24CA0010 Peo v Salinas 12-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0010 Adams County District Court No. 21CR1929 Honorable Jeffrey Smith, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Randolph Christopher Salinas,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Welling and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 31, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Mulligan Breit LLC, Patrick J. Mulligan, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Randolph Christopher Salinas, appeals the
judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty
of sex assault on a child, sex assault on a child — pattern of abuse,
sex assault on a child — position of trust, and indecent exposure.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 A jury could have reasonably found the following facts from
the evidence introduced at trial.
¶3 Salinas and B.M. were in a romantic relationship for
approximately four years, living together for three of those years.
Both had children from prior relationships. One of B.M.’s
children — her daughter and the victim in this case, A.G. — was
between ten and fourteen to fifteen years old during B.M. and
Salinas’s relationship. B.M. and Salinas also had a son together.
¶4 Due to B.M.’s work schedule, Salinas often supervised A.G.
and dropped her off at school. Over time, Salinas engaged in a
series of increasingly sexual behaviors with A.G., including but not
limited to,
sending A.G. a picture of his penis, claiming it was an
accident and asking her to not tell her mother;
1 walking around the home naked or in his underwear,
sometimes with his penis erect;
driving A.G. to sex shops and offering to buy her
underwear and a vibrator;
masturbating in front of A.G. — at times while watching
pornography on his phone — although A.G. never saw
him ejaculate;
placing A.G.’s hand on his erect penis and telling her to
roll a condom onto it, saying these are things she “need[s]
to know” so she is “prepared in the future”; and
pulling A.G.’s underwear down and touching her vagina
and clitoris with a vibrator.
¶5 In January 2021, A.G. disclosed Salinas’s abuse to her
mother, B.M., who immediately took her to a police station. A
forensic interviewer, Linda Mikow, later spoke with A.G. about
Salinas’s conduct.
¶6 As relevant to this appeal, A.G., B.M., Mikow, and three law
enforcement officers testified for the prosecution at trial. The
prosecution also called a generalized expert, Beth Peters, to testify
2 about sexual abuse dynamics, including the concept of “grooming”
victims.1
¶7 For his part, Salinas denied the allegations. He asserted that
B.M. manipulated A.G. into fabricating the allegations to deprive
Salinas from seeing his son.
¶8 The jury found Salinas guilty on all counts.
¶9 On appeal, Salinas contends that the district court erred by
admitting (1) improper “vouching” testimony by three witnesses;
(2) a witness’s testimony regarding prior inconsistent statements by
B.M. for the limited purpose of impeachment; and (3) irrelevant and
highly prejudicial testimony from multiple witnesses. Salinas also
contends that the cumulative effect of these errors requires
reversal. We address and reject each contention in turn.
II. Vouching
¶ 10 We first address Salinas’s contention that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting improper vouching testimony
from three prosecution witnesses: the generalized expert, Peters; the
1 A generalized expert aims to educate the jury about general
concepts or principles without discussing the particular facts of the case. People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69, ¶ 1.
3 forensic interviewer, Mikow; and Detective Michael Griffith. We also
address Salinas’s related arguments that apply to Peters only.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 11 We review a district court’s decision on the admissibility of
evidence for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57,
¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on an erroneous
understanding or application of the law. People v. Scott, 2021 COA
71, ¶ 23.
¶ 12 Except for Salinas’s challenge to the detective’s testimony,
Salinas’s vouching-related contentions are unpreserved. We review
preserved trial errors for nonconstitutional harmless error. Hagos
v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12. Under this standard, we reverse only
if a reasonable probability exists that the court’s error contributed
to the defendant’s conviction. People v. Roman, 2017 CO 70, ¶ 13.
By contrast, we review Salinas’s unpreserved contentions for plain
error. See Hagos, ¶ 14. Plain error is error that is both obvious
and substantial. People v. Burdette, 2024 COA 38, ¶ 32. We need
not decide whether the trial court actually erred if it’s clear that the
4 alleged error wasn’t obvious. People v. Vigil, 251 P.3d 442, 447
(Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 13 A witness, including an expert witness, may not testify that
another witness was telling the truth on a particular occasion. See
Venalonzo v. People, 2017 CO 9, ¶ 32. Such testimony improperly
invades the province of the fact finder. Id. This issue often arises
in child sex assault cases when the case’s outcome turns on the
victim’s credibility. Id. at ¶ 33. Although expert testimony in such
cases isn’t permitted to bolster the child victim’s credibility, an
expert may respond to hypothetical questions involving the facts of
the case at hand. See People v. Mintz, 165 P.3d 829, 831 (Colo.
