23CA1650 Peo v March 09-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1650 El Paso County District Court No. 22CR2599 Honorable Monica Jo Gomez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Lamar March,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Tow and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Kimberly Alderman Penix, Alternate Defense Counsel, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Lamar March, appeals the judgment of conviction
entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of attempted first degree
murder, first degree burglary, first degree assault, violation of a
protection order, and three crime of violence sentence enhancers.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In June 2021, before the events giving rise to this case, March
severely injured the victim, his girlfriend, and ultimately pleaded
guilty to second degree assault. The district court in that case
entered a mandatory protection order against March, listing the
victim as the protected party and requiring, among other things,
that March vacate the victim’s home.
¶3 In May 2022, law enforcement responded to a disturbance at
the victim’s apartment complex and found her “crying hysterically.”
Officers observed that the victim appeared injured, her hair had
been “sheared off,” and she had tried to use stools to prevent
someone from entering her apartment. The victim told law
enforcement that March had threatened to kill her.
¶4 After being transported to the hospital, the victim told the
treating forensic nurse examiner that March had punched, kicked,
1 and choked her, causing her to lose consciousness and urinate on
herself. The victim also reported that March had forced her to cut
off her own hair to cause her embarrassment.
¶5 The prosecution asserted that March subjected the victim to
intense and repeated domestic violence, in part, because he feared
the victim was cheating on him. Before trial, the prosecution gave
notice under CRE 404(b)(3) that it intended to introduce evidence of
other acts related to March’s 2021 assault of the victim. Over
March’s objection, the trial court ruled that most of the
prosecution’s proposed other acts evidence related to the 2021
incident was admissible to show March’s state of mind, motive, and
common scheme or plan.
¶6 The jury found March guilty of attempted first degree murder,
first degree burglary, first degree assault, and violation of a
protection order. It further found that March caused serious bodily
injury when committing attempted murder, burglary, and assault,
rendering those offenses crimes of violence. See § 18-1.3-
406(2)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2025.
¶7 The trial court sentenced March to forty-eight years in the
Department of Corrections’ custody. As relevant to this appeal, the
2 court’s sentence encompassed (1) thirty-two years for attempted
first degree murder and (2) sixteen years for first degree burglary,
running consecutively to the sentence for attempted murder.
¶8 On appeal, March contends that (1) the trial court erred by
admitting other acts evidence under CRE 404(b); (2) insufficient
evidence supported his convictions for first degree assault, first
degree burglary, and attempted first degree murder; and (3) his
sentence violates his right to due process. We address each
contention in turn.
II. CRE 404(b)
¶9 March argues that the trial court abused its discretion under
CRE 404(b) by admitting extensive other acts evidence. We
disagree.
A. Additional Background
¶ 10 Based on the court’s pretrial order under CRE 404(b), the
prosecution introduced significant other acts evidence related to the
2021 incident. The following is illustrative:
• The victim’s sister testified that she checked on the
victim at March’s apartment after she had been
unusually noncommunicative in the days leading up to
3 the 2021 incident; receiving no response at the
apartment, the victim’s sister contacted the police for a
welfare check. Officers later forced open the apartment
door, found the victim inside, and took her out on a
stretcher due to her injuries.
• The victim’s sister testified that the victim was
“unrecognizable” at the hospital — her face was “three
times” bigger than normal, her eyes were swollen shut,
she had a cigarette burn on her leg, she suffered bruises
“from head to toe,” and blood was everywhere. The
victim relayed to her sister that March had threatened to
kill her and had tortured her “for a few days.”
• Four additional family members testified for the
prosecution regarding the 2021 incident, including the
victim’s brother-in-law, who said the victim appeared
“[b]eat up” after the assault; March’s sister, who testified
that March felt he could “hurt” the victim and was “losing
control of himself”; and March’s mother and stepfather,
who expressed concern for the victim after not hearing
from her.
4 • The detective who investigated the 2021 incident testified
that the victim initially couldn’t communicate at the
hospital due to the severity of her injuries. The detective
also testified that he (1) found blood on walls, window
blinds, and clothes in March’s apartment; and (2)
interviewed March’s sister, who said that March had
admitted to choking and threatening to kill the victim.
• The forensic nurse examiner, who had reviewed the
victim’s medical history, testified that the victim suffered
a subdural hematoma following the 2021 incident.
• The prosecution introduced several photographs of the
victim’s injuries, March’s apartment, and other evidence
related to the 2021 incident.
¶ 11 The court issued several limiting instructions regarding the
other acts evidence, informing the jurors that evidence regarding
the 2021 incident was being admitted for a limited purpose of
showing motive, intent, common scheme or plan, and preparation.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 12 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42, ¶ 23. A court
5 abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or when its ruling
is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.
