23CA1705 Peo v Meza-Franco 04-03-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1705 Weld County District Court No. 20CR1721 Honorable Vincente G. Vigil, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jose De Jesus Meza-Franco,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 3, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Adrienne R. Teodorovic, Alternate Defense Counsel, Windsor, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jose De Jesus Meza-Franco, appeals the judgment
of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of multiple
counts of conspiracy to sell or distribute cocaine and one count of
money laundering. We reverse the judgment of conviction and
remand for a new trial.
I. Background
¶2 This case arises from a Weld County Drug Task Force
investigation into a drug distribution network (the network).
During the investigation, officers lawfully obtained authorization to
wiretap phone lines belonging to Jose Arellano-Arredondo, whom
officers believed to be one of two people at the top of the network.
During the investigation, law enforcement identified Meza-Franco as
an “alternate source” of narcotics for the network, who allowed the
network to store narcotics on his property, known as the “farm.” In
addition to the wiretap surveillance, officers conducted passive
surveillance at locations connected to Meza-Franco and
Arellano-Arredondo.
¶3 Based upon evidence gathered from the wiretapped phone
calls (wiretap calls) and passive surveillance, the prosecution
charged Meza-Franco with two counts of conspiracy to sell or
1 distribute cocaine (between 14 grams and 225 grams), one count of
conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or distribute cocaine
(between 14 grams and 225 grams), one count of conspiracy to sell
or distribute cocaine (more than 225 grams), and one count of
money laundering. Before trial, the prosecution dismissed the
count of conspiracy to sell or distribute (more than 225 grams). A
jury found Meza-Franco guilty on the remaining counts. The court
sentenced Meza-Franco to thirty-six years in the custody of the
Department of Corrections — eight years for each of the three
conspiracy convictions and twelve years for money laundering, all
running consecutively.
¶4 On appeal, Meza-Franco alleges two errors by the trial court in
admitting expert testimony from Investigator Valentin Oliveros, the
lead investigator on the case. Meza-Franco argues that Investigator
Oliveros’s testimony exceeded the scope of his expertise because it
(1) went beyond merely defining and explaining narcotics-related
“price[s], quantities, and terminology” and improperly relied on his
factual knowledge of the investigation (dual capacity testimony) and
(2) “usurped the jury’s role in finding the facts” by improperly
summarizing the evidence to support “[Investigator] Oliveros’s belief
2 in Meza-Franco’s guilt.” As discussed below, we disagree with
Meza-Franco’s first assertion. With respect to his second assertion,
we disagree that Investigator Oliveros improperly summarized
evidence, but we agree that certain portions of Investigator
Oliveros’s testimony usurped the jury’s role, and, as a result, we
reverse Meza-Franco’s convictions on the conspiracy counts. And
because, under the circumstances, proof of the conspiracy offenses
was necessary to prove the money laundering charge, we also
reverse that conviction.
II. Whether Investigator Oliveros’s Testimony Exceeded the Scope of His Expert Qualification
A. Additional Facts
¶5 At trial, the court qualified Investigator Oliveros as an expert
in “narcotics and culture including prices, amounts for personal
use and distribution and terminology” and the Spanish language.
Investigator Oliveros testified that he was the lead agent assigned to
the investigation; listened to “hundreds, if not thousands” of
wiretapped calls; and pulled and reviewed recordings of calls
relevant to the case before testifying. The prosecution offered as
exhibits transcripts of certain wiretap calls, each of which was
3 related to one of the charged counts against Meza-Franco.
Meza-Franco did not object to the admission of the wiretap call
transcripts generally. He did object to Investigator Oliveros’s
interpretation of the content of the wiretap calls, however, arguing
that the transcripts should be allowed to “stand on [their] own
without explanation” from Investigator Oliveros and that the jurors
should review the transcripts to “determine on their own what they
think is going on.”
¶6 The court overruled Meza-Franco’s objection, concluding that
Investigator Oliveros could “opine on interpretations of coded
language and may discuss the context of the investigation
and . . . testify as to what he believes the conversation[s] to be
about.” The court also said it would instruct the jurors to “decide
what weight or value they give the testimony of any experts [who]
have testified at trial.” Thereafter, Investigator Oliveros testified to
the circumstances surrounding the transcribed wiretap calls, their
content, and his interpretations of the content as it related to each
charged count.
