23CA0866 Peo v Shead 01-29-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0866 Douglas County District Court No. 22CR10 Honorable Patricia D. Herron, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ahmarion Kaliel Shead,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Fox and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 29, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Shann Jeffery, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Ahmarion Kaliel Shead, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of aggravated
robbery involving a simulated deadly weapon, two counts of
menacing, and first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft. We
reverse and remand for a new trial.
I. Background
¶2 In December 2021, Noah Reed listed his van for sale on two
online marketplaces. He brought a friend along for a test drive with
a potential buyer, whom he and his friend later identified as Shead.
Reed and his friend testified that during the test drive, the potential
buyer stopped the van, pointed what appeared to be a gun at them,
and told them to get out of the car.
¶3 As relevant to this appeal, the prosecution charged Shead with
one count of aggravated robbery involving a simulated deadly
weapon, two counts of menacing, one count of first degree
aggravated motor vehicle theft, and one crime of violence sentence
enhancer.
¶4 Shead retained private counsel, William O’Donnell, who
attempted to arrange an interview with the assigned detective as
well as detectives in other counties where Shead had other open
1 cases. The other detectives didn’t join, however, so the March 2022
interview included only Shead, O’Donnell, and the detective in this
case. During the videotaped interview, Shead confessed to
committing almost all the elements of the charged offenses.
¶5 Soon after the interview, O’Donnell stopped practicing criminal
law and withdrew from the case. The public defender’s office then
began representing Shead. In August 2022, the prosecution offered
Shead a plea deal, but Shead didn’t accept the offer. The case
proceeded to a jury trial.
¶6 During voir dire, multiple prospective jurors said they would
trust the testimony of law enforcement officers over testimony by
other witnesses. Two such prospective jurors, J.H. and K.B., ended
up sitting on the jury.
¶7 The jury found Shead guilty of the charges identified above.
The district court sentenced Shead to eighteen years in the custody
of the Department of Corrections.
¶8 On appeal, Shead contends that (1) the district court violated
his constitutional right to a fair trial because two jurors expressed
pro-law enforcement bias; (2) his videotaped confession was
inadmissible under CRE 410 because it occurred during plea
2 negotiations; and (3) the district court plainly erred by admitting his
videotaped confession because his Miranda waiver wasn’t knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.
¶9 We agree with Shead’s first contention as to one of the
challenged jurors, J.H., and therefore reverse Shead’s convictions.
Because it’s likely to arise on remand, we also address and reject
Shead’s second contention. But we decline to reach his third
contention for the first time on appeal.
II. Juror Bias
A. Additional Background
¶ 10 On his juror questionnaire, J.H. wrote “[d]epends” when asked
whether there was any reason why he couldn’t be a fair and
impartial juror. J.H. explained that he was “pro-law enforcement,
military, and for following established laws.” J.H. also wrote in his
questionnaire that his brother-in-law worked for a police
department.
¶ 11 Consistent with his questionnaire, J.H. expressed partiality for
law enforcement several times during voir dire, albeit with some
equivocation. In response to the prosecutor’s question about
putting aside preconceived notions, J.H. said that would be “a
3 challenge” because he puts “a lot of faith” in institutions and law
enforcement officers. But J.H. added, “I think I could put that
behind me.”
¶ 12 J.H. also agreed with the prosecutor, at least initially, that law
enforcement officers sometimes make mistakes and that a juror
shouldn’t automatically believe an officer over other witnesses
simply because they are a member of law enforcement. In later
responses to defense counsel’s questions, however, J.H. said he
would give a law enforcement officer’s testimony more credibility
over another lay witness, even before hearing any testimony or
knowing anything about the officer’s training or experience. The
following exchange is illustrative:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . Taking away those hypotheticals just knowing what you know, do you believe that you will give law enforcement a leg up in their testimony just because they’re law enforcement and not taking anything else into account based on kind of your beliefs and what you’ve said?
....
[PROSPECTIVE JUROR J.H.]: . . . If you’re talking somebody random that I don’t know saying something different than testimony from a uniformed police officer which does line up with the rest of the facts, I’ll be honest I
4 would probably give — because I do think we put special trust in our uniformed officers.
I would have to give that more credibility than somebody I have no idea because the only difference I would have if that’s what you’re saying is the fact that he has sworn an oath —
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.
