23CA1372 Peo v Sharrett 12-11-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1372 Jefferson County District Court No. 22CR2693 Honorable Christopher C. Zenisek, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jason Michael Sharrett,
Defendant-Appellant.
SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
T. Marshal Seufert, Alternate Defense Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jason Michael Sharrett, appeals the district court’s
sentence imposed on the judgment of conviction entered on his
guilty plea to one count of driving under the influence (fourth or
subsequent offense) and one count of vehicular assault (reckless).
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 During an afternoon rush hour, Jefferson County 911
dispatchers received multiple calls about a rollover traffic collision
on Colorado State Highway 470. Callers and victims reported that
someone was driving a silver GMC Yukon about eighty miles an
hour on the highway shoulder. They also told dispatchers that the
Yukon had rammed a vehicle four times at a stoplight, crashed into
several other vehicles, and ultimately rolled over. In total, the
Yukon hit eleven vehicles. Several victims in those vehicles
sustained injuries requiring medical treatment; one victim had a
nasal fracture requiring eighteen stitches.
¶3 Police identified Sharrett as the Yukon’s driver. Police also
discovered that he had five prior convictions for driving while ability
impaired (DWAI) or driving under the influence (DUI). Sharrett was
taken to the hospital, where medical personnel measured his blood
1 alcohol content at 0.372. (The legal limit for DUI is 0.08.) He later
said that he had received a head injury the day before the incident,
had no memory of the day of the incident, and only remembered
waking up in the hospital days later.
¶4 The People charged Sharrett with twenty-two counts, including
DUI (fourth or subsequent offense), vehicular assault and vehicular
assault (reckless), assault in the third degree, reckless
endangerment, reckless driving, driving under restraint, failure to
report accident or return to the scene, and failure to possess
insurance while operating a vehicle.
¶5 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sharrett pleaded guilty to two of
the charges: DUI (fourth or subsequent offense) and vehicular
assault (reckless). In exchange, the People dismissed the other
charges. Sharrett signed a petition to plead guilty by admitting that
his actions met the elements of both counts to which he was
pleading guilty. He acknowledged that the district court had the
discretion to find extraordinary aggravating circumstances and
could sentence him to a term up to twice the longest sentence in
the presumptive range for each offense. He also acknowledged that
2 the district court could require that he serve the sentences
consecutively to each other.
¶6 The district court accepted Sharrett’s guilty plea. On June 2,
2023, the court sentenced him to twelve years in prison for the DUI
conviction and to six years in prison for the vehicular assault
conviction, to be served consecutively.
II. Discussion
¶7 Sharrett contends that the district court erred by sentencing
him to consecutive sentences based on his guilty plea because the
two offenses were based on identical evidence. We disagree.
A. Timeliness of Appeal
¶8 Before we can address the merits, we must review the
timeliness of Sharrett’s appeal. If his appeal was untimely, we lack
jurisdiction to consider it. See People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893, 896
(Colo. 2005) (citing Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Colo.
1988)). Jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.
People v. Lopez, 2020 COA 119, ¶ 21.
¶9 Shortly after Sharrett began serving his prison sentence, he
sent a letter to his attorney asking counsel to appeal his sentence.
According to the Public Defender’s appellate division, his attorney
3 immediately notified the appellate division of his request. But the
appellate division said that it didn’t receive that notification until
the filing deadline had passed.
¶ 10 Eventually, the appellate division filed a notice of appeal on
August 10, 2023, twenty days late.1 Along with the notice, the
appellate division filed a motion to accept the notice of appeal as
timely filed. The appellate division later withdrew due to a potential
conflict of interest as a result of the late filing.
¶ 11 A motions division of this court reviewed the motion, deferred
its resolution, and ordered the parties to address timeliness in their
merits briefs.
