Peo v. Miedema

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0618
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0618 Peo v Miedema 08-28-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0618 Lincoln County District Court No. 22CR31 Honorable H. Clay Hurst, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Mitchell A. Miedema,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Welling and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 28, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Leo T. Nguyen, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Molly K. Turner, Deputy State Public Defender, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Mitchell A. Miedema, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of a misdemeanor

harassment charge. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have

found the following facts.

¶3 Miedema lived with his romantic partner, N.A., and her two

children. N.A. loaned a smartphone to Miedema, which he used to

message his ex-girlfriend. N.A. discovered the messages and

decided to confront Miedema about them.

¶4 Miedema was still texting his ex-girlfriend when N.A.

confronted him. N.A. tried to grab the phone out of his hand, and

in response, Miedema choked her. When he stopped, N.A. retreated

to her bedroom and locked the door.

¶5 The next morning, N.A. dropped her children off at school and

then went to Big R, her place of employment. When N.A. arrived at

Big R, she told a coworker, Josh Furman, what had happened.

Furman was a state trooper who worked at Big R while off duty. He

told N.A. that he was a “mandatory reporter” and that she should

tell the police about the incident.

1 ¶6 From there, N.A. went to the police, where she described the

incident to Limon Chief of Police Lynn Yowell and Officer Jacob

Herrera. Two weeks later, she filed a victim impact statement with

the Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney’s Office. According to her

later testimony, N.A. never advised the officers, nor wrote in her

victim impact statement, that she had been advised by anyone to

report the incident to the police.

¶7 Miedema was arrested on charges of second degree and third

degree assault. The prosecution later added another second degree

assault charge and a harassment charge. The prosecution dropped

the felony charges before trial, and the jury found Miedema guilty of

a single count of harassment. He was sentenced to six months in

jail suspended upon the successful completion of two years of

supervised probation, running consecutively to his sentence in a

separate case.

II. Issues on Appeal

¶8 Miedema contends that the district court erred (1) when it

failed to sanction the prosecution for an alleged Crim. P. 16

violation and (2) by admitting several out-of-court statements made

2 by Miedema’s ex-girlfriend without calling her as a witness at trial

in violation of the Confrontation Clause.

A. Alleged Crim. P. 16 Violation

¶9 Miedema first contends that the court erred by declining to

sanction the prosecution for violating Crim. P. 16 based on its

allegedly late disclosure that N.A. had told Furman about the

incident before reporting it to the police. He claims further that the

delayed notification prevented the defense from effectively preparing

for trial and that any remedy short of dismissal would have unfairly

required Miedema to waive speedy trial. We are not persuaded.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 10 On the day that trial began, the prosecutor disclosed to

Miedema’s attorney that, when N.A. arrived at Big R the morning

after the incident, she told Furman what had happened. The

prosecutor also disclosed that Furman was an off-duty state trooper

and that he had told N.A. that he was a mandatory reporter and

that she should tell the police about the incident.

¶ 11 Although the prosecution had endorsed Furman as a potential

witness more than nine months before trial, defense counsel

contended that the prosecution had nonetheless violated its Crim.

3 P. 16 discovery obligations by not disclosing the details of the

conversation sooner and argued that Miedema was prejudiced

because those details could impact N.A.’s credibility. Defense

counsel asked the court to dismiss the charges as a sanction

because granting a continuance to allow the defense to follow up on

the newly disclosed information would force Miedema to choose

between his speedy trial right and his right to a fair trial.

¶ 12 The court declined to impose sanctions, finding that there was

no Crim. P. 16 violation because Furman had been disclosed as a

potential witness and, in an earlier motion, the defense indicated

that it planned to interview him. Moreover, there appeared to be no

written report about the conversation between N.A. and Furman.

The court also noted that more than a month remained before the

expiration of Miedema’s statutory speedy trial deadline, and it

further confirmed that Miedema did not wish to delay the trial in

order to have the opportunity to investigate the new evidence.

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 13 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Campbell v. People, 2019 CO 66, ¶ 21. A trial court

abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,

4 unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. People v.

Williams, 2019 COA 32, ¶ 21.

¶ 14 In every criminal case, the parties are obligated to disclose

certain information before trial. See Crim. P. 16. “By permitting

the prosecution and defense to obtain relevant information prior to

trial,” our supreme court has explained, “[the discovery rules]

promote fairness in the criminal process by reducing the risk of trial

by ambush.” People v. Grant, 2021 COA 53, ¶ 20 (quoting Lanari v.

