23CA1495 Peo v Schreiner 03-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1495 Boulder County District Court No. 21CR1698 Honorable Patrick Butler, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Devan Rebecca Schreiner,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 19, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joshua J. Luna, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Stephen Arvin, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Devan Rebecca Schreiner, appeals the district
court’s order imposing restitution. We conclude that the order
must be vacated and the case must be remanded for the court to
enter an order reflecting that Schreiner owes no restitution.
I. Background
¶2 On March 7, 2023, a jury convicted Schreiner of first degree
murder. The court proceeded to immediate sentencing and imposed
a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
¶3 On March 24, 2023, the prosecution filed a “Motion for
Reservation of Restitution and Court to Make a Finding and Order
of Restitut[io]n.” The prosecutor noted that Schreiner’s sentence
was not final because restitution had not been mentioned by either
party or the court at sentencing and the court had not made a
finding or order regarding restitution. He represented that the
Crime Victim Compensation Board (CVCB) had incurred a
pecuniary loss for funeral expenses and asked the court to correct
the mittimus to reflect a restitution award to the CVCB. The motion
did not indicate a requested amount of restitution.
¶4 On March 27, 2023, the district court issued an order granting
the motion, stating, “The Court finds good cause for determining
1 the restitution longer than 91 days after sentencing. Any motion
for restitution shall be filed within 91 days of this Order. Any
objection shall be filed within 14 days of any Motion.” That day, the
prosecution submitted a request for the court to order Schreiner to
pay restitution in the amount of $8,806.31 to the CVCB. The
prosecution did not specify what losses supported this requested
amount.
¶5 On March 29, 2023, Schreiner filed an objection to the
restitution request, arguing that the prosecution had not
established the amount of the requested losses or that she was
liable for the losses. The court ordered the parties to schedule a
hearing on restitution and found that good cause existed to set the
hearing more than ninety-one days after sentencing.
¶6 On July 13, 2023 — 128 days after sentencing — the court
held a restitution hearing. The prosecution amended its requested
restitution amount to $7,806.31 and stated that the amount was
based on $1,020 in mental health counseling costs and $6,781.31
for funeral and burial expenses. Defense counsel argued that the
prosecution failed to present sufficient documentation to justify the
2 restitution request. The court rejected counsel’s argument and
ordered Schreiner to pay $7,806.31 in restitution.
II. Analysis
¶7 On appeal, Schreiner contends that the restitution order must
be vacated because the district court failed to comply with its
statutory obligation to enter a restitution order at sentencing. We
agree.
¶8 Every order of conviction must include one of the four types of
orders set forth in the restitution statute. People v. Weeks, 2021
CO 75, ¶ 3. At the time Schreiner was sentenced, section 18-1.3-
603(1), C.R.S. 2023, required that every order of felony conviction
include one of the following orders:
(a) An order of a specific amount of restitution be paid by the defendant;
(b) An order that the defendant is obligated to pay restitution, but that the specific amount of restitution shall be determined within the ninety-one days immediately following the order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for extending the time period by which the restitution amount shall be determined;
(c) An order, in addition to or in place of a specific amount of restitution, that the defendant pay restitution covering the actual
3 costs of specific future treatment of any victim of the crime; or
(d) [An order containing] a specific finding that no victim of the crime suffered a pecuniary loss and therefore no order for the payment of restitution is being entered.
“[A] sentence that fails to include one or more of the four
enumerated restitution orders in subsection (1) is a sentence not
authorized by law (i.e., an illegal sentence) that may be corrected at
any time.” Snow v. People, 2025 CO 32, ¶ 21.
¶9 In Snow, the sentencing court deferred the issue of restitution
in its entirety for sixty days and then entered a restitution order
108 days after sentencing. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 7-8. The supreme court
concluded that, because deferring restitution in its entirety is not
one of the restitution orders authorized by section 18-1.3-603(1),
the defendant’s sentence was not authorized by law. Snow, ¶¶ 2,
22-23, 27. And, as a remedy, the supreme court determined that
the restitution order must be vacated and the case must be
returned to the district court with instructions to enter an order
pursuant to section 18-1.3-603(1)(d) that the defendant owes no
restitution. Snow, ¶¶ 3-5, 30-38.
4 ¶ 10 The Attorney General argues that Snow is distinguishable
from this case because (1) the district court’s March 27 order was a
subsection (1)(b) order that corrected the illegality caused by the
court’s failure to address restitution at sentencing; and (2) the
March 27 order was timely filed within ninety-one days of
sentencing as permitted by subsection (1)(b).
