Peo v. Quintanilla

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 16, 2026
• Docket: 24CA0280
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0280 Peo v Quintanilla 04-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0280 Arapahoe County District Court No. 21CR2203 Honorable Shay Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jesse Ivan Quintanilla,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Harris and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 16, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

The Law Offices of Colin Bresee, M. Colin Bresee, Gregory Huckaby, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 A jury found defendant, Jesse Ivan Quintanilla, guilty of two

counts of sexual assault on a child for sexually abusing his

girlfriend’s daughter. Quintanilla appeals his conviction, arguing

that the trial court reversibly erred by admitting generalized expert

witness testimony. We disagree and therefore affirm the judgment

of conviction.

I. Background

¶2 In 2021, the victim told her therapist that Quintanilla — who

lived with the victim, her mother, and her sister — had made her

touch “something squishy” that was “connected to [Quintanilla’s]

body.” That disclosure led to a police investigation, after which the

prosecution charged Quintanilla with three counts of sexual assault

on a child as part of a pattern of abuse.

¶3 At trial, the victim testified that when she was in second grade,

Quintanilla came into her room “in the middle of the night,” carried

her to a bathroom, and locked the door. Once there and with the

lights off, the victim said that Quintanilla “grab[bed]” her hand and

made her “touch the squishy thing” that was connected to him

“between his legs.” Quintanilla then carried her back to her room

and told her “not to tell anybody what happened.” The victim said

1 this happened many times, but that she didn’t tell anyone because

she was scared.

¶4 Quintanilla didn’t testify. His counsel defended on the theory

that the victim “made up this story,” and pointed in closing

argument to, among other things, her delay in reporting the alleged

abuse, inconsistencies in her story, and her demeanor when

testifying.

¶5 After the prosecution dismissed one of the sexual assault

counts, the jury found Quintanilla guilty of the remaining counts.

¶6 The trial court sentenced Quintanilla to two consecutive

indeterminate terms of twelve years to life in prison.

II. Analysis

¶7 Quintanilla argues that the trial court erred by admitting the

testimony of Suvi Miller, a generalized child sexual assault expert

witness. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Additional Background

¶8 Before trial, the prosecution endorsed Miller as a generalized

expert witness and provided a general summary of her proposed

2 testimony.1 Quintanilla moved to exclude Miller as an expert under

CRE 702, CRE 403, and CRE 608 and alternatively requested a

hearing under People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001).

¶9 At a motions hearing, the court denied the request for a

Shreck hearing. As to whether Miller’s testimony fit the case, the

court recognized that Miller was qualified as an expert and that

generally her testimony was helpful and provided “valuable”

information to the jury. The court also agreed that Miller’s

testimony “needs to be tailored based on what takes place in the

trial.”

¶ 10 The court ordered the prosecution to “comb through” Miller’s

proposed testimony and narrow it down to topics likely to emerge at

trial, recognizing that the court is “a little handcuffed this far from

trial in being able to say . . . what we anticipate would be relevant.”

The court then noted, “[I]f there’s continued concerns, we can have

a more narrow discussion about [Miller’s proposed testimony],

and . . . if we need to have additional discussion after the victim[’s]

1 Miller’s “Summary of Proposed Testimony” and “source list” are

not part of the appellate record.

3 testimony, then we can do that as well.” The court also ordered the

prosecution to produce Miller’s “source list.”

¶ 11 At trial, over defense counsel’s objection, the court qualified

Miller as a “child sexual abuse, behavior and disclosure expert.”

Miller then testified that children sometimes wait before disclosing

sexual abuse and that disclosure may be gradual. She explained

factors that may lead to delayed reporting, testified about victim

demeanor, and discussed issues victims might have with describing

the sequencing and timing of their abuse. Miller also explained to

the jury that her role was “to provide general information . . . about

how children may disclose,” but “no specifics to the case.”

¶ 12 Defense counsel did not object to the relevance of any specific

testimony or argue that any testimony did not fit the facts of the

case, but counsel did vigorously cross-examine Miller.

B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 13 Expert witness testimony is governed by Rule 702 and is

admissible when (1) the scientific principles at issue are reasonably

reliable; (2) the expert is qualified to offer the testimony; (3) the

testimony is helpful to the jury; and (4) the testimony’s probative

value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

4 prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury. People v. Cooper, 2021

CO 69, ¶ 47; see CRE 702, 403.

¶ 14 “We review a trial court’s admission of expert testimony for an

abuse of discretion and will reverse only when that decision is

manifestly erroneous.” Cooper, ¶ 44 (citation omitted).

C. The Trial Court Properly Qualified Miller

¶ 15 We reject Quintanilla’s claim that the court abused its

discretion by qualifying Miller as an expert in child sexual abuse.