[PROSPECTIVE JUROR J.H.]: — and this person has no allegiance except for the defendant.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Let me ask it this way. Just without hearing the testimony, without hearing training and experience, right, just the fact that they’ve sworn that oath, just the fact that they’re law enforcement, do they start higher or maybe with more credibility than just your average lay witness?
[PROSPECTIVE JUROR J.H.]: They do for me, yes.
¶ 13 Defense counsel challenged J.H., among others, for cause
based on “law enforcement bias.” The district court then read the
pattern jury instruction on credibility, COLJI-Crim. E:05 (2024),
and asked each of the challenged prospective jurors whether the
instruction “change[d] anything” about how they would assess a law
enforcement officer’s credibility. J.H. responded that, while he
would consider the same credibility factors for all witnesses, law
enforcement officers have “inherent” credibility in his view based on
5 the “special trust” that society places in them. J.H. added, “[J]ust
being a hundred percent honest with the [c]ourt, I would give law
enforcement a small leg up just by the nature of trust like we
discussed, but I agree that [in] each individual case we should look
at all those factors.”
¶ 14 The prosecutor tried to rehabilitate J.H., asking him directly
whether he would follow the court’s credibility instruction. J.H.
answered that, although he would look at “all factors for all
testimony,” he was nonetheless “more apt to put a little more trust
in an officer of the law than . . . a random person.” J.H. elaborated
that most people who go into law enforcement hold “lofty ideals that
inherently attract a degree of trust from me just because of the
sacrifice they make on a personal level.”
¶ 15 When the prosecutor tried again to rehabilitate J.H. by asking
through a leading question whether he would follow the court’s
credibility instruction, J.H. responded, “Absolutely.”
¶ 16 Finally, defense counsel asked J.H. whether a law enforcement
officer starts with a “leg up.” J.H. answered, “I would weigh
everything and when weighing everything, [law enforcement] will get
increased credibility as a baseline.”
6 ¶ 17 Defense counsel again challenged J.H. for cause, arguing that
J.H. said he would give law enforcement a “leg up out of the gate
without hearing anything.” The prosecution opposed the challenge,
saying no “leg up standard” exists and that J.H. acknowledged that
he would adhere to the court’s credibility instruction. The district
court agreed with the prosecution and denied the challenge for
cause but didn’t make any findings reconciling J.H.’s conflicting
statements.
¶ 18 Defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges to strike
other prospective jurors who made statements favoring law
enforcement, but counsel exhausted her peremptory challenges
before she could strike J.H. As a result, J.H. served on the jury.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 19 Both the United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee
a criminal defendant the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury.
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16; People v. Garcia,
2018 COA 180, ¶ 17. The right to challenge a juror for cause is an
integral part of a fair trial. Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486
(Colo. 1999). “To ensure a defendant’s right to a fair trial with an
impartial jury, a trial court must excuse biased or prejudiced
7 persons from the jury.” People v. Young, 16 P.3d 821, 824 (Colo.
2001) (citing Nailor v. People, 612 P.2d 79, 80 (Colo. 1980)).
¶ 20 A trial court must sustain a challenge for cause, for example,
when “[t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evince[s] enmity
or bias toward the defendant or the state.” § 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S.
2025; see also Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X) (similar). When “a potential
juror’s statements compel the inference that [they] cannot decide
crucial issues fairly, a challenge for cause must be granted in the
absence of rehabilitative questioning or other counter-balancing
information.” People v. Merrow, 181 P.3d 319, 321 (Colo. App.
2007); accord People v. Prator, 833 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Colo. App.
1992) (trial court erred by denying challenge for cause to a
prospective juror who conveyed a “clear expression of bias in favor
of law enforcement witnesses”), aff’d, 856 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1993). A
declaration by the prospective juror that they will not follow the
court’s instructions isn’t a prerequisite for disqualification. People
v. Gulyas, 2022 COA 34, ¶ 26.
¶ 21 We review a trial court’s denial of a challenge for cause for an
abuse of discretion. People v. Blassingame, 2021 COA 11, ¶ 9. “A
court abuses its discretion when it issues a ruling that is manifestly
8 arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misconstrues or
misapplies the law.” Id. In determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion, we examine the entire voir dire of the
prospective juror. Id. (citing People v. Wilson, 114 P.3d 19, 22 (Colo.
App. 2004)). If a biased juror sits on the jury, structural error
occurs and we must reverse the defendant’s convictions. People v.
Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 2.
C. Analysis
¶ 22 We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
denying Shead’s challenge for cause to J.H. During voir dire, J.H.
candidly admitted that he would give a law enforcement officer more
credibility than other witnesses, even before hearing any testimony,
simply because they are a member of law enforcement. Based on
J.H.’s statements, the court should have granted Shead’s challenge
for cause. See Gulyas, ¶ 24.
¶ 23 Although the court and the prosecution tried to rehabilitate
J.H. by asking whether he would follow the court’s credibility
instruction, their attempts proved unsuccessful. J.H. continued to
say that he would give law enforcement officers a “leg up,” view
them with “inherent” credibility, and place “more trust” in them
9 compared to other witnesses. See Blassingame, ¶¶ 21-22. If
anything, J.H. upped the ante after his attempted rehabilitation by
saying he would extend law enforcement officers “increased
credibility as a baseline.” See id. at ¶¶ 22, 26 (concluding trial
court erred by denying challenge for cause, in part because the
prospective juror’s equivocal statements reappeared after the
prosecutor’s attempted rehabilitation).
¶ 24 In addition, J.H. didn’t need to “unequivocally” state his
partiality for one side to be deemed unfit to serve on the jury. Id. at
¶ 26. To the contrary, it’s enough that the prospective juror
provided “‘uncertain answers’ and was never sufficiently
rehabilitated.” Gulyas, ¶ 23 (quoting Blassingame, ¶ 27). Here,
J.H.’s repeated, unrehabilitated remarks that he would favor law
enforcement officers before hearing any testimony left little doubt
that he would struggle to decide crucial issues fairly. Blassingame,
¶ 28.
¶ 25 True, J.H. made some limited statements suggesting that he
would follow the court’s credibility instruction. But those remarks
were either equivocal, inconsistent with his statements favoring law
enforcement, or in response to the prosecutor’s leading questions.
10 See id. at ¶ 22 n.2 (answers to leading questions during voir dire
are viewed with suspicion); People v. Luman, 994 P.2d 432, 436
(Colo. App. 1999) (reversing convictions because “there was no
rehabilitation . . . containing unequivocal statements by the juror of
[their] commitment to fairness that might support the trial court’s
conclusion”). When defense counsel followed up with open-ended
questions, J.H. again emphasized that a law enforcement officer
would start with increased credibility as a “baseline.” See
Blassingame, ¶¶ 20, 26.
¶ 26 We recognize that the district court is generally best positioned
to decide whether a prospective juror can render a fair and
impartial verdict based on its unique ability to observe the potential
juror’s demeanor and credibility. Id. at ¶ 23. But here, the district
court made no findings or credibility determinations resolving J.H.’s
self-contradictory statements. See People v. Hancock, 220 P.3d
1015, 1019-20 (Colo. App. 2009) (trial court erred by denying
challenge for cause, in part because the court didn’t “explain on the
record why prospective juror N.’s clear statements of doubt in her
willingness or ability to follow the law should be disregarded in
favor of an earlier general and seemingly inconsistent statement”),
11 overruled on other grounds by, People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18.
Absent such findings, J.H.’s final statement — that he would afford
law enforcement officers heightened credibility as a “baseline” —
leaves us with considerable uncertainty about whether he would
follow the court’s credibility instruction or decide crucial issues
impartially. Blassingame, ¶ 28; see also People v. Marciano, 2014
COA 92M-2, ¶ 17 (“While we defer to the trial court’s unique
perspective and ability to assess credibility and demeanor, absent
any findings regarding credibility or demeanor we are left with a
cold record devoid of any support for the trial court’s conclusions.”).
¶ 27 The People’s arguments to the contrary don’t convince us
otherwise. The People argue that Shead could have removed J.H.
with a peremptory challenge but “chose” otherwise. But Shead had
already exhausted his peremptory challenges on other prospective
jurors. And a defendant need not cure a trial court’s erroneous
denial of a challenge for cause by using a peremptory challenge to
strike the objectionable prospective juror to preserve a claim that a
biased juror deprived the defendant of their right to a fair trial. See
Garcia, ¶¶ 9-11.