¶ 13 Because March preserved his challenge through a timely
objection, we review any error in the court’s evidentiary ruling for
nonconstitutional harmless error. Pernell v. People, 2018 CO 13,
¶ 22. Under this standard, we will reverse only if a reasonable
probability exists that the court’s error contributed to the
defendant’s conviction. People v. Roman, 2017 CO 70, ¶ 13.
¶ 14 CRE 404(b) governs the admissibility of other acts evidence.
The rule prohibits the use of “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong,
or act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in conformity with the
character.” CRE 404(b)(1). But such evidence “may be admissible
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack
of accident.” CRE 404(b)(2). And as with all evidence, other acts
evidence is admissible only if relevant and if its probative value isn’t
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. CRE
401-403.
6 ¶ 15 Under CRE 404(b), the court must first determine, by a
preponderance of the evidence, whether the defendant committed
the prior acts. See People v. Vasquez, 2022 COA 100, ¶ 74. After
making this threshold finding, the court next analyzes the prior act
evidence under our supreme court’s four-part Spoto framework.
People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990). Under Spoto,
evidence of extrinsic acts that suggest bad character is admissible
only if (1) the evidence relates to a material fact; (2) the evidence is
logically relevant; (3) the logical relevance is independent of the
prohibited inference that the defendant acted in conformity with his
bad character; and (4) the evidence’s probative value isn’t
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See
Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 27 (citing Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318-
19).
¶ 16 In cases involving domestic violence, other acts of violence
may be admitted “to show a common plan, scheme, design, identity,
modus operandi, motive, or guilty knowledge or for some other
purpose.” § 18-6-801.5(3), C.R.S. 2025. In such cases, the General
Assembly has declared that “evidence of similar transactions”
involving domestic violence “can be helpful” and sometimes
7 “necessary” because domestic violence is “frequently cyclical in
nature, involves patterns of abuse, and can consist of harm with
escalating levels of seriousness.” § 18-6-801.5(1); see also People v.
Cross, 2023 COA 24, ¶ 22 (By enacting section 18-6-801.5, the
legislature intended to “place[] its finger on the scale in favor of
admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence in prosecutions
involving domestic violence.”).
C. Analysis
¶ 17 At the outset, we note that March doesn’t dispute the trial
court’s threshold finding that the prosecution proved, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that March committed the prior acts
involving the 2021 incident.
¶ 18 Turning to the first Spoto prong, the court properly found that
the evidence regarding the 2021 incident related to March’s intent,
motive, and plan. These were material facts because (1) March’s
intent to harm or kill the victim was an essential element for
multiple charges that he faced, see §§ 18-3-102(1)(a), 18-3-
202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; and (2) March claimed that the victim
assaulted him first and that he merely defended himself.
See People v. McBride, 228 P.3d 216, 227 (Colo. App. 2009)
8 (evidence of the defendant’s prior violent acts was admissible to
prove intent); People v. Torres, 141 P.3d 931, 934 (Colo. App. 2006)
(“Evidence of a prior act of domestic violence is relevant to show the
defendant’s intent to harm the victim, rather than merely to
frighten her.”).
¶ 19 As to the second prong, the court acted within its discretion by
finding the evidence logically relevant. Evidence that March had
previously threatened the victim and beaten her tended to make it
more likely that March intended to harm or kill the victim rather
than merely defend himself. See Torres, 141 P.3d at 934 (“[T]he
evidence [of a prior act of domestic violence] had a tendency to show
that it was more probable that [the defendant] intended to commit
the acts of domestic violence.”); see also Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d
458, 465 (Colo. 2009) (“Because the prior act evidence is logically
relevant to demonstrate [the defendant’s] mental state, it
necessarily is relevant to rebut his claim of self-defense.”).
¶ 20 As to the third prong, the court appropriately found that the
evidence of the 2021 incident bore logical relevance independent of
the impermissible inference that March acted in conformity with his
bad character. Recall, both the 2021 incident and the crimes in
9 this case involved March making threats and inflicting bodily injury
against the same victim, his girlfriend. See Cross, ¶ 22 (“[U]nder
the third prong of Spoto, acts of [a] ‘defendant’s violent behavior
toward the same victim in an ongoing relationship’ are admissible
in domestic violence cases.” (citation omitted)). And in both
incidents, the evidence showed that March choked the victim and
marred her physical appearance — first by burning her leg with a
cigarette in 2021 and then by shearing off her hair in this case.
The prosecution therefore tied the prior act evidence “with sufficient
specificity to the charged offenses,” allowing the jury to properly
consider it independent of any prohibited propensity inference.
