22CA0596 Peo v Redwine 04-09-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA0596 La Plata County District Court No. 17CR343 Honorable Jeffrey R. Wilson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Mark Allen Redwine,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Kuhn and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 9, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jason C. Middleton, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 A jury found Mark Allen Redwine guilty of second degree
murder and child abuse resulting in death for the murder of his
child. One hundred thirty-eight days after sentencing, the trial
court ordered $900 in restitution for the cost of the child’s burial
plot.
¶2 In this appeal, Redwine challenges the restitution order,
arguing that (1) the trial court and prosecution failed in their
statutory obligations at the time of sentencing regarding restitution;
(2) the court erred by finding that good cause existed to extend the
statutory ninety-one-day deadline to determine restitution; and
(3) the court erred by finding good cause to further continue the
restitution hearing based on the prosecution witness’s surgery.1
¶3 We discern no reversible error and therefore affirm the order.
I. The Restitution Statute and Weeks
¶4 Under Colorado’s restitution statute, every order of conviction
must include one of four types of restitution orders. § 18-1.3-
603(1), C.R.S. 2023. As relevant here, one of those options is an
order “that the defendant is obligated to pay restitution, but that
1 Redwine has separately appealed the judgment of conviction in
Colorado Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA1859.
1 the specific amount of restitution shall be determined within the
ninety-one days immediately following the order of conviction,
unless good cause is shown for extending the time period by which
the restitution amount shall be determined.” § 18-1.3-603(1)(b).
¶5 The statute also requires the prosecution to file information
supporting a specific amount of restitution “prior to the order of
conviction or within ninety-one days, if it is not available prior to
the order of conviction.” § 18-1.3-603(2)(a).
¶6 In People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75 (Weeks II)2, the supreme court
interpreted these provisions of the restitution statute as follows.
First, the prosecution must file its information supporting a specific
amount of restitution “before the judgment of conviction or, if it
isn’t yet available, within ninety-one days of the judgment of
conviction.” Id. at ¶ 31. Second, if the court proceeds under
section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), the judgment of conviction must include
an order that the defendant is obligated to pay restitution but that
2 We use the shorthand “Weeks II” because later in this opinion we
also cite the opinion from a division of this court that preceded the supreme court’s opinion in Weeks II, namely, People v. Weeks, 2020 COA 44, aff’d, 2021 CO 75, for which we will use the shorthand “Weeks I.”
2 the specific amount will be determined later. Weeks II, ¶ 4. And
third, if the court determines that an extension of its ninety-one-
day deadline to order an amount of restitution is warranted, it must
make an express finding of good cause, before the ninety-one-day
deadline expires, to extend the deadline. Id. at ¶ 5.
II. Background
A. The Sentencing Hearing and Mittimus
¶7 The sentencing hearing took place on October 8, 2021, one
month before the supreme court issued its opinion in Weeks II.
¶8 At the hearing, the prosecutor said that he did not have a
victim impact statement on file and requested that restitution
“remain open” for ninety-one days. Defense counsel objected,
arguing that a victim impact statement should have been completed
before sentencing. The court asked defense counsel when he
noticed the absence of a victim impact statement, and defense
counsel responded that he noticed the day before. The court then
found that both parties had been dilatory on the issue and said,
“[W]e’re gonna go forward.” Restitution was not discussed further
at the hearing. The court sentenced Redwine to forty-eight years in
the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC).
3 ¶9 On the same day, the court issued a mittimus that read, in
pertinent part, “DEF TO PAY ALL COSTS, FEES AND ANY
RESTITUTION, WHICH SHALL BE FILED WITHIN 45 DAYS.” So,
the court’s forty-five-day deadline for the prosecution to file its
motion for restitution and costs was November 22, 2021, and the
statutory ninety-one-day deadline for the court to order a specific
amount of restitution was January 7, 2022.