4 1. First Conspiracy Count and Money Laundering Count
¶7 The first conspiracy and money laundering counts
corresponded to wiretap calls between June 29, 2020, and July 6,
2020. Investigator Oliveros testified he believed that Meza-Franco
and Arellano-Arredondo were discussing the arrival of a shipment of
cocaine because the prices and amounts they discussed were
consistent with the prices and amounts of drugs officers had
obtained from the network in undercover buys. Investigator
Oliveros said he interpreted Meza-Franco’s statement that “he
w[ould] take three” to mean that Meza-Franco participated with
Arellano-Arredondo in distributing cocaine to others, and
Arellano-Arredondo’s statement to Meza-Franco that “we can just
buy the five” as reflecting a “partnership” to purchase five ounces of
cocaine.
¶8 Investigator Oliveros also described surveillance video from
Arellano-Arredondo’s residence on June 30, which showed
Meza-Franco’s brother and a van in which an undercover officer
investigating the network had previously seen Arellano-Arredondo
arrive to complete a controlled drug buy.
5 ¶9 Investigator Oliveros opined that the events in the video, along
with phone calls leading up to them, were indicative “that a
narcotics transaction potentially had occurred.”
¶ 10 Investigator Oliveros also testified about communications
between and surveillance of Meza-Franco and Arellano-Arredondo
during this time that he believed demonstrated Meza-Franco was
coordinating with Arrellano-Arredondo to receive and distribute
2. Second Conspiracy Count
¶ 11 The second conspiracy count related to several wiretap calls
between Meza-Franco and Arellano-Arredondo on July 9, 2020.
Investigator Oliveros testified that Arellano-Arredondo asked
Meza-Franco about acquiring “flour,” which Investigator Oliveros
believed meant cocaine, and that “[Arellano-Arredondo] ha[d] a
customer asking for 10,” which Investigator Oliveros understood
meant a customer was asking for ten ounces of cocaine.
Investigator Oliveros also opined that Meza-Franco’s response “that
he only ha[d] five or six” but would “see if he had a different kind”
meant that Meza-Franco only had a few ounces of cocaine in his
possession, but that he would acquire a different batch of cocaine.
6 ¶ 12 Investigator Oliveros also interpreted wiretap calls between
Meza-Franco and Arellano-Arredondo on July 10, 2023.
Investigator Oliveros opined that, during those wiretap calls,
Meza-Franco and Arrellano appeared to be discussing that an
individual who had “fronted” narcotics to them was requesting
payment of $1,500 per ounce, but Meza-Franco and Arrellano
intended to tell their source to “leave it at 12,” meaning that they
wanted to “relay to the source of their narcotics to try to do the
ounces of cocaine for [$1,200].”
¶ 13 Based on these conversations, Investigator Oliveros opined
that Meza-Franco and Arrellano-Arredondo “agreed for
[Meza-Franco] to reach out to an individual he knows to be able to
try and purchase two ounces of cocaine . . . [and] eventually
figure[ed] out that it was [going to] cost about [$1,500] an ounce”
because Arellano-Arredondo “had a customer [who] was looking to
purchase 10 ounces and [Arellano-Arredondo] didn’t have enough
to fill that order.” Investigator Oliveros also testified “[i]t appeared
that sometime after that . . . agreement conversation, [Meza-Franco]
did in fact go to Mr. Arrellano’s residence,” which Investigator
Oliveros said he believed could have been an “overt act” in
7 furtherance of the agreement to purchase the two ounces of
3. Third Conspiracy Count
¶ 14 The third conspiracy count related to wiretap calls on August
8, 2020. Investigator Oliveros said Meza-Franco told
Arellano-Arredondo during one wiretap call that he “still doesn’t
have anything,” while Arellano-Arredondo said he had “paper for
[Meza-Franco] to pick up,” which Investigator Oliveros said meant
money. Investigator Oliveros said Meza-Franco reminded
Arellano-Arredondo they had “previously agreed on nine per six,”
meaning six ounces of cocaine for $9,000, based upon the
previously discussed price of $1,500 per ounce. Meza-Franco also
said that his source would soon arrive at the farm.
¶ 15 Investigator Oliveros next interpreted a wiretap call later that
day in which Meza-Franco told Arellano-Arredondo there was a
miscommunication about either the purity or type of cocaine they
would be receiving. Mezo-Franco said that it was too expensive to
purchase narcotics from an alternate source, but that he would talk
to the individual the next day.
