Peo v. Schendorf

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 16, 2026
• Docket: 22CA1785
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

22CA1785 Peo v Schendorf 04-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1785 Jefferson County District Court No. 21CR1192 Honorable Robert Lochary, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Lance Petersen Schendorf,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 16, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, M. Shelby Deeney, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Lance Petersen Schendorf, appeals the trial court’s

judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of one

count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance

and two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 At 5:45 a.m. on May 6, 2021, Jefferson County Regional SWAT

used a battering ram to enter an apartment in Arvada. Once inside,

the SWAT team located seven individuals, including Schendorf.

¶3 The apartment had two bedrooms, an office, a bathroom, a

living room, a kitchen, and a dining area. The doors to all the

rooms were opened or unlocked, except for the office. Officers used

force to unlock the office door. After the SWAT team cleared out the

apartment’s occupants, detectives from the North Metro Drug Task

force began searching the apartment.

¶4 In the office, detectives found a desk with computer monitors,

several small bags, a glass pipe, a scale, prescription bottles, a

small scoop, and a container with a “white crystal” substance. They

also found mail with Schendorf’s name (but a different address) and

1 a prescription bottle with Schendorf’s name on it near the computer

monitors.

¶5 Detectives opened an unlocked safe on a shelf in the office and

found a white substance inside. During the search, detectives

found two bags of suspected narcotics at the bottom of a trash can

near the desk, which they collected for testing. Detectives found

another safe in the office’s closet. The second safe was locked, so

they pried it open. Detectives found a credit card with Schendorf’s

name on it in the second safe. Detectives didn’t find mail, credit

cards, prescription medication, or documents with any other

names, besides Schendorf’s, during their search of the apartment.

¶6 During the search, detectives found a total of 10.39 pounds of

methamphetamine and a tin containing pills. Of the pills found, six

tablets were identified as fentanyl — a schedule II controlled

substance — and fourteen tablets were identified as

methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA) — a schedule I controlled

substance.

¶7 The People charged Schendorf with one count of possession

with intent to distribute a controlled substance under section 18-

18-405(2)(a)(I)(A), C.R.S. 2025, and two counts of unlawful

2 possession of a controlled substance under section 18-18-403.5(1),

C.R.S. 2025 — one for possession of fentanyl and one for

possession of MDA.

¶8 The jury found Schendorf guilty of all three charges, and the

court sentenced him to a controlling term of twenty years in the

custody of the Department of Corrections.

II. Analysis

¶9 On appeal, Schendorf contends that (1) the evidence against

him was insufficient to sustain a conviction for possessing a

controlled substance with intent to distribute; (2) the trial court

reversibly erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence; (3) the

trial court’s admission of improper testimony violated his right to a

fair trial; and (4) these errors cumulatively deprived him of a fair

trial. We address and reject each contention in turn.

A. Sufficiency of Evidence

¶ 10 Schendorf contends that there is insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s finding that he knowingly possessed

methamphetamine and intended to distribute it. We disagree.

3 1. Additional Facts

¶ 11 Detective Daniel Gomez oversaw the execution of the search

warrant and testified at trial as an expert in narcotics distribution

and trafficking. Gomez identified the contents of physical and

photo exhibits and testified that the size of bags found in the living

room was consistent with the size of bags typically associated with

a “user’s amount of a controlled substance,” commonly referred to

as “micro baggies.” He also testified that when a user purchases

methamphetamine, it’s put into small bags, weighed (usually in

grams), and sold according to weight. Gomez identified a photo of a

scale and testified that scales are commonly used in the sale of

controlled substances. He also identified a small scooper and

explained those were “often used to scoop [out a substance] . . . and

weigh it.”

¶ 12 When asked about a particular exhibit, Gomez testified that it

was a bag collected from the apartment, which appeared to contain

a controlled substance consistent with what he knows

methamphetamine to look like. He similarly identified six other

exhibits as bagged substances collected during the search. Gomez

testified that there was “a little over ten pounds” of

4 methamphetamine recovered from the apartment, and based on his

training and experience, that amount of methamphetamine was

“distribution level” and not for personal use. Gomez said there are

roughly 453 grams in a pound and that, even at that weight, a

typical user — who uses one to four grams — would not carry a

pound of methamphetamine because it would be akin to walking

around with $1,700 to $2,200 dollars.

¶ 13 Natasha Collins, an agent with the Colorado Bureau of

Investigation, testified as an expert in forensic chemistry and said

that she had tested three of the physical exhibits admitted into

evidence. Collins confirmed that one of the exhibits was a bag

containing a substance that weighed 453.25 grams and had tested

positive for methamphetamine. Collins explained that even if she

had received other packages containing suspected

methamphetamine, she wouldn’t have tested them because

“Colorado is . . . a weight state, meaning that there [are] weight

thresholds in the [statutes]” and that the “maximum weight

threshold for methamphetamine is 112 grams.” Because the bag

that she tested “had already met that maximum weight threshold, .

. . there was no reason for [her] to keep testing.”

5 2. Standard of Review

¶ 14 We review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence was sufficient in quantity and quality to sustain a

defendant’s conviction. People v. Price, 2023 COA 96, ¶ 16. “Our

review examines the relevant direct and circumstantial evidence as

a whole to analyze whether the evidence is substantial and

sufficient for a reasonable mind to find the defendant guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Id.