App. 2007). An expert witness may also testify regarding the range
of typical demeanors and behavioral traits displayed by a sexually
abused child; such testimony assists the jury in understanding the
victim’s behavior after the incident. People v. Short, 2018 COA 47,
¶ 13.
¶ 14 When a party opens the door to otherwise inadmissible
evidence, their opponent may then inquire into the previously
barred matter. Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Colo. 2008).
“The concept of ‘opening the door’ represents an effort by courts to
5 prevent one party in a criminal trial from gaining and maintaining
an unfair advantage by the selective presentation of facts that,
without being elaborated or placed in context, create an incorrect or
misleading impression.” People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191, 195 (Colo.
1996).
B. Generalized Expert: Beth Peters
¶ 15 Turning first to Salinas’s contention that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting Peters’s expert testimony, we
perceive no basis to reverse.
¶ 16 Without objection by Salinas, the district court recognized
Peters as an expert in the “dynamics and impact of sexually abused
children.” Peters emphasized at the beginning of her testimony
that, as a generalized expert, she had no knowledge of the case’s
specific facts, hadn’t spoken to anyone involved in the case, and
had no opinion on A.G.’s credibility.
¶ 17 In responding to the prosecutor’s questions, Peters testified
that certain hypothetical behaviors by perpetrators are consistent
with the concept of “grooming” child victims. Peters explained, for
example, that grooming can include (1) texting a victim a lewd
photograph; (2) walking around naked when the victim is home;
6 (3) driving a victim alone to a sex shop; and (4) masturbating in
front of a victim, even without ejaculating.
¶ 18 According to Salinas, this testimony amounted to improper
vouching because it “endorsed” A.G.’s specific allegations. But the
prosecutor didn’t tie the posed hypotheticals to A.G.’s specific
allegations. Moreover, Peters, as a generalized expert, repeatedly
disclaimed offering any opinion on the credibility of A.G.’s
allegations. Indeed, Peters’s testimony that Salinas challenges
zeroed in on behaviors typically associated with child sex assault
assailants, not victims. And although some of the prosecutor’s
hypotheticals mirrored certain allegations against Salinas, we
certainly can’t say that permitting Peters to respond to such
hypothetical questions constituted obvious error. See Mintz, 165
P.3d at 831; see also Short, ¶¶ 10, 15 (trial court properly admitted
therapist’s answers to hypothetical questions based on the
circumstances of the case, in part because the testimony didn’t
focus on the child’s truthfulness); People v. Morrison, 985 P.2d 1, 5-
6 (Colo. App. 1999) (similar); cf. Short, ¶¶ 87-89 (Welling, J.,
specially concurring) (declining to find obvious error in a
prosecutor’s use of closely tailored hypotheticals because “not only
7 was there no settled authority indicating that such hypotheticals
were improper, the limited authority supports a contrary
conclusion”).
¶ 19 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by Salinas’s reliance on People
v. Cernazanu, 2015 COA 122. In Cernazanu, the victim’s mother
testified that the victim didn’t “engage in her typical ‘lying’ behavior”
when she disclosed the defendant’s sexual assaults. Id. at ¶ 16.
The division concluded that the mother’s testimony “necessarily
implied” that the victim “was telling the truth on that occasion.” Id.
In this case, however, Peters’s testimony didn’t touch on A.G.’s
characteristics at all, let alone her truthfulness on a specific
occasion. To the contrary, Peters explained that, as a generalized
expert, she had no ability to opine on A.G.’s credibility.