¶ 12 Sharrett contends that we have jurisdiction over his appeal
because, even if his notice was untimely, we may exercise our
discretion to extend his time to file based on good cause or other
1 Sharrett argues that the time for appealing didn’t begin to run
until July 18, 2023, at the earliest, when the court entered a written order granting the prosecution’s motion to impose an undetermined amount of restitution. But at sentencing, the court ordered restitution while deferring determination of the amount. Thus, the time for appealing began to run on the date of sentencing, June 2, 2023. Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 41.
4 grounds. The People agree that we have the discretion to accept
Sharrett’s notice of appeal as timely.
¶ 13 We have broad discretion to decide whether to accept a late-
filed notice. Baker, 104 P.3d at 896. Taken together, the rules of
appellate procedure allow us to enlarge the time to file a notice of
appeal when there is excusable neglect or good cause shown. Id. at
895-96 (citing C.A.R. 2, 4(b)(1), 26(b)). Excusable neglect requires a
showing of some “unavoidable hindrance or accident.” Id. at 896
(quoting Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Dist. Ct., 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo.
1973)). But we may review the totality of the circumstances to find
whether other good cause exists. Id. In doing so, we consider a
nonexclusive list of factors, including (1) the potential prejudice the
People may suffer from a late filing; (2) interests of judicial
economy; and (3) the propriety of requiring the defendant to pursue
other remedies. Id. at 896-97 (citing Estep, 753 P.2d at 1248).
¶ 14 Based on consideration of these factors and our review of the
record, we conclude that good cause exists to accept Sharrett’s
notice of appeal as timely. The record appears to show that
Sharrett wanted to appeal his sentence before the deadline to
appeal passed. We accept the appellate division’s representations
5 that Sharrett sent a letter to his attorney asking to appeal and that
his trial counsel immediately attempted to contact the appellate
division. As well, the People concede that they won’t suffer any
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23CA1372 Peo v Sharrett 12-11-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1372 Jefferson County District Court No. 22CR2693 Honorable Christopher C. Zenisek, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jason Michael Sharrett,
Defendant-Appellant.
SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
T. Marshal Seufert, Alternate Defense Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jason Michael Sharrett, appeals the district court’s
sentence imposed on the judgment of conviction entered on his
guilty plea to one count of driving under the influence (fourth or
subsequent offense) and one count of vehicular assault (reckless).
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 During an afternoon rush hour, Jefferson County 911
dispatchers received multiple calls about a rollover traffic collision
on Colorado State Highway 470. Callers and victims reported that
someone was driving a silver GMC Yukon about eighty miles an
hour on the highway shoulder. They also told dispatchers that the
Yukon had rammed a vehicle four times at a stoplight, crashed into
several other vehicles, and ultimately rolled over. In total, the
Yukon hit eleven vehicles. Several victims in those vehicles
sustained injuries requiring medical treatment; one victim had a
nasal fracture requiring eighteen stitches.
¶3 Police identified Sharrett as the Yukon’s driver. Police also
discovered that he had five prior convictions for driving while ability
impaired (DWAI) or driving under the influence (DUI). Sharrett was
taken to the hospital, where medical personnel measured his blood
1 alcohol content at 0.372. (The legal limit for DUI is 0.08.) He later
said that he had received a head injury the day before the incident,
had no memory of the day of the incident, and only remembered
waking up in the hospital days later.
¶4 The People charged Sharrett with twenty-two counts, including
DUI (fourth or subsequent offense), vehicular assault and vehicular
assault (reckless), assault in the third degree, reckless
endangerment, reckless driving, driving under restraint, failure to
report accident or return to the scene, and failure to possess
insurance while operating a vehicle.
¶5 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sharrett pleaded guilty to two of
the charges: DUI (fourth or subsequent offense) and vehicular
assault (reckless). In exchange, the People dismissed the other
charges. Sharrett signed a petition to plead guilty by admitting that
his actions met the elements of both counts to which he was
pleading guilty. He acknowledged that the district court had the
discretion to find extraordinary aggravating circumstances and
could sentence him to a term up to twice the longest sentence in
the presumptive range for each offense. He also acknowledged that
2 the district court could require that he serve the sentences
consecutively to each other.