¶ 15 “The prosecution has the burden of establishing a prima facie

case of guilt through the introduction of sufficient evidence.”

McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63. Evidence is sufficient where

there is more than a modicum of relevant evidence, Price, ¶ 17, but

“[a] criminal verdict may not be based on guessing, speculation, or

conjecture,” People v. Pratarelli, 2020 COA 33, ¶ 14. In assessing

the sufficiency of the evidence, (1) a defendant’s mental state may

be inferred from their conduct and other evidence, including the

circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime; (2) the

prosecution, rather than the defendant, must be given the benefit of

every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence;

and (3) where reasonable minds could differ, the evidence is

6 sufficient to sustain a conviction. People v. Robinson, 226 P.3d

1145, 1154 (Colo. App. 2009). While the prosecution receives the

benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn, “there must

be a logical and convincing connection between the facts

established and the conclusion inferred.” Clark v. People, 232 P.3d

1287, 1292 (Colo. 2010).

3. Knowing Possession

¶ 16 Schendorf contends that the prosecution failed to prove that

he knowingly possessed methamphetamine because it didn’t

establish that he had “dominion and control” over the premises

where detectives found the methamphetamine. In support,

Schendorf asserts that at least six other men were in the apartment

at the time of the search and that the prosecution failed to prove

that he had exclusive possession of the apartment. Schendorf also

claims that there weren’t any circumstances that could buttress the

inference that he knew methamphetamine was present because he

wasn’t found near the locked office at the time of the search, there

were no drugs on his person, no one testified that he had control

over the office, the prosecution didn’t introduce fingerprint evidence

or scientific evidence linking him to the drugs, and there was no

7 testimony proving that he had a key to the office. We disagree with

both contentions.

a. Applicable Law

¶ 17 It is unlawful to knowingly possess a controlled substance

with the intent to distribute. § 18-18-405(1)(a). To sustain a

conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the prosecution

must prove that the defendant had knowledge that he possessed a

narcotic drug and that he knowingly intended to possess the drug.

Robinson, 226 P.3d at 1154. A conviction for possession may be

predicated on circumstantial evidence. Id. The drugs need not be

found on the defendant’s person if they are “found in a place under

his or her dominion and control.” Id. If an individual has exclusive

possession of the premises, then knowledge of possession may be

inferred by the jury. People v. Yeadon, 2018 COA 104, ¶ 25, aff’d,

2020 CO 38. However, if a person does not have exclusive

possession of the premises in which drugs are found, an inference

of possession may not be drawn “unless there are statements or

other circumstances tending to buttress the inference.” People v.

Stark, 691 P.2d 334, 339 (Colo. 1984) (quoting Petty v. People, 447

P.2d 217, 220 (Colo. 1968)).

8 b. Analysis

¶ 18 The prosecution didn’t introduce evidence like a lease

agreement or utility bill indicating that Schendorf had exclusive

possession of the apartment. Cf. People v. Poe, 2012 COA 166,

¶¶ 17-18 (holding that evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s

conclusion that the defendant exercised dominion and control over

the premises where drugs were found because the apartment

belonged to the defendant and there was no evidence of other

individuals in the apartment). But, in the locked office where they

discovered the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia,

detectives found several items bearing Schendorf’s name, including

mail, a prescription bottle, and a credit card. Moreover, detectives

found the credit card in a locked safe within the locked office.

While these items don’t establish that Schendorf lived in the

apartment, a juror could reasonably infer that he exercised

dominion and control over the office and exclusively possessed it

because his personal property was kept there.

¶ 19 Even if Schendorf didn’t have exclusive possession of the

office, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer

that he knew methamphetamine was present because there were

9 other circumstances that buttressed the inference and linked him

to the drugs found therein. First, when detectives executed the

search warrant, none of the other six individuals were in the office,

and detectives testified that they didn’t find anyone else’s personal

property in the office — only Schendorf’s. Cf. People v. Steed, 540

P.2d 323, 327 (Colo. 1975) (holding that the defendant was entitled

to judgment of acquittal where methamphetamine was found in a

living room among nine people with nothing to link the possession

to the defendant, who was not one of the nine). Second, in addition

to methamphetamine, detectives found scales, small bags, and a

scoop in plain sight once they opened the locked office door. Third,

while it’s possible that other occupants of the apartment may have

also knowingly possessed the methamphetamine, that wouldn’t

preclude the jury from finding that Schendorf knowingly possessed

the methamphetamine. See People v. Wilkie, 522 P.2d 727, 729

(Colo. 1974) (recognizing that sole and exclusive possession is not

required and that joint possession in a place at least partially under

the dominion and control of the accused is sufficient).

¶ 20 Viewing these circumstances together and giving the

prosecution the benefit of every favorable inference, even if

10 Schendorf’s possession wasn’t exclusive, because he had dominion

and control over the locked office, which, in addition to drugs and

paraphernalia, contained his personal property, the jury could

reasonably have inferred that he knowingly possessed

methamphetamine.