B. The Proceedings During the First Ninety-One Days After Sentencing
¶ 10 On November 29, 2021, one week after the expiration of the
court-imposed deadline, the prosecution filed a motion for the costs
of prosecution, detailing a multitude of expenses incurred during
the four-year history of the case totaling more than $100,000.
However, the motion did not include any request for restitution.
The next day, the prosecution filed an amended motion for its
prosecution costs but again did not mention restitution.
¶ 11 On December 13, 2021, the defense filed an “objection to
untimely filing,” arguing that the court “lack[ed] jurisdiction” to rule
on the motion because the prosecution filed it past the
court-imposed deadline of November 22, 2021.
4 ¶ 12 Then, on December 21, 2021 — seventy-four days after
sentencing — the prosecution amended its motion to include a
request for $900 in restitution for the cost of the victim’s burial
plot. It also filed a response to the defense’s objection, in which it
explained its reasons for not meeting the court’s forty-five-day
deadline:
The People have been in regular consultation with the victim’s family throughout the long history of this case, including on the issue of restitution, and neither have been dilatory nor negligent on the topic. Instead, the victims have contemplated carefully whether to seek restitution in this case, and for what categories, if at all. Their specific financial expenses due to the defendant’s criminal acts are beyond reasonable calculation; they are dispersed over a[] 9-year time period [since the murder] among many different potential categories, and would require the victim’s family to search through years of financial records to locate all of the pecuniary losses associated with this case. After deliberation, and for a host of reasons, the victim’s family has chosen to forgo most restitution, instead focusing on the most recent cost, securing a final resting place for the victim. Their decision, and the associated costs of the burial plot, were determined by the family recently, thus explaining the delay in the People’s $900 restitution request being filed on December 21, 2021.
5 The prosecution also argued that, despite its failure to request
restitution by the forty-five-day deadline, the court still had ample
time to order restitution within the statutory ninety-one-day
deadline for what was “a simple request, comprised of single
expense, documented with a valid receipt, for a clearly authorized
expense.”3
¶ 13 On December 28, 2021, the court set a hearing on the
prosecution’s motion for restitution and the costs of prosecution for
January 4, 2022 (three days before the expiration of the statutory
ninety-one-day deadline). In doing so, the court noted that it still
had jurisdiction to rule on the motion despite the prosecution
missing the court-imposed forty-five-day deadline.
¶ 14 The next day, the defense filed a motion for a writ of habeas
corpus to transport Redwine from the DOC to the courthouse for
the hearing on January 4.
¶ 15 However, on January 2 — two days before the scheduled
hearing, and five days before the ninety-one-day deadline — the
court issued an order finding good cause to continue the restitution
3 The motion also included a multitude of costs incurred by the
prosecution in litigating the four-year case.
6 hearing beyond the ninety-one-day deadline. Specifically, the court
found as follows:
• It had excused the prosecution’s failure to file the motion
for restitution and costs within the court-imposed
forty-five-day deadline.
• The defense had not filed an “appropriate” motion for a
writ of habeas corpus for Redwine to appear at the
January 4 restitution hearing.
• The sheriff’s office had informed the court clerk’s office
that even if it was provided with a proper writ of habeas
corpus, it did not believe it could transport Redwine to
the January 4 restitution hearing because of DOC
requirements, the New Year’s Day holiday, its staffing
levels, and other transports it was obligated to complete.
• Although the defense had objected to the original motion
for the costs of prosecution, it hadn’t objected to the
amended motion containing the prosecution’s restitution
request.
• Despite the lack of objection, the court found that “it
needs a hearing upon this matter prior to determining
7 the amount of restitution to be ordered” because of “the
extremely contentious history of this case and defense
counsel’s attempt to procure [Redwine’s] presence at the
hearing.”
• Under those circumstances, the court found “that good
cause exists for [it] to hold the hearing and determine the
amount of restitution owed outside of the 91-day time
limit” because of “the need for a hearing . . . coupled with
the late, but statutorily timely, filing of the restitution
request and the difficulties in obtaining [Redwine’s]
presence at the hearing.”
