Peo v. Ojeda

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 27, 2025
• Docket: 22CA1153
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

22CA1153 Peo v Ojeda 02-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1153 City and County of Denver District Court No. 20CR2166 Honorable Ericka F.H. Englert, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Amadeus J. Ojeda,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Brown and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 27, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Cynthia A. Harvey, Alternate Defense Counsel, Aurora, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Amadeus J. Ojeda, appeals the district court’s

judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of second

degree assault with a deadly weapon as an act of domestic violence.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Ojeda was arrested after police received an early morning

disturbance call from one of Ojeda’s neighbors. After interviewing

Ojeda’s wife — the victim of the assault — the police concluded that

Ojeda and his wife had an argument in the kitchen, during which

Ojeda grabbed a hammer and struck his wife several times on her

head and arms, causing visible lacerations.

¶3 A jury found Ojeda guilty of assault in the second degree with

a deadly weapon as an act of domestic violence. The district court

sentenced him to ninety days in jail and two years of probation.

II. Discussion

¶4 Ojeda contends that prospective jurors A and D — both of

whom ultimately served on the jury — showed disqualifying bias in

their answers during voir dire, and the district court erred by

denying his counsel’s challenges for cause to these prospective

jurors. We disagree as to both jurors.

1 A. Standard of Review

¶5 Trial courts have “discretionary authority over the conduct

and the scope of the voir dire examination.” People v. Garcia, 2022

COA 144, ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Flockhart, 2013 CO 42, ¶ 37). So

“[w]e review a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause to

prospective jurors for an abuse of discretion.” People v. Clemens,

2017 CO 89, ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its decision

is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or if it misapplies the

law. People v. Montoya, 2024 CO 20, ¶ 47.

¶6 In determining whether the court abused its discretion, we

review the entire voir dire. People v. Samuels, 228 P.3d 229, 242

(Colo. App. 2009) (citing Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo.

1999)). In doing so, however, we defer to the district court’s

assessment of a prospective juror’s credibility and refrain from

second-guessing the court based on the cold record. Clemens, ¶ 13.

B. Applicable Law

¶7 “Both the United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee

criminal defendants the right to a trial by an impartial jury.” Id. at

¶ 15 (first citing U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; and then citing Colo.

Const. art. II, § 16). “Procedures for preventing biased jurors from

2 serving are critical to the protection of the defendant’s right to an

impartial jury.” Clark v. People, 2024 CO 55, ¶ 2 (citing Georgia v.

McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58 (1992)). “A trial court must grant a

challenge for cause if a prospective juror is unwilling or unable to

accept the basic principles of criminal law and to render a fair and

impartial verdict based upon the evidence admitted at trial and the

court’s instructions.” Morrison v. People, 19 P.3d 668, 672 (Colo.

2000); accord People v. LePage, 397 P.3d 1074, 1081 (Colo. App.

2011), aff’d on other grounds, 2014 CO 13; see also

§ 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2024; Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X).

¶8 But the mere possibility that a prospective juror may have said

something indicating a possible bias against the defendant doesn’t

necessarily require dismissal of the juror, provided the prospective

juror agrees “to set aside any preconceived notions and make a

decision based on the evidence and the court’s instructions.”

Flockhart, ¶ 36 (quoting People v. Lefebre, 5 P.3d 295, 301 (Colo.

2000)). Accordingly, the district court “may properly consider ‘a

prospective juror’s assurance that he or she can fairly and

impartially serve on the case.’” LePage, 397 P.3d at 1081 (quoting

People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1243 (Colo. 1988)). The court

3 must, however, grant a challenge when “a potential juror’s

statements compel the inference that he or she cannot decide

crucial issues fairly . . . in the absence of rehabilitative questioning

or other counter-balancing information.” People v. Merrow, 181

P.3d 319, 321 (Colo. App. 2007); see Vigil v. People, 2019 CO 105,

¶¶ 11, 24 (section 16-10-103(1)(j) requires a court to remove

prospective jurors who show actual enmity or bias against the

defendant or the State).

C. Analysis

1. Juror A

¶9 Ojeda contends that Juror A showed bias warranting

dismissal because she said (1) men are generally more likely to

commit domestic violence than women, and (2) she would be “more

likely” to believe a hypothetical victim’s initial report of abuse over a

later contradictory report. We disagree.

a. Juror A’s Statements and the Court’s Ruling

¶ 10 During voir dire, Ojeda’s counsel asked Juror A whether “men

are more likely to commit domestic violence.” She said, “Yes.”

When asked why, she explained, “[B]ecause of stories I’ve heard and

statistics that I’ve heard in the media.” But Juror A also said that

4 she didn’t believe Ojeda in particular was more likely to commit

domestic violence just because he was a man; rather, men, “in

general, are.”

¶ 11 Ojeda’s attorney also asked Juror A, “[W]ould you be more

likely to believe [a victim of domestic abuse’s] first story or her

second story?” Juror A, indicating that she would be more likely to

believe the first story, explained, “Statistically speaking, I know that

that is a common occurrence. I know that women facing abuse are

often abused many, many times before they come forward, and it’s

a really typical thing to do.”

¶ 12 Ojeda’s counsel followed up, “What if there was no physical

evidence to support the first story. Would you still believe it more

just because it was the first story?” (Emphasis added.) Juror A

replied, “I think I would be a little bit biased for that because it’s

hard to have evidence in these sort of situations.”

¶ 13 Ojeda’s counsel then asked Juror A, “If there’s not any

evidence supporting the first story, would you expect me or [co-

counsel] or Mr. Ojeda to tell you why someone would not tell the

truth? (Emphasis added.) Juror A said she knew Ojeda wasn’t

obligated to produce any evidence and then said,

5 I think a question I have here is the difference between what we can use, as a jury, with evidence versus what we hear from witnesses. Because I think in a case like this, what we hear from a witness might be more . . . there might be more learned from a witness than from hard evidence.

