24CA1568 Peo v Siegel 02-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1568 El Paso County District Court No. 02CR1938 Honorable Marcus S. Henson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Steven Tod Siegel,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE LUM J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 19, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Richard Bednarski, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Steven Tod Siegel appeals the district court’s order denying his
petition to discontinue sex offender registration and for his removal
from the sex offender registry pursuant to section 16-22-113,
C.R.S. 2025. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2001, Siegel began electronically communicating with an
undercover detective who posed as an individual able to facilitate
adults’ sexual fantasies with children. The detective coordinated
with Siegel to meet underage girls in exchange for payment and
arranged a meet-up at a hotel in Colorado Springs. Siegel arrived at
the specified hotel one evening and confirmed his identity with the
undercover detective. The detective then arrested him, searched his
car, and found a video camera, condoms, and a sex toy. Siegel was
initially charged with three crimes: soliciting for child prostitution,
criminal attempt to commit sexual exploitation of a child, and
criminal attempt to commit sexual assault on a child.
¶3 Siegel pleaded guilty to criminal attempt to commit sexual
exploitation of a child and to an added count of sexual exploitation
of a child (possession of sexually exploitative material) in exchange
for dismissal of the remaining charges. The district court sentenced
1 Siegel to ten years to life on sex offender intensive supervision
probation, which required that he complete sex offender treatment.
The district court register of actions also reflects a note that Siegel
was required to “register as [a] sex offender for 10 yrs after
prob[ation].”
¶4 Siegel successfully completed his probationary term in 2014
and registered as a sex offender for ten years thereafter. In 2024,
he filed a petition to discontinue sex offender registration with the
district court, arguing that he had completed his ten-year
registration term. After a hearing, the district court denied Siegel’s
petition, reasoning that, under section 16-22-113(3)(c), Siegel’s two
convictions rendered him ineligible for deregistration.
¶5 Siegel appeals. First, he argues that section 16-22-113(3)(c) is
intended for “habitual abusers” and not for offenders whose
convictions arise from a single offense. Second, Siegel contends
that the district court erred by concluding that he doesn’t qualify
for the statutory exception offered in section 18-6-403(5.7), C.R.S.
2025, as an alternative avenue for deregistration. Third, Siegel
argues that even if the statutes preclude deregistration, he is
entitled to deregister from the sex offender registry because the
2 sentencing court advised him that he would be eligible to deregister
ten years after his successful termination from probation, which
was material to his plea bargain. We address each argument in
turn.
II. Standard of Review
¶6 We review a district court’s statutory interpretation de novo.
People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 17. In construing a statute, we aim
to give effect to the legislative intent. Id. To discern intent, we look
first to the plain language of the statute and give “its words and
phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Weeks, 2021
CO 75, ¶ 25 (quoting McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10). We
must construe a statute “as a whole” with an eye toward “giving
consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts” while
avoiding “constructions that would render any words or phrases
superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.” McCoy v. People,
2019 CO 44, ¶ 38.
¶7 When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we
give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning “and look no further.”
Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 12.
3 III. Applicable Law
¶8 Sex offenders in Colorado are required to register as such
pursuant to the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA).
§ 16-22-103, C.R.S. 2025. A person who is required to register may
petition the court to discontinue registration under certain
circumstances. § 16-22-113. However, section 16-22-113(3)(c)
states in relevant part that “[a]ny adult who has more than one
conviction as an adult for unlawful sexual behavior or any other
offense, the underlying factual basis of which is unlawful sexual
behavior,” is not eligible to petition for deregistration.
¶9 Section 18-6-403(5.7) provides an exception to this
ineligibility: An “adult who has more than one conviction” for sexual
exploitation of a child (accessing, viewing, possessing, or controlling
sexually exploitative material) “in a single criminal case is eligible to
petition for removal from the registry pursuant to section
16-22-113.” See § 16-22-113(3)(c); § 18-6-403(3)(b.5), (5.7).
¶ 10 A division of this court interpreted the deregistration eligibility
criteria in People v. Atencio, 219 P.3d 1080 (Colo. App. 2009). In
Atencio, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempt to
commit sexual assault on a child with each count naming a
4 separate victim. Id. at 1081. Upon completing his probationary
sentence, the defendant petitioned the court to discontinue his
statutorily required sex offender registration. Id. The People
opposed the petition, arguing that he was ineligible under section
16-22-113 because he had been convicted of two counts of unlawful
sexual behavior. Id. The defendant argued that because he
pleaded guilty to two counts in the same case, section
16-22-113(3)(c) was inapplicable to him. Id. The division disagreed
and concluded that a person who is convicted of more than one
charge of unlawful sexual behavior is ineligible for deregistration
under section 16-22-113, regardless of whether the convictions
occurred in the same case or in separate cases. Id.