People, 827 P.2d 495, 499 (Colo. 1992)).

¶ 15 As relevant to Miedema’s appellate arguments, Crim. P. 16

requires the prosecution to disclose “any material or information

within [its] possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of

the accused as to the offense charged.” Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2). The

prosecution’s disclosure obligation extends to information “in the

possession or control” of “any others who have participated in the

investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly

report, or with reference to the particular case have reported,” to

the prosecution. Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3); Grant, ¶ 22. The rule requires

that such information be produced “as soon as practicable but not

later than 35 days before trial.” Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3). If a discovery

5 violation occurs, the trial court determines an appropriate sanction.

People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶ 13.

3. Analysis

¶ 16 Miedema contends that information about N.A.’s conversation

with Furman was subject to the disclosure requirements of Crim.

P. 16(I)(a)(2). He also asserts that, because of Furman’s

employment as a state trooper, Furman’s participation in the

conversation, as well as Yowell’s alleged knowledge of it, triggered

the prosecution’s disclosure obligations under Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3).

By failing to disclose anything about the conversation until the first

day of trial, Miedema argues, the prosecution violated the

disclosure deadline set forth in Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3).

¶ 17 At the threshold, it is not at all clear that information about

N.A.’s conversation with Furman would have “tend[ed] to negate the

guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or would tend to

reduce the punishment therefor.” Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2). While

Miedema asserts that it was “information relevant to the credibility

of a key witness” — which can be exculpatory, see People v.

Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167, 174-75 (Colo. 2001) — he also

acknowledges that “[n]obody knows exactly what [N.A. and Furman]

6 spoke about” during their interaction at Big R. Moreover, he

concedes that “it is possible that [N.A.’s] statements to [Furman]

were entirely consistent with her later statements to police,” and

that Furman might not have offered “coaching [or] advice about how

she should file the report.” In other words, Miedema’s assertion

that information about the conversation had apparent exculpatory

value and was thus subject to the disclosure requirements of Crim.

P. 16(I)(a)(2) is entirely speculative. But a “conclusory and

speculative” claim that withheld evidence has apparent exculpatory

value is not enough to require disclosure. People v. Eason, 2022

COA 54, ¶ 48 (collecting cases).

¶ 18 Regardless, even if information about N.A.’s conversation with

Furman did have apparent exculpatory value, the prosecution did

not have any obligation to disclose it under Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3).

¶ 19 Miedema contends that disclosure was required because

(1) Furman is a state trooper based in the Eighteenth Judicial

District, and, in that capacity, he “regularly report[s]” to the District

Attorney’s office; and (2) Furman “participated in the . . . evaluation

of the case” when he heard N.A.’s initial statement and told her to

file a police report. As a Colorado state trooper, however, Furman is

7 employed by a state agency, see §§ 24-33.5-201(2), -212, C.R.S.

2025, and nothing in the record suggests that Furman “regularly

reports” to the Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney’s Office. Nor

does the record suggest that Furman acted as an arm of the

prosecution team in this case such that the prosecution might be

considered to be in constructive custody of information concerning

the conversation between Furman and N.A. See Solano v. Newman,

2024 COA 93M, ¶¶ 29, 35 (a prosecutor is in constructive custody

of information from government entities that assisted the

prosecution with the criminal investigation against a defendant).

¶ 20 Nor does Miedema point us to any statutory, regulatory, or

department policies that could have triggered a temporary reporting

relationship, such as Furman’s duty as a mandatory reporter. See,

e.g., § 19-3-304, C.R.S. 2025 (persons required to report child

abuse or neglect); § 18-6.5-108, C.R.S. 2025 (persons required to

report mistreatment of at-risk elders and at-risk adults with

intellectual disabilities); § 12-240-139, C.R.S. 2025 (requiring

8 certain medical professionals to report domestic abuse).1

Accordingly, even if Furman “participated in the . . . evaluation of

the case” when he listened to N.A. and advised her to report the

incident (and assuming that information about the conversation

had apparent exculpatory value), the disclosure requirements of

Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3) would not have applied.

¶ 21 As to Chief Yowell, Miedema cites no record evidence

suggesting that Chief Yowell was aware of the initial conversation

between Furman and N.A. Rather, the record demonstrates only

that defense counsel speculated that “there [was] a real possibility

here that Chief Yowell knew this information and that it wasn’t

disclosed to us, and that’s why the People moved to endorse.” But

even this speculation is undercut by the record: N.A. testified at

trial that she never informed the police that she had been advised

to report the incident.

