24CA0110 Peo v Orozco 09-10-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0110 Weld County District Court No. 19CR2105 Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alejandro Orozco, Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Grove and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 10, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Joseph Paul Hough, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Alejandro Orozco, appeals the judgment of conviction entered against him after a jury found him guilty of numerous counts of sexual assault on a child, one count of attempted sexual assault on a child, one count of aggravated incest, and various aggravated sex offense sentence enhancers. On appeal, Orozco contends that the trial court erred by (1) admitting generalized expert testimony and (2) denying his motion to sever the charges into separate cases for each child victim. We disagree with his contentions and affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 Orozco was charged with multiple offenses based on evidence that over a three-year period, he repeatedly sexually assaulted his biological daughter, L.L.; L.L.’s half-sister, N.L.; and his niece, A.K. — all of whom were under the age of fifteen. (At the end of the charged period, L.L. was ten, N.L. was eight, and A.K. was six.)
¶3 The three victims testified at trial; Orozco did not. Defense counsel argued to the jury that the victims may have been coached and weren’t credible due to their delayed disclosure, inconsistencies in their testimony, and the lack of corroborating physical evidence.
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¶4 The jury acquitted Orozco of three of the charges. However, it found him guilty of twenty counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust as to a victim under age fifteen or as part of a pattern of abuse (fifteen counts as to L.L., four counts as to N.L., and one count as to A.K.), one count of attempt to commit sexual assault on a child by a person in a position of trust (as to L.L.), one count of aggravated incest (as to L.L.), and various aggravated sex offense sentence enhancers. He received an indeterminate sentence of ninety-six years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. This appeal followed.
II. Generalized Expert Testimony
¶5 Orozco contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting expert testimony pertaining to child sexual assault. Specifically, he asserts that the prosecution’s generalized expert was unqualified and that her testimony was irrelevant, unreliable, and unhelpful to the jury. We aren’t persuaded.
A. Legal Standards
¶6 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69, ¶ 44. A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
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unreasonable, or unfair or if it misconstrues or misapplies the law. People v. Toro-Ospina, 2023 COA 45, ¶ 30.
¶7 As a general rule, all relevant evidence is admissible. CRE 402. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. CRE 401. Relevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. CRE 403.
¶8 Under CRE 702, “a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education[] may testify . . . in the form of an opinion or otherwise” if their “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
¶9 Courts apply a four-part test to determine the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) the underlying scientific principles must be reasonably reliable; (2) the expert must be qualified to offer the testimony; (3) the testimony must be helpful to the jury; and (4) the testimony must satisfy CRE 403. People v. Martinez, 2024 CO 69, ¶ 20; People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77-79 (Colo. 2001).
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¶ 10 The third requirement — helpfulness to the jury — turns on whether the expert testimony fits the particular case. Cooper, ¶ 49. “[G]eneralized expert testimony fits a case if it has a sufficient logical connection to the factual issues to be helpful to the jury while still clearing the ever-present CRE 403 admissibility bar.” Id. at ¶ 52; accord People v. Coons, 2021 CO 70, ¶ 42.
B. Additional Background
¶ 11 Before trial, the prosecution endorsed a witness as an expert in child sexual assault victim dynamics and behaviors. Orozco objected on the grounds that the witness wasn’t qualified to opine on such topics and that her proposed testimony wasn’t relevant to the issues in the case. Orozco asked the court to exclude the expert’s testimony or, alternatively, to hold a Shreck hearing.
¶ 12 The trial court issued an order setting the matter for a Shreck hearing. In its order, the court observed that “the principles behind the field of child assault victim dynamics and behaviors are reasonably reliable” and that “[t]estimony in that area is permissible so long as it is limited to educating jurors on counter-intuitive behaviors to assist the jurors in understanding and assessing witness testimony and does not bolster or speak directly to the
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credibility of any witnesses.” The court found that the endorsed witness was qualified to testify as an expert based on her “years of direct experience working with victims, including child victims of sexual assault,” and her familiarity with the literature in the area. However, the court expressed concern with the scope of the expert’s proposed testimony — specifically, whether the testimony had a sufficient nexus to the case to be useful to the jury. Accordingly, the court focused the Shreck hearing on that issue.