8 ¶ 16 Based upon these wiretap calls and surveillance video of
Meza-Franco’s residence, Investigator Oliveros concluded that
Meza-Franco was attempting to conduct a transaction for six
ounces of cocaine for $9,000, but that the transaction likely didn’t
occur because “whatever narcotics they were [looking] at was not
what they were expecting.” He also opined that Meza-Franco overtly
acted to further the agreement to purchase six ounces of cocaine for
$9,000 by arranging the transaction by phone.
B. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶ 17 We review a trial court’s admission of expert testimony for an
abuse of discretion. People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Colo.
2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s ruling is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on an
erroneous understanding of the law. Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d
458, 463 (Colo. 2009).
¶ 18 The parties disagree whether Meza-Franco preserved his
argument that Investigator Oliveros’s testimony exceeded the scope
of his expert qualification. As we understand his argument,
Meza-Franco asserts that Investigator Oliveros’s dual capacity
testimony exceeded the scope of his expertise because it (1) relied
9 on facts not known to the jury and summarized all of the evidence
— not just the wiretap calls — concerning law enforcement’s
investigation of the network and (2) went beyond simply informing
the jury about narcotics prices, terminology, or quantities. He
asserts that he preserved his objection to the entirety of Investigator
Oliveros’s testimony when he “objected to the prosecution’s first
question eliciting summarization of the meaning of the [wiretap]
calls.”
¶ 19 The People assert that Meza-Franco failed to preserve the
arguments he now raises on appeal regarding how Investigator
Oliveros’s testimony exceeded the scope of his expert qualification.
We agree with the People. See People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36,
¶ 37 (an issue isn’t preserved if the defendant didn’t object, objected
on different grounds than those raised on appeal, or objected on
unspecific grounds that didn’t alert the court to the particular issue
for which review is sought).
¶ 20 If a claim wasn’t preserved, we reverse only for plain error.
Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. A “plain error” is an error so
obvious that a trial judge should be able to avoid it without an
objection. Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 16.
10 C. Applicable Law
¶ 21 “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.” CRE 702.
¶ 22 Expert testimony is admissible under CRE 702 if the proffered
testimony is reliable, the expert is qualified to opine on such
matters, and the expert testimony is relevant — meaning it is useful
to the jury. People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001). A trial
court’s reliability inquiry “should be broad in nature and consider
the totality of the circumstances of each specific case.” Id.; see also
Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105, 1114 (Colo. 1999)
(experience-based expertise is subject to the standards of CRE 702).
¶ 23 Expert testimony is useful to the jury when it assists the jury
“to either understand other evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.” People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 379 (Colo. 2007). A trial
court must balance its discretion to allow expert witness testimony
with its obligation to ensure that the probative value of the expert’s
11 testimony is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See
id.
D. Discussion
1. Investigator Oliveros’s Testimony Didn’t Rely on Facts Not Known to the Jury or Improperly Summarize Evidence About the Investigation of the Network
¶ 24 Meza-Franco alleges that the court erroneously allowed
Investigator Oliveros to testify about facts not known to the jury
and about the overall investigation of the network. We aren’t
persuaded.
¶ 25 The prosecution called several other officers to testify about
law enforcement’s investigation of the network, and the jury
received the transcripts of the wiretap calls about which
Investigator Oliveros testified. Meza-Franco fails to identify the
investigatory facts to which Investigator Oliveros testified that were
otherwise unknown to the jury. Thus, Meza-Franco’s argument is
conclusory, and we decline to address it further. People v. Wallin,
167 P.3d 183, 187 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to address
arguments presented in a perfunctory or conclusory manner).
12 ¶ 26 We likewise reject Meza-Franco’s argument that Investigator
Oliveros’s testimony improperly summarized evidence related to the
overall investigation of the network.
¶ 27 Investigator Oliveros was one of the lead case agents assigned
to the investigation of the network. In that role, he was responsible
for delegating assignments to other officers and speaking with them
about aspects of the overall investigation. And he was the point of
contact for some of the undercover officers who made drug buys
during the investigation.
¶ 28 As he was qualified as an expert witness, Investigator Oliveros
was entitled to rely on information from other officers to talk about
the overall course of the investigation and to form opinions about it.