The court set a January 4 Webex hearing to reschedule the hearing
on restitution and the costs of prosecution.
¶ 16 One day after the court issued this order, and one day before
the January 4 scheduling hearing, the defense filed an objection to
the continuance, arguing that the prosecution should have moved
for a specific amount of restitution at sentencing or, at the very
least, by the court-ordered forty-five-day deadline.
¶ 17 At the scheduling hearing, Redwine appeared via video, and
the court expressed surprise that he was appearing without a video
8 writ. Redwine’s counsel again objected to the continuance beyond
the ninety-one-day deadline and asserted that he and his client
were ready to proceed that day via Webex with the hearing on
restitution and the costs of prosecution. However, given that the
court had continued the hearing on the motion and was holding the
Webex hearing only to reschedule the hearing on the motion, the
prosecutor represented that he was not prepared to proceed that
day via Webex. And when the court remained firm about
rescheduling the substantive hearing and asked defense counsel
how long would be required for the hearing, defense counsel
responded “half a day” at a “minimum” given complexities
surrounding the prosecution’s motion for the prosecution costs.
The court then proposed a rescheduled hearing date of February 4,
2022, and, although the defense initially requested a date later in
February, both parties ultimately agreed to the February 4 hearing
date.
C. The Remaining Proceedings
¶ 18 On January 26, 2022, the prosecution moved to continue the
February 4 hearing. In the motion, the prosecution relayed that its
witness for the restitution hearing — the victim’s mother — was
9 having surgery on January 26 and would be continuing to
convalesce on February 4. Given that it was unclear how long the
witness’s recovery period would be, the prosecution requested a
five-week continuance in the event that she would be required to
appear in person, and a three-week continuance if she could appear
remotely.
¶ 19 The court ordered the defense to file any response by noon on
January 31, 2022. After the court didn’t receive a response by that
deadline, it granted the prosecution’s request to continue the
restitution hearing and ordered counsel to appear via Webex on
February 4 to reschedule the hearing. Later that same day, the
defense filed an objection arguing, among other things, that the
prosecution had not shown due diligence by waiting until January
26 to request the continuance.
¶ 20 At the February 4 Webex hearing, the prosecutor said that the
victim’s surgery made it difficult for her to sit for extended periods
of time. The court rescheduled the hearing on restitution and the
costs of prosecution for February 24, 2022.
¶ 21 After further briefing, the court issued an order denying the
prosecution’s request for the costs of prosecution on the ground
10 that Redwine did not have the ability to pay the extensive costs.
That left outstanding only the prosecution’s request for $900 in
restitution for the cost of the victim’s burial plot.
¶ 22 Then, on February 23, 2022 (the day before the scheduled
restitution hearing), the court issued an order vacating the hearing.
In the order, the court noted that after it denied the prosecution’s
request for the costs of prosecution, the court received an email
from the defense that read,
Mr. Redwine . . . has requested that the costs hearing be vacated based on the prosecution’s pleading and the court’s order. He is not contesting the amount of restitution requested ($900). As identified in the order, he has preserved timing and jurisdiction objections [to restitution] for which the court will not take further evidence or argument. There is no objection as to [the] amount [of restitution] so based on [the court’s order denying the costs of prosecution] there is no longer any contested issue necessitating the [restitution] hearing.
Based on that representation from the defense, the court vacated
the restitution hearing and ordered $900 in restitution.
III. Standard of Review
¶ 23 The proper interpretation of the restitution statute is a
question of law that we review de novo. Weeks II, ¶ 13.
11 ¶ 24 “However, the issue of whether good cause exists to extend the
ninety-one-day deadline to determine restitution under section 18-
1.3-603(1)(b) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v.
Weeks, 2020 COA 44, ¶ 11 (Weeks I), aff’d, 2021 CO 75; cf. People
v. Hines, 2021 COA 45, ¶ 17 (“[W]e review for an abuse of discretion
the district court’s decision to grant a continuance for good
cause.”). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it
misconstrues or misapplies the law. Weeks I, ¶ 11.
