Peo v. Sharpe

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 23CA1863
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA1863 Peo v Sharpe 03-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1863 Chaffee County District Court No. 22CR139 Honorable Lynette M. Wenner, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Christopher Marc Sharpe,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Kuhn and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 19, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Cynthia A. Harvey, Alternate Defense Counsel, Aurora, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Christopher Marc Sharpe, appeals his conviction

for stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c) and (3)(b), C.R.S. 2025.

Sharpe argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to find that he

surveilled the victim; and (2) the conviction violates his First

Amendment rights under Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66

(2023). For the reasons below, we affirm.

I. Background

¶2 T.I. moved to Buena Vista, Colorado with her son in October

2020. Hoping to meet people in the community, T.I. accepted

Facebook friend requests from people with mutual connections even

though she had never met them. In May 2022, T.I. received a friend

request from Christopher Sharpe of Lakewood, Colorado. She

accepted the request and Sharpe directly messaged her. After only

one day, Sharpe expressed interest in T.I. and said he could not

wait to meet her in person. This made T.I. uncomfortable and she

told Sharpe that she was not interested in a long-distance

relationship. Ignoring this, he replied:

Are you willing to actually have a relationship with myself, because if that’s the case, I do and really am interested in you and would like to put a ring on your finger possibly have another child. But, at this moment, I feel this

1 is moving too quick even with my ability to move quickly.

¶3 T.I. said, “[n]o, no, no,” but continued to occasionally respond

to Sharpe’s messages throughout May. Sharpe told T.I. he wanted

to be in her life and planned to take time off work to visit her. He

also inquired about her son, her time and location of birth, and

asked if he was being punished when she did not respond. T.I.

repeatedly expressed her disinterest in a relationship with Sharpe

and eventually blocked him.

¶4 As a precaution, T.I. called the police for advice. They

suggested keeping copies of Sharpe’s messages, which T.I. could

only do if she unblocked him on Facebook. When she did so,

Sharpe barraged her with more messages and said he knew who

she was dating. T.I. again blocked him after copying the messages.

Undeterred, Sharpe sent friend requests to T.I.’s sister and friends.

Two police officers then contacted Sharpe and he signed a directive

agreeing to not directly or indirectly contact T.I.

¶5 This did not dissuade Sharpe. Shortly after signing the

directive, he found T.I.’s phone number on her photography

Facebook page and called her. T.I. then received Facebook

2 messages from “Raven Adams,” who shared that Sharpe remained

very interested in her and “trie[d] to find anyone and everyone who

might know [T.I.].” T.I. continued to deny friend requests from

accounts with the name “Christopher Sharpe” and she learned from

“Raven Adams” that Sharpe was making fake profiles “just so he

could look at [T.I.] and chat with [her].” T.I. also received messages

from “Bee Bee” relaying similar information.

¶6 The “Raven Adams” and “Bee Bee” accounts were fake. Briana

Holte, Sharpe’s on-again-off-again-girlfriend, operated both. At

trial, Holte testified about Sharpe’s obsession with T.I. She

disclosed that Sharpe asked her to befriend people close to T.I. so

he could monitor T.I. via Holte and stated that she saw Sharpe

using a fake account to surveil T.I.’s profile. Holte also relayed that

Sharpe saved Facebook photos of T.I. and her son onto his phone.

¶7 T.I. informed her coworkers and friends about Sharpe’s

conduct. She changed her route to work, kept her curtains closed,

switched her social media account settings to “private,” and stopped

meeting people in the community. She would not let her son play

outside without a trusted adult, did not enroll him in sports, and

3 refused to participate in after-school events. T.I. even considered

purchasing a gun to “protect [her]self and [her] son.”

¶8 The People charged Sharpe with one count of stalking - second

offense under section 18-3-602(1)(c) and (3)(b). The jury convicted

Sharpe as charged and, after a bifurcated proceeding regarding a

prior stalking conviction, the trial court sentenced him to six years

in the Department of Corrections’ custody.

¶9 Sharpe argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to

find that he surveilled T.I. He also contends that the conviction

violates his First Amendment rights because it is based on

protected speech. Because the trial took place before the Supreme

Court decided Counterman, a “true threats” stalking case, Sharpe

asks us to reverse his conviction because the jury was not

instructed on the “recklessness” mental state the Court established.

