23CA1073 Peo v Peters 12-19-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1073 Mesa County District Court No. 22CV10 Honorable Paul R. Dunkelman, Judge
People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Belinda Knisley,
Defendant,
and Concerning Tina Peters,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT VACATED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Gomez and Taubman*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 19, 2024
Daniel P. Rubinstein, District Attorney, Richard Tuttle, Deputy District Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
John Case, P.C., John Case, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Tina Peters appeals the district court’s finding of punitive
contempt. Because insufficient evidence and findings supported
the contempt judgment, we vacate the contempt judgment as well
as the punitive sanction.
I. Background and Procedural History
¶2 This contempt proceeding arises out of a criminal case filed
against Belinda Knisley, one of Peters’ former employees in Grand
Junction, Colorado. In February 2022, Peters attended a hearing in
Knisley’s case. At that hearing, the prosecution reported concerns
to the court that Peters was recording the proceeding on her iPad.
The Knisley court stopped the hearing and asked Peters whether
she was recording the proceeding. Peters denied recording it. The
court then explained that “there’s a sign on the door that says no
recording, video, audio, it’s all common sense for most folks to
know that.” The court added that “this is the one warning” and if it
“find[s] that someone has violated this order in the future, then [it
would] take appropriate action.”
¶3 Later, the Knisley court revisited the allegation and made the
following additional comments:
1 [I]t had come to the [c]ourt’s attention that someone may have been recording in the courtroom. I do not find one way or another as to whether that person was recording, or broadcasting, or audio recording[,] video recording[,] whatever it may have been. That individual told me that they were not doing any of those three things.
So, I relied on that representation in not entering any type of action at that time. If I had known[,] if it had been confirmed[,] I would have done something differently, and that’s in-part, because there is a decorum order that I entered [in Ms. Knisley’s case]. There’s also a sign on the outside of the door that specifically says that no one is authorized — I shouldn’t say the sign on the outside of the door. My decorum order says this — no one is authorized to record any portion of the [c]ourt’s proceedings via audio or — or video, and that, of course, would encompass broadcasting of the same. So, I make that additional record.
¶4 A few weeks later, the prosecution moved for a contempt
citation against Peters, requiring her to “show cause why she
should not be held in contempt for being untruthful to the [Knisley]
court.” Attached to the motion were affidavits from two individuals
who claimed that Peters had been recording the proceedings.
Though acknowledging “there is a lot to unravel with respect to
whether Peters could be charged with knowledge [of] a decorum
2 order, issued in [Knisley’s case] that was not served on [Peters],” the
district court issued the contempt citation.
¶5 At Peters’ contempt hearing, the prosecution presented three
witnesses who testified about Peters’ conduct and statements at the
Knisley hearing. After the hearing, the district court entered an oral
ruling finding that Peters had recorded the proceeding and was
dishonest to the Knisley court. And it found that her dishonesty
“obstructed the administration of justice” and offended the dignity
of the court. The district court, therefore, found Peters in contempt
and imposed a fine as a punitive sanction.
II. Analysis
¶6 Peters argues that the contempt judgment can’t stand because
insufficient evidence and findings supported it. We agree.
¶7 A party seeking punitive sanctions for contempt must
prove — and a court must find — beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) a lawful order existed; (2) the alleged contemnor had knowledge
of that order; (3) the alleged contemnor had the ability to comply
with that order; and (4) the alleged contemnor willfully refused to
comply with that order. People ex rel. State Eng’r v. Sease, 2018 CO
91, ¶ 23. Thus, as relevant here, to find a party in contempt and to
3 impose punitive sanctions, a court must find that the alleged
contemnor knew about a court order and willfully violated it. In re
Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 91-92 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶8 We review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a
contempt judgment. People in Interest of K.P., 2022 COA 60, ¶¶ 22,
37. But we review a district court’s contempt finding for an abuse
of discretion. Sease, ¶ 24. A court abuses its discretion when it
misconstrues or misapplies the law or its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021
COA 141, ¶ 25.
¶9 Peters is correct that the contempt judgment lacks several
required findings, without which it cannot stand. First, the
judgment doesn’t plainly identify — by date or otherwise — the
court order that Peters purportedly violated. And “[t]here can be no
contempt without proof of the existence of an underlying court
order which is violated.” In re Marriage of Zebedee, 778 P.2d 694,
697 (Colo. App. 1988); see also In re Marriage of Nussbeck, 974 P.2d
493, 499 (Colo. 1999) (The purpose of punitive contempt is “to
punish the offending party for refusal to obey lawful orders.”).