4. Intent to Distribute

¶ 21 Schendorf contends that the prosecution failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed

methamphetamine “with intent to distribute” because only one

pound of the substance found in the apartment was forensically

tested and confirmed as methamphetamine. Without testing the

other nine pounds of evidence, he says, there was insufficient proof

that the remaining substances weren’t something else. Schendorf

asserts that, without definitive testing, the only other evidence of

intent to distribute was based on Gomez’s “speculative” opinion that

ten pounds of methamphetamine was consistent with distribution

levels rather than personal use. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 22 As mentioned above, we review de novo whether there was

sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Price, ¶ 16. “Intent can

11 rarely be proven other than through circumstantial or indirect

evidence.” People v. Sena, 2016 COA 161, ¶ 16.

b. Analysis

¶ 23 First, intent to distribute may be proved through evidence of

scales, small bags, and larger amounts of controlled substances

that are separately packaged. See, e.g., People v. Munoz-Casteneda,

2012 COA 109, ¶ 35 (evidence of digital scales, stacks of cash, and

approximately two ounces of cocaine divided into smaller amounts

and packaged in separate bags was sufficient proof of the

defendant’s intent to distribute); People v. Atencio, 140 P.3d 73, 76

(Colo. App. 2005) (large amount of cocaine that was separately

packaged constituted sufficient proof of the defendant’s intent to

distribute). Gomez testified that he saw scales, a scooper, and

micro baggies in the office, which are all items consistent with

distribution rather than personal use. He also testified that “a little

over [ten] pounds” of methamphetamine was recovered from the

apartment, and based on his training and experience, that amount

of methamphetamine was “distribution level” and not for personal

use. Based on Gomez’s testimony alone, there was sufficient

12 circumstantial evidence for the jury to find that Schendorf intended

to distribute methamphetamine.

¶ 24 Second, Collins testified that she only tested one of the

packages containing suspected methamphetamine, which weighed

453.25 grams. When asked why she didn’t test the other packages

recovered from the office, Collins explained that because the bag

she tested was already over 112 grams — the requisite statutory

amount for a level one drug felony — it was unnecessary for her to

continue testing. Such an amount of methamphetamine suggests

intended distribution rather than personal use. As Gomez testified,

a user consumes about one to four grams per day, and a typical

user wouldn’t have that much methamphetamine in their

possession.

¶ 25 Giving every favorable inference to the prosecution, the

amount of methamphetamine found, coupled with the presence of

scales, a scoop, and micro baggies in the office, was sufficient for a

reasonable juror to conclude that Schendorf intended to distribute

13 B. Motion to Suppress Evidence

¶ 26 Schendorf contends that the trial court erred by not

suppressing the evidence recovered from the search because (1) the

warrant lacked particularity and allowed for an overbroad and

general search; (2) the court improperly applied the severability

doctrine; and (3) the court improperly applied the good faith

exception. We disagree with Schendorf’s contentions.

1. Applicable Facts

¶ 27 Both the search warrant and affidavit were provided to the

issuing judge. Gomez testified that, when officers executed the

search, he had the warrant and affidavit with him. Schendorf did

not review the warrant.

¶ 28 The warrant allowed search and seizure of “[p]ersonal property

tending to establish the identity of the persons in control of

contraband related paraphernalia consisting in part and including

but not limited to DNA evidence, rent receipts, mail envelopes,

photographs, keys, and U.S. currency.” The warrant gave both the

physical address and a physical description of the apartment to be

searched. It specified that “the search is to include, but is not

limited to, rooms, closets, cabinets, boxes, furniture, clothes,

14 containers, any crawlspaces, or storage area connected to, and all

vehicles, structures, located on the curtilage thereof and upon

person or persons within the above described structure.” The

warrant also directed officers to “search forthwith the place, person

or vehicle above described for said property, and the said property

and every part thereof to take, remove and seize.”

¶ 29 The warrant incorporated the affidavit by reference. The

affidavit, which Gomez prepared, indicated that probable cause for

the search was based on a confidential informant’s controlled

purchases of substances inside the apartment that had field tested

positive for methamphetamine. The affidavit described the search’s

objective as “[m]ethamphetamine and its salts and isomers, the

salts of methamphetamine, isomers, vessels, implements and

furniture used in connection with the manufacture, production,

storage and dispensing of methamphetamine and related illegal

drugs.”

¶ 30 Before trial, Schendorf moved to suppress all the evidence

obtained through the search warrant. Schendorf argued that the

warrant was deficient on its face because it didn’t include

information that detectives were looking for methamphetamine.

15 Rather, the warrant only authorized seizure of (1) personal property

tending to establish the identity of the persons in control of the

controlled substances; (2) related paraphernalia; and (3) U.S.

currency. The court held a hearing at which defense counsel

challenged the use of the catchall phrase “but is not limited to”

because it made the warrant overly broad and improperly extended

the areas to be searched beyond the apartment.

¶ 31 The court agreed that the warrant was overly broad.

Specifically, the phrases “including but not limited to,” “to include,

but is not limited to,” and “to search forthwith the place, person or

vehicle above described for said property, and the said property and

every part thereof” permitted a general exploratory search. While

these phrases authorized a general search, the language

immediately following identified specific areas and items subject to

the search. The court found that the warrant incorporated the

affidavit by reference, and it concluded that the warrant’s

deficiencies could be cured through severance. Accordingly, the

court found “a good-faith basis” (1) to sever the phrases “included

but not limited to” and “every part thereof” and (2) to permit a

search of the “rooms, closets, cabinets, boxes, furniture, clothes,

16 containers, any crawlspaces, or storage area connected to.” The

court determined that with the excisions, the warrant was not

overly broad and because the search warrant incorporated the

affidavit by reference, evidence of methamphetamine found within

the permitted areas was also admissible.