¶ 20 Although placed within the “vouching” section of his opening
brief, Salinas raises other challenges to Peters’s testimony that
aren’t directly tied to vouching. Salinas argues, for example, that
Peters usurped the court’s and the jury’s roles by testifying that
“penetration is not the definition of sexual abuse” and “[i]t’s not
required.” But Peters’s statement wasn’t expressed as an opinion of
the applicable law or legal standards; instead, it arose in the
8 context of her discussion about grooming. See People v. Baker,
2021 CO 29, ¶ 32 (setting forth factors that courts should consider
in determining whether opinion testimony is admissible under CRE
704). Moreover, the district court correctly instructed the jury
(1) on the applicable law and (2) that it could accept or reject an
expert’s opinions. See id. And, consistent with her role as a
generalized expert, Peters didn’t opine that Salinas had committed
the charged offenses, nor did she suggest a “particular likelihood”
that he had done so. Id.
¶ 21 Finally, we aren’t convinced by Salinas’s argument that the
district court erred by failing to make specific findings on the
reliability, relevance, and usefulness of Peters’s expert testimony.
Salinas didn’t object to Peters’s expert testimony under CRE 702 or
People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001), so the lack of findings
didn’t necessarily render her expert testimony inadmissible. See
People v. Martinez, 2024 CO 69, ¶ 36; see also Ruibal v. People,
2018 CO 93, ¶ 13 (explaining that, “where a proper challenge has
been raised, a trial court ‘is required to issue specific findings’ as to
relevance and reliability under CRE 702” (emphasis added) (quoting
People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Colo. 2011))); People in
9 Interest of A.F., 2025 COA 76, ¶ 13 n.2 (“When no party objects to
the expert testimony, a lack of findings does not necessarily render
it inadmissible.” (citing Martinez, ¶ 36)); cf. People v. Yachik, 2020
COA 100, ¶¶ 49, 54 (concluding the trial court erred by failing to
make required findings on the admissibility of the prosecution
expert’s testimony where the defense “raised objections pretrial”
and “maintained a continuing objection” during trial).
¶ 22 Even if findings had been required absent an objection, we
discern no substantial error that requires reversal. See Burdette,
¶ 32. Colorado courts have previously recognized that generalized
expert testimony is admissible to provide the jury with background
information on patterns of child sexual abuse and associated
behaviors by victims and offenders. See, e.g., People v. Conyac,
2014 COA 8M, ¶ 30; cf. Kutzly v. People, 2019 CO 55, ¶ 11 (no
Shreck hearing is required “if Colorado has already properly
accepted the basis of the expert’s testimony”).
C. Forensic Interviewer: Linda Mikow
¶ 23 We reach the same conclusion with respect to Mikow, the
forensic interviewer who spoke to A.G. during a recorded interview.
10 ¶ 24 The district court recognized Mikow as an expert in forensic
interviewing without objection by Salinas. During cross-
examination, defense counsel asked Mikow about A.G.’s omission
from her interview of certain details regarding Salinas’s alleged
abuse, including A.G.’s failure to mention whether Salinas
ejaculated when masturbating in front of her. The prosecutor
followed up on redirect by asking Mikow whether children who have
experienced “this kind of trauma” frequently omit details. Mikow
answered, “Yes.” The prosecutor then asked whether A.G.’s
omission was “consistent with” other cases that Mikow had
encountered. Mikow replied, “Yeah. [A.G.] said that things were
blurry for her.” Defense counsel didn’t object.
¶ 25 Similar to our conclusion regarding Peters’s testimony, we
detect no obvious improper vouching in Mikow’s testimony.
Mikow’s testimony helped the jury understand “typical demeanor
and behavioral traits” of sexually abused child victims, including
how they sometimes omit details or delay reporting their abuse.
People v. Relaford, 2016 COA 99, ¶ 28 (quoting Mintz, 165 P.3d at
831). In addition, Mikow was permitted to explain whether A.G.’s
11 behavior was “consistent with” child victims’ typical behavior.
People v. Glasser, 293 P.3d 68, 78 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 26 Salinas relies on People v. Marx, 2019 COA 138, ¶¶ 16-19, to
argue that Mikow’s testimony served no purpose other than
bolstering A.G.’s credibility. We conclude Marx is distinguishable.