¶ 14 Earlier, Juror A had confirmed that she was comfortable

affording Ojeda the presumption of innocence and holding the

prosecution to its burden of proof and that she wouldn’t let a female

friend’s experience with domestic violence affect her decision.

¶ 15 The district court denied Ojeda’s counsel’s challenge for cause

to Juror A after concluding that she “would provide Mr. Ojeda the

presumption of innocence” because “she does not presume that Mr.

Ojeda is more likely to have committed this crime given that he is a

man . . . [and] said she would follow the law.”

b. Application of the Law

¶ 16 The district court didn’t abuse its discretion. Nothing in Juror

A’s statements showed that she was “unwilling or unable to accept

the basic principles of criminal law and to render a fair and

impartial verdict based upon the evidence admitted at trial and the

court’s instructions.” Morrison, 19 P.3d at 672. Indeed, Juror A

confirmed that she didn’t harbor any bias against Ojeda personally

6 despite her belief that men are more likely than women to commit

domestic violence. And she indicated that she was open to

following the court’s instructions based on the evidence. See

Flockhart, ¶ 36.

¶ 17 As for Juror A’s answers concerning the first

report/recantation hypothetical, the details of the initial

hypothetical were unclear, and counsel later changed the facts

more than once.1 As the district court noted, Juror A said that she

didn’t fully understand what she could or couldn’t consider when

weighing evidence. We aren’t persuaded that the court abused its

discretion by crediting Juror A’s statement that she could follow the

law, particularly in light of the rather confusing exchange regarding

counsel’s hypothetical and the fact Juror A hadn’t yet been

instructed as to how she could consider different types of evidence.

¶ 18 Ojeda’s reliance on People v. Hancock, 220 P.3d 1015, 1017-20

(Colo. App. 2009), overruled on other grounds by People v. Novotny,

2014 CO 18, is misplaced. In Hancock, a prospective juror said he

1 Ojeda’s counsel first set up the hypothetical with no mention of

evidence, then changed it to involve no physical evidence, then — in a question focused on Ojeda’s burden to produce evidence — changed it to involve no evidence at all.

7 believed it was defense counsel’s job to prove that his client wasn’t

guilty. Id. But Juror A confirmed that she understood the

prosecution’s burden of proof and that Ojeda didn’t have any

burden.

2. Juror D

¶ 19 Ojeda next contends that the district court erred by denying

his counsel’s challenge for cause to Juror D because Juror D said

(1) he had personal experience with domestic abuse; (2) people with

prior convictions might be less trustworthy than those without

criminal convictions; and (3) he would want to judge credibility by

looking a witness in the eyes. We reject these contentions.

a. Juror D’s Statements and the Court’s Ruling

¶ 20 Juror D told the prosecutor that his ex-wife was a victim of

domestic violence in her previous marriage. He said that her

experience was severe, had a lasting impact on her, and affected her

marriage to him. But when the prosecutor asked if this experience

would affect his judgment in this case, Juror D replied, “Not really

because it didn’t happen to me personally.”

¶ 21 Ojeda’s counsel asked prospective jurors whether someone

who had been convicted of a crime was less trustworthy (Ojeda had

8 a prior conviction). Juror D said he’d consider a conviction “a little

bit” because someone with a conviction is “trying a little too hard

maybe to prove themselves and give up and go back to the way they

were.” He continued, “I worked construction for 25 years and

worked with a lot of individuals that went to jail for various reasons,

said that they were straight and narrow, got a job. Some of them

did, some of them didn’t. I’m kind of 50/50 on it.” When Ojeda’s

counsel asked him whether he would have a hard time following an

instruction to assess each witness’s credibility if any witness had a

prior conviction, he said, “I’d have to probably see the individual in

their eyes, listen to what they’re saying and how they say it, how

they handle themselves because that will say a lot.”

¶ 22 Ojeda’s counsel challenged Juror D for cause, arguing that

Juror D’s ex-wife’s experience with domestic violence “affected their

relationship severely” and, because Ojeda had a prior conviction,

Juror D’s statements about persons with prior convictions meant

that, if Ojeda chose to testify, Juror D couldn’t fairly judge his

credibility.

¶ 23 The district court denied the challenge. It concluded that

Juror D hadn’t indicated that his ex-wife’s experience with domestic

9 violence would affect his ability to fairly evaluate the evidence in

this case and that Juror D’s statements concerning persons with

prior convictions didn’t indicate that he would be unable to follow

the law on assessing credibility were he to be “instructed in that

regard.”

¶ 24 Again, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion. Despite

Juror D’s ex-wife’s experience having affected him, Juror D said

that experience never interfered with the trust in their relationship.

In any event, Juror D confirmed that there was nothing about his

ex-wife’s experience that would give him concerns about being a fair

juror and that he presumed Ojeda was innocent.

¶ 25 Juror D also said that a prior conviction was only one factor

he would consider in determining witness credibility. Indeed, he

would consider “a lot of things.” And, as the People correctly point

out, a prior felony conviction, if admissible as evidence, is

something that a juror may lawfully consider in assessing witness

credibility. See § 13-90-101, C.R.S. 2024 (evidence of a prior felony

conviction is admissible “for the purpose of affecting the credibility

of [a] witness”). A defendant isn’t excepted from that rule, so

10 nothing Juror D said reflected an unwillingness or inability to follow

the law or impermissibly “chilled” Ojeda’s choice whether to testify.

III. Disposition

¶ 26 We affirm the district court’s judgment of conviction.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE YUN concur.