¶ 11 Initially, we are not convinced that the March 27 order can be
read as constituting a subsection (1)(b) order. The order made no
mention of Schreiner’s liability for restitution and instructed the
prosecution to file “[a]ny motion for restitution.” Thus, the March
27 order is more akin to an order deferring restitution in its
entirety.
¶ 12 Nevertheless, even if the March 27 order could be considered a
subsection (1)(b) order, we reject the Attorney General’s assertion
that the entry of that order within ninety-one days of sentencing
cured the court’s failure to enter a restitution order authorized by
subsection (1) at sentencing. See id. at ¶ 27 (“[T]he subsection
(1)(b) deadline is inapposite here because the district court never
entered a subsection (1)(b) order. Rather, at sentencing, the court
5 merely reserved the issue of restitution in its entirety, an order not
authorized by subsection (1).”).
¶ 13 Subsection (1)(b) creates two separate, final, appealable
orders: a preliminary sentencing order assigning liability for
restitution but reserving the court’s determination of the amount,
and a subsequent order setting the amount of restitution for which
a defendant is liable. Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶¶ 41-43;
Weeks, ¶¶ 4, 30; Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 578-79 (Colo.
2008).
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23CA1495 Peo v Schreiner 03-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1495 Boulder County District Court No. 21CR1698 Honorable Patrick Butler, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Devan Rebecca Schreiner,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 19, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joshua J. Luna, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Stephen Arvin, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Devan Rebecca Schreiner, appeals the district
court’s order imposing restitution. We conclude that the order
must be vacated and the case must be remanded for the court to
enter an order reflecting that Schreiner owes no restitution.
I. Background
¶2 On March 7, 2023, a jury convicted Schreiner of first degree
murder. The court proceeded to immediate sentencing and imposed
a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
¶3 On March 24, 2023, the prosecution filed a “Motion for
Reservation of Restitution and Court to Make a Finding and Order
of Restitut[io]n.” The prosecutor noted that Schreiner’s sentence
was not final because restitution had not been mentioned by either
party or the court at sentencing and the court had not made a
finding or order regarding restitution. He represented that the
Crime Victim Compensation Board (CVCB) had incurred a
pecuniary loss for funeral expenses and asked the court to correct
the mittimus to reflect a restitution award to the CVCB. The motion
did not indicate a requested amount of restitution.
¶4 On March 27, 2023, the district court issued an order granting
the motion, stating, “The Court finds good cause for determining
1 the restitution longer than 91 days after sentencing. Any motion
for restitution shall be filed within 91 days of this Order. Any
objection shall be filed within 14 days of any Motion.” That day, the
prosecution submitted a request for the court to order Schreiner to
pay restitution in the amount of $8,806.31 to the CVCB. The
prosecution did not specify what losses supported this requested
amount.
¶5 On March 29, 2023, Schreiner filed an objection to the
restitution request, arguing that the prosecution had not
established the amount of the requested losses or that she was
liable for the losses. The court ordered the parties to schedule a
hearing on restitution and found that good cause existed to set the
hearing more than ninety-one days after sentencing.
¶6 On July 13, 2023 — 128 days after sentencing — the court
held a restitution hearing. The prosecution amended its requested
restitution amount to $7,806.31 and stated that the amount was
based on $1,020 in mental health counseling costs and $6,781.31
for funeral and burial expenses. Defense counsel argued that the
prosecution failed to present sufficient documentation to justify the
2 restitution request. The court rejected counsel’s argument and
ordered Schreiner to pay $7,806.31 in restitution.
II. Analysis
¶7 On appeal, Schreiner contends that the restitution order must
be vacated because the district court failed to comply with its
statutory obligation to enter a restitution order at sentencing. We
agree.
¶8 Every order of conviction must include one of the four types of
orders set forth in the restitution statute. People v. Weeks, 2021
CO 75, ¶ 3. At the time Schreiner was sentenced, section 18-1.3-
603(1), C.R.S. 2023, required that every order of felony conviction
include one of the following orders:
(a) An order of a specific amount of restitution be paid by the defendant;
(b) An order that the defendant is obligated to pay restitution, but that the specific amount of restitution shall be determined within the ninety-one days immediately following the order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for extending the time period by which the restitution amount shall be determined;
(c) An order, in addition to or in place of a specific amount of restitution, that the defendant pay restitution covering the actual
3 costs of specific future treatment of any victim of the crime; or
(d) [An order containing] a specific finding that no victim of the crime suffered a pecuniary loss and therefore no order for the payment of restitution is being entered.
“[A] sentence that fails to include one or more of the four
enumerated restitution orders in subsection (1) is a sentence not
authorized by law (i.e., an illegal sentence) that may be corrected at
any time.” Snow v. People, 2025 CO 32, ¶ 21.