¶ 13 After the hearing, the court ruled to allow the expert testimony. The court found that the expert’s testimony about counterintuitive behaviors by child sexual assault victims would be helpful to the jury. The court cited evidence that the victims in this case delayed reporting, continued to spend time with Orozco, and expressed a desire to protect him from going to jail, all of which the court said might seem counterintuitive. And it found that “delayed disclosure and family dynamics is not something that is within the understanding or province of a general person.” The court also found that the expert’s testimony about grooming would be helpful, noting that, while there wasn’t evidence of gift buying, there was evidence of Orozco building trust with the victims. The court
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explained that the testimony could help the jury to “understand[] why an individual would continue to spend time with an offender [and] would want to protect them and not report them even when something like this was happening.” The court made clear, however, that the expert’s testimony would be limited to rebutting potential misconceptions about victim behavior and would not include whether the children in this case were victims because they acted consistently with how victims might be expected to act.
¶ 14 The expert testified at trial consistent with that limitation.
C. Analysis
¶ 15 Considering the four requirements set forth in Shreck, we conclude that the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by admitting the expert’s testimony.
¶ 16 First, the scientific principles underlying the expert’s testimony are reasonably reliable. Orozco doesn’t develop any argument challenging this point. See People v. Cuellar, 2023 COA 20, ¶ 44 (declining to address an undeveloped argument). And, indeed, “[n]umerous Colorado appellate courts have recognized the value and upheld the reliability of [generalized] expert testimony regarding the nonintuitive reactions of victims in sexual assault
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cases.” People v. Vanderpauye, 2021 COA 121, ¶ 57, aff’d, 2023 CO 42. This is also true of child sexual assault cases. See People v. Shannon, 2024 COA 41, ¶ 32 (citing cases).
¶ 17 Second, the expert was qualified to offer the testimony. Orozco points out that the expert hadn’t worked as a therapist in the previous twenty-five years and hadn’t met with any sexual assault victims in the previous two years and that the scholarly thinking in the area changes constantly. But the standard to qualify someone as an expert is liberal and doesn’t require specific degrees, training certificates, professional memberships, experiences, or other credentials. See Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Colo. 2008). Instead, an expert may be “qualified by any one of the five factors specified in [Rule 702]: knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Id.
¶ 18 And there was ample information before the trial court regarding the expert’s qualifications. That information indicated that the expert had a master’s degree in social work; had worked with victims (including child victims) for many years as a caseworker, therapist, and consultant; and had testified in well over a hundred cases on issues of sexual assault, sexual assault on a
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child, domestic violence, and similar issues. This was more than sufficient to qualify her as an expert. See id.; see also People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371, 383 (Colo. App. 2007) (a therapist who had seventeen years’ experience working with victims of sexual abuse and had testified as an expert more than twenty-five times was sufficiently qualified to serve as an expert).
¶ 19 Third, the expert’s testimony was helpful to the jury because it fit the case. More specifically, the testimony was relevant to the jurors’ assessment of the victims’ seemingly counterintuitive behaviors, particularly given that the defense was challenging their credibility based in part on their delayed reporting. See Vanderpauye, ¶ 57; Shannon, ¶ 32; see also Whitman, 205 P.3d at 383 (Expert testimony “providing a relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of [a] child’s conduct and demeanor which the jury could not otherwise bring to its evaluation of [the child’s] credibility is helpful and appropriate in cases of sexual abuse of children, and particularly of [young] children.” (final alteration in original) (quoting People v. Aldrich, 849 P.2d 821, 829 (Colo. App. 1992))).
