Peo v. Snyder

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 27, 2025
• Docket: 21CA0621
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

21CA0621 Peo v Snyder 02-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0621 Pitkin County District Court No. 18CR69 Honorable Christopher G. Seldin, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Lilith Newmoon Hazel Snyder,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Grove and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 27, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna Brackett, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Cynthia A. Harvey, Alternate Defense Counsel, Aurora, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Lilith Newmoon Hazel Snyder, appeals a condition

of her probationary sentence. We dismiss the appeal.

I. Background

¶2 As part of a plea agreement, Snyder pleaded guilty to second

degree burglary in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges.

The parties stipulated that Snyder would not be sentenced to

prison, but they left all other sentencing options open to the court.

¶3 At the sentencing hearing, the district court learned that

because Snyder did not qualify for community corrections, the only

available sentencing option was a sentence to probation. The court

accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Snyder to four years of

probation with, as now relevant, a ninety-day jail sentence as a

condition.

¶4 On appeal, Snyder contends that the district court “abused its

discretion when it imposed an arbitrary sentence of 90 days jail as

a condition of her probationary sentence” because it “focused on

uncharged and unsubstantiated acts,” “discount[ed] significant

mitigation,” and “prioritiz[ed] punishment over all other sentencing

criteria.”

1 II. Discussion

¶5 Because we must always ensure that we have jurisdiction to

hear an appeal, we may raise jurisdictional defects sua sponte,

regardless of whether the parties have raised the issue. People v.

S.X.G., 2012 CO 5, ¶ 9. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to

review Snyder’s sentence.

¶6 Section 18-1.3-104(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, prohibits appellate

review of “[t]he granting or denial of probation and the conditions of

probation including the length of probation” unless probation is

granted “contrary to the provisions of [Title 18].” Thus, appellate

courts do not have jurisdiction to review a challenge to probation

unless the district court exceeded its statutory authority under Title

18. People v. Rossman, 140 P.3d 172, 174 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶7 Snyder consented to probation in lieu of imprisonment;

therefore, the district court had statutory authority to sentence her

to probation with the conditions it deemed best — including a

ninety-day jail commitment. § 18-1.3-202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. And

absent a challenge to the court’s statutory authority to impose the

ninety-day jail condition, or that the condition itself violates a

constitutional right, we are without jurisdiction to review it. See

2 People v. Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Colo. 1997) (“A

probationer may challenge terms of probation that are not within

the statutory authority of the court” to impose.); see also People v.

Cooley, 2020 COA 101, ¶ 26 (considering de novo whether a

probation condition is constitutional or statutorily authorized).

¶8 Accordingly, because Snyder merely challenges the district

court’s exercise of discretion and not its statutory authority, we are

without jurisdiction to review her claim.1

III. Disposition

¶9 The appeal is dismissed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

1 In light of our disposition, we do not address the People’s

contention that because the sentence Snyder received was within the range to which she stipulated as part of a plea agreement, she is barred from challenging it by section 18-1-409, C.R.S. 2024.