See CRE 703; see People v. Garrison, 2017 COA 107, ¶ 46 (when an
officer’s testimony about the course of an investigation relies on
specialized training or knowledge, the officer must first be qualified
as an expert); see also United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921,
930-31 (10th Cir. 2013) (law enforcement expert testimony
explaining how an investigation began, the law enforcement
agencies involved, the investigative techniques used, or roles played
by participants to a criminal enterprise is generally admissible).
13 ¶ 29 Additionally, the prosecution’s evidence, if believed by the jury,
showed the complexity of the facts concerning the network’s
operation and Meza-Franco’s alleged involvement in it. Because a
court acts within its discretion to allow a witness to provide
summary testimony if it determines that the evidence is sufficiently
complex such that doing so would assist the trier of fact, Murray v.
Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M, ¶ 31, we conclude
that the court didn’t plainly err by allowing Investigator Oliveros to
summarize the information related to the overall investigation of the
network. See generally United States v. Duran, 941 F.3d 435,
445-46 (10th Cir. 2019) (court did not err by allowing law
enforcement officer to describe the events that triggered the
investigation of defendant in drug conspiracy case).
2. Investigator Oliveros’s Testimony Didn’t Exceed the Scope of His Expert Qualification by Opining on Matters Beyond Narcotics Prices, Terminology, or Quantities
¶ 30 We also reject Meza-Franco’s contention that Investigator
Oliveros exceeded the scope of his expertise by testifying to issues
beyond narcotics prices, terminology, or quantities.
¶ 31 Investigator Oliveros testified regarding the basis of his
expertise, which included his multi-year experience as an
14 investigator for the Weld County Drug Task Force and his
specialized training related to narcotics investigations. When the
court qualified Investigator Oliveros as an expert, it authorized him
to opine about the context of the investigation into the network, his
interpretation of any coded language the participants used in the
wiretap calls, and what Investigator Oliveros believed the phone
conversations were about.
¶ 32 Despite Meza-Franco’s argument otherwise, the court
authorized Investigator Oliveros to opine more broadly than just
about narcotics prices, terminology, or quantities. The court acted
within its discretion to permit Investigator Oliveros’s expert
testimony, and such testimony — which was based on his
established expertise and provided context to the investigation and
included his interpretations of the evidence presented — was within
the parameters of the court’s authorization. See People v. Watson,
53 P.3d 707, 711 (Colo. App. 2001) (“Whether opinion testimony is
within a particular witness’s expertise generally is a matter
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”); see also People v.
Munoz-Casteneda, 2012 COA 109, ¶ 28 (when a defendant is
charged with conspiracy, evidence of a drug trafficking organization
15 may be relevant because the prosecution must prove the
defendant’s involvement with others). Accordingly, we discern no
error, let alone plain error, in the court’s admission of Investigator
Oliveros’s testimony that, according to Meza-Franco, addressed
facts not known to the jury or addressed the overall investigation of
the network.
III. Whether Investigator Oliveros’s Testimony Usurped the Jury’s Role
¶ 33 Meza-Franco argues that Investigator Oliveros’s dual capacity
testimony, which combined his expert testimony about narcotics
with his personal knowledge of the investigation, “crossed the line
from legitimate expert opinion” into an improper opinion on
Meza-Franco’s guilt. We disagree with Meza-Franco’s assertion that
the entirety of Investigator Oliveros’s testimony was improper
opinion testimony, but as we discuss next, we agree that portions of
Investigator Oliveros’s testimony usurped the jury’s role.
¶ 34 After interpreting the wiretap calls related to the first and
second conspiracy counts, Investigator Oliveros testified that he
believed Meza-Franco entered into an illegal narcotics transaction.
16 ¶ 35 During his testimony about the third conspiracy count, the
prosecutor asked Investigator Oliveros, “why do you believe in your
opinion that the drug that was agreed to be bought and distributed,
or possessed with the intent to distribute was in fact cocaine?”
Investigator Oliveros responded that he believed it was cocaine
based on the discussion of the purchase price for the amount of the
substance that Meza-Franco and Arrellano-Arrendondo were
attempting to obtain.
