculation because no endorsed witness could testify about how
the reported level of methamphetamine would have affected this
victim or about the general effects of methamphetamine on users.
The prosecutor therefore requested exclusion of the evidence,
contending that any probative value was substantially outweighed
by the risk of unfair prejudice and potential for jury confusion and
speculation.
¶ 28 Defense counsel argued that the toxicology results in the
coroner’s report were relevant to Spain’s self-defense theory and
asserted that at least one endorsed witness — a homeless outreach
coordinator — could offer anecdotal testimony about observing
individuals on methamphetamine. When the court asked whether
this witness would testify about the victim’s condition, counsel
admitted that she could not, as she lacked personal knowledge of
the victim’s behavior while under the influence of
methamphetamine.
14 ¶ 29 Defense counsel nonetheless argued that “it would be very
unlikely for a person in [the coordinator’s] capacity in Denver to
have never come across an individual [who] they later learned to be
on methamphetamine” and that a methamphetamine expert witness
was unnecessary because multiple witnesses could testify about
“how people have interacted with them in the past, being on
methamphetamine.”
¶ 30 In addition, counsel contended that the victim’s
methamphetamine level was relevant to the forensic pathologist’s
testimony regarding “how he arrived at his conclusion in his expert
opinion that this was a homicide” and whether it was possible the
victim instead “died as a result of his methamphetamine
intoxication.”
¶ 31 The prosecutor countered that defense counsel was
speculating: The outreach coordinator had not been endorsed as an
expert and therefore could not testify generally about
methamphetamine, and she could not offer a lay opinion as to
whether the victim appeared to be under the influence because she
was not present at the shooting. The prosecutor further argued
that the defense could not “tie the numbers here in the [toxicology]
15 report to anything” — specifically, there was no basis to determine
what the numbers meant, whether this was the victim’s first or
fiftieth time using methamphetamine, or how long
methamphetamine “stays in the body.” In sum, the prosecutor
concluded, the information would lead the jury to speculate that the
victim had attacked Spain because the victim was under the
influence, despite no evidence supporting that inference.
¶ 32 The district court denied Spain’s request to admit the
toxicology results, concluding that the victim’s methamphetamine
level was irrelevant under CRE 401 and 402 and that any probative
value was outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury about the
relevant issues. See CRE 403.
¶ 33 The court also relied on People v. Delaney, 620 P.2d 44, 45-46
(Colo. App. 1980), in which the division concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the manslaughter
victim’s blood alcohol and narcotics concentration when the defense
“made no effort to show how such substances might have affected
the victim’s behavior . . . on the night in question.” Similarly, the
district court here found that no witnesses could testify about the
specific effects of the drugs on the victim the night of the shooting,
16 whether the victim was a heavy user, or whether the amount of
methamphetamine could have caused him to act aggressively or
violently.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 34 “The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” People v.
Salazar, 2012 CO 20, ¶ 17. However, this right is not absolute; it
guarantees “only that the accused be permitted to introduce all
relevant and admissible evidence.” Id.; see also People v. Cline,
2022 COA 135, ¶ 77 (explaining that the right to present a defense
is subject to compliance with the rules of evidence).
¶ 35 A district court has considerable discretion to determine the
relevancy, probative value, and prejudicial impact of evidence.
People v. Cordova, 293 P.3d 114, 118 (Colo. App. 2011). Relevant
evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” CRE 401. Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. CRE
17 403. Accordingly, we review a district court’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion, and we will overturn
the decision only if it was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.
People v. James, 117 P.3d 91, 94 (Colo. App. 2004).
¶ 36 An erroneous evidentiary ruling may rise to the level of a
constitutional error if it deprived the defendant of a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense. People v. Conyac, 2014
COA 8M, ¶ 93; see Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo.
2009). But the right to present a defense “is violated only where the
defendant was denied virtually his only means of effectively testing
significant prosecution evidence.” Conyac, ¶ 93.
C. Analysis
¶ 37 We conclude that the district court neither abused its
discretion nor violated Spain’s constitutional right to present a
defense by excluding the toxicology report indicating the victim had
methamphetamine in his system.
¶ 38 First, as the prosecutor argued and the district court found,
no experts were endorsed to testify about methamphetamine or its
effects. Consequently, no witness could explain how
methamphetamine affects users generally, interpret the
18 concentration of methamphetamine in the victim’s system,
determine whether the victim was under the influence, or assess
whether that amount of methamphetamine in the victim’s body
could have triggered violent or aggressive behavior. The district
court therefore acted within its discretion by excluding the report.