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 32 Our review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question

of fact and law. People v. Thompson, 2021 CO 15, ¶ 15. We accept

the factual findings of the trial court if they are supported by

competent evidence but assess their legal significance de novo. Id.

Our review of a ruling on a motion to suppress is limited to the

record created at the suppression hearing. People v. Dacus, 2024

CO 51, ¶ 24. We review de novo whether a search warrant may be

severed and whether the good faith exception applies. United States

v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1153 (10th Cir. 2006).

¶ 33 A warrant that is not sufficiently particular is invalid, “and

evidence discovered pursuant to an invalid warrant, with some

limited exceptions, cannot be introduced in court.” Dhyne v.

People, 2024 CO 45, ¶ 10. “Blanket suppression is an

extraordinary remedy that should be used only when the violations

17 of search warrant requirements are so extreme that the search is

essentially transformed into an impermissible general search.”

People v. Eirish, 165 P.3d 848, 856 (Colo. App. 2007).

3. Particularity

¶ 34 Schendorf first argues that the warrant was overbroad and

lacked particularity because it didn’t authorize detectives to search

for and to seize methamphetamine, and it didn’t limit the items to

be seized or the places to be searched.

¶ 35 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

requires a warrant to describe with particularity the places to be

searched and the items to be seized. People v. Staton, 924 P.2d

127, 131 (Colo. 1996) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV). This

requirement precludes general searches, which are prohibited.

Thompson, ¶ 18. The standard for particularity is “whether the

description in a warrant is sufficiently particular that it enables the

executing officer to reasonably ascertain and identify the things

authorized to be seized.” People v. Roccaforte, 919 P.2d 799, 803

(Colo. 1996). “[T]he particularity of an affidavit can cure an

overbroad warrant.” Id. at 804. However, for the affidavit to satisfy

18 the particularity requirement, (1) the warrant must incorporate the

affidavit by reference; (2) the affidavit and warrant must both be

presented to the issuing judge or magistrate; and (3) both

documents must be present during the execution of the search

warrant. Staton, 924 P.2d at 132.

¶ 36 Schendorf first argues that the warrant didn’t include

methamphetamine and only included one category of evidence to be

seized — personal property tending to establish the identity of the

persons in control of contraband related paraphernalia — which

wasn’t evidence of any criminal activity. Although the warrant

didn’t specifically list methamphetamine as an item to be seized,

the warrant incorporated the affidavit — which did specify

methamphetamine — by reference and both documents were

present when the judge signed the warrant and during the search.

Accordingly, the warrant and affidavit together met the particularity

requirements. Cf. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558 (2004)

(holding a warrant invalid that did not describe “at all” the items to

be seized and did not incorporate by reference the affidavit that

19 provided detailed description of the items, and the affidavit was

similarly not present at the search).

¶ 37 Schendorf further alleges that the warrant and affidavit were

not presented to him, but he doesn’t provide authority indicating he

must have been presented with these documents. Because

Schendorf doesn’t develop this argument, we will not address it

further. See People v. Liggett, 2021 COA 51, ¶ 53 (acknowledging

that we do not address undeveloped arguments), aff’d, 2023 CO 22.

Recall that the particularity requirement is met if both the warrant

and supporting affidavit are presented to the issuing judge and the

warrant and affidavit are present during the search’s execution or

the affiant supervises the search. See Staton, 924 P.2d at 132.

Here, Gomez took both the warrant and the affidavit to execute the

search, and Gomez was the affiant and supervised the search.

¶ 38 Schendorf also argues that the warrant didn’t limit the items

seized or places searched to a particular crime. We aren’t

persuaded. The affidavit listed the type of property to be seized —

methamphetamine, related paraphernalia, and indicia of ownership.

The warrant referenced personal property similar to the property

listed in the affidavit. These descriptions provided enough

20 particularity to adequately describe evidence related to suspected

methamphetamine distribution. Cf. Cassady v. Goering, 567 F.3d

628, 635 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The officers only had probable cause to

search for evidence related to marijuana cultivation, yet the warrant

authorized the seizure of all possible evidence of any crime in any

jurisdiction.”).

¶ 39 Accordingly, the court properly concluded that the warrant

incorporated the affidavit by reference and that the items and

locations cited in the warrant and affidavit were described with

sufficient particularity.

4. Severance

¶ 40 Schendorf argues that the trial court improperly applied the

severance doctrine. Rather than conducting a multi-step analysis

and determining which portions of the warrant were sufficiently

particularized and valid, the court simply severed the catchall

phrases. Schendorf also argues that even if the court properly

applied the doctrine, the warrant had so many invalid portions that

it was entirely “contaminated” and defective. We disagree with both

contentions.

21 a. Applicable Law

¶ 41 It’s possible to sever deficient portions of a search warrant

without invalidating the entire warrant. Eirish, 165 P.3d at 855.