12 ¶ 28 The People also rely on decisions in which reviewing courts
upheld denials of challenges for cause to prospective jurors who,
like J.H., gave self-contradictory answers during voir dire. We
conclude that the People’s cited cases are distinguishable because
either (1) the challenged prospective juror in those cases indicated
upon further questioning that they would follow the trial court’s
instructions and could be fair and impartial to both sides, see, e.g.,
People v. Samson, 2012 COA 167, ¶¶ 18, 22; People v. Vigil, 718
P.2d 496, 501 (Colo. 1986); or (2) the trial court made findings that
the challenged prospective juror could be fair (or, at a minimum,
didn’t harbor prejudice or bias) notwithstanding their inconsistent
statements, see, e.g., Garcia, ¶ 21; People v. Sandoval, 733 P.2d
319, 322 (Colo. 1987). Neither occurred here.
¶ 29 Accordingly, because the district court abused its discretion by
denying Shead’s challenge for cause to J.H., we reverse Shead’s
convictions and remand the case for a new trial. Given our
disposition, we need not reach Shead’s argument that a second
juror, K.B., also expressed impermissible bias during voir dire.
13 III. Admissibility of Confession
¶ 30 Because it’s likely to arise on remand, we also address Shead’s
contention that the district court erred by admitting his videotaped
confession. According to Shead, the court violated CRE 410,
section 16-7-303, C.R.S. 2025, and Crim. P. 11(f)(6) because he
confessed to the charged offenses during plea negotiations. The
People counter that the district court properly admitted the
confession because the prosecutor didn’t consent to be bound by
the alleged plea discussions at Shead’s interview. We conclude the
district court acted within its discretion when admitting Shead’s
confession.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 31 CRE 410 limits evidence related to the plea bargaining
process:
[E]vidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in any connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal action, case, or proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer.
14 Section 16-7-303 and Crim. P. 11(f)(6) contain similar limitations,
rendering inadmissible “the fact that the defendant or his defense
counsel and the district attorney engaged in plea discussions or
made a plea agreement.”
¶ 32 But this principle doesn’t extend to all discussions between a
suspect and law enforcement agents. People v. Rollins, 759 P.2d
816, 818 (Colo. App. 1988). Rather, it “applies only to discussions
between defense counsel, or pro se litigants, and prosecuting
attorneys who have specific authority to bind the government to a
plea-agreement later consummated in court.” Id. While the
prosecuting attorney need not be present for statements to be
considered part of plea negotiations, their “knowledge and consent
to be bound by such discussions is an essential prerequisite.” Id.
¶ 33 As before, we review a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility
of evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v. Garcia, 169 P.3d
223, 226 (Colo. App. 2007).
B. Analysis
¶ 34 We perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decision admitting Shead’s confession. Based on testimony at a
pretrial motions hearing, the court found that the parties hadn’t yet
15 commenced plea negotiations when Shead’s interview with the
detective took place.
¶ 35 The prosecution presented ample evidence at the motions
hearing to support the court’s findings. The prosecutor testified
that (1) O’Donnell, not the prosecution, requested the interview;
(2) she didn’t authorize the interviewing detective to make any
promises or engage in plea discussions; (3) she hadn’t reviewed the
case to determine whether a plea bargain was appropriate, so plea
negotiations hadn’t yet commenced; (4) she didn’t agree to a “quid
pro quo or anything” in exchange for Shead sitting for the interview;
and (5) the interview played no role in the prosecution’s decision on
whether, or when, to extend a plea offer.
¶ 36 Based on this testimony and the court’s findings, the
prosecution didn’t “consent to be bound” by any interview
discussions. Rollins, 759 P.2d at 818.
¶ 37 Garcia, relied on by Shead, is distinguishable. 169 P.3d at
227. In that case, the defendant “was expected to take [a]
polygraph before engaging in (further) plea negotiations,” leading a
division of this court to conclude that the polygraph was “part of the
plea negotiations.” Id. By contrast, the prosecutor here testified
16 that the later plea offer wasn’t conditioned on Shead’s participation
in the interview.
¶ 38 To the extent Shead points to evidence in the record that he
believes shows the parties were in the midst of negotiating a plea,
we may not reweigh the evidence to reach a result contrary to the
one the district court reached. People v. Liebler, 2022 COA 21, ¶ 20
(appellate courts don’t reweigh evidence, assess credibility, or
resolve inconsistencies or contradictions in testimony).
¶ 39 Accordingly, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion when
admitting Shead’s confession.
IV. Disposition
¶ 40 We reverse Shead’s convictions and remand the case for a new
trial.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE KUHN concur.