Peo v. Quezada

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 2, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0541
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0541 Peo v Quezada 10-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0541 Adams County District Court No. 21CR4108 Honorable Mark D. Warner, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Froilan Quezada,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Freyre and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 2, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Hernandez & Associates, P.C., Jonathan R. Booker, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Froilan Quezada, appeals the district court’s

restitution order. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Quezada was involved in a head-on collision with a vehicle

driven by Samer Kabbara, who is from Lebanon. Kabbara suffered

severe injuries, and Quezada’s friend and passenger, Raul

Villalobos, was killed. Quezada pled guilty to vehicular homicide,

third degree assault, and driving while intoxicated. As part of the

plea agreement, he agreed to pay restitution.

¶3 On April 19, 2023, the district court sentenced Quezada to

community corrections for the felony and to county jail for the

misdemeanors. The court also entered a preliminary order for

restitution, but it granted the prosecution twenty-one days to

request a specific amount. Under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), C.R.S.

2022,1 the court’s preliminary restitution order triggered the ninety-

one-day period for the court to impose restitution, unless it found

1 Section 18-1.3-603(1), (1)(b), C.R.S. 2022, was in effect when

Quezada was sentenced. Because the statute has since been amended, we refer to the 2022 version throughout this opinion. See Ch. 307, sec. 1, § 18-1.3-603(1), (1)(b), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1606.

1 good cause for extending the deadline. The resulting deadline to

impose restitution was July 19, 2023.

¶4 On May 3, 2023, the prosecution filed a motion to impose

restitution totaling $29,793.90. This request included $3,203.24

for medical bills paid to Mount Lebanon Hospital, $90.66 for

medical bills paid to American University of Beirut Medical Center,

and an estimated $34,500.00 for a bilateral knee replacement

surgery to be performed in Lebanon, offset by $8,000.00 Kabbara

received from an insurance settlement.

¶5 On May 24, 2023, Quezada objected to the motion for

restitution and requested an evidentiary hearing to “be set on a

future date to be determined by” the district court.

¶6 The court initially set a restitution hearing for June 26,

2023 — twenty-three days before the statutory deadline. Quezada

then filed a motion to continue the matter “to a future date,” again,

“to be determined” by the court. In response, the prosecution

requested the court make a finding of good cause for setting the

hearing outside the ninety-one-day period required by section 18-

1.3-603(1)(b). It further requested the court to find that Quezada

had waived his right to have the hearing set within the deadline.

2 Quezada did not object, and the court set the hearing for August 1,

2023.

¶7 Due to a busy docket, the court reset the August 1 hearing to

August 25, 2023. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the

parties to file written closing arguments by the end of the following

week. Based on complications in the restitution dispute, including

the fact that some restitution documents were provided from

Lebanon and required currency conversion, the court found

“extraordinary circumstances” required additional time so it could

review the record closely. It found that an extension of thirty days

was necessary before it could “enter any sort of order.”

¶8 On September 1, 2023, Quezada and the prosecution filed

written closing arguments.

¶9 The court did not enter any order on the amount of restitution.

¶ 10 On February 7, 2024, the prosecution moved for a

determination of restitution so the victim could make an informed

decision regarding different treatment options. On February 15,

2024, the court entered a written order imposing the requested

amount of $29,793.90.

3 ¶ 11 Quezada appeals, arguing the district court lacked authority to

impose restitution beyond the ninety-one-day deadline required by

section 18-1.3-603(1)(b). He further argues the court erred by

allowing Kabbara double recovery following the insurance

settlement and by concluding Kabbara’s future knee replacement

surgery was recoverable as an actual cost. We disagree with these

arguments and affirm.

II. Timeliness

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 Whether a district court has authority to order a defendant to

pay restitution is a legal question that we review de novo. People v.

Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 24.

¶ 13 Section 18-1.3-603(1) requires that, with one exception not

relevant here, every sentence in a Colorado criminal case must

include consideration of restitution. See Babcock v. People, 2025

CO 26, ¶ 8. Among the four types of restitution orders a court may

enter is one that requires the defendant to pay restitution but “that

[provides] the specific amount of restitution shall be determined

within the ninety-one days immediately following the order of

conviction, unless good cause is shown for extending the time

4 period by which the restitution amount shall be determined.” § 18-

1.3-603(1)(b).