Severance applies where the valid portions of a warrant are

particularized and distinguishable from the invalid portions. Sells,

463 F.3d at 1155. Under the severance doctrine, suppression of

evidence is only necessary when evidence is seized pursuant to the

invalid parts of the warrant. Id. at 1161.

¶ 42 To implement the doctrine, the court first divides the warrant

into “phrases, clauses, paragraphs, or categories of items” and

determines whether that “part of the warrant describes with

sufficient particularity [the] items to be seized for which there is

probable cause.” Id. at 1155-56. Next, the court distinguishes the

valid portions of the warrant from the invalid portions and

“employ[s] a holistic test that examines the qualitative as well as the

quantitative aspects of the valid portions of the warrant relative to

the invalid portions to determine whether the valid portions ‘make

up the greater part of the warrant.’” Id. at 1160 (quoting United

States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 822 (10th Cir. 1993)). Any evidence

22 seized under the invalid portions of the warrant must be

suppressed. Id. at 1161.

¶ 43 Schendorf relies on Sells to argue that the court needed to

divide the warrant into sections and to isolate the categories of

items to be seized to prevent exploratory rummaging and then it

had to separate the valid portions of the warrant from the invalid

portions. In Sells, the court determined that the warrant could be

divided up by commas to allow officers to search for five categories

of evidence, including specific firearms, footwear, and clothing. Id.

at 1156. Here, the court severed the phrase “including, but not

limited to” twice — the first time to limit the search to particularized

items (“DNA evidence, rent receipts, mail envelopes, photographs,

keys, and U.S. currency”) and the second time to limit the search to

particularized areas (“rooms, closets, cabinets, boxes, furniture,

clothes, containers, any crawlspaces, or storage area”).

¶ 44 While the court didn’t divide the warrant into sections and

then split the evidence into categories, removing the problematic

language had the same effect because the places to be searched and

items to be seized are sufficiently particular. And the valid portions

23 make up the greater portion of the warrant both in quantity and

quality.

¶ 45 Lastly, the trial court distinguished the valid parts of the

warrant from the invalid parts and suppressed evidence recovered

from the invalid portions, including evidence found on the curtilage

of the apartment complex and “videotapes, computer data

recordings and photographic material.”1

¶ 46 Accordingly, the court didn’t err by denying the motion to

suppress.

C. Testimonial Errors

¶ 47 Schendorf contends that (1) the court erred by accepting

Gomez as an expert witness; (2) Gomez’s statements usurped the

function of the jury; (3) the trial court erred by permitting Detective

Tom Thwaits to provide expert testimony under the guise of lay

1 Although the court mentioned that it found a “good faith” basis to

sever the “but not limited to” language, it didn’t apply the good faith exception — only the severance doctrine. Good faith is its own exception and applies when a court finds that a warrant is invalid. See People v. Cooper, 2016 CO 73, ¶ 10. To the extent that Schendorf challenges the court’s use of the good faith exception, because the court didn’t use it — other than to find that no good faith exception applied to the invalid language “videotapes, computer data recordings and photographic material” for which evidence was suppressed — we will not address it.

24 testimony; and (4) Officer Dean Moretti’s testimony regarding the

execution of the search warrant was improper. We disagree with

each contention.

1. Gomez’s Expert Testimony

¶ 48 Schendorf argues that Gomez was unqualified to give expert

testimony because it lacked reliability and wasn’t based in science.

a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 49 Trial courts have broad discretion to determine the

admissibility of expert testimony. People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371,

380 (Colo. 2007). We review a trial court’s decision to admit expert

testimony for an abuse of discretion and only reverse when the

decision is manifestly erroneous. People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69,

¶ 44. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or it misapplies the law. People

v. Grant, 2021 COA 53, ¶ 12.

¶ 50 CRE 702 and CRE 403 govern the admissibility of expert

testimony. Kutzly v. People, 2019 CO 55, ¶ 10. Under CRE 702, a

witness qualified as an expert because of knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education may provide opinion testimony if

“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the

25 trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

issue.” CRE 702 “requires a ‘broad’ and ‘liberal’ inquiry into the

admissibility of expert testimony.” Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006,

1011 (Colo. 2008) (quoting People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77-78

(Colo. 2001)). Relevant “evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” CRE 403.

¶ 51 In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, courts

employ a Shreck analysis, looking to whether “(1) the scientific

principles underlying the testimony are reasonably reliable; (2) the

expert is qualified to opine on such matters; (3) the expert

testimony will be helpful to the jury; and (4) the evidence satisfies

CRE 403.” People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Colo. 2011). A

court is required to issue specific findings when it makes a

determination of relevance and reliability under CRE 702. Id.