4 ¶ 10 Even so, the prosecution says that the district court “found
that [the Knisley court] noted that there was a sign on the
courtroom door ‘that says no recording, no video, audio.’” There are
three problems with this argument. First, the district court didn’t
make such a finding, and the prosecution’s purported support for
the statement is not from the court’s findings; rather, it’s simply a
colloquy between defense counsel and the court. Second, the court
couldn’t reasonably make such a finding. That’s because the
prosecution never introduced the sign at the contempt hearing, and
it’s unknown what the sign said or whether it was a court order.
And insofar as the prosecution points to the Knisley court’s general
reference to a decorum order entered in the Knisley case, the
district court specifically declined to judicially notice the Knisley
court’s statements “for the truth of the matter asserted,” though it
judicially noticed the transcript of the Knisley hearing for other
purposes. Thus, the record is devoid of any evidence about the
existence, scope, or content of the court order that Peters allegedly
violated. See Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc. v. Cross Slash
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23CA1073 Peo v Peters 12-19-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1073 Mesa County District Court No. 22CV10 Honorable Paul R. Dunkelman, Judge
People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Belinda Knisley,
Defendant,
and Concerning Tina Peters,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT VACATED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Gomez and Taubman*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 19, 2024
Daniel P. Rubinstein, District Attorney, Richard Tuttle, Deputy District Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
John Case, P.C., John Case, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Tina Peters appeals the district court’s finding of punitive
contempt. Because insufficient evidence and findings supported
the contempt judgment, we vacate the contempt judgment as well
as the punitive sanction.
I. Background and Procedural History
¶2 This contempt proceeding arises out of a criminal case filed
against Belinda Knisley, one of Peters’ former employees in Grand
Junction, Colorado. In February 2022, Peters attended a hearing in
Knisley’s case. At that hearing, the prosecution reported concerns
to the court that Peters was recording the proceeding on her iPad.
The Knisley court stopped the hearing and asked Peters whether
she was recording the proceeding. Peters denied recording it. The
court then explained that “there’s a sign on the door that says no
recording, video, audio, it’s all common sense for most folks to
know that.” The court added that “this is the one warning” and if it
“find[s] that someone has violated this order in the future, then [it
would] take appropriate action.”
¶3 Later, the Knisley court revisited the allegation and made the
following additional comments:
1 [I]t had come to the [c]ourt’s attention that someone may have been recording in the courtroom. I do not find one way or another as to whether that person was recording, or broadcasting, or audio recording[,] video recording[,] whatever it may have been. That individual told me that they were not doing any of those three things.
So, I relied on that representation in not entering any type of action at that time. If I had known[,] if it had been confirmed[,] I would have done something differently, and that’s in-part, because there is a decorum order that I entered [in Ms. Knisley’s case]. There’s also a sign on the outside of the door that specifically says that no one is authorized — I shouldn’t say the sign on the outside of the door. My decorum order says this — no one is authorized to record any portion of the [c]ourt’s proceedings via audio or — or video, and that, of course, would encompass broadcasting of the same. So, I make that additional record.
¶4 A few weeks later, the prosecution moved for a contempt
citation against Peters, requiring her to “show cause why she
should not be held in contempt for being untruthful to the [Knisley]
court.” Attached to the motion were affidavits from two individuals
who claimed that Peters had been recording the proceedings.
Though acknowledging “there is a lot to unravel with respect to
whether Peters could be charged with knowledge [of] a decorum
2 order, issued in [Knisley’s case] that was not served on [Peters],” the
district court issued the contempt citation.
¶5 At Peters’ contempt hearing, the prosecution presented three
witnesses who testified about Peters’ conduct and statements at the
Knisley hearing. After the hearing, the district court entered an oral
ruling finding that Peters had recorded the proceeding and was
dishonest to the Knisley court. And it found that her dishonesty
“obstructed the administration of justice” and offended the dignity
of the court. The district court, therefore, found Peters in contempt
and imposed a fine as a punitive sanction.
II. Analysis
¶6 Peters argues that the contempt judgment can’t stand because
insufficient evidence and findings supported it. We agree.