¶9 In Snow, the sentencing court deferred the issue of restitution
in its entirety for sixty days and then entered a restitution order
108 days after sentencing. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 7-8. The supreme court
concluded that, because deferring restitution in its entirety is not
one of the restitution orders authorized by section 18-1.3-603(1),
the defendant’s sentence was not authorized by law. Snow, ¶¶ 2,
22-23, 27. And, as a remedy, the supreme court determined that
the restitution order must be vacated and the case must be
returned to the district court with instructions to enter an order
pursuant to section 18-1.3-603(1)(d) that the defendant owes no
restitution. Snow, ¶¶ 3-5, 30-38.
4 ¶ 10 The Attorney General argues that Snow is distinguishable
from this case because (1) the district court’s March 27 order was a
subsection (1)(b) order that corrected the illegality caused by the
court’s failure to address restitution at sentencing; and (2) the
March 27 order was timely filed within ninety-one days of
sentencing as permitted by subsection (1)(b).
¶ 11 Initially, we are not convinced that the March 27 order can be
read as constituting a subsection (1)(b) order. The order made no
mention of Schreiner’s liability for restitution and instructed the
prosecution to file “[a]ny motion for restitution.” Thus, the March
27 order is more akin to an order deferring restitution in its
entirety.
¶ 12 Nevertheless, even if the March 27 order could be considered a
subsection (1)(b) order, we reject the Attorney General’s assertion
that the entry of that order within ninety-one days of sentencing
cured the court’s failure to enter a restitution order authorized by
subsection (1) at sentencing. See id. at ¶ 27 (“[T]he subsection
(1)(b) deadline is inapposite here because the district court never
entered a subsection (1)(b) order. Rather, at sentencing, the court
5 merely reserved the issue of restitution in its entirety, an order not
authorized by subsection (1).”).
¶ 13 Subsection (1)(b) creates two separate, final, appealable
orders: a preliminary sentencing order assigning liability for
restitution but reserving the court’s determination of the amount,
and a subsequent order setting the amount of restitution for which
a defendant is liable. Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶¶ 41-43;
Weeks, ¶¶ 4, 30; Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 578-79 (Colo.
2008). The former order is a component of a defendant’s sentence;
the latter is not. Tennyson, ¶¶ 6-7, 39-43; Sanoff, 187 P.3d at 578-
79.
¶ 14 Subsection (1)(b)’s ninety-one-day time period applies to the
order determining the restitution amount. Weeks, ¶¶ 4-5, 39. The
Attorney General has not presented, nor have we found, any
authority that would support a conclusion that the preliminary
order assigning restitution liability can also be entered within that
ninety-one-day timeframe. See Snow, ¶¶ 27-29 (concluding that
subsection (1)(b) did not authorize the post-sentencing imposition of
restitution because “the record of the district court proceedings is
barren of an explicit or implicit finding of restitution liability either
6 before or during the sentencing hearing” that would provide a “basis
for [the supreme court] to infer that the only issue the district court
deferred until after the sentencing hearing was the determination of
the amount of restitution” (emphasis added)); cf. id. at ¶ 33
(“Allowing trial courts to correct their failure to adhere to
[subsection (1)’s] requirement [that, at sentencing, the court must
enter one or more of the four enumerated restitution orders] by
simply entering a subsection (1)(a) order at any time would make
the requirement pointless.”).
¶ 15 To the contrary, “subsection (1)(b) . . . orders must enter
before or during the sentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶ 34 n.11. And the
entry of such order after sentencing would be untimely. Cf. id. at ¶
34 (“[O]rders under subsection (1)(a) must enter at or before the
sentencing hearing”; thus, “subsection (1)(a) orders entered after the
sentencing hearing are necessarily untimely.”).
¶ 16 Consistent with Snow, the district court’s failure to enter an
order authorized by subsection (1) at sentencing must be remedied
by vacating the untimely July 13 restitution order and remanding
the case for entry of a subsection (1)(d) order that Schreiner owes
no restitution. See id. at ¶ 38 n.12 (recognizing that a subsection
7 (1)(d) order would also be untimely but holding that “courts must
have a way to correct an illegal sentence like the one imposed on
[the defendant]” and “a subsection (1)(d) order is the only restitution
order in the statutory list that does that without violating our
General Assembly’s intent in revising our restitution paradigm”).
¶ 17 Because we are vacating the restitution order on the above
ground, we need not address Schreiner’s other claim that the order
should be vacated because the prosecution failed to comply with its
obligations under section 18-1.3-603(2)(a).
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The restitution order is vacated, and the case is remanded for
correction of the mittimus to reflect that Schreiner owes no
restitution.
JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.