In that case, an expert in sexual assault victim behavior testified
that only two to six percent of sexual assaults reported by children
and teenagers involve false allegations. Id. at ¶ 17. A division of
this court concluded that the expert’s testimony served no purpose
other than to influence the jury’s determination of the accuser’s
credibility. Id. at ¶ 19. By contrast, Mikow’s expert testimony
provided insight into why child victims sometimes fail to recall
specific details of their abuse — “puzzling aspects” of a child
victim’s behavior that the jury might not otherwise bring to its
evaluation. People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371, 383 (Colo. App. 2007)
(quoting People v. Aldrich, 849 P.2d 821, 829 (Colo. App. 1992)).
Such testimony is often “helpful and appropriate” in cases involving
sexual abuse of children. Short, ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Myers, 359
N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984)).
12 ¶ 27 Moreover, even if Mikow’s testimony on redirect crept close to
improper vouching, we conclude defense counsel opened the door
by asking her about A.G. omitting whether Salinas ejaculated when
masturbating. The prosecutor’s questions on redirect — including
asking whether A.G.’s level of detail was “consistent with” other
child victims — were fair game given defense counsel’s questioning.
See Murphy, 919 P.2d at 195.
D. Detective Griffith
¶ 28 Salinas next argues that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting Detective Griffith’s testimony that A.G.
“appeared to be credible” during her forensic interview. But the
court sustained Salinas’s objection to this testimony and instructed
the jury to disregard the detective’s statement. In the written jury
instructions, the court again directed the jury, “If I told you not to
consider a particular statement that was made during the trial, you
must not consider it in your deliberations.” Salinas didn’t seek
further relief.
¶ 29 On appeal, Salinas doesn’t point to anything in the record
suggesting that the jury disregarded the court’s curative
instructions. Under these circumstances, we presume that the jury
13 understood and followed the court’s instructions. See People v.
Snider, 2021 COA 19, ¶ 31; see also People v. Alemayehu, 2021
COA 69, ¶ 101 (declining to consider a contention of error where the
trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection and counsel didn’t
request any additional relief).
¶ 30 Accordingly, we reject Salinas’s argument that the district
court reversibly erred by admitting improper vouching testimony
from Peters, Mikow, and Griffith.
III. Prior Inconsistent Statements
¶ 31 Salinas contends that the district court erred by instructing
the jury that it could consider certain testimony by Salinas’s mother
regarding B.M.’s prior inconsistent statements only for the limited
purpose of impeachment. We conclude that any error in the court’s
instructions was harmless.
A. Additional Background
¶ 32 B.M. acknowledged during defense counsel’s cross-
examination that she had likely made prior disparaging comments
about Salinas, including calling him a “broke ass father” and
threatening to withhold visitation of their son until Salinas paid
child support. But B.M. denied saying that she was “going to
14 destroy” Salinas or “going to get [him] with [her] daughter.” The
court released B.M. from her subpoena after her testimony without
objection by Salinas.
¶ 33 The defense later called Salinas’s mother, T.S., to rebut B.M.’s
denial. T.S. testified that she overheard a phone call between B.M.
and Salinas in May 2020, during which B.M. used “very abusive”
language. When T.S. began to relay what B.M. had allegedly said,
the prosecution objected based on hearsay. At a bench conference,
defense counsel argued that T.S.’s testimony was admissible both
for impeachment purposes and for its truth as a prior inconsistent
statement. The court sustained the prosecution’s objection in part,
ruling that it would admit T.S.’s testimony for the limited purpose of
impeachment. T.S. then testified that B.M. told Salinas on the
phone that she “was going to destroy him using her daughter.” The
court instructed the jury that it could consider T.S.’s last answer for
the limited purpose of assessing B.M.’s credibility.
¶ 34 During defense counsel’s redirect, T.S. testified that B.M.
repeated her threats in a second phone call to Salinas in November
2020. At the prosecution’s request, the court again instructed the
15 jury that it could consider T.S.’s answer for the limited purpose of
assessing B.M.’s credibility.
B. Standard of Review and Statutory Framework
¶ 35 As before, we review the district court’s decisions on the
admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Davis, ¶ 13.
Because Salinas preserved his argument before the district court,
we review his contention for nonconstitutional harmless error. See
Hagos, ¶ 12.
¶ 36 Section 16-10-201, C.R.S. 2025, governs the use of prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence in criminal trials.