¶6 The district court accepted Sharrett’s guilty plea. On June 2,
2023, the court sentenced him to twelve years in prison for the DUI
conviction and to six years in prison for the vehicular assault
conviction, to be served consecutively.
II. Discussion
¶7 Sharrett contends that the district court erred by sentencing
him to consecutive sentences based on his guilty plea because the
two offenses were based on identical evidence. We disagree.
A. Timeliness of Appeal
¶8 Before we can address the merits, we must review the
timeliness of Sharrett’s appeal. If his appeal was untimely, we lack
jurisdiction to consider it. See People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893, 896
(Colo. 2005) (citing Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Colo.
1988)). Jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.
People v. Lopez, 2020 COA 119, ¶ 21.
¶9 Shortly after Sharrett began serving his prison sentence, he
sent a letter to his attorney asking counsel to appeal his sentence.
According to the Public Defender’s appellate division, his attorney
3 immediately notified the appellate division of his request. But the
appellate division said that it didn’t receive that notification until
the filing deadline had passed.
¶ 10 Eventually, the appellate division filed a notice of appeal on
August 10, 2023, twenty days late.1 Along with the notice, the
appellate division filed a motion to accept the notice of appeal as
timely filed. The appellate division later withdrew due to a potential
conflict of interest as a result of the late filing.
¶ 11 A motions division of this court reviewed the motion, deferred
its resolution, and ordered the parties to address timeliness in their
merits briefs.
¶ 12 Sharrett contends that we have jurisdiction over his appeal
because, even if his notice was untimely, we may exercise our
discretion to extend his time to file based on good cause or other
1 Sharrett argues that the time for appealing didn’t begin to run
until July 18, 2023, at the earliest, when the court entered a written order granting the prosecution’s motion to impose an undetermined amount of restitution. But at sentencing, the court ordered restitution while deferring determination of the amount. Thus, the time for appealing began to run on the date of sentencing, June 2, 2023. Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 41.
4 grounds. The People agree that we have the discretion to accept
Sharrett’s notice of appeal as timely.
¶ 13 We have broad discretion to decide whether to accept a late-
filed notice. Baker, 104 P.3d at 896. Taken together, the rules of
appellate procedure allow us to enlarge the time to file a notice of
appeal when there is excusable neglect or good cause shown. Id. at
895-96 (citing C.A.R. 2, 4(b)(1), 26(b)). Excusable neglect requires a
showing of some “unavoidable hindrance or accident.” Id. at 896
(quoting Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Dist. Ct., 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo.
1973)). But we may review the totality of the circumstances to find
whether other good cause exists. Id. In doing so, we consider a
nonexclusive list of factors, including (1) the potential prejudice the
People may suffer from a late filing; (2) interests of judicial
economy; and (3) the propriety of requiring the defendant to pursue
other remedies. Id. at 896-97 (citing Estep, 753 P.2d at 1248).
¶ 14 Based on consideration of these factors and our review of the
record, we conclude that good cause exists to accept Sharrett’s
notice of appeal as timely. The record appears to show that
Sharrett wanted to appeal his sentence before the deadline to
appeal passed. We accept the appellate division’s representations
5 that Sharrett sent a letter to his attorney asking to appeal and that
his trial counsel immediately attempted to contact the appellate
division. As well, the People concede that they won’t suffer any
prejudice if Sharrett is allowed to appeal and point out that the
issues Sharrett raises could be raised in a postconviction
proceeding. We therefore exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 2,
4(b)(1), and 26(b) and accept Sharrett’s notice of appeal as timely.
B. Double Jeopardy and Merger
¶ 15 As noted, Sharrett contends that his sentences for DUI (fourth
or subsequent offense) and vehicular assault (reckless) must run
concurrently because the two offenses are based on identical
evidence.2 We disagree.
