Peo v. Shea

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 24CA0674
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0674 Peo v Shea 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0674 Boulder County District Court No. 18CR272 Honorable Patrick Butler, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Daniel Richard Shea,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Phoebe W. Dee, Alternate Defense Counsel, Basalt, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Daniel Richard Shea, appeals the postconviction

court’s order summarily denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion, in which

he claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel related

to his sentencing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 According to the presentence investigation report (PSIR)

detailing the circumstances of the offenses, Shea believed he had

been financially harmed by a consulting company in Colorado that

he hired to build a website for a business he was trying to launch.

He concocted a plan to extort money from the consulting company’s

two co-owners. He paid an accomplice to help him with the plan,

telling the accomplice that he needed help “pull[ing] off a prank on

some of his friends.”

¶3 Shea and his accomplice traveled from Oregon to Colorado,

went to the company’s office, and handcuffed the two co-owners,

after which the accomplice left the scene. Shea then assaulted both

victims, threatened them by holding a gun to their heads and a

knife to their throats, and demanded $50,000 from them.

¶4 The prosecution charged Shea with, among other offenses,

first degree burglary; two counts each of second degree kidnapping,

1 criminal extortion, attempted aggravated robbery, and menacing;

and seven crime of violence counts.

¶5 The parties ultimately reached a plea agreement. In exchange

for the dismissal of the remaining counts, Shea pled guilty to one

count each of first degree burglary, second degree kidnapping, and

criminal extortion, along with the three corresponding crime of

violence counts. The parties stipulated to an aggregate sentence in

the range of twenty-five to forty years in the custody of the

Department of Corrections (DOC).

¶6 The PSIR detailed, among other things, the circumstances of

the offenses, Shea’s admissions during a police interrogation, and

Shea’s background, including his history of concussions, mental

health issues, and substance abuse.

¶7 Before sentencing, Shea’s counsel filed a Motion in

Anticipation of Sentencing (presentence motion). In it, counsel

requested and argued for an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years

in the DOC, the bottom of the stipulated range. The court also

received numerous letters and references supporting Shea from his

family and friends.

2 ¶8 At sentencing, the prosecutor requested an aggregate sentence

of forty years in the DOC, while Shea’s counsel again requested a

sentence of twenty-five years in the DOC. After hearing both

counsel’s arguments in support of those requests, as well as Shea’s

allocution, the district court imposed an aggregate sentence of

thirty-five years in the custody of the DOC.

¶9 Soon after sentencing, Shea filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(b)

motion to reconsider his sentence. In it, he attributed his

commission of the offenses to his traumatic brain injury caused by

his long history of concussions, as well as his insomnia and

depression. He faulted his counsel for not advancing those

arguments in support of a more lenient sentence. He also claimed

that his accomplice played a major role in carrying out the crimes,

and he faulted the prosecutor for characterizing the accomplice as a

victim of Shea’s plan.

¶ 10 After the prosecution filed a response, the same district judge

who had presided over sentencing issued a written order denying

Shea’s request for reconsideration of his sentence.

¶ 11 Shea later filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion, subsequently

supplemented by post-conviction counsel, raising ineffective

3 assistance of counsel claims. In his motion, Shea alleged his

sentencing counsel provided ineffective assistance “in preparing

for[] and presenting mitigation at his sentencing hearing with the

direct result being that he received a longer than called for

sentence.” Specifically, Shea alleged counsel failed to present

mitigation evidence that Shea was “in a mental fog” in the months

leading up to the offenses and during the offenses as a result of his

substance abuse, traumatic brain injury, anxiety, and insomnia.

And he again faulted the prosecutor for characterizing the

accomplice as a victim of his plan to commit the offenses.

¶ 12 After the prosecution filed a response, the postconviction court

issued a written order denying the motion without a hearing. Shea

now challenges that summary denial.

II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 13 A defendant raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). For the performance prong,

the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. For the

4 prejudice prong, the defendant must show a “reasonable

probability” that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id.