¶ 36 Specifically referencing all three conspiracy counts, the
prosecutor asked Investigator Oliveros to opine whether “the
cocaine that was conspired to either be distributed or possessed
with the intent to be distributed was . . . greater than 14 grams and
less than 225 grams.” Investigator Oliveros responded that, “based
on those three counts, those three incidences they were talking in
ounces — multiple ounces so it’d be over the 14 grams.” With
respect to the money laundering count, the following exchange
occurred between the prosecutor and Investigator Oliveros:
[PROSECUTOR] Now do you believe in your opinion that [Meza-Franco] and Mr. Arellano-Arredondo engaged in a financial transaction when they exchanged five ounces
17 of cocaine for $7,000 dollars on June 30th? Through [Meza-Franco’s] brother[?]
[INVESTIGATOR OLIVEROS] Yes sir.
[PROSECUTOR] [Is i]t also your opinion that [Meza-Franco] completed that financial transaction with the intent to promote his further distribution of . . . cocaine, to another individual?
[INVESTIGATOR OLIVEROS] Yes.
¶ 37 Meza-Franco didn’t contemporaneously object to any of this
testimony, request a curative jury instruction, or request other
limiting measures. On cross-examination, Investigator Oliveros
conceded that he had never seen Meza-Franco in possession of
drugs or money.
¶ 38 In its final instructions, the court instructed the jury that it
was free to reject or accept, in whole or in part, any expert’s
testimony.
¶ 39 Meza-Franco argues that Investigator Oliveros’s testimony
usurped the jury’s role. The People concede — and we agree — that
Meza-Franco preserved his argument that Investigator Oliveros’s
testimony about the content of the wiretap calls usurped the jury’s
role in determining Meza-Franco’s guilt by objecting before
18 Investigator Oliveros began testifying. We review preserved
challenges to a trial court’s admission of expert testimony for an
abuse of discretion and reverse only if the error was not harmless.
People v. Baker, 2021 CO 29, ¶¶ 29, 38. An error is not harmless if
it substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the
trial proceedings. People v. Martinez, 2020 COA 141, ¶ 28.
C. Applicable Law
¶ 40 “[T]rial courts have an obligation to serve as gatekeepers
regarding the propriety of expert testimony.” Lawrence v. People,
2021 CO 28, ¶ 43. An expert can’t usurp the jury’s factfinding role.
Rector, 248 P.3d at 1203. For instance, an expert can’t “tell the
jury what result to reach,” People v. Collins, 730 P.2d 293, 306
(Colo. 1986), can’t “testify that he believes that the defendant
committed the crime at issue,” People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶ 31,
and can’t imply that the applicable legal standard has been
satisfied, People in Interest of J.R., 2021 COA 81, ¶ 31.
¶ 41 To determine whether an expert’s testimony usurped the jury’s
function, we consider whether (1) the testimony was clarified during
cross-examination; (2) the testimony expressed an opinion on the
applicable law or legal standards; (3) the jury was properly
19 instructed on the law and that it may accept or reject the expert’s
opinion; and (4) the expert opined that the defendant committed the
crime or that there was a particular likelihood that the defendant
committed the crime. Rector, 248 P.3d at 1203. We consider this
nonexhaustive list of factors in light of the totality of Investigator
Oliveros’s testimony to determine whether the court’s admission of
his testimony was erroneous. See Lawrence, ¶ 40 (citing Rector,
248 P.3d at 1203).
1. The Court Erred by Admitting Portions of Investigator Oliveros’s Expert Testimony
¶ 42 Primarily relying on United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45,
53-54 (2d Cir. 2003), Mezo-Franco asserts the court was required to
take special care in managing Investigator Oliveros’s testimony to
mitigate the “aura of special reliability and trustworthiness”
surrounding his testimony as both an investigating officer and a
narcotics expert. And we note that another division of this court
has recognized that “[t]here are special concerns attendant to law
enforcement expert testimony.” People v. Ornelas-Licano, 2020 COA
62, ¶ 64 (citations omitted). But Colorado appellate courts have not
20 categorically prohibited law enforcement officers from providing
dual capacity testimony. See People v. Fortson, 2018 COA 46M,
¶ 99 (noting that, while dual capacity testimony may be
problematic, “in the absence of binding appellate authority
condemning such testimony, it remains for the trial court to
exercise its discretion to control and, in appropriate circumstances,
preclude such testimony on proper objection”). Therefore, we reject
Meza-Franco’s contention that the court abused its discretion by
not excluding Investigator Oliveros’s expert testimony in its entirety
because Investigator Oliveros testified in a dual capacity role.