IV. Analysis
¶ 25 Redwine first contends that both the prosecution and the trial
court failed to comply with their statutory obligations regarding
restitution at sentencing.
1. Error
¶ 26 The record indicates that Redwine is correct as to the
prosecution. In Weeks II, ¶ 46, the supreme court “infer[red] from
the restitution statute that the legislature expects litigants . . . to be
prepared to address the issue of restitution at sentencing hearings.”
Specifically, “by the time of the sentencing hearing, the prosecution
12 should know whether it is seeking restitution, even if the
information related to the proposed amount isn’t yet available.” Id.
at ¶ 44 n.14.
¶ 27 Here, the record suggests that the prosecutor was unprepared
to address the issue of restitution at sentencing because he did not
have a victim impact statement on file. See § 18-1.3-603(2)(a) (The
prosecution shall present information in support of restitution
“through victim impact statements or other means.”). Instead, the
prosecutor simply requested that restitution “remain open for 91
days.”
¶ 28 And, because the prosecutor did not explain why he did not
have restitution information ready at the time of sentencing, the
trial court erred by extending the prosecution’s deadline to request
a specific amount of restitution. See People v. Martinez Rubier,
2024 COA 67, ¶¶ 35-41; People v. Brassill, 2024 COA 19, ¶¶ 30-45
(cert. granted Aug. 4, 2025).
¶ 29 However, we conclude that the trial court did not lose the
statutory authority to impose restitution after sentencing. See
Martinez Rubier, ¶¶ 42-54; Brassill, ¶¶ 56-64. On the mittimus, the
court specifically ordered, “DEF TO PAY ALL COSTS, FEES AND
13 ANY RESTITUTION.” And the trial court gave the prosecution forty-
five days to determine the amount of restitution it intended to
request. We conclude that this was sufficient to constitute a
restitution order under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b). See § 18-1.3-
603(1)(b) (authorizing “[a]n order that the defendant is obligated to
pay restitution, but that the specific amount of restitution shall be
determined” later); cf. Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶¶ 10, 45
(concluding that the trial court implicitly found at sentencing that
the defendant was liable for restitution but that the amount of
restitution would be determined later); People v. Tennyson, 2023
COA 2, ¶ 37 (clarifying that the mittimus in Tennyson did not
include any notation regarding restitution), aff’d, 2025 CO 31; see
also Weeks II, ¶ 7 n.4 (“In requiring an express finding of
extenuating circumstances to extend the prosecution’s deadline and
an express finding of good cause to extend the court’s deadline, we
don’t mean to suggest that talismanic incantations are necessary.
In both instances, substance controls over form.”).
¶ 30 And because the defense had an opportunity to be heard at
the sentencing hearing, we are unpersuaded by Redwine’s
14 argument that the court erred by entering that notation on the
mittimus without giving the defense an opportunity to be heard.
2. The Error Does Not Warrant Reversal
¶ 31 We conclude that reversal is not warranted. In Brassill, a
division of this court considered what the proper remedy was for the
prosecution’s failure to exercise reasonable diligence to determine
the amount of restitution before sentencing, and for a trial court’s
decision to excuse the prosecution’s error in that regard. See
Brassill, ¶¶ 46-49, 56-63. The division, in effect, held that the
prosecution’s and trial court’s error was harmless because the court
never lost the authority to order restitution under section
18-1.3-603(1)(b). See Brassill, ¶¶ 56-63. Another division of this
court reached the same conclusion in Martinez Rubier, ¶¶ 42-54.
¶ 32 Because we ultimately conclude below that the trial court
18-1.3-603(1)(b), and because Redwine has not shown that he
suffered actual prejudice by any delay (such as faded memories of
witnesses or the loss of material evidence), the prosecution’s failure
to be prepared at sentencing to address restitution does not
warrant reversal. See Martinez Rubier, ¶¶ 42-54; Brassill, ¶¶ 56-63.