People v. Salas, 2017 COA 63, ¶ 33. Under the statute, competent
evidence regarding a witness’s prior inconsistent statement may be
admissible as substantive evidence that establishes a fact, not just
for impeachment purposes, provided two conditions are met:
“(a) [t]he witness, while testifying, was given an opportunity to
explain or deny the statement or the witness is still available to give
further testimony in the trial; and (b) [t]he previous inconsistent
statement purports to relate to a matter within the witness’s own
knowledge.” § 16-10-201(1); see also Salas, ¶ 33 (noting that
section 16-10-201 “relaxes” CRE 613’s foundational requirements
16 for impeachment by prior inconsistent statements “in some
respects,” but that the rule and the statute don’t conflict).
C. Analysis
¶ 37 Salinas argues that the district court should have admitted
T.S.’s testimony about B.M.’s prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence and not merely for impeachment purposes.
The People counter that defense counsel failed to give B.M. an
adequate “opportunity to explain or deny” her prior statements and
that she was no longer available after her testimony.
§ 16-10-201(1)(a). Analogizing to CRE 613, the People assert that
defense counsel identified B.M.’s alleged prior statements — that
B.M. would “destroy” Salinas and “get [him] with [her] daughter” —
but neglected to call B.M.’s attention to the particular time and
occasion when she made those statements. See CRE 613.
¶ 38 We need not decide whether defense counsel provided B.M.
with an adequate opportunity to explain or deny her prior
statements because, even if he did, any error in the court’s limiting
instructions was harmless. See People v. Kern, 2020 COA 96, ¶¶ 7,
18. B.M.’s prior inconsistent statements bore on her credibility —
the very purpose for which the court admitted T.S.’s testimony.
17 Salinas acknowledges as much in his opening brief, saying that
T.S.’s testimony was “critical” to show B.M.’s “motive and bias” as
the victim’s mother. See Margerum v. People, 2019 CO 100, ¶ 10
(explaining that unearthing a witness’s “bias or an ulterior motive”
are methods of attacking the witness’s credibility).
¶ 39 Moreover, even putting aside T.S.’s testimony, Salinas still
managed to raise a serious question about B.M.’s credibility. See
People v. Komar, 2015 COA 171M, ¶ 57. In response to defense
counsel’s questioning, B.M. admitted, among other things, that
(1) her relationship with Salinas was “consistently rocky”; (2) the
two argued “a lot” over infidelity and money; (3) she had made prior
allegations of domestic violence against Salinas that a jury
disbelieved, resulting in Salinas’s acquittal; and (4) she threatened
to withhold visits with Salinas’s son if he didn’t pay child support.
Armed with this testimony, defense counsel argued in closing that
B.M. had a motive to fabricate allegations against Salinas and knew
how to use the court system to her advantage. Against this
backdrop, we perceive no reasonable probability that any error in
the court’s limiting instructions contributed to Salinas’s conviction.
See Roman, ¶ 13.
18 ¶ 40 United States v. McGirt, 71 F.4th 755 (10th Cir. 2023), relied
on by Salinas, doesn’t require a different conclusion. For one,
McGirt isn’t binding on us. See Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1255
(Colo. 1999), aff’d sub nom., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
For another, its facts are distinguishable. In McGirt, the trial court
instructed the jury that it could consider prior inconsistent
statements from three government witnesses, including the child
victim, solely for impeachment. 71 F.4th at 758. But unlike this
case, the witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements included the
circumstances of the defendant’s actual alleged sexual abuse. See
id. at 761-67. In reversing the defendant’s conviction, the Tenth
Circuit explained that the trial court’s erroneous limiting
instruction wasn’t harmless because the defendant had attempted
to use the witnesses’ prior statements as substantive evidence to
create an “alternate narrative” of the alleged events. Id. at 769. The
witnesses’ prior statements established, among other things, that
the defendant lacked the opportunity to sexually abuse the victim.
Id.
¶ 41 Here, however, B.M.’s prior inconsistent statements were
limited to her hostile arguments with Salinas. They bore primarily,
19 if not solely, on B.M.’s credibility. Such arguments, even if believed
by the jury over B.M.’s denials, didn’t establish an “alternate
version of events.” Id. at 770.