¶ 14 A district court “lack[s] authority” to order restitution when it

neither determines the restitution amount within ninety-one days

nor finds good cause to extend the deadline. Weeks, ¶¶ 5, 45.

However, when a defendant’s conduct manifests an intent to

relinquish the statutory right to have a restitution amount ordered

within ninety-one days of sentencing, he waives any claim that the

restitution order must be vacated. See People v. Roberson, 2025 CO

30, ¶¶ 14, 17.

B. Discussion

¶ 15 Quezada asserts the district court lacked authority to order

restitution because he did not waive his statutory rights, and the

court’s order was issued 174 days after the restitution hearing,

when the court found good cause to extend its deadline by only

thirty days. We conclude this argument is waived.

¶ 16 As discussed, the district court sentenced Quezada and

entered a preliminary restitution order on April 19, 2023.

Therefore, it had until July 19 — ninety-one days later — to

determine the restitution amount, unless it found good cause for an

5 extension. When Quezada initially objected to the amount

requested by the prosecution, he requested a hearing “be set on a

future date to be determined by” the court. The court set the

hearing for June 26 — twenty-three days before the ninety-one-day

period expired.

¶ 17 Quezada then moved to continue the hearing again, indicating

for a second time that the date should be determined by the district

court. He made no mention of the statutory deadline for

determining the restitution amount. Furthermore, when the

prosecution explicitly asked the court to make a finding that there

was good cause to set the hearing outside the ninety-one-day period

and that Quezada had waived his right to have restitution be

determined sooner, Quezada made no objection.

¶ 18 Based on this record, we conclude Quezada waived his right to

have restitution determined within ninety-one days. Unlike in

Weeks, Quezada did not assert his statutory right before the ninety-

one-day deadline lapsed. In fact, he never asserted his right under

section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) until this appeal. Instead, Quezada

repeatedly asked the court to set a restitution hearing at its own

convenience. He did not object when the court set the restitution

6 hearing outside the ninety-one-day period, even when the

prosecution specifically raised the issue of waiver. And when the

court apparently forgot to enter an order after the hearing, it was

the prosecution — not Quezada — that nudged the court to make a

final determination.

¶ 19 To be sure, the court far exceeded the thirty days it found

would be necessary to determine restitution. We do not condone its

failure to enter an order in a timely manner. But we also cannot

overlook that Quezada waived his right to challenge the court’s

eventual order on timeliness grounds.

¶ 20 Indeed, in Roberson, ¶ 17, the supreme court found that a

defendant’s failure to object to a hearing outside the statutory

deadline and repeated requests for continuances “all without any

mention of the ninety-one-day deadline despite numerous

opportunities to do so” constituted a voluntary waiver of the

statutory right provided by section 18-1.3-603(1)(b). Similarly,

here, we conclude Quezada’s repeated requests for a hearing to be

set on a date determined by the district court, combined with his

failure to object to a hearing outside the statutory period or to raise

the issue at any point before this appeal, “reflects ‘conduct that

7 manifests an intent to relinquish a right or privilege.’” Roberson,

¶ 17 (quoting Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 28). Because waiver

extinguishes error and appellate review, id. at ¶ 13, we do not

consider Quezada’s argument that the district court lacked

authority to order restitution.

III. Insurance Settlement Setoff

¶ 21 Quezada next asserts the district court abused its discretion

by not deducting Kabbara’s insurance settlement award from

Quezada’s restitution obligation. We discern no error.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 22 We review a district court’s restitution award for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Gregory, 2019 COA 184, ¶ 21. A court abuses

its discretion when it misconstrues or misapplies the law or when

its decision fixing the amount of restitution is not supported by the

record. Id. We will not disturb the court’s determination as to the

amount of restitution if it is supported by the record. Id.

¶ 23 Restitution is “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim . . .

proximately caused by an offender’s conduct . . . that can be

reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.” § 18-1.3-

602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2025. A court may not award restitution to a

8 victim for a pecuniary loss if the victim has received or is entitled to

receive benefits or reimbursement under an insurance policy. § 18-

1.3-603(8)(c)(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 24 The prosecution bears the burden of proving the amount of

restitution owed by a preponderance of the evidence, while the

defendant bears the burden of proving any setoff. Gregory, ¶ 25.