¶ 16 A witness may be qualified to offer expert testimony based on

one or more of the five factors in Rule 702 — knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education. Huntoon v. TCI Cablevision of

Colo., Inc., 969 P.2d 681, 690 (Colo. 1998).

¶ 17 To qualify an expert witness, “[a] trial court need not conduct

a Shreck hearing if there is sufficient information to make an

admissibility determination without one, but [it] must nonetheless

address the testimony and make specific findings regarding its

challenged admissibility.” Kutzly v. People, 2019 CO 55, ¶ 11.

However, if “Colorado has already properly accepted the basis of the

expert’s testimony,” failing to make specific findings doesn’t rise to

an abuse of discretion. Id.

5 ¶ 18 As we understand it, Quintanilla doesn’t argue that Miller

wasn’t qualified but instead claims that the trial court erred by

failing to make “any findings on the record regarding . . . Miller.”

¶ 19 But that’s not accurate. Based on its experience with Miller,

the court specifically found that Miller “is an expert [and] that she

does provide information that is valuable to the jury.” This finding

implicitly recognizes that the proposed testimony is reliable. See

People v. Ruibal, 2015 COA 55, ¶ 24 (concluding that when the

court overruled the defendant’s objection to the expert witness’

testimony without a specific reliability finding, it “implicitly

determined that the . . . expert testimony was based on a reliable

scientific principle”), aff’d, 2018 CO 93; cf. People v. Yachik, 2020

COA 100, ¶ 50 (requiring more specific findings where the trial

court found only that the expert “meets the qualifications”).

¶ 20 And even if the trial court’s findings should have been more

robust, Colorado courts have “consistently upheld the admission of

‘[e]xpert testimony about the general behavior of sexual assault

victims.’” People v. Rail, 2016 COA 24, ¶ 64 (alteration in original)

(citation omitted), aff’d on other grounds, 2019 CO 99, and

abrogated on other grounds by, Bock v. People, 2024 CO 61; see also

6 People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371, 383 (Colo. App. 2007) (“We

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that

an expert’s explanation of possible child behaviors and reactions

would be helpful to the trier of fact and was admissible here.”).

¶ 21 To the extent Quintanilla generally contends that the court

erred by denying his request for a Shreck hearing, we disagree.

When, as here, the court “already has sufficient information to

make specific findings under Shreck, a hearing is not necessary.”

People v. Wilson, 2013 COA 75, ¶ 23.

¶ 22 And, finally, Quintanilla also seems to argue that by denying

him a Shreck hearing, the court failed to realize that the

prosecution provided him with an older version of Miller’s source

list. As best we understand, he says that this hindered his cross-

examination. But Quintanilla doesn’t explain how his cross-

examination was prejudiced. At any rate, the court later found that

the prosecution had committed a discovery violation by providing

the older source list and instructed the jury that the prosecution

had not complied with its disclosure duty. Quintanilla doesn’t

7 explain why that sanction was insufficient to cure any potential

prejudice.2

¶ 23 For all these reasons, we conclude that the court didn’t abuse

its discretion by qualifying Miller as an expert in child sexual

assault and declining to hold a Shreck hearing.

D. Miller’s Testimony Was Relevant and Not Unfairly Prejudicial

¶ 24 We next reject Quintanilla’s contention that the court erred by

allowing irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony.

¶ 25 While the parties disagree about the extent to which

Quintanilla preserved these objections, we needn’t resolve this

dispute because we conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion by admitting Miller’s testimony.

¶ 26 With respect to relevance, a generalized expert’s testimony is

helpful if it “fits a case” by having a sufficient logical connection to

the factual issues. Cooper, ¶ 52. But “each aspect of such

2 Quintanilla also suggests that the trial court erred by preventing

him from cross-examining Miller on a 2017 admonition against her. But Quintanilla was allowed to substantially question Miller on the incident. Regardless, he doesn’t explain how the court erred or how the error impacted the trial. See People v. Relaford, 2016 COA 99, ¶ 70 n.2 (“We do not consider bare or conclusory assertions presented without argument or development.”).

8 testimony need not match a factual issue.” Id. at ¶ 53. And with

respect to generalized expert testimony, “the fit inquiry must be

flexible.” Id.

¶ 27 Miller testified about delayed disclosure, factors affecting

disclosure, victim demeanor, and the way victims sequence events.

All this testimony was logically connected to the facts in evidence

and helpful to the jury to understand the evidence. The testimony

helped explain counterintuitive victim behavior such as why a child

victim may delay reporting abuse, why descriptions of the abuse

might be inconsistent, and why a child victim’s demeanor might be

different than expected. See id.; see also People v. Koon, 724 P.2d

1367, 1370 (Colo. App. 1986) (admitting expert testimony about

how the child sexual assault victim’s behavior “was consistent with

the unique child incest patterns”).