¶ 52 When specialized knowledge is based on experience, we

determine whether the evidence is reasonably reliable and whether

it will assist the trier of fact. People v. Douglas, 2015 COA 155,

¶ 61. We therefore focus on “(1) whether the testimony would be

useful to the jury and (2) whether the witness is qualified to render

26 an opinion on the subject.” Id. An expert’s testimony is useful to

the jury if it assists the trier of fact to understand other evidence or

determine an issue of fact. Id. at ¶ 62. Usefulness of an expert’s

testimony depends on whether a logical relation exists between the

testimony and the facts. Id. The qualification standard is liberal,

but an expert witness must be able to provide an explanation of his

qualifications. Id.

b. Additional Facts

¶ 53 The prosecution filed a notice to endorse Gomez as an expert

in narcotics trafficking and distribution. Defense counsel moved to

strike Gomez’s anticipated testimony and requested a Shreck

hearing, which the court held. Defense counsel argued that there

was no reliable basis for Gomez’s testimony and that his testimony

would be anecdotal and not based on any reliable science. Defense

counsel also challenged Gomez as an expert based on his

credentials, asserting that he had completed only one basic

narcotics investigation course two years previously, a laboratory

certification in 2020, and no other narcotics-specific certifications

or training.

27 ¶ 54 The court found that Gomez had over twenty-one years of

experience in law enforcement and had been assigned to the drug

task force for three years, and that his curriculum vitae indicated

that he “secures intelligence information, gathers evidence, effects

arrests, writes and executes search warrants and testifies in

criminal proceedings related to narcotics.” The court also found

that he “handle[d] confidential informants” and was “a

[methamphetamine] lab team member . . . in identifying,

investigating and dismantling methamphetamine labs,” and that he

took several courses, including courses in basic narcotics and

undercover investigations. He also held a clandestine laboratory

certification and Peace Officer Standards and Training

certifications.

¶ 55 The court concluded that Gomez had knowledge, skill, and

experience beyond what would be expected of a layperson and that

his testimony would be useful to the jury in explaining the “logical

relevance between the opinion that . . . Gomez is going to offer and

the issues in the case at hand given the charges.” Having

concluded that the prosecution met its burden under Shreck, the

28 court denied defense counsel’s motion. Defense counsel renewed

her objection at trial, but the court declined to reconsider its ruling.

c. Analysis

¶ 56 Schendorf contends that the trial court improperly admitted

Gomez’s expert testimony because it was unreliable, not based on

scientific or technical knowledge as required by CRE 702, and

anecdotal. We disagree for several reasons.

¶ 57 First, Gomez was qualified to opine on matters of drug

distribution and trafficking; he had over twenty years of experience

in law enforcement — as a detective and a patrol officer — during

which he received structured training through courses and

experience-based training.

¶ 58 Second, Gomez’s testimony was reasonably reliable. Although

his testimony wasn’t based on scientific principles, it was based on

technical knowledge, which he amassed over his experience in the

field and “hundreds, if not thousands,” of interviews of “victims,

witnesses, [and] suspects in jail.” See, e.g., People v. Perkins, 2023

COA 38, ¶ 48 (testimony of fire investigator regarding the origin of

an explosion was admissible under CRE 702 because it was based

29 on professional experience, deductive reasoning, and technical

knowledge).

¶ 59 Third, Gomez’s testimony was useful for the jury because, as

the trial court pointed out, “amounts and personal use of

methamphetamine or indicia of distribution” wouldn’t be “within

the ambit of [a] layperson’s knowledge.” Gomez’s testimony would

help the jury understand the evidence.

¶ 60 Finally, Gomez’s testimony was relevant to the case.

¶ 61 Accordingly, the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by

allowing Gomez to testify as an expert witness on narcotics

distribution and trafficking.

2. Usurping the Jury’s Role

¶ 62 Schendorf contends that the trial court erred by allowing

Gomez to opine that the amount of methamphetamine found was

consistent with distribution because the jury was responsible for

determining whether Schendorf had the intent to distribute

methamphetamine. We disagree.

a. Additional Facts

¶ 63 The prosecutor asked Gomez how much methamphetamine a

typical user consumes in a day. Gomez testified that a typical user

30 “won’t use more than [one] to [four] grams. . . . No more than [four].

On average, probably [one] to [two] grams.” Regarding the amount

of methamphetamine found, the prosecutor asked Gomez whether

the amount was “personal use, or is that more distribution-level

methamphetamine?” Gomez responded, “Distribution-level

methamphetamine.” When asked why, Gomez said,

Well, there’s [ten] pounds of — a little over [ten] pounds there. If it was a user amount and he did, let’s just say, [four] grams, just to make the math easy, [four] times [seven] is [twenty-eight] grams. [Twenty-eight] times, you know — there’s [sixteen] ounces. Well, [twenty-eight] grams is an ounce, and there’s [sixteen] ounces in a pound, so that’s [sixteen] weeks’ worth of usage for somebody who was using [four] grams. We’re just throwing that number out there. So he’s got 16 weeks with a — per pound, and it’s 10 pounds in there, so 160 weeks. So he can, or whoever — it’s over three years’ worth of non-stop doing [methamphetamine] every day for over three years.

Gomez testified that it was uncommon for a methamphetamine user

to have ten pounds of the drug. Defense counsel didn’t object

during this questioning.

¶ 64 On cross-examination, defense counsel had the following

exchange with Gomez:

31 [Defense counsel]: [Y]ou indicated in your report that large quantities can be consistent with distribution?

[Gomez]: Yes.

[Defense counsel]: But also that small quantities can be consistent with distribution?

....

[Defense counsel]: You also indicated that as to the quantity of methamphetamine found in this case, typically your typical user wouldn’t carry it around with them due to the value?

[Defense counsel]: Okay. And you have noted in your report that the quantities found could also, in addition, be consistent with potential personal use?