When a settlement agreement is clearly intended to cover all

categories of loss for which restitution could be imposed, the

defendant has met his burden of proving a setoff. Id. at ¶ 29. The

prosecution may then rebut the inference that a double recovery

has occurred. People v. Stanley, 2017 COA 121, ¶ 34. It can do so

by showing that the victim used the settlement proceeds for losses

proximately caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct but which

were not covered by the restitution order. Id.

¶ 25 After the collision, Kabbara settled with Quezada’s insurance

company for $25,000.00 in exchange for releasing Quezada “from

any and all claims, causes of action, obligations and liabilities

arising from or related to any bodily injury due to” the accident. Of

the settlement proceeds, $8,000.00 was paid to Kabbara, with the

9 rest being used for Medicaid medical services and attorney fees and

costs.

¶ 26 As discussed, the prosecution’s request for $29,793.90 in

restitution included $34,500.00 for Kabbara’s double knee

replacement surgery, plus $3,293.90 for non-Medicaid medical

services, minus the $8,000.00 that Kabbara received in the

settlement.

¶ 27 On this record, we conclude the district court properly

determined there was no double recovery. Quezada argues the

court should have offset the part of the settlement that Kabbara

used to pay his attorney fees from the restitution award. But

beyond citing Stanley, where there is no discussion of attorney fees

whatsoever, he does not support his position with any authority.

Likewise, while Quezada argues that neither the prosecution nor

the district court cited authority to suggest that attorney fees are

compensable as restitution, he does not indicate how the court’s

failure to cite authority amounts to an abuse of discretion. Because

these arguments are undeveloped, we do not consider them.

See People v. Liggett, 2021 COA 51, ¶ 53, aff’d, 2023 CO 22.

10 ¶ 28 More importantly, despite how Quezada frames this issue on

appeal, the prosecution did not seek restitution for attorney fees.

Instead, as described above, its restitution request specifically

sought to cover non-Medicaid medical expenses. Quezada does not

develop his argument that portions of the settlement award were

“for some of the same damages at issue in the restitution order.”

And while the comprehensive settlement agreement may have

created an inference of double recovery, see Gregory, ¶ 29, we

conclude the prosecution effectively rebutted this inference by

showing that all but $8,000.00 of the proceeds were used for losses

not covered by the restitution order, see Stanley, ¶ 34. Accordingly,

no additional setoff was required.

IV. Cost of Future Medical Treatment

¶ 29 Finally, Quezada challenges the award of $34,500.00 to cover

Kabbara’s future knee replacement surgery in Lebanon. We

conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s order.

¶ 30 Under section 18-1.3-603(1)(c), a court is authorized to impose

restitution for the actual cost of specific future treatment. In a

sufficiency challenge, we review the record de novo to determine

whether the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most

11 favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient in both quantity and

quality to support the order by a preponderance of the evidence.

People v. Fregosi, 2024 COA 6, ¶ 40; Gregory, ¶ 25.

¶ 31 The prosecution supported its restitution request with invoices

detailing preliminary diagnostics, x-rays illustrating the severity of

Kabbara’s injuries, and letters from his orthopedic surgeon

estimating the cost of necessary surgery at $34,500.00. At the

restitution hearing, Kabbara also testified that he required a double

knee replacement due to the collision, and his surgeon estimated

each knee replacement would cost $12,000.00 for equipment alone,

assuming no complications. He testified that it was his

understanding that the surgery might “cost more, but its baseline is

$34,500.”

¶ 32 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, we conclude it was sufficient to support the restitution

order. Quezada argues the letter from Kabbara’s surgeon was “from

an unverified physician in another country who did not testify” and

whose estimate was provided in dollars, rather than Lebanese

pounds. But nothing in the record suggests that Kabbara’s surgeon

was not qualified to make such an estimate or do so in American

12 dollars. Nor does Quezada explain how the lack of an itemized

invoice or scheduled surgery date precludes recovery for “specific

future treatment” under section 18-1.3-603(1)(c). See Liggett, ¶ 53

(we do not address undeveloped arguments). Because we conclude

the surgeon’s letter was sufficient to support the restitution award,

we affirm.

V. Disposition

¶ 33 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE YUN concur.