¶ 42 Accordingly, we conclude that any error in the district court’s
limiting instructions was harmless.
IV. Irrelevant and Highly Prejudicial Evidence
¶ 43 Salinas contends that the district court abused its discretion
by admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony from
multiple witnesses. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and General Principles
¶ 44 Once again, we review the district court’s decisions on the
admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Davis, ¶ 13.
Except for his challenge to Detective Griffith’s testimony, Salinas
didn’t preserve his challenges by objecting to the witnesses’
testimony at trial, thus limiting our review to plain error. See
Hagos, ¶ 14.
¶ 45 Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” CRE 401. All relevant evidence is generally
20 admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. CRE 402-403; People v. Salas, 902
P.2d 398, 401 (Colo. App. 1994).
B. B.M.
¶ 46 Salinas challenges three portions of B.M.’s testimony as
irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
¶ 47 First, Salinas says that B.M. improperly relayed her prior
allegations of domestic violence against Salinas. But B.M. also
explained that a jury acquitted Salinas of those charges. Moreover,
defense counsel first raised B.M.’s prior domestic violence
allegations in opening statements, using the jury’s acquittal to cast
doubt on B.M.’s credibility. Salinas therefore opened the door to
the prosecution’s later questions about B.M.’s prior allegations. See
People v. Davis, 312 P.3d 193, 196 (Colo. App. 2010) (a party who
raises a subject in opening statement opens the door for the
opposing party to admit evidence on the same subject), aff’d, 2013
CO 57.
¶ 48 Second, Salinas complains that B.M. told the jury that she
“put [A.G.] in therapy” after A.G. disclosed Salinas’s offenses. We
can’t say that the district court erred, let alone plainly erred, by
21 admitting this testimony. Evidence that A.G. attended therapy after
disclosing the alleged sexual assaults tended to corroborate that
she “suffered a traumatic event, which relates directly to whether
the events she described even occurred.” People v. Mena, 2025 COA
14, ¶ 21.
¶ 49 Third, Salinas challenges B.M.’s testimony on redirect
(1) stating that Child Protective Services issued an “emergency”
protection order that prevented Salinas from contacting B.M.’s
children and (2) describing Salinas as “[o]versexual.” But again,
defense counsel opened the door to these subjects. See Murphy,
919 P.2d at 195. Defense counsel asked B.M. during cross-
examination about B.M.’s prior domestic violence allegations and
the resulting protection order that prevented Salinas from
contacting his son.2 Defense counsel also asked B.M. about her
and Salinas’s sex life, which she described as “robust,” and about
instances when Salinas sent B.M. videos of him masturbating.
Based on this line of questioning on cross-examination, we discern
2 Salinas takes issue with B.M.’s description of the protection order
as an “emergency” order. But he doesn’t develop this argument, so we decline to address it. See People v. Liggett, 2021 COA 51, ¶ 53, aff’d, 2023 CO 22.
22 no error, plain or otherwise, in the court’s admission of B.M.’s
testimony on redirect. See id.
C. Peters
¶ 50 Peters, the generalized expert, testified that (1) a child victim
might not remember the details of their sexual assault due to
“disassociation processing” and (2) grooming behaviors can include
building likability by providing the child with money or alcohol.
Departing from his prior argument that Peters’s hypotheticals were
too tailored to A.G.’s specific allegations, Salinas now argues that
these portions of Peters’s testimony improperly inflamed the
passions of the jury because they bore no relationship to the
allegations against him.
¶ 51 Salinas’s argument ignores, however, Peters’s role as a
generalized expert. Because generalized expert testimony seeks to
inform the jury about generic concepts or principles without
knowledge of the specific facts, parts of the testimony will inevitably
not be connected to the case. People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69, ¶ 53.
“If the generalized expert testimony’s logical connection to the
factual issues is sufficient to be helpful to the jury without running
23 afoul of CRE 403, the testimony fits the case.” Id. at ¶ 5. The
required fit is necessarily flexible. Id. at ¶ 53.
¶ 52 We conclude Peters’s testimony satisfied this standard.