[Gomez]: Small amounts, yeah, but not [ten] pounds.

¶ 65 Gomez also said, “I don’t see somebody buying [ten] pounds of

methamphetamine for personal use.” Gomez again testified on

redirect that ten pounds is typically for distribution or selling to

others. Again, defense counsel didn’t object.

32 b. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 66 As mentioned, we review a trial court’s admission of expert

testimony for abuse of discretion. People in Interest of J.R., 2021

COA 81, ¶ 16. “An expert may . . . offer testimony that embraces an

ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Rector, 248 P.3d at

1203. In determining whether an expert’s testimony usurped the

jury’s role, we consider various factors including, but not limited to,

whether (1) the testimony was clarified on cross-examination; (2) the expert’s testimony expressed an opinion of the applicable law or legal standards and thereby usurped the function of the court; (3) the jury was properly instructed on the law and that it could accept or reject the expert’s opinion; and (4) the expert opined that the defendant had committed the crime or that there was a particular likelihood that the defendant did so.

People v. Baker, 2021 CO 29, ¶ 32.

¶ 67 Gomez’s testimony didn’t usurp the jury’s role. Although

Gomez testified that the amount of methamphetamine found in the

office was consistent with distribution, he didn’t testify that

Schendorf intended to distribute methamphetamine. See Atencio,

140 P.3d at 76 (sergeant’s opinion “that four ounces of a controlled

33 substance was an amount consistent with distribution, rather than

with personal use” didn’t invade the jury’s province because the

sergeant didn’t testify that the defendant possessed the intent to

distribute). Also, Gomez didn’t express an opinion on the applicable

law or legal standards. He didn’t testify that Schendorf was guilty

or had committed any crimes, nor did he opine on elements

necessary for a conviction. Finally, the court instructed the jury

that it could accept or reject any witness testimony and that the

weight to give to expert testimony was entirely its decision.

3. Thwaits’s Testimony on Controlled Substances

¶ 68 Schendorf contends that the trial court erred by admitting

Thwaits’s testimony because he provided expert testimony but

wasn’t endorsed as an expert.

¶ 69 Thwaits assisted with the search warrant’s execution and

searched the office. He testified that he found “several baggies and

scales on top of the desk, some bags with white shards which I

know to be, in my professional opinion, to be —” Defense counsel

then objected on grounds of foundation and improper testimony

34 under CRE 702. The court sustained the objection and told the

prosecutor to lay foundation.

¶ 70 During his testimony, Thwaits identified multiple substances

as narcotics based on his training and experience. Thwaits testified

that he is often assigned to cases involving controlled substances

and identifies controlled substances as part of those investigations.

Defense counsel objected to each identification, and the court told

the prosecutor to lay foundation.

¶ 71 The court ultimately overruled defense counsel’s objections,

finding that the prosecutor had laid adequate foundation and the

questions were appropriate under the case law and rules.

¶ 72 Later, defense counsel renewed her objection, arguing that

Thwaits’s testimony was based on his training and experience but

that he hadn’t been endorsed as an expert. In response, the court

found,

Regarding the expertise, I agree, I think under Atencio and Venalonzo[ v. People, 2017 CO 9], this detective has provided expert testimony here. Clearly, recognizing methamphetamine or any other controlled substance provides some – would require some level of expertise beyond what we would expect from a layperson. That said, I can’t find that there’s prejudice here, that the charges articulate that

35 methamphetamine is an issue, controlled substances are an issue. It was brought up during opening statements. So the fact that he wasn’t endorsed I can’t find is — that the defense was somehow caught off guard that this was methamphetamine. The only thing I will say, though, is that the People better get a chemist in here who is going to testify that that’s what that is.

b. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 73 We review a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 122 (Colo. 2002).

Whether the trial court abused its discretion here turns on whether

the testimony of the officer was improper lay testimony. Id.

¶ 74 Because CRE 701 prohibits lay testimony based on specialized

knowledge, “a police officer’s testimony must be based on

experience common to ordinary citizens, not experience unique to

the witness’s role as a police officer.” Douglas, ¶ 38. Where an

officer’s testimony is based on his specialized training or education,

and not only his perceptions, the officer must be qualified as an

expert to offer what amounts to expert testimony. Stewart, 55 P.3d

at 124.

¶ 75 We review preserved claims of error under the harmless error

standard. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12. Reversal is required

36 under that standard only where the error “substantially influenced

the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings.” Id.

(quoting Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo. 1986)).

¶ 76 The trial court found — and we agree — that Thwaits offered

expert testimony. The basis for Thwaits’s testimony was his

experience, and he could not have identified the substances without

that specialized experience and training as an officer. See

Venalonzo, ¶ 22 (“[I]t is the nature of the experiences that could

form the opinion’s basis that determines whether the testimony is

lay or expert opinion.”). Instead of prohibiting Thwaits’s testimony,

however, the court abused its discretion by permitting expert

testimony under the guise of lay witness testimony.

¶ 77 But the court’s error was harmless because it didn’t

substantially influence the verdict or the fairness of the trial

proceedings, for a few reasons.