¶ 14 A postconviction court may deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion

without holding an evidentiary hearing “only where the motion,

files, and record in the case clearly establish that the allegations

presented in the defendant’s motion are without merit and do not

warrant postconviction relief.” Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77

(Colo. 2003). That standard is satisfied if (1) the defendant’s

allegations are bare and conclusory; (2) the allegations, even if true,

do not warrant postconviction relief; or (3) the record directly

refutes the defendant’s claims. People v. Duran, 2015 COA 141,

¶ 9.

¶ 15 We review de novo a postconviction court’s ruling denying a

Crim. P. 35(c) motion without an evidentiary hearing. People v.

Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14.

5 III. Analysis

¶ 16 As we understand it, Shea challenges the summary denial of

three ineffective assistance claims. First, he asserts a broad claim

that counsel was ineffective by effectively conceding the absence of

mitigating circumstances and echoing the prosecution’s assessment

of Shea’s culpability. Second, he asserts a more specific claim that

counsel was ineffective for mischaracterizing his state of mind at

the time of the offense. And third, he argues counsel should have

more effectively countered the prosecution’s argument that Shea

victimized his codefendant and manipulated him into participating

in the crimes. We conclude that summary denial of all three claims

was appropriate because the record either refutes their factual

allegations or establishes that Shea could not prove at least one

prong of Strickland.

A. Broad Mitigation Claim

¶ 17 In this claim, Shea alleged that his counsel at sentencing

“expressly disavowed” mitigating factors, “told the court that . . .

mitigating circumstances did not exist,” “and, essentially, echoed

the People’s assessment of [his] culpability.”

6 ¶ 18 Those assertions are refuted by the record. See Duran, ¶ 9. At

sentencing, Shea’s counsel emphasized mitigating factors at length

during her argument. For example, counsel discussed Shea’s

substance abuse, saying that Shea “had always used some

substances . . . . And I don’t think that made him do this, but it

certainly fueled his impulsivity . . . . I think it is fair and accurate

to say that he was addicted.” Counsel then turned to Shea’s mental

health, saying, “Mr. Shea has suffered from depression the entirety

of his life . . . . And he also suffered from insomnia . . . . I think he

wasn’t figuring out how to deal with those.” After laying that

groundwork, counsel asserted that “in the five to six weeks leading

up” to the offenses, “he sort of spiraled and ruminated” before

executing his plan to commit the offenses. Counsel then proceeded

to emphasize that (1) Shea has no criminal history; (2) his way of

life before the offenses, as reflected in the letters and references

from family and friends, shows that the offenses were an “anomaly”;

(3) his behavior in jail has been impeccable; and (4) he plans to use

his time in the DOC to get mental health and substance abuse

treatment and to utilize his nursing background in the DOC’s

hospice or medical unit. Counsel also presented some of those

7 arguments in the presentence motion. After presenting all that

mitigation, counsel repeated her request for the minimum

stipulated sentence of twenty-five years, which notably was in stark

contrast to the prosecution’s request for the maximum stipulated

sentence of forty years.

B. Specific Mitigation Claim

¶ 19 Shea’s specific mitigation claim is premised on the factual

assertion that he “was under the influence of drugs at the time of

the offense.” Working from that premise, he contends that his

counsel was ineffective in saying at sentencing, “[W]e aren’t saying

that he was high and he did this impulsively.” In Shea’s view, his

counsel essentially told the court that he “committed this crime

stone sober,” attributing his motive to his “hyper-masculine” nature

and desire to avoid being perceived as a failure.

¶ 20 We conclude that this argument mischaracterizes Shea’s

counsel’s argument at sentencing, read holistically. Shea’s counsel

made these statements in the context of highlighting that Shea had

accepted responsibility for his offenses, as reflected by his own

confessions during the police interrogation. Promoting acceptance

of responsibility is one of the statutorily enumerated purposes of

8 sentencing. See § 18-1-102.5(1)(f), C.R.S. 2025. And Shea’s

counsel made those statements in response to the prosecutor’s

argument that Shea had not accepted responsibility for his actions,

which the prosecutor based on Shea’s statements in the PSIR

emphasizing his drug addiction, his history of concussions, his

mental health issues, and that the months leading up to the

offenses were a “blur.”