Mikow, the forensic interviewer, testified that A.G. couldn’t recall
some of the details of Salinas’s sexual assaults. Peters later
explained that a child’s lack of memory may result from
“disassociation processing,” during which the victim may “take
[their] consciousness somewhere else” as a survival method during
a threatening event. The prosecution therefore established a
sufficiently logical connection between Peters’s testimony about
disassociation processing and the facts surrounding A.G.’s memory.
¶ 53 The same is true of Peters’s testimony about grooming
behaviors. The prosecution elicited evidence that Salinas groomed
A.G. in various ways, and Peters’s testimony sought to educate the
jury about the concept of grooming by discussing examples. Some
mirrored the prosecution’s allegations against Salinas. Others
didn’t. But again, a generalized expert’s testimony need not
perfectly fit the facts of the case in its entirety. Id. at ¶ 85 (“[T]here
will almost always be some testimony that has no logical relation to
the facts of the case.”). The prosecution’s evidence that Salinas
24 groomed A.G. sufficiently established the required logical
connection.
¶ 54 Salinas challenges two other portions of Peters’s testimony as
irrelevant and highly prejudicial. First, Salinas says that Peters
improperly compared him to renowned sex offender Larry Nassar, a
former Olympic team physician who sexually assaulted many
female gymnasts. In support, Salinas relies on Harris v. People, 888
P.2d 259, 265 (Colo. 1995), where the supreme court reversed a
defendant’s conviction because the prosecutor in closing argument
repeatedly compared the defendant to Saddam Hussein,
characterizing both as “thug[s]” and “bull[ies].”
¶ 55 But unlike the situation in Harris, neither the prosecution nor
Peters directly compared Salinas to Nassar. The reference to
Nassar occurred near the end of the prosecutor’s redirect
examination of Peters, unfolding as follows:
[Prosecutor:] What about masturbating in front of the child in odd places such as a car?
[Peters:] Location does not matter.
[Prosecutor:] Location does not matter[?]
[Peters:] It really doesn’t.
[Prosecutor:] Why not?
25 [Peters:] I’m thinking of a video I watched when I was teaching at the university. The video interviewed sex offenders in prison. And they discussed oftentimes manipulating the victim to the point of secrecy where they could molest them when other people were present. They talked about molesting a little girl in the backseat when her parents were driving.
[Prosecutor:] Would a famous example be Dr. Larry Nassar, the doctor who treated all the gymnastics children?
[Peters:] Yes. Even though there was a parent in the room, the parent is not considering that . . . kind of touch [to] be inappropriate or sexually abusive.
¶ 56 As is evident from the context above, Peters’s brief adopted
reference to Nassar was in the context of making the larger point
that location doesn’t necessarily matter when an abuser has
successfully built trust by grooming their victim. Peters explained
that, in the case of Nassar, a parent was often present when the
abuse occurred but didn’t consider Nassar’s actions “inappropriate
or sexually abusive.” Because Peters’s adoption of the prosecutor’s
reference to Nassar was in the context of providing additional
explanation about the concept of grooming and didn’t draw a direct
comparison between Nassar and Salinas — indeed, as a generalized
expert she had no knowledge of the specific accusations against
26 Salinas — we perceive no obvious error in the court’s failure to
intervene and strike the testimony. See People v. Ujaama, 2012
COA 36, ¶ 42 (“To qualify as plain error, the error must be one that
‘is so clear-cut, so obvious,’ a trial judge should be able to avoid it
without benefit of objection.” (citation omitted)).
¶ 57 To the extent Salinas argues that this portion of Peters’s
testimony lacked a sufficiently logical connection to the facts at
hand, we disagree. Salinas attacked the credibility of A.G.’s
accusations, in part, by characterizing some of the locations of the
alleged assaults as “absurd.” Defense counsel argued, for example,
that an adult man would never exit his townhome and walk to his
vehicle in a densely populated area “with his penis hanging out.”
Given these arguments by the defense, Peters’s testimony about
location not mattering bore a sufficiently logical connection to the
factual issues in Salinas’s case. See Cooper, ¶ 52.