¶ 78 First, Thwaits’s testimony concerning the substances found in

the office was consistent with testimony by Gomez, who was

properly endorsed as an expert and testified that the white

substance appeared to be methamphetamine. See People v. Quillen,

37 2023 COA 22M, ¶ 24 (admitting portions of a letter was harmless

because evidence was cumulative of a detective’s proper testimony

about the same information).

¶ 79 Second, Collins testified that the substances collected from the

office tested positive for methamphetamine, fentanyl, and MDA.

¶ 80 Third, defense counsel couldn’t have been surprised by

Thwaits’s testimony that the collected substance was likely

methamphetamine because the charging documents allege that

Schendorf “knowingly possessed with intent to sell or distribute

[m]ethamphetamine” and that the prosecution would offer

testimony to prove that charge.

4. Moretti’s Testimony on Search Warrant Execution

¶ 81 Schendorf contends that Moretti’s testimony explaining the

SWAT team’s role in executing search warrants was improper

because (1) it was irrelevant to whether Schendorf knowingly

possessed and intended to distribute a controlled substance; (2) it

referenced a screening process; and (3) it was more prejudicial than

probative since it suggested that Schendorf was a known criminal

to police. We disagree.

38 a. Additional Facts

¶ 82 Moretti — a member of the SWAT team — described the

process for executing a search warrant:

We get contacted by the jurisdiction of investigators/detectives that would like to serve the warrant. We run it through a SWAT matrix is what we refer to it as, see if it is high risk. If they request a warrant based on the risk level, then we will serve it. Before we serve a warrant, we’ll scout a location, and then we’ll have a tactical briefing as well as an investigation briefing.

Moretti testified that, after the SWAT team arrives at the property to

be searched, officers give the occupants “loud verbal commands

and announcements,” and if the occupants ignore those commands,

the SWAT team will “breach the door with a large metal ram.”

Schendorf’s counsel didn’t object to Moretti’s testimony.

¶ 83 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.” CRE 401. “[I]n some circumstances, police officers

may testify about the reasons they took certain investigative steps,

39 even where this testimony touches upon prohibited subjects.”

People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶ 32.

¶ 84 Because Schendorf’s attorney didn’t object to Moretti’s

testimony, any error was unpreserved, and we review for plain

error. See People v. Van Meter, 2018 COA 13, ¶ 26. “Plain error is

[error that is] obvious and substantial,” Hagos, ¶ 14, and that “so

undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast

serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction,”

Thompson v. People, 2020 CO 72, ¶ 54. An error is obvious if it

contravened well-settled legal principles, clear statutory commands,

or Colorado case law. Id. The error must be one that a judge

should be able to avoid without an objection. People v. Ujaama,

2012 COA 36, ¶ 42.

¶ 85 Schendorf first argues Moretti’s testimony shouldn’t have been

admitted because it was irrelevant to the charges. We are

unpersuaded. Moretti’s testimony related to the investigation and

the warrant’s execution, which provided information about who

breached the locked room before it was searched, how many

individuals were in the building, and other investigative decisions.

40 While this testimony may have suggested the SWAT team was

requested by detectives, the probative nature of the above

information was not outweighed by the danger of any unfair

prejudice.

¶ 86 Next, Schendorf argues that Moretti’s reference to a “SWAT

matrix” was improper because it referenced a “screening process”

that hinted at Schendorf’s guilt or implied that he was a criminal.

In support, Schendorf cites People v. Mendenhall, 2015 COA 107M,

¶ 62. In Mendenhall, an investigative officer testified why, based on

his experience with how many potential cases he received annually

and how many cases resulted in criminal charges, he decided to

recommend charges against the defendant. Id. The court

determined that the statement improperly implied that the

defendant was guilty because the prosecution thought it was

“appropriate” to bring criminal charges in his case but not others.

Id. at ¶ 63. But Moretti’s statement about a SWAT matrix was

unlike the investigative officer’s statement in Mendenhall. Moretti

didn’t discuss a process to bring criminal charges, nor did he

discuss what made the warrant “high risk” or imply that Schendorf

was known to police. Because Moretti’s statement about a SWAT

41 matrix didn’t imply that there was additional evidence supporting

Schendorf’s guilt, there was no error in admitting his testimony.

¶ 87 Even if the testimony had been improper, its admission didn’t

amount to plain error because any error was not obvious and didn’t

undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial. Moretti’s

statements did not discuss the process leading to Schendorf’s

charge or the decision to charge Schendorf. Moretti simply

described the process of executing a warrant and that process as

applied to the apartment. See People v. Walker, 2022 COA 15, ¶ 36

(finding no plain error where the comment didn’t mention a

screening process). Additionally, Moretti’s reference to the SWAT

matrix was in a brief portion of his testimony, and the matrix wasn’t

mentioned again during trial or closing.

D. Cumulative Error

¶ 88 Schendorf contends that a new trial is required because

numerous errors in the aggregate deprived him of a fair trial. “For

reversal to occur based on cumulative error, a reviewing court must

identify multiple errors that collectively prejudice the substantial

rights of the defendant, even if any single error does not.” Howard-

Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25. The cumulative error doctrine

42 thus requires that multiple errors occurred. People v. Daley, 2021

COA 85, ¶ 141. Because we haven’t identified multiple errors, the

cumulative error doctrine doesn’t apply.

III. Disposition

¶ 89 We affirm.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.