McBride, 228 P.3d at 227.
¶ 21 While evidence of the 2021 incident no doubt injected some
bad character evidence into the trial, Spoto’s third prong doesn’t
demand the complete absence of a bad character inference; it
merely requires that the proffered evidence be logically relevant
independent of that inference. People v. Lancaster, 2022 COA 82,
¶ 47.
¶ 22 For two reasons, we aren’t persuaded otherwise by March’s
reliance on Yusem, 210 P.3d at 466-67. First, Yusem didn’t involve
10 a defendant’s acts of domestic violence, let alone multiple acts
against the same victim. Under March’s view, other acts evidence
involving domestic violence could never be admitted in a later
domestic violence case because it would necessarily suggest that
the defendant acted in conformity with that bad character. But
that view “cannot be squared with the General Assembly’s directive
in section 18-6-801.5(3).” Cross, ¶ 23. Second, unlike in Yusem,
where the other act and the charged offense lacked similarity, 210
P.3d at 467, we have already concluded that the prosecution tied
the evidence of the 2021 incident with sufficient specificity to
March’s charged offenses. And, in any event, CRE 404(b) doesn’t
require similarity for the other acts evidence to be admissible.
Yusem, 210 P.3d at 467.
¶ 23 As to the fourth prong, we perceive no abuse of discretion in
the court’s finding that the probative value of the other acts wasn’t
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The
probative value of the 2021 evidence was high because March’s
intent and motive were central disputed issues at trial. See People
v. Herron, 251 P.3d 1190, 1198 (Colo. App. 2010) (under Spoto’s
fourth prong, the court considers the importance of the material
11 fact for which the evidence is offered and whether the fact is
disputed). And although the court admitted a large quantum of
other acts evidence regarding the 2021 incident, we can’t say that
decision amounted to an abuse of discretion given that the main
witness to the incident — the victim — testified she didn’t
remember anything prior to waking up in the hospital. See id.
(considering “the availability of alternative means of proof” under
Spoto’s fourth prong).
¶ 24 We also conclude that the court mitigated any danger of unfair
prejudice by giving several limiting instructions informing the jury
that evidence of the 2021 incident could be considered only for
limited purposes. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that
the jury followed the court’s limiting instruction. People v. Rowe,
2012 COA 90, ¶ 46.
¶ 25 Affording the other acts evidence its maximum probative value
attributable by a reasonable fact finder and the minimum unfair
prejudice to be reasonably expected, Bondsteel v. People, 2019 CO
26, ¶ 50, and mindful of the General Assembly’s guidance in section
18-6-801.5, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling
under Spoto’s fourth prong.
12 ¶ 26 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court didn’t abuse its
discretion by admitting the evidence of the 2021 incident under
CRE 404(b).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 27 March next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions for first degree assault, first degree
burglary, and attempted first degree murder. Specifically, he
argues that insufficient evidence allowed the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he (1) caused serious bodily injury by
strangling the victim; (2) entered the victim’s residence unlawfully
or with the intent to commit a crime; and (3) acted with the specific
intent to kill the victim. We aren’t persuaded.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 28 We review the record de novo to determine whether the
evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality
to sustain the defendant’s conviction. Clark v. People, 232 P.3d
1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010). Applying a “substantial evidence test,” we
consider whether the relevant evidence, viewed as a whole and in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and
sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the
13 defendant is guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
Johnson v. People, 2023 CO 7, ¶ 13. Under this test, relevant
evidence includes both direct and circumstantial evidence. McCoy
v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63.
B. First Degree Assault by Strangulation
¶ 29 As relevant here, a person commits assault in the first degree
by strangulation if, “[w]ith the intent to cause serious bodily injury,
he or she applies sufficient pressure to impede or restrict the
breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by applying
such pressure to the neck . . . of the other person and thereby
causes serious bodily injury.” § 18-3-202(1)(g), C.R.S. 2025.
Serious bodily injury is any bodily injury that, “either at the time of
the actual injury or at a later time, involves a substantial risk of
death.” § 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 30 At trial, the forensic nurse examiner testified as an expert in
strangulation and concluded that the victim suffered serious bodily
injury. She supported her conclusion by testifying to the following:
• The victim relayed at the hospital that March had
strangled her three times and that she had lost
consciousness and urinated on herself.
14 • Any loss of consciousness during strangulation poses
substantial risk of death.
• The victim showed signs of strangulation, such as trouble
breathing, painful and difficult swallowing, blurry vision,
tingling all over her body, neck pain, and a sore throat.