¶ 58 Second, Salinas asserts that Peters improperly inflamed the
passions of the jury by mentioning her past “negative experiences”
with defense investigators. But Peters’s statement, fleeting as it
was, arose on redirect after defense counsel cross-examined her
about testifying only for the prosecution. When asked on redirect
27 whether she would be willing to speak with the defense, Peters
clarified that she prefers to share the “totality” of her testimony in
the courtroom — and also limits her conversations with
prosecutors — due to past negative experiences when her pretrial
statements were misrepresented. Because defense counsel opened
the door to Peters’s alleged bias by implying that she favored the
prosecution, we can’t say that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting Peters’s clarifying testimony on redirect.
D. Detective Neihart
¶ 59 Next, Salinas challenges four portions of Detective Matt
Neihart’s testimony. Some of his arguments go beyond relevance
and undue prejudice under CRE 402 and 403. He argues that
Detective Neihart
provided irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony by
saying that the court’s mandatory protection order
prevented Salinas from contacting anyone under the age
of eighteen;
28 violated Salinas’s right against self-incrimination by
describing Salinas’s testimony at an earlier court
hearing, despite Salinas choosing not to testify at trial;
improperly testified that Salinas’s earlier testimony —
without specifying what testimony — wasn’t “consistent
with” testimony by the prosecution’s witnesses at trial;
and
offered an improper expert opinion by saying that
Salinas’s explanation that pornography “would just kind
of pop up” on his cell phone wasn’t consistent with his
understanding of “how browsing on cell phones works.”
¶ 60 We reject these contentions as follows:
Salinas opened the door to Neihart’s testimony about the
mandatory protection order by asking B.M. earlier
whether the court issued a protection order when she
initiated “this report to the Westminster police.” See
Murphy, 919 P.2d at 195.
Absent a showing of involuntariness (which Salinas
doesn’t argue), a defendant’s former testimony is
generally admissible at a later trial without running afoul
29 of the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. See
People v. Arrington, 682 P.2d 490, 492-93 (Colo. App.
1983).
Salinas’s third challenge to Neihart’s testimony in the
opening brief lacks specificity and consists of just two
sentences. His reply brief doesn’t address the issue at
all. We therefore decline to address it. See People v.
Wallin, 167 P.3d 183, 187 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to
address arguments presented in a perfunctory or
conclusory manner).
The prosecution asked Neihart about his “everyday
understanding of how browsing on cell phones work[s].”
Because Neihart’s answer fell within an ordinary person’s
experience and knowledge, it didn’t constitute improper
expert testimony. See Venalonzo, ¶ 23.
E. Detective Griffith and Officer Daversa
¶ 61 Finally, Salinas challenges (1) Detective Griffith’s testimony
that A.G. “appeared to be credible” and (2) Officer Nicholas
Daversa’s testimony that he told B.M. not to allow Salinas to have
contact with their children.
30 ¶ 62 We have already rejected Salinas’s challenge to Detective
Griffith’s testimony because the court sustained the defense’s
contemporaneous objection and instructed the jury to disregard the
testimony. As to Officer Daversa’s testimony, Salinas’s entire
argument on this issue in his opening brief again consists of less
than two sentences, so we don’t address it. See Wallin, 167 P.3d at
187.
V. Cumulative Error
¶ 63 Salinas contends the cumulative effect of the district court’s
errors violated his right to due process and a fair trial. The
cumulative error doctrine requires reversal when “the cumulative
effect of [multiple] errors and defects substantially affected the
fairness of the trial proceedings and the integrity of the fact-finding
process.” Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 24 (alteration in
original) (quoting People v. Lucero, 615 P.2d 660, 666 (Colo. 1980)).
¶ 64 Here, we have presumed one error — the limiting instruction
discussed in Part III — but determined it was harmless. We have
also rejected two plain error challenges — the use of tailored
hypotheticals discussed in Part II.B and the reference to Nassar
discussed in Part IV — because even if the court erred, neither error
31 was obvious. Considering the combined effect of these presumed
errors under the rubric of cumulative error, we aren’t persuaded
that, taken together, they substantially prejudiced Salinas’s right to
a fair trial. See Conyac, ¶ 152; see also People v. Vialpando, 2022
CO 28, ¶¶ 40-46 (concluding five errors viewed in the aggregate
didn’t constitute cumulative error that deprived the defendant of a
fair trial).
¶ 65 Accordingly, the cumulative error doctrine doesn’t warrant
reversal.
VI. Disposition
¶ 66 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.