Peo v. Patterson

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 29, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0448
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0448 Peo v Patterson 05-29-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0448 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22CR1231 Honorable Shay K. Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Allen David Patterson,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Welling and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 29, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Allen David Patterson, Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, Allen David Patterson (Patterson), appeals the

postconviction court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In June 2022, the prosecution charged Patterson with ten

counts of sexual assault on a child committed as part of a pattern

of abuse and two aggravated sex offense counts. Patterson pled

guilty to added counts of child abuse pursuant to section 18-6-

401(1)(a), (7)(a)(III), C.R.S. 2024, and sexual exploitation of a child

pursuant to section 18-6-403(3)(a), C.R.S. 2024, in exchange for the

dismissal of the original charges and a stipulated, aggregate

sentence of thirty years in the custody of the Department of

Corrections.

¶3 Patterson filed a motion titled “Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,

and/or Dismiss for want/or Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

and/or Personal Jurisdiction.” He alleged, among other things, that

the court lacked jurisdiction to enter a conviction on his guilty pleas

because the Colorado Revised Statutes were constitutionally

required to, but did not, include enacting clauses for the statutes

defining the offenses to which he pled guilty.

1 ¶4 The postconviction court construed Patterson’s motion as filed

pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c) and denied it without holding a hearing

or appointing counsel. See Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(III) (defendants may

challenge their conviction on the basis that the court lacked subject

matter or personal jurisdiction); see also People v. Knoeppchen,

2019 COA 34, ¶ 6 (“[T]he substantive issues raised in a motion,

rather than the label placed on such motion, . . . determine how the

matter should be characterized.”), overruled on other grounds by

People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 47 n.16. Relying on People v.

Washington, 969 P.2d 788 (Colo. App. 1998), the court found that it

had jurisdiction over this matter because the official session laws

defining the offenses to which Patterson pled guilty properly

contained the constitutionally required enacting clauses.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶5 We review a district court’s denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion

without a hearing de novo. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14. A

Crim. P. 35(c) motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing

only where the motion, files, and record clearly establish that the

defendant’s allegations are without merit and do not warrant relief.

Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003).

2 ¶6 Article V, Section 18, of the Colorado Constitution, titled

“Enacting clause,” provides that “[t]he style of the laws of this state

shall be: ‘Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of

Colorado’.”

¶7 The session laws of Colorado are the official publication of the

enactments of the General Assembly. Washington, 969 P.2d at 789;

see also § 24-70-223(1), C.R.S. 2024. The Colorado Revised

Statutes include, among other things, a compilation of the session

laws. Washington, 969 P.2d at 789; see also §§ 2-5-101 to -126,

C.R.S. 2024. The Colorado Revised Statutes are the official

publication of the statutes of Colorado and may be considered as

evidence in Colorado courts. § 2-5-118(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; People v.

Summers, 208 P.3d 251, 259 (Colo. 2009).

¶8 To craft the Colorado Revised Statutes, the revisor of statutes

is required to “compile, edit, arrange, and prepare for publication all

laws of the state of Colorado of a general and permanent nature.”

§ 2-5-101(1), C.R.S. 2024. To fulfill this duty, the revisor must

“[a]dopt a uniform system of punctuation, capitalization, and

wording”; “[e]liminate all obsolete and redundant wording of laws”;

“[c]orrect obvious errors and inconsistencies”; “[c]orrect inaccurate

3 references to the titles of officers, departments, or other agencies of

the state and to other statutes, and make such other name changes

as are necessary to be consistent with the law currently in effect”;

“[e]liminate any duplications in law and any laws repealed directly

or by implication”; and “[c]larify existing laws, modernize

terminology, and make such other nonsubstantive changes as the

committee considers proper.” § 2-5-103(1)(a)-(f), C.R.S. 2024; see

also Washington, 969 P.2d at 789. The revisor is authorized to

make changes in the arrangement and terminology of the statutes

to improve the style and clarity of the laws. § 2-5-103(2).

¶9 The compilation contains both statutory laws and

nonstatutory material. § 2-5-101(3); see also § 2-5-102, C.R.S.

2024. The nonstatutory material includes references to the

statutory history of each section. § 2-5-102(1)(a). These references

to the session laws are to “permit a researcher to locate the source

legislation.” Washington, 969 P.2d at 789.

¶ 10 “[T]he statutory compilation is produced to aid the public in

locating relevant statutes and ascertaining their precise language

by combining initial enactments, amendments, and repeals into a

single source organized by subject.” Id.

4 III. Analysis

¶ 11 On appeal, Patterson raises multiple challenges to, and asks

us to not follow, the holding in Washington. We are not persuaded.

¶ 12 In Washington, the defendant argued, like here, that the court

lacked jurisdiction to enter conviction on his guilty plea because the

statute defining the crime to which he pled guilty, as it was

published in the Colorado Revised Statutes, lacked the enacting

clause. Id. at 788-89. A division of this court rejected this

argument, reasoning that “because the act adopting the statutory

compilation itself contains the proper enacting clause,” omitting

that clause “from the [published] Colorado Revised Statutes does

not render the statutes unconstitutional, and there was no

constitutional deficiency in [the] defendant’s conviction.” Id. at 790.

¶ 13 We agree with the reasoning in Washington and conclude that

the enacting clause is not constitutionally required to be included

in the Colorado Revised Statutes. Cf. Summers, 208 P.3d at 259 (a

statutory provision that appeared in the session laws, but not the

Colorado Revised Statutes, was enforceable).

¶ 14 Because the session laws defining the offenses to which

Patterson pled guilty contained enacting clauses, see Ch. 216, sec.

5 2, § 18-6-401(1)(a), 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 801, 803; Ch. 274, sec.

1, § 18-6-403(3)(a), 2015 Colo. Sess. Laws 1113, 1115, we conclude

that the court had jurisdiction to enter convictions on his guilty

pleas.

¶ 15 Finally, Patterson attempts to incorporate by reference the

other arguments raised in his postconviction motion, but which he

has not specifically reasserted on appeal. This is not permitted.

See C.A.R. 57; People v. Gutierrez-Vite, 2014 COA 159, ¶ 28.

Accordingly, those arguments are abandoned, and we decline to

address them. See People v. Brooks, 250 P.3d 771, 772 (Colo. App.

2010).

IV. Conclusion

¶ 16 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GROVE concur.