Counterman, 600 U.S. at 69. We disagree and affirm the judgment

of conviction.

II. Surveillance-Based Stalking

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 “[S]ufficiency of the evidence claims may be raised for the first

time on appeal and are not subject to plain error review.” McCoy v.

4 People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 27. Thus, we review the record de novo in

unpreserved sufficiency claims to determine whether the evidence

“viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion

by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge

beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 32

(citation omitted). However, we “may not serve as a thirteenth juror

and consider whether [we] might have reached a different

conclusion than the jury.” Id. at ¶ 33.

B. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶ 11 A defendant is guilty of stalking if “directly, or indirectly

through another person,” he knowingly and repeatedly “follows,

approaches, contacts, [or] places [the victim] under surveillance . . .

in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious

emotional distress.” § 18-3-602(1)(c). While “surveillance” is not

statutorily defined, its common meaning is “close watch kept over

someone,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/7995-

2YRC, or “close observation or listening of a person or place in the

hope of gathering evidence,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1752 (12th ed.

2024). See Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384, 387 (Colo. 2005)

5 (words and phrases are “given effect according to their plain and

ordinary meaning”). The defendant need not be physically present

and may surveil the victim electronically. People v. Sullivan, 53

P.3d 1181, 1184 (Colo. App. 2002); see also People v. Crawford,

2025 CO 22, ¶ 4 (using the word “surveil” to describe the

defendant’s use of online resources to learn information about the

victim).

¶ 12 Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably

conclude that Sharpe repeatedly contacted and surveilled T.I. See

Sullivan, 53 P.3d at 1184; Crawford, ¶ 4. Sharpe used Facebook to

find her phone number and learn who she was dating and, after T.I.

blocked him, created numerous profiles hoping to see content

accessible only to T.I.’s Facebook friends. Holte testified that

Sharpe used Facebook to see what T.I. was doing and downloaded

T.I.’s Facebook pictures onto his phone. She also saw him looking

at T.I.’s profile under an alias. Further, Sharpe sent friend requests

to T.I.’s friends and family and regularly attempted to contact her.

This conduct caused T.I. to change her daily habits and fear for her

own safety and her son’s welfare. This evidence, taken together and

viewed in a light most favorable to the People, is sufficient for a

6 reasonable jury to conclude that Sharpe placed T.I. under

surveillance. See Sullivan, 53 P.3d at 1184; Crawford, ¶ 4; see also

People v. Brown, 2014 COA 130M, ¶¶ 46-50 (concluding that the

defendant surveilled the victims through recorded videos and this

was sufficient to support his stalking conviction).

III. Jury Instruction

A. Additional Background

¶ 13 Before trial, Sharpe moved to dismiss the case on First

Amendment grounds, arguing that his speech was not a true threat.

He previewed that Counterman, a true-threats case concerning

Colorado’s stalking statute, was pending before the Supreme Court

and posited that the Court’s adoption of a “recklessness” mens rea

would facially invalidate the statute. The People countered that the

content of the Facebook messages did not form the primary basis of

the charge; rather, their theory hinged on Sharpe’s repeated

attempts to contact and surveil T.I. Thus, the totality of Sharpe’s

conduct — not his speech alone — caused T.I. distress. The trial

court agreed with the People and denied Sharpe’s motion.

¶ 14 Sharpe later requested a jury instruction on true threats. He

did not ask the court to instruct the jury that, to find him guilty of

7 stalking for uttering a true threat, he must have acted recklessly.

He instead asked for the then-existing objective standard

articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court in People in Interest of

R.D., 2020 CO 44, ¶ 4, abrogated in part by Counterman, 600 U.S.

at 78. The trial court gave a modified version of this proposed

instruction.

¶ 15 After trial but before sentencing, the Supreme Court

announced Counterman. The Court adopted a “recklessness”

standard requiring the prosecution to show that “the defendant

consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications

would be viewed as threatening violence.” Counterman, 600 U.S. at

69. Sharpe renewed his motion to dismiss, arguing that he had

been prosecuted under the objective standard Counterman

disavowed. The People maintained that his conviction was valid

because Counterman affected speech-based — rather than conduct-

based — grounds for stalking, and in any event, Sharpe could raise

an instructional challenge on appeal. The trial court again agreed

with the People and denied Sharpe’s motion.