1 Although Furman appears to have told N.A. that he was a

“mandatory reporter” due to his employment as a peace officer, it is not clear which, if any, mandatory reporting statute would have applied under the circumstances here, and the record does not reflect that he ever directly reported the conversation to the police.

9 ¶ 22 Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the

district court abused its discretion when it concluded that the

prosecution had complied with its disclosure obligations.

B. Alleged Confrontation Clause Violation

¶ 23 Miedema next argues the district court violated his

confrontation rights when it admitted text messages between

himself and his ex-girlfriend. We disagree.

¶ 24 At trial, the prosecution moved to admit the following

unredacted screenshot of a conversation between Miedema and his

ex-girlfriend into evidence:

10 Text Message Conversation

¶ 25 The prosecution argued that Miedema’s statements — which

appear on the right side of the text chain — were admissible as

nonhearsay under CRE 801(d)(2)(A) and that the ex-girlfriend’s

11 statements were admissible under the rule of completeness, CRE

106. Counsel maintained, however, that the ex-girlfriend’s

statements included in the screenshot were not hearsay because

they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Defense

counsel objected, claiming that the ex-girlfriend’s messages were

inadmissible hearsay that violated Miedema’s Confrontation Clause

rights. The court admitted the statements under CRE 801(d)(2)(A)

and CRE 106, and rejected Miedema’s Confrontation Clause

argument.

¶ 26 Appellate review of a possible Confrontation Clause violation is

de novo. Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 198 (Colo. 2002).

¶ 27 Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as provided by the

Colorado Rules of Evidence or other rules or statutes. CRE 802.

Hearsay is “a statement other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c).

¶ 28 CRE 106 provides that “[w]hen a statement or part thereof is

introduced by a party, an adverse party may require introduction of

any other part . . . which ought in fairness to be considered

12 contemporaneously with it. The adverse party may do so over a

hearsay objection.” See also People v. McLaughlin, 2023 CO 38,

¶ 27 (“[B]y its plain language, CRE 106 contemplates that the

proponent of the original evidence that creates a misleading

impression is also the proponent of the additional evidence that

ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with the

original evidence.”). Evidence admitted under the rule of

completeness remains subject to the considerations of relevance

and prejudice required under CRE 401 and CRE 403. Id. at ¶ 33.

¶ 29 The Confrontation Clause provides that, “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo.

Const. art. II, § 16. Because the provision applies to “witnesses”

against the accused, the Confrontation Clause is implicated only

when “testimonial” hearsay statements are at issue. Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). A testimonial statement is one

made “under circumstances that would lead an objective witness

reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use

at a later trial.” Nicholls v. People, 2017 CO 71, ¶ 22 (citing

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-53).

13 3. Analysis

¶ 30 Miedema concedes that his own statements in the text chain

were admissible nonhearsay under CRE 801(d)(2)(A) and that the

ex-girlfriend’s statements could have qualified for admission under

CRE 106. But he asserts that, even if the ex-girlfriend’s statements

were admissible under the rules of evidence, they still should have

been excluded because they were testimonial and thus violated his

confrontation rights absent the ex-girlfriend’s appearance to testify

at trial.

¶ 31 Miedema’s arguments fail on two independent grounds. First,

even if the Confrontation Clause was triggered, the ex-girlfriend’s

statements were not testimonial. Statements are testimonial when

the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ongoing

emergency, and that the primary purpose of an interrogation is to

establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal

prosecution. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011). Here,

there was no police involvement in the text chain at all, see Ohio v.

Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 246 (2015) (explaining statements to

individuals who are not law enforcement officers are much less

likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers),

14 and no reasonable reading of the exchange could support a

conclusion that it was the functional equivalent of an interrogation.

Accordingly, none of the challenged statements were testimonial

and their admission did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.

¶ 32 Second, the ex-girlfriend’s statements were not hearsay at all,

and thus did not raise confrontation concerns. See People v. Abad,

2021 COA 6, ¶ 68 (“Although the admission of testimonial hearsay

implicates a defendant’s confrontation rights under the Federal and

Colorado Constitutions, the admission of nonhearsay does not.”).

When offering the exhibit, the prosecutor argued that the ex-

girlfriend’s messages provided context for the inculpatory

statements made by Miedema. In other words, the prosecutor was

not admitting the ex-girlfriend’s statements to prove the truth of the

matter asserted. We agree that this is the role that they played;

accordingly they were not hearsay.

III. Disposition

¶ 33 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.