¶ 43 Some of Investigator Oliveros’s testimony indeed touched on
the ultimate issues in the case. For example, when the prosecutor
asked him whether he had an opinion that Meza-Franco engaged in
“illegal narcotics transactions” on June 29, June 30, and July 9,
2020, Investigator Oliveros testified that he did and described each
transaction in detail. But this and similar testimony didn’t
impermissibly and directly usurp the jury’s function by concluding
that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to prove the
elements of the charged offenses.
21 ¶ 44 However, we conclude that portions of Investigator Oliveros’s
testimony did cross the line from expert testimony appropriately
tailored to the case’s factual circumstances to improper legal
conclusions under the Rector factors.
¶ 45 The jury was properly instructed on the law with respect to
assessing Investigator Oliveros’s testimony, including that it could
reject or accept some or all of, and was not bound by, any expert’s
testimony. See Lawrence, ¶ 53. “Absent a showing to the contrary,
we presume the jury heeded the court’s instructions.” People v.
Thompson, 950 P.2d 608, 614 (Colo. App. 1997). Thus, our
assessment of the third Rector factor weighs against a conclusion
that the court reversibly erred.
¶ 46 However, in our assessment, factors one, two, and four weigh
in favor of a conclusion that the court erred.
¶ 47 Factor one weighs in favor of error because — despite eliciting
testimony from Investigator Oliveros that he had never observed
Meza-Franco with drugs or money — defense counsel’s
cross-examination of Investigator Oliveros didn’t clarify that, while
Investigator Oliveros could provide opinions about the drug types,
terminology, prices, and quantities referenced in the wiretap calls,
22 he could not affirmatively opine that his interpretation of the
wiretap calls, along with Meza-Franco’s actions, satisfied the legal
¶ 48 This leads to factor two, which suggests that an error occurred
because Investigator Oliveros expressed an opinion on the
applicable legal standards. “The crime of conspiracy is the illegal
agreement to commit a crime coupled with at least one overt act in
furtherance of that agreement.” People v. Robinson, 226 P.3d 1145,
1155 (Colo. App. 2009) (quoting People v. Phong Le, 74 P.3d 431,
435-36 (Colo. App. 2003)); see also People v. Lucero, 2016 COA 105,
¶ 26 (“To prove the requisite conspiratorial agreement to distribute
drugs, the prosecution must proffer evidence of an agreement to
advance further distribution of the drugs to others beyond the
alleged conspirators.”). And the crime of money laundering is
committed when a person (1) conducts or attempts to conduct a
financial transaction; (2) knowing or believing that the property
involved in that transaction represents the proceeds of a criminal
offense; (3) with the intent to promote the commission of a criminal
offense. § 18-5-309(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2024; Butler v. People, 2019 CO
87, ¶ 14.
23 ¶ 49 Indeed, by responding to the prosecutor’s questions, which the
prosecution explicitly posed in legal terms, Investigator Oliveros
provided direct opinions that Meza-Franco entered into agreements
with Arellano-Arredondo to sell and distribute cocaine and that
Meza-Franco committed overt acts in furtherance of those
agreements. For example, in response to the prosecutor’s inquiry
“what overt acts, if any, were carried out in furtherance” of the
agreements to purchase cocaine, Investigator Oliveros described
that Meza-Franco engaged in arranging the drug transactions by
phone, was present on the property where the transactions
occurred, and followed up with phone calls. Likewise, Investigator
Oliveros provided direct opinions, using legal terms prompted by
the prosecutor, that Meza-Franco and Arellano-Arredondo engaged
in a financial transaction on June 30 through Meza-Franco’s
brother, and that Mezo-Franco completed that transaction with the
intent to promote his further distribution of cocaine to another
individual.
¶ 50 Factor four is also indicative of error because, in combination
with Investigator Oliveros’s testimony regarding the meaning of the
wiretap calls, the prosecutor’s specific questions prompted
24 Investigator Oliveros to respond that Meza-Franco completed overt
acts, including placing calls in furtherance of the third conspiracy
count; agree with the prosecutor that the essential elements of all
three of the conspiracy counts had been satisfied; and further agree
it was his opinion, with respect to the money laundering count, that
Meza-Franco made an illegal agreement and completed a financial
transaction with the intent to promote further distribution of three
ounces of cocaine. Indeed, in response to the prosecutor’s
questions that used legal language, Investigator Oliveras directly
opined that Meza-Franco’s actions on June 30 satisfied the
elements of money laundering. In doing so, Investigator Oliveros
effectively testified that Meza-Franco had met each element of the
conspiracy charges, all but agreeing with the prosecutor that the
legal standards for conspiracy to distribute cocaine had been met
and telling the jury that Meza-Franco was guilty. See Baker, ¶¶ 33,
34.