IV. Section 16-22-113(3)(c) Ineligibility
¶ 11 Siegel first argues that the ineligibility criteria in section
16-22-113(3)(c) don’t apply to individuals whose multiple
convictions (1) arise out of the same criminal act and (2) don’t
involve multiple victims. For this reason, he also argues that the
district court erred by relying on Atencio to conclude that he is
ineligible for deregistration because that case involved multiple
victims, whereas his case doesn’t. We are unpersuaded.
5 ¶ 12 The term “conviction” may vary in meaning depending on the
language and context of the statute. Atencio, 219 P.3d at 1082;
People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Colo. 1994). For
purposes of CSORA, a “conviction” means “having received a verdict
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
24CA1568 Peo v Siegel 02-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1568 El Paso County District Court No. 02CR1938 Honorable Marcus S. Henson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Steven Tod Siegel,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE LUM J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 19, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Richard Bednarski, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Steven Tod Siegel appeals the district court’s order denying his
petition to discontinue sex offender registration and for his removal
from the sex offender registry pursuant to section 16-22-113,
C.R.S. 2025. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2001, Siegel began electronically communicating with an
undercover detective who posed as an individual able to facilitate
adults’ sexual fantasies with children. The detective coordinated
with Siegel to meet underage girls in exchange for payment and
arranged a meet-up at a hotel in Colorado Springs. Siegel arrived at
the specified hotel one evening and confirmed his identity with the
undercover detective. The detective then arrested him, searched his
car, and found a video camera, condoms, and a sex toy. Siegel was
initially charged with three crimes: soliciting for child prostitution,
criminal attempt to commit sexual exploitation of a child, and
criminal attempt to commit sexual assault on a child.
¶3 Siegel pleaded guilty to criminal attempt to commit sexual
exploitation of a child and to an added count of sexual exploitation
of a child (possession of sexually exploitative material) in exchange
for dismissal of the remaining charges. The district court sentenced
1 Siegel to ten years to life on sex offender intensive supervision
probation, which required that he complete sex offender treatment.
The district court register of actions also reflects a note that Siegel
was required to “register as [a] sex offender for 10 yrs after
prob[ation].”
¶4 Siegel successfully completed his probationary term in 2014
and registered as a sex offender for ten years thereafter. In 2024,
he filed a petition to discontinue sex offender registration with the
district court, arguing that he had completed his ten-year
registration term. After a hearing, the district court denied Siegel’s
petition, reasoning that, under section 16-22-113(3)(c), Siegel’s two
convictions rendered him ineligible for deregistration.
¶5 Siegel appeals. First, he argues that section 16-22-113(3)(c) is
intended for “habitual abusers” and not for offenders whose
convictions arise from a single offense. Second, Siegel contends
that the district court erred by concluding that he doesn’t qualify
for the statutory exception offered in section 18-6-403(5.7), C.R.S.
2025, as an alternative avenue for deregistration. Third, Siegel
argues that even if the statutes preclude deregistration, he is
entitled to deregister from the sex offender registry because the
2 sentencing court advised him that he would be eligible to deregister
ten years after his successful termination from probation, which
was material to his plea bargain. We address each argument in
turn.
II. Standard of Review
¶6 We review a district court’s statutory interpretation de novo.
People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 17. In construing a statute, we aim
to give effect to the legislative intent. Id. To discern intent, we look
first to the plain language of the statute and give “its words and
phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Weeks, 2021
CO 75, ¶ 25 (quoting McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10). We
must construe a statute “as a whole” with an eye toward “giving
consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts” while
avoiding “constructions that would render any words or phrases
superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.” McCoy v. People,
2019 CO 44, ¶ 38.
¶7 When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we
give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning “and look no further.”
Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 12.
3 III. Applicable Law
¶8 Sex offenders in Colorado are required to register as such
pursuant to the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA).
§ 16-22-103, C.R.S. 2025. A person who is required to register may
petition the court to discontinue registration under certain
circumstances. § 16-22-113. However, section 16-22-113(3)(c)
states in relevant part that “[a]ny adult who has more than one
conviction as an adult for unlawful sexual behavior or any other
offense, the underlying factual basis of which is unlawful sexual
behavior,” is not eligible to petition for deregistration.
¶9 Section 18-6-403(5.7) provides an exception to this
ineligibility: An “adult who has more than one conviction” for sexual
exploitation of a child (accessing, viewing, possessing, or controlling
sexually exploitative material) “in a single criminal case is eligible to
petition for removal from the registry pursuant to section
16-22-113.” See § 16-22-113(3)(c); § 18-6-403(3)(b.5), (5.7).