¶ 20 Orozco nonetheless argues that the average person has sufficient knowledge of concepts like delayed reporting and
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grooming, such that expert testimony on those issues is not helpful. It was well within the trial court’s discretion to conclude otherwise, particularly given the expert’s testimony at the hearing about continuing misperceptions on those issues and the case law supporting the admissibility of expert testimony on such issues. See, e.g., Shannon, ¶ 32 (“[T]he helpfulness and admissibility of [generalized expert] testimony in a case such as this [involving, among other things, delayed reporting and grooming] is amply supported by Colorado case law.”); see also Romero v. People, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 15 (“[A]n ordinary citizen could not be expected to possess the experience, skills, or knowledge required to understand the concept of ‘grooming’ as it relates to sexual predation.”); People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 952 (Colo. 1987) (Expert testimony may be “helpful to [a] jury in determining what effect should be given to [a] victim’s delay in reporting [a sexual assault].”), abrogated on other grounds by Shreck, 22 P.3d 68.
¶ 21 Orozco also argues that there was no evidence of grooming in this case. But the trial court found, with record support, that while there wasn’t evidence of gift giving as a form of grooming, there was evidence of “trust” and “relationship building” between Orozco and
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the victims. And the court explained that grooming was “essentially . . . about building trust, building relationships,” and may be connected with delayed disclosure. Accordingly, there was a sufficient basis to allow the expert’s testimony relating to grooming (although she never used that term).
¶ 22 And fourth, the expert’s testimony satisfied the balancing test of CRE 403. Again, Orozco doesn’t develop any argument challenging this point. See Cuellar, ¶ 44. At any rate, as we’ve stated, the expert’s testimony was very relevant to the case. And Orozco hasn’t articulated any danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed the testimony’s probative value.
¶ 23 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the expert testimony.
III. Severance of Charges
¶ 24 Orozco also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to sever the charges into separate cases for each child victim. Again, we aren’t persuaded.
A. Legal Standards
¶ 25 Under Crim. P. 8(a)(2), multiple offenses may be charged in a single information if they are “of the same or similar character,” are
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based on acts that are “connected together,” or are based on acts that constitute “parts of a common scheme or plan.” See Buell v. People, 2019 CO 27, ¶ 21. As relevant here, when assessing whether offenses are of the same or similar character, courts consider factors such as the elements of the offenses, the temporal proximity and physical location of the acts, the likelihood that the evidence will overlap, the modus operandi of the offenses, and the identity of the victims. Bondsteel v. People, 2019 CO 26, ¶ 38.
¶ 26 Under Crim. P. 14, “[i]f it appears that a defendant . . . is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses . . . , the court may order . . . separate trials of counts.”
¶ 27 We review a trial court’s decision whether to sever charges for an abuse of discretion. People v. Garcia, 2012 COA 79, ¶ 23. Because the decision is discretionary, a defendant challenging the denial of a request to sever must show that trying the charges together caused “actual prejudice” and that the jury was unable to separate the facts and legal principles applicable to each offense. Bondsteel, ¶ 59 (quoting Garcia, ¶ 28).
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B. Additional Background
¶ 28 The complaint and information charged Orozco with offenses relating to all three child victims (as well as a fourth child who is no longer at issue because the count relating to that child was dismissed). Before trial, Orozco filed a motion to sever the charges as to each child.
¶ 29 The trial court denied the motion. While the court recognized that the charges arose from allegations of sexual abuse against four different children, it concluded that the counts were of the same or similar character because “the charge date range is the same; the locations are the same or similar; the children are all close family members; . . . [and] the pattern of grooming . . . [was] consistent.” The court found that, as to three of the children, “there [we]re allegations of having the children perform sexual acts on each other either with or in front of [Orozco],” the children had “confided in each other and made a decision not to tell on [Orozco],” and the disclosure occurred at the same time. And even as to the fourth child, the court found that “there [wa]s such broad overlap in terms of her disclosure” and the investigations were so “inextricably
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intertwined” that it was too difficult to separate out the charges as to her from those as to the other children.