¶ 21 Even before sentencing, Shea’s counsel stated in the

presentence motion that

Mr. Shea does not seek to excuse or justify his actions in anyway. He repeatedly asserted that he was not excusing his actions in the PSI and reiterated to counsel that his intent in providing information about his mental health, head trauma, and drug abuse was not intended to excuse or mitigate his actions in this case.

(Emphasis added.) And in Shea’s own pro se Crim. P. 35(b) motion,

he wrote, “I confessed upon [my] arrest . . . . I see no way to

express remorse without taking ownership of my actions.

Accountability is part of my character.” Thus, the record indicates

that Shea’s counsel was merely fulfilling her client’s wishes in

arguing that, despite Shea’s substance abuse, history of

9 concussions, and mental health issues, he had reflected on his

actions and was accepting responsibility for them. And as we have

already explained, Shea’s counsel then proceeded to argue

mitigating factors at length at sentencing, including regarding

Shea’s substance abuse, in requesting the minimum possible

aggregate sentence of twenty-five years in the DOC.

¶ 22 Further, as emphasized by the prosecution at sentencing, any

argument that Shea committed this crime spontaneously under the

influence of drugs would have been weak considering the evidence

that Shea had planned the offenses in the weeks or months leading

up to them.

¶ 23 On this record, we conclude Shea was not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing to prove counsel’s allegedly deficient

performance in failing to present mitigation on his behalf.

C. Countering the Prosecutor’s Characterization of the Accomplice as a Victim of Shea’s Plan

¶ 24 Shea also claims that his counsel was ineffective by not

countering the prosecutor’s argument at sentencing that Shea had

victimized his codefendant by manipulating him to participate in

the crimes. Shea does not explain how his counsel could or should

10 have effectively countered that argument. Instead, he asserts

generally that his counsel should have “lodge[d] an[] objection” to

the prosecutor’s argument, and that “[t]here is no possible strategic

reason to have allowed th[e] argument to go unanswered.”

Nevertheless, we will construe Shea’s claim as implying that it was

improper for the prosecutor to describe a culpable (charged and

convicted) codefendant as one of Shea’s victims.

¶ 25 We conclude that the record in the case clearly establishes

that Shea’s claim is without merit because it shows that the

counterargument would have had little to no impact. Ardolino, 69

P.3d at 77. The prosecutor at sentencing specifically conceded that

the codefendant had been sentenced to probation for his role in the

crimes. The prosecutor continued, however, to argue that Shea was

much more culpable for concocting the plan to commit the crimes

and manipulating the codefendant to participate in them. The

prosecutor also highlighted Shea’s own admissions during a police

interrogation — which were documented in the PSIR — that Shea

effectively tricked the codefendant into participating in the plan by

telling the codefendant that he needed help pulling off a “prank” on

his friends.

11 ¶ 26 The prosecutor’s argument at sentencing that Shea had

victimized the codefendant was forthcoming, appropriately

nuanced, and supported by the record before the district court.

Therefore, any attempt by counsel to challenge that characterization

would have been feeble, and we conclude there is no reasonable

probability that raising it would have resulted in a different

sentence. Indeed, in its order denying the Crim. P. 35(b) motion,

the district court effectively ruled that neither this argument nor the

unmade mitigation argument discussed above would have made a

difference in the sentence it imposed.

¶ 27 Because the record established that Shea could not prove

prejudice, Shea was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this

claim.

IV. Abandoned Claims

¶ 28 As to any other claims raised in Shea’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion,

he has not reasserted those claims on appeal. We therefore deem

them abandoned. See People v. Osorio, 170 P.3d 796, 801 (Colo.

App. 2007).

V. Disposition

¶ 29 The order is affirmed.

12 JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.