¶ 28 Indeed, Quintanilla doesn’t seriously argue that these topics

didn’t fit the case. He instead focuses on Miller’s discussion of

gradual reporting, asserting that she “invited the jury to speculate

that [the victim] was more affected and hurt than was shown by her

literal testimony.” While it’s true that this case didn’t involve a

gradual disclosure, a generalized expert’s testimony needn’t

9 perfectly match the facts of the case. See Cooper, ¶ 53. That’s

because a generalized expert “seeks to inform the jury about generic

concepts or principles without knowledge of the facts”; thus, “it is

almost inevitable that parts of such testimony will not be logically

connected to the case.” Id.; see People v. Coons, 2021 CO 70, ¶ 4

(“[E]ach aspect of [generalized expert witness] testimony need not

match a factual issue.”).3

¶ 29 Nor are we persuaded that the probative value of Miller’s

testimony was significantly outweighed by unfair prejudice.

Contrary to Quintanilla’s assertion, Miller did not “provide[] the jury

with scenarios that mimicked and paralleled the family dynamic in

the Quintanilla household.” Miller clearly stated she was testifying

to “no specifics to the case,” and she offered no testimony about

whether Quintanilla had sexually assaulted the victim. Rather, she

largely limited her testimony to a general discussion of delayed

reporting and child abuse victim behavior which was helpful to the

3 In his reply brief, Quintanilla argues that the prosecution didn’t

comply with the court’s order to limit Miller’s testimony. Even assuming Quintanilla properly raised that contention in his opening brief, we conclude that Miller’s testimony was logically connected to the facts and not unduly prejudicial. We therefore do not address the pretrial ruling.

10 jury. See Rail, ¶ 74 (rejecting contention in similar case where

Miller also testified that her testimony was unfairly prejudicial).

¶ 30 We therefore conclude that Miller’s testimony was relevant and

not unfairly prejudicial.4

E. Miller Didn’t Improperly Bolster the Victim’s Credibility

¶ 31 And, finally, we reject Quintanilla’s claim that Miller’s

testimony improperly bolstered the victim’s credibility.

¶ 32 While expert testimony isn’t permitted to bolster a victim’s

credibility, see Cooper, ¶ 95, a generalized expert may testify about

child assault victim behavior and demeanor, see Rail, ¶ 64.

¶ 33 That’s what Miller did in this case. Though Quintanilla

suggests otherwise, Miller never testified about the victim or opined

about the victim’s credibility. She never offered statistics on the

rates of false abuse claims. She didn’t opine that children as a

4 Quintanilla also frequently references the “lengthy [and] narrative

nature” of Miller’s testimony. But the bulk of her testimony was offered in response to cross-examination. Defense counsel never objected to any of Miller’s responses as improper narrative testimony, and Quintanilla doesn’t explain how the trial court plainly erred by allowing the responses. See People v. Trujillo, 2015 COA 22, ¶ 8. We therefore do not consider the nature of Miller’s responses. See People v. Lowe, 2021 CO 51, ¶ 20 n.4 (declining to address “undeveloped assertion of error lacking support in legal authority”).

11 class are always truthful. Rather, she testified about general child

abuse reporting and victim behavior and certainly not, as

Quintanilla claims, about “the importance of believing children.”

See id. at ¶ 73 (rejecting a claim that Miller improperly bolstered the

victim’s testimony under similar circumstances).

¶ 34 That makes this case different from People in Interest of G.E.S.,

2016 COA 183. In that dependency and neglect case, a division of

this court reversed an adjudication and dispositional order. The

division concluded that the erroneous admission of polygraph

evidence was not harmless for several reasons, including that an

expert in child sex abuse had specifically testified about the

credibility of the victim’s initial outcry. Id. at ¶¶ 31, 34. Unlike the

expert in G.E.S., Miller never testified that the victim’s outcry was

credible.

¶ 35 Because Miller testified generally without implying that the

victim’s allegations in this case were truthful, any bolstering effect

on the victim’s credibility was incidental. See People v. Cernazanu,

2015 COA 122, ¶ 20 (generalized expert opinion testimony is

admissible even if it incidentally bolsters the victim’s testimony).

12 ¶ 36 We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by

admitting Miller’s testimony.

F. Cumulative Error

¶ 37 Because we disagree that the trial court committed any errors,

let alone multiple errors, we necessarily reject Quintanilla’s claim

that reversal is warranted under the cumulative error doctrine. See

Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 24.

III. Disposition

¶ 38 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.