¶ 16 Sharpe argues that his conviction for stalking violates the First

Amendment because the jury was not instructed on the

8 “recklessness” standard Counterman established. The People

concede that to convict Sharpe of stalking for his speech, the court

should have instructed the jury accordingly. However, the People

reiterate that Sharpe’s repeated, unwelcome conduct informed the

prosecution’s theory and argue that any instructional error was

harmless because there is not a reasonable possibility the jury

would have concluded differently had it received a Counterman

instruction. Based on the evidence presented, we agree with the

People.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 17 “The trial court has broad discretion to formulate jury

instructions as long as they are correct statements of the law.”

People v. Carter, 2015 COA 24M-2, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Oram,

217 P.3d 883, 893 (Colo. App. 2009), aff’d, 255 P.3d 1032 (Colo.

2011)). While we review de novo whether jury instructions

accurately inform the jury of the governing law, we review the trial

court’s decision to give a particular instruction for an abuse of

discretion. Id.

¶ 18 Because the alleged omission of a mens rea element from a

jury instruction implicates the defendant’s right to due process, we

9 apply the constitutional harmless error standard. People v.

Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 20. “A constitutional error is harmless

when the evidence properly received against a defendant is so

overwhelming that the constitutional violation was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt.” People v. Walker, 2022 COA 15, ¶ 23 (citation

omitted).

C. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶ 19 True threats are ‘“serious expression[s]’ conveying that a

speaker means to ‘commit an act of unlawful violence’” and are not

entitled to First Amendment protection. Counterman, 600 U.S. at

74 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)); People v.

Morris, 2025 COA 15, ¶ 26. In true-threats cases, the People must

prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the

statement’s threatening nature, but a mental state of recklessness

is sufficient. Counterman, 600 U.S. at 69. This constitutional

requirement is limited to stalking charges premised on the

defendant’s speech. Crawford, ¶ 23 (“The Counterman Court limited

its review to defining the bounds of the First Amendment’s true-

threats exception and did not consider Colorado’s stalking statute

outside of that context.”); accord Morris, ¶ 33.

10 ¶ 20 While the crime of stalking under section 18-3-602(1)(c) may

include the content of communications, “sometimes it is primarily

or solely about the conduct itself.” Crawford, ¶ 14. In Crawford,

the Colorado Supreme Court held that “stalking charges brought

under section 18-3-602(1)(c), based on a repeated course of

conduct, do not require proof that the defendant acted with a

reckless mens rea.” Id. at ¶ 9. The court noted, however, “that

First Amendment protections may extend to conduct that is

sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.” Id. at ¶ 18

(citation modified). Courts are tasked with determining “whether

there is an intent to convey a particularized message” and the

likelihood that the message would be understood by the recipient.

Id. (citation modified).

¶ 21 By agreeing to instruct the jury on true threats and related

First Amendment principles — in addition to surveillance-based

stalking — the trial court conceded that Sharpe’s conduct was

“imbued with elements of communication.” See id. While the court

accurately instructed the jury on the law at the time, Counterman’s

“recklessness” requirement is now the governing standard.

Counterman, 600 U.S. at 69. If our analysis stopped here, and if

11 the prosecution premised the charges on speech alone, Sharpe’s

conviction would require reversal because he was prosecuted under

the outdated objective test. See § 18-1-410(1)(f)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (A

defendant is entitled to retroactive application of a “significant

change in the law.”).

¶ 22 But this is not merely a true-threats case. Rather, it was

prosecuted under a theory of repeated, unwelcome conduct. We are

not convinced that the jury would have reached a different result

had it been instructed that, to find Sharpe guilty of stalking, he had

to have acted recklessly in uttering a true threat. Instead, the

People presented overwhelming evidence that Sharpe repeatedly

contacted and surveilled T.I., and focused closing argument on

these contacts. See Walker, ¶¶ 23-25. More, Sharpe recruited

others to connect with T.I. even after law enforcement reiterated

that she did not welcome Sharpe’s conduct. To the extent the

People introduced the content of Sharpe’s communications, this

was necessary to prove the reasonableness of T.I.’s distress, as the

statute requires. § 18-3-602(1)(c). We therefore conclude that any

error in failing to provide a Counterman instruction was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence the jury properly

12 received against Sharpe for surveillance-based stalking was

overwhelming. See Walker, ¶ 23.

IV. Disposition

¶ 23 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.