¶ 10 A division of this court interpreted the deregistration eligibility
criteria in People v. Atencio, 219 P.3d 1080 (Colo. App. 2009). In
Atencio, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempt to
commit sexual assault on a child with each count naming a
4 separate victim. Id. at 1081. Upon completing his probationary
sentence, the defendant petitioned the court to discontinue his
statutorily required sex offender registration. Id. The People
opposed the petition, arguing that he was ineligible under section
16-22-113 because he had been convicted of two counts of unlawful
sexual behavior. Id. The defendant argued that because he
pleaded guilty to two counts in the same case, section
16-22-113(3)(c) was inapplicable to him. Id. The division disagreed
and concluded that a person who is convicted of more than one
charge of unlawful sexual behavior is ineligible for deregistration
under section 16-22-113, regardless of whether the convictions
occurred in the same case or in separate cases. Id.
IV. Section 16-22-113(3)(c) Ineligibility
¶ 11 Siegel first argues that the ineligibility criteria in section
16-22-113(3)(c) don’t apply to individuals whose multiple
convictions (1) arise out of the same criminal act and (2) don’t
involve multiple victims. For this reason, he also argues that the
district court erred by relying on Atencio to conclude that he is
ineligible for deregistration because that case involved multiple
victims, whereas his case doesn’t. We are unpersuaded.
5 ¶ 12 The term “conviction” may vary in meaning depending on the
language and context of the statute. Atencio, 219 P.3d at 1082;
People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Colo. 1994). For
purposes of CSORA, a “conviction” means “having received a verdict
of guilty” or “having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere.”
§ 16-22-102(3), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 13 Siegel pleaded guilty to two charges: criminal attempt to
commit sexual exploitation of a child and sexual exploitation of a
child (possession of sexually exploitative material). Under the plain
language of the statute, Siegel has more than one “conviction” and
is therefore ineligible for deregistration.1 Siegel’s argument that
ineligibility doesn’t apply to individuals who are not “habitual
abusers” (i.e., individuals whose convictions arise from a single
offense and don’t involve multiple victims) requires us to read words
into the statute, which we can’t do. See People v. Shores, 2016 COA
129, ¶ 17 (We cannot “read into a statute an exception, limitation,
or qualifier that its plain language does not suggest, warrant, or
1 Siegel does not dispute that his convictions are for “unlawful
sexual behavior” or “any other offense, the underlying factual basis of which is unlawful sexual behavior” as those terms are used in section 16-22-113(3)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
6 mandate.” (quoting People v. Sorrendino, 37 P.3d 501, 504 (Colo.
App. 2001))).
¶ 14 Furthermore, the Atencio division’s holding wasn’t premised on
the fact that the convictions involved separate victims. Rather, it
was based solely on the statutory definition of “conviction” and the
lack of any statutory language requiring that the convictions occur
in separate cases. Atencio, 219 P.3d at 1082-83.
¶ 15 For these reasons, the district court didn’t err in interpreting
section 16-22-113(3)(c) or by relying on Atencio to rule that Siegel is
ineligible for deregistration.
V. Section 18-6-403(5.7) Exception to Ineligibility
¶ 16 Siegel next contends that the district court erred by
concluding that he isn’t eligible to deregister under the statutory
exception to ineligibility in section 18-6-403(5.7). We again
disagree.
¶ 17 By its plain language, the exception in section 18-6-403(5.7)
applies only to individuals who have more than one conviction for
sexual exploitation of a child relating to accessing, viewing,
possessing, or controlling sexually exploitative material.
§ 18-6-403(3)(b.5), (5.7). While Siegel has one conviction that fits
7 this exception, his second conviction (criminal attempt to commit
sexual exploitation of a child) doesn’t qualify. Thus, the district
court didn’t err by concluding that the exception doesn’t apply to
Siegel.
VI. The Sentencing Court’s Advisement
¶ 18 Siegel’s last contention is that he is entitled to deregister
because the sentencing court advised him that he would be eligible
to petition for deregistration ten years after termination from
probation, and the ability to deregister was material to his
agreement to plead guilty.
¶ 19 The sentencing court included the following language in the
minute order entered on September 30, 2002: “AFTER 10 YRS
DEFT MAY PETITION COURT UPON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION
OFFENSE SPECIFIC TREATMENT AND PROVIDER STATES HE IS
NO LONGER THREAT TO THE COMMUNITY; MUST REGISTER AS
SEX OFFENDER FOR 10 YRS AFTER PROB.” The record doesn’t
contain the sentencing transcript or the plea agreement.
¶ 20 Based on this limited record, it’s unclear whether the minute
order reflects the court’s statements to Siegel before his plea or
afterward (or indeed whether the court said anything at all to Siegel
8 regarding his sex offender registration obligation), nor is it clear
whether the statement induced Siegel’s plea. But even if we
assume (without deciding) that the sentencing court misadvised
Siegel regarding his sex offender registration requirements, we
discern no error by the district court on the issue before us. Given
the statutory language described above, the court lacked discretion
to grant Siegel’s petition to deregister.
VII. Disposition
¶ 21 The district court’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.