2 Sharrett also appears to contend that the district court couldn’t
sentence him to a controlling sentence of eighteen years in prison based on his guilty plea because a jury’s guilty verdict on all counts would have resulted in a shorter sentence. He is mistaken. Had a jury found him guilty of felony DUI (a class 4 felony), vehicular assault (DUI) (a class 4 felony), and vehicular assault (reckless) (a class 5 felony), the sentencing court would have merged the felony DUI and vehicular assault (DUI) convictions, leaving a felony DUI conviction and a vehicular assault (reckless) conviction. So the sentencing court would have been in the identical position to sentence Sharrett to consecutive sentences on felony DUI and vehicular assault (reckless). In any event, Sharrett is bound by the terms of his plea agreement.
6 1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 16 “The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and
Colorado Constitutions protect an accused against being twice
placed in jeopardy for the same crime.” Woellhaf v. People, 105
P.3d 209, 214 (Colo. 2005); see U.S. Const. amend. V; Colo. Const.
art. II, § 18. “[T]o determine whether punishments imposed by a
court after a defendant’s conviction are constitutionally proper, we
must determine what punishments the legislature has authorized.”
Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 50 (citing Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980)). “[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause
simply embodies the constitutional principle of separation of powers
by ensuring that courts do not exceed their own authority by
imposing multiple punishments not authorized by the legislature.”
Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 214; see Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688; § 18-1-
408(5)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 17 “Absent legislation to the contrary, sentencing courts in
Colorado have discretion to order sentences for different convictions
to be served either consecutively or concurrently.” Thompson v.
People, 2020 CO 72, ¶ 59 (citing Schneider v. People, 2016 CO 70,
¶ 22). But a district court must sentence a defendant concurrently
7 when identical evidence supports multiple convictions, unless
multiple victims are involved. Id. (citing § 18-1-408(3)). “[T]o decide
whether identical evidence supported multiple convictions, we must
‘determine if the separate convictions were based on more than one
distinct act and if so, whether those acts were separated by time
and place.’” Id. at ¶ 60 (quoting Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896, 901
(Colo. 2007)). “In conducting this analysis, we focus on the
evidence that supported the convictions, not on the evidence
necessarily required to prove the elements of those convictions.” Id.
(citing Juhl, 172 P.3d at 902).
¶ 18 We review de novo whether a district court’s sentence was
authorized by law. Waddell v. People, 2020 CO 39, ¶ 10.
2. Analysis
¶ 19 Contrary to Sharrett’s assertion, each conviction is based on
separate, independent evidence. DUI is a strict liability crime,
meaning no mental state is required for a conviction. Given
Sharrett’s prior DUI and DWAI convictions, Sharrett committed the
felony DUI offense as soon as he began operating the vehicle after
consuming enough alcohol to put him over the legal blood-alcohol
limit. That is, the felony DUI offense was established by evidence
8 that Sharrett began operating his vehicle while under the influence,
after having at least three prior similar offenses. But that evidence
didn’t prove the vehicular assault offense. That offense was
established by evidence that at some later time and place, Sharrett
drove recklessly and thereby caused serious bodily injury to
another person. See § 18-3-205(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 20 We therefore conclude that each conviction was based on
different evidence, so it doesn’t matter that the offenses may have
arisen out of the same criminal episode. See Juhl, 172 P.3d at 899-
900 (convictions for offenses arising out of the same criminal
episode must be sentenced concurrently only if the convictions are
based on identical evidence).
¶ 21 Sharrett also appears to argue that felony DUI is a lesser
included offense of vehicular assault. It isn’t. The elements of the
9 offenses differ such that proof of vehicular assault doesn’t prove
felony DUI. See § 18-1-408(5)(a); Reyna-Abarca, ¶ 64.3
III. Disposition
¶ 22 The sentence is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.
3 To the extent Sharrett argues that each conviction concerned the
same victim, we aren’t persuaded. While the vehicular assault charge named a victim, the felony DUI charge didn’t because the offense doesn’t require a victim. See § 42-4-1301(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. Indeed, comments by sponsors for the bill enacting felony DUI indicate that the victims of repeat felony DUI offenses are public safety and the DUI offender himself. 2d Reading on H.B. 15-1043 before the H., 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 14, 2015).