Delaney, 620 P.2d at 45-46; see also State v. Jennings, 502 P.3d
1255, 1260 (Wash. 2022) (holding that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by excluding the victim’s toxicology report in a
self-defense case because “reasonable minds might differ” as to the
relevance of the report when the defendant “offered no witness to
testify as to the potential effects on the victim or that he had
previously observed the victim under the influence of
methamphetamine”).
¶ 39 Still, citing medical journals and media sources, Spain argues
that expert testimony was unnecessary because the connection
between methamphetamine and violent behavior is “common
knowledge.” We disagree that the behavioral effect of 440
nanograms of methamphetamine on the victim is within the
common knowledge of a lay person. Further, the significance of the
toxicology report is a matter of specialized scientific knowledge that
19 exceeds whatever common knowledge the jury may have regarding
the general effects of methamphetamine. See CRE 702.
Accordingly, the toxicology report was not admissible without expert
testimony.
¶ 40 Spain’s reliance on People v. Dunham, 2016 COA 73, ¶ 38, is
misplaced. In Dunham, an attempted murder case in which the
victim testified, the division found it was error to prevent
cross-examination about the victim’s methamphetamine use on the
night of the shooting because it directly related to his credibility.
See id. at ¶ 40 (“Many courts have recognized that evidence a
witness was under the influence of drugs at the time of the events
about which the witness testified bears directly on the witness’s
credibility because drug use may affect a person’s ability to perceive
accurately.”). Here, in contrast, the victim could not testify, so the
reasoning in Dunham does not apply.
¶ 41 Second, no witnesses — including Spain — testified about
their observations of the victim on the night of the shooting.
Without any evidence of the victim’s behavior during the relevant
time period, admitting the toxicology results would have only
confused the jury and invited speculation. See CRE 403. The
20 district court therefore acted within its discretion by excluding this
evidence. See Gill v. State, 765 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. 2014)
(upholding exclusion of toxicology evidence in a self-defense case
because the defendant made no showing as to “how any drugs that
were allegedly in [the victim’s] system may have been affecting his
behavior at the time of his fatal encounter with [the defendant]”);
Lawrence v. State, 2015 WY 97, ¶ 19 (upholding exclusion of
toxicology evidence in a self-defense case because there was no
evidence the defendant was aware of the victim’s intoxication).
¶ 42 The toxicology evidence was also irrelevant to the forensic
pathologist’s determination of the victim’s cause of death. The
pathologist concluded that the victim died of gunshot wounds to the
torso and ruled the death a homicide. Nothing in the autopsy
report or the pathologist’s testimony suggested any doubt about the
cause of death. The evidence established that the victim died as a
result of gunshot wounds, not methamphetamine intoxication.
Thus, defense counsel did not have the right to cross-examine any
witness about whether the victim’s death was due to
methamphetamine intoxication. See People v. Scearce, 87 P.3d 228,
233 (Colo. App. 2003) (noting that “the right to present a defense
21 does not guarantee a defendant a right to question witnesses in
violation of the rules of evidence”); People v. Saiz, 32 P.3d 441, 449
(Colo. 2001) (While constitutional rights “inform and shape the
limits of a trial court’s discretion to control cross-examination and
exclude evidence offered by a criminal defendant, they do not
eliminate that discretion or guarantee that a defendant be permitted
to present all the evidence he wishes or do so in the manner he
chooses.”).
¶ 43 Finally, the district court did not violate Spain’s constitutional
right to present a defense because he was able to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. See, e.g.,
Krutsinger, 219 P.3d at 1062 (“[T]he standard or test for assessing
whether a defendant’s right to confront or present a defense has
been violated by evidentiary rulings is clearly dependent upon the
extent to which he was permitted to subject the prosecutor’s case to
‘meaningful adversarial testing.’” (quoting Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986))).
¶ 44 The defense mounted a self-defense case by presenting
evidence that the victim was holding a large, sharp, serrated
hunting knife when Spain shot him and by extensively
22 cross-examining Spain’s cellmate, who testified for the prosecution.
Spain does not argue that he was deprived of the opportunity to
present a defense; he merely claims that the jury “very likely would
have given stronger consideration to [his] self-defense claim had it
been aware of the methamphetamine evidence.” The district court
therefore did not deny Spain a meaningful opportunity to present a
defense.
IV. Disposition
¶ 45 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.