¶ 30 The court further concluded that Orozco hadn’t shown that he would be unduly prejudiced by trying the charges together. It also determined that the evidence as to each child would be admissible in separate trials as to the other children under CRE 404(b) and section 16-10-301, C.R.S. 2026, to show a common plan, scheme, identity, modus operandi, or intent. In particular, as to modus operandi, the court explained that the alleged acts were “of . . . a similar nature” and involved “children perform[ing] acts with each other,” and so they would be relevant “to disprove any defense that this is some kind of accident or incidental touching [and] to show that there was intent on the part of [Orozco].” The court went on to detail how the evidence satisfied each of the four requirements for admission under Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence related to material facts, that is, whether Orozco committed the acts and what his intent was; (2) those material facts were logically relevant; (3) the relevance was independent of any inference that Orozco had a bad character and acted in conformity with that character; and (4) the evidence’s probative value wasn’t substantially outweighed by the
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danger of unfair prejudice, particularly given that the evidence was highly relevant and that any prejudicial impact could be minimized with a limiting instruction. See generally People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990); see also § 16-10-301(1) (“[E]vidence of other sexual acts is typically relevant and highly probative [in sexual offense cases], and it is expected that normally the probative value of such evidence will outweigh any danger of unfair prejudice, even when incidents are remote from one another in time.”).
¶ 31 Finally, the court noted that it would give the jury an instruction about considering each offense separately. The court gave such an instruction at trial.
C. Analysis
¶ 32 We conclude that the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying the motion to sever.
¶ 33 We agree with the trial court’s assessment that the charges pertaining to each of the victims were of the same or similar character. As the trial court explained, the victims were all close family members, the timeframe for the assaults was the same, the assaults took place in the same locations, and the type of assault was similar as to each of the victims. There was also an overlap in
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evidence, given that some of the offenses involved more than one of the victims, the victims confided in one another about the assaults and their decisions to delay disclosure, and all of the offenses were uncovered as part of the same investigation. Thus, we reject Orozco’s argument that the offenses were only “generally similar.” See Bondsteel, ¶¶ 40-42 (offenses involving separate assaults were properly joined when they involved assaults on women in similar locations and circumstances, they occurred within six months of one another, the investigations were intertwined, and they shared some common evidence); Garcia, ¶¶ 2, 30-32 (offenses involving sexual assaults against five different women over the course of a year and a half were properly joined).
¶ 34 We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Orozco didn’t sufficiently establish harm resulting from trying the charges together. Generally, a party can’t establish prejudice when the evidence of each incident would have been admissible in separate trials. Buell, ¶ 31. Here, the trial court ruled that even if it were to sever the charges as to each child, it would exercise its discretion to admit evidence in each case of the incidents relating to the other children. See People v. Lancaster, 2022 COA 82, ¶ 37 (“Trial courts
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are accorded substantial discretion when deciding whether to admit evidence of other acts.” (quoting Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 463 (Colo. 2009))). Orozco doesn’t address that ruling in his briefing and, thus, apparently concedes that the evidence would’ve been cross-admissible in separate trials.
¶ 35 Moreover, while Orozco suggests that the joint trial may have affected his decision not to testify, he doesn’t develop that argument by explaining what testimony he might have offered in defense of the charges, as to which victim such testimony would’ve been offered, or how the joint trial affected his decision not to offer that testimony. See Cuellar, ¶ 44.
¶ 36 Nor is there any indication that the jury was unable to separate the facts and legal principles applicable to each offense. See Bondsteel, ¶ 59. The jury was instructed to “independently assess the guilt or innocence of [Orozco] on each crime,” and we presume that the jury followed that instruction. See People v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA 1, ¶ 91 (“Absent a contrary showing, we presume that the jury followed [an] instruction.”). Indeed, the jury acquitted Orozco on three charges, suggesting that it “carefully considered each count and did not blur together the facts and legal
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theories involved in each [charge] but rather kept them separate.” Bondsteel, ¶ 62; accord Garcia, ¶ 30.
¶ 37 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion to sever.
IV. Disposition
¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.