¶ 51 Meza-Franco’s trial counsel eventually objected to this line of
questioning, arguing that the prosecutor was “testifying and having
the officer agree with him.” Although trial counsel’s objection was
to the prosecution leading the witness, and not to Investigator
25 Oliveros’s provision of improper legal opinion, we agree that the
manner in which the prosecutor elicited Investigator Oliveros’s
testimony was improper. The prosecutor’s manner of questioning
Investigator Oliveros — using legal language, centered on the
elements necessary prove the offenses, and asking Investigator
Oliveros to identify specific evidence that satisfied those elements —
resulted in Investigator Oliveros rendering improper legal opinions.
¶ 52 Further, this testimony was unnecessary because the jury
could have applied Investigator Oliveras’s opinions about the
wiretap calls to the law to reach its own conclusions about whether
Meza-Franco committed the charged offenses. Accordingly, we
conclude that the court abused its discretion by admitting the
portions of Investigator Oliveros’s testimony in which he
affirmatively agreed with the prosecutor’s questioning regarding the
applicable legal standard and words of the elements of the crime
and responded to questioning regarding whether the elements of the
crime had been satisfied because such testimony constituted
improper legal opinion testimony.
26 2. The Error Wasn’t Harmless
¶ 53 Because the error was preserved, the People bear the burden
to show that the error was harmless. James v. People, 2018 CO 72,
¶ 18. The People assert that any error in the admission of
Investigator Oliveros’s improper legal opinion testimony was
harmless because “the jury also heard from numerous officers
conducting surveillance of [Meza-Franco] and Arellano-Arredondo
that matched up to events discussed in the calls themselves.” We
disagree.
¶ 54 The prosecution’s case primarily relied on Investigator
Oliveros’s testimony about the wiretap calls to connect Meza-Franco
to the network and its distribution of cocaine. No corroborating
physical evidence directly linked Meza-Franco to the distribution of
cocaine, and other witnesses provided either general background
information related to the network or evidence that corroborated
Investigator Oliveros’s interpretation of the wiretap calls, such as
information about surveillance video of Meza-Franco. But that
“corroborating” evidence doesn’t make sense without Investigator
Oliveros’s testimony to contextualize it. Said another way, the
factual and legal significance of Meza-Franco’s words and actions
27 only makes sense when placed in context by Investigator Oliveros’s
¶ 55 We recognize the risk that the jury possibly afforded
Investigator Oliveros’s improper testimony “particular weight and
credibility” because he testified as an expert, was employed by the
government, and testified to complex matters. Baker, ¶¶ 41-42; see
also Ornelas-Licano, ¶ 64. Under these circumstances, we conclude
there is a reasonable probability that Investigator Oliveros’s
inadmissible expert testimony substantially influenced the verdict
or impaired the trial’s fairness. See Yusem, 210 P.3d at 469.
Because the court’s error in allowing Investigator Oliveros’s
impermissible expert testimony was not harmless, we reverse
Meza-Franco’s convictions for conspiracy to sell or distribute
(between 14 grams and 225 grams) and conspiracy to possess with
intent to sell or distribute (between 14 grams and 225 grams).
¶ 56 We also reverse Meza-Franco’s conviction for money
laundering. Meza-Franco was charged under section
18-5-309(1)(a)(I), which required proof that Meza-Franco knowingly
conducted a financial transaction with proceeds from a criminal
offense, with the intent to promote the commission of another
28 criminal offense. Under that section, the prosecution was required
to prove the conspiracy as the underlying unlawful offense upon
which the transfer of proceeds was based. See People v. Woodyard,
2023 COA 78, ¶ 68 (concluding that federal courts have interpreted
a substantially similar provision of the federal money laundering
statute “to require proof of a covered offense” apart from the
transfer of proceeds itself). Therefore, because we have reversed
Meza-Franco’s conviction on the conspiracy charges, his conviction
for money laundering is also necessarily reversed.
IV. Disposition
¶ 57 We reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new
trial.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.