• The victim displayed abrasions and bruising to her upper
lip, which aren’t “uncommon” with strangulation.
¶ 31 The jury also heard from one of the responding police officers
who first spoke with the victim. The officer testified that the victim
had “dark markings” around her neck, a “larger red area” on her
chest, and “slightly swollen” cheeks. The prosecution introduced
multiple pictures of the victim, taken by the officer, that generally
confirmed the officer’s observations.
¶ 32 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable
doubt that March inflicted serious bodily injury on the victim by
strangulation. § 18-3-202(1)(g).
¶ 33 March urges us to consider the conflict between the victim’s
reports to police and the physical evidence introduced at trial. As
examples, he points to the lack of urine on her clothing and the
15 absence of trauma to her neck during the medical examination.
But the task of resolving conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence
fell to the jury. See People v. Plancarte, 232 P.3d 186, 192 (Colo.
App. 2009). In addition, March’s argument ignores the forensic
nurse examiner’s testimony that (1) the dark and red markings
initially observed by the officer may have “dissipated” before she
examined the victim and (2) strangulation doesn’t always result in
observable external or internal injuries.
C. First Degree Burglary
¶ 34 “A person commits first degree burglary if the person
knowingly enters unlawfully . . . in a building or occupied structure
with intent to commit therein a crime . . . and if in effecting entry or
while in the building or occupied structure . . . the person . . .
assaults or menaces any person . . . .” § 18-4-202(1), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 35 The mandatory protection order entered after March’s 2021
assault prohibited March from, among other things, harassing,
molesting, intimidating, retaliating against, or tampering with the
16 victim.1 See § 18-1-1001(1), C.R.S. 2025. The prosecution alleged
that March intended to commit the crime of violating a protection
order when he unlawfully entered the victim’s apartment.
¶ 36 According to one of the responding officers, the victim said
that she didn’t know how March gained entry into her apartment.
She suspected March might have made a copy of her key. The
victim had also placed stools in front of her apartment door to block
access. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the jury could reasonably infer that March entered the
victim’s apartment unlawfully. See People v. Bondurant, 2012 COA
50, ¶ 63 (concluding sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s
first degree burglary conviction where the defendant entered the
residence “unexpectedly” and “without prior arrangements” or
invitation). While March testified that he entered the apartment
with the victim’s permission, the jury was free to reject his
testimony. See Plancarte, 232 P.3d at 192.
1 The trial court took judicial notice that the protection order was
modified in April 2022, shortly before March’s crimes in this case, so that March could contact the victim and visit her home (presumably because he and the victim share two children). The protection order’s other provisions, however, remained in place.
17 ¶ 37 We also conclude that sufficient evidence allowed the jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that March entered the apartment
with the intent to commit a crime therein — specifically, violating a
protection order. See § 18-6-803.5(1), C.R.S. 2025. Based on the
evidence that March choked the victim three times and sheared off
her hair, the jury could reasonably infer that March entered the
apartment intending to harass, molest, intimidate, retaliate against,
or tamper with the victim. See People v. Phillips, 219 P.3d 798, 800
(Colo. App. 2009) (“An actor’s state of mind is normally not subject
to direct proof and must be inferred from his or her actions and the
circumstances surrounding the occurrence.”).
D. Attempted First Degree Murder
¶ 38 A person commits murder in the first degree if, “[a]fter
deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of a person
other than himself, he causes the death of that person or of another
person.” § 18-3-102(1)(a). “A person commits criminal attempt if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
commission of an offense, he engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward the commission of the offense.” § 18-2-
101(1), C.R.S. 2025.
18 ¶ 39 We conclude sufficient evidence permitted the jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that March acted after deliberation and
with the intent to kill the victim. In addition to the evidence that
March choked the victim three times, one of the responding officers
testified that the victim, while at the hospital, reported that March
threatened her by saying, “I’m going to kill you, you’re not going to
make it out alive and no one is going to save you this time.”
March’s mother and the victim’s sister also testified that March had
previously threatened to kill the victim. And, as discussed, the jury
heard evidence about the 2021 incident in which March severely
beat the victim and left her unresponsive. See People v. Jensen, 55
P.3d 135, 140 (Colo. App. 2001) (the prosecution may prove the
defendant’s culpable mental state in a homicide trial through
“evidence of prior threats, mistreatment, or malice by the defendant
toward the victim”).
¶ 40 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury
could reasonably infer from this evidence that March acted after
deliberation and with the intent to kill the victim. See People v.
Harmon, 2025 COA 38M, ¶¶ 31-32; People v. Bogle, 743 P.2d 56, 58
(Colo. App. 1987).
19 ¶ 41 Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported March’s convictions
for first degree