¶7 A party seeking punitive sanctions for contempt must
prove — and a court must find — beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) a lawful order existed; (2) the alleged contemnor had knowledge
of that order; (3) the alleged contemnor had the ability to comply
with that order; and (4) the alleged contemnor willfully refused to
comply with that order. People ex rel. State Eng’r v. Sease, 2018 CO
91, ¶ 23. Thus, as relevant here, to find a party in contempt and to
3 impose punitive sanctions, a court must find that the alleged
contemnor knew about a court order and willfully violated it. In re
Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 91-92 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶8 We review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a
contempt judgment. People in Interest of K.P., 2022 COA 60, ¶¶ 22,
37. But we review a district court’s contempt finding for an abuse
of discretion. Sease, ¶ 24. A court abuses its discretion when it
misconstrues or misapplies the law or its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021
COA 141, ¶ 25.
¶9 Peters is correct that the contempt judgment lacks several
required findings, without which it cannot stand. First, the
judgment doesn’t plainly identify — by date or otherwise — the
court order that Peters purportedly violated. And “[t]here can be no
contempt without proof of the existence of an underlying court
order which is violated.” In re Marriage of Zebedee, 778 P.2d 694,
697 (Colo. App. 1988); see also In re Marriage of Nussbeck, 974 P.2d
493, 499 (Colo. 1999) (The purpose of punitive contempt is “to
punish the offending party for refusal to obey lawful orders.”).
4 ¶ 10 Even so, the prosecution says that the district court “found
that [the Knisley court] noted that there was a sign on the
courtroom door ‘that says no recording, no video, audio.’” There are
three problems with this argument. First, the district court didn’t
make such a finding, and the prosecution’s purported support for
the statement is not from the court’s findings; rather, it’s simply a
colloquy between defense counsel and the court. Second, the court
couldn’t reasonably make such a finding. That’s because the
prosecution never introduced the sign at the contempt hearing, and
it’s unknown what the sign said or whether it was a court order.
And insofar as the prosecution points to the Knisley court’s general
reference to a decorum order entered in the Knisley case, the
district court specifically declined to judicially notice the Knisley
court’s statements “for the truth of the matter asserted,” though it
judicially noticed the transcript of the Knisley hearing for other
purposes. Thus, the record is devoid of any evidence about the
existence, scope, or content of the court order that Peters allegedly
violated. See Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc. v. Cross Slash
Ranch, LLC, 179 P.3d 237, 239 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Generally, there
can be no contempt unless an order or decree requires a party to
5 do, or refrain from doing, some specific act.”); see also People v.
Lockhart, 699 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Colo. 1985) (“A party may be held in
contempt only for refusal to do exactly what the court order
requires.”).
¶ 11 Second, even if we assume the prosecution presented some
evidence that the Kinsley court entered a decorum order that
prohibited recording the proceedings, the district court didn’t find
that Peters had actual knowledge of the order. And, again, it
couldn’t make that finding because the prosecution presented no
evidence that Peters — a nonparty to the Knisley case — had actual
notice or knowledge of such an order.1 The court seemingly
acknowledged the absence of proof that Peters had actual
knowledge of an order, stating that Peters’ actions at the Knisley
hearing indicated that she “was aware” that recording the
proceeding “was not acceptable, if not a violation of a [c]ourt order.”
But some general awareness that certain conduct isn’t “acceptable”
isn’t enough to support a punitive contempt finding. See People in
1 In fact, Knisley testified at Peters’ contempt hearing that she was
unaware of any prohibition against recording the proceedings in her criminal case.
6 Interest of F.S.B., 640 P.2d 268, 269 (Colo. App. 1981) (“[A]
contempt proceeding is fatally defective unless it is shown that the
contemnor had actual notice or knowledge of the existence of the
order at the time [she] is claimed to have violated it.”).
¶ 12 Finally, the district court didn’t find that Peters willfully
violated the purported decorum order. Because the purpose of
punitive contempt is to punish, “the contemnor’s mental state of
willful disobedience must be shown.” Cyr, 186 P.3d at 91-92 (A
willful act is done “voluntarily, knowingly, and with conscious
regard for the consequences of [one’s] conduct.” (quoting Nussbeck,
974 P.2d at 499)).
¶ 13 For these reasons, we vacate the contempt judgment as well as
the punitive sanction. Having so concluded, we needn’t consider
Peters’ remaining contentions.
III. Disposition
¶ 14 The contempt judgment is vacated.
JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.