15 B. The Extension of the Statutory Ninety-One-Day Deadline
¶ 33 Redwine also contends that the trial court lost the authority to
order restitution when it continued the restitution hearing beyond
the statutory ninety-one-day deadline. But again, section
18-1.3-603(1)(b) requires that “the specific amount of restitution
shall be determined within the ninety-one days immediately
following the order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for
extending the time period by which the restitution amount shall be
determined.” (Emphasis added.) If a trial court determines that an
extension of the ninety-one-day deadline is warranted, it must
make an express finding of good cause, before the ninety-one-day
deadline expires, to extend the deadline. Weeks II, ¶ 5.
¶ 34 The trial court did that. In the court’s January 2, 2022,
written order — issued five days before the ninety-one-day
deadline — it expressly found good cause to extend the deadline
based on a combination of several reasons. First, although the
prosecution had not met its court-imposed forty-five-day deadline to
move for a specific amount of restitution, it did file its restitution
motion before the ninety-one-day deadline under section
18-1.3-603(2), which led the court to believe that it could resolve
16 the restitution issue within the ninety-one-day deadline. And the
court scheduled the restitution hearing for January 4, 2022, within
the ninety-one-day deadline.
¶ 35 Second, the court pointed out that the defense had not filed
any objection to the prosecution’s restitution motion between
December 21, 2021, and January 2, 2022. However, the defense
did file an apparently deficient motion for a writ of habeas corpus
for Redwine to appear in person at the January 4 restitution
hearing. So, the court reasonably concluded that the prosecution’s
restitution motion was contested and that a hearing was necessary.
¶ 36 And third, the court ultimately learned that Redwine could not
be transported from the DOC to the courthouse on January 4.
Under these circumstances, we discern no error in the court’s
finding that good cause existed to continue the combined hearing
on restitution and the costs of prosecution beyond the
ninety-one-day deadline. See People v. Hernandez, 2019 COA 111,
¶ 19 (“[A] restitution hearing is a proceeding at which a defendant
has a right to be present.”).
¶ 37 Also, we have found nothing in the record showing that either
party suggested, leading up to the January 4 hearing, that the
17 combined hearing on restitution and the costs of prosecution
should be held remotely via Webex. On appeal, Redwine argues
that he “could have waived his appearance or arranged to appear
electronically (as ultimately happened), once timely informed of
difficulties in securing his physical presence” at the January 4
hearing. But he did not make that argument in his objection filed
the day before the hearing. Instead, he argued in that filing — filed
four days before the expiration of the ninety-one-day deadline —
that the court would be unable to meet the ninety-one-day deadline.
And once the court had already ruled that the January 4 Webex
hearing was being held solely to reschedule the combined hearing
on restitution and the costs of prosecution, Redwine’s surprise
appearance at the hearing did not affect the court’s justification for
continuing the hearing.
¶ 38 Further, we have found nothing in the record showing that
either party requested that the restitution proceedings be bifurcated
from the proceedings related to the prosecution’s extensive request
for the costs of prosecution. Although the defense ultimately
objected in February 2022 filings on the ground that Redwine was
financially unable to pay such extensive costs of prosecution, it did
18 not lodge that objection in its filing on December 13, 2021 — filed
nearly a month before the ninety-one-day deadline — in which it
focused on the prosecution’s failure to meet the court-imposed
C. The Second Continuation of the Restitution Hearing
¶ 39 We also discern no reversible error in the trial court’s decision
to continue the restitution hearing a second time based on the
victim’s mother’s surgery. The court issued its ruling after the
defense failed to timely object to the prosecution’s request for the
extension based on the surgery. We recognize that the defense’s
lateness in objecting to the prosecution’s motion for a continuance
was trivial compared to, for example, the much more substantial
delay by the prosecution in filing its motion for restitution.
However, we discern no basis for reversal on this issue.
V. Disposition
¶ 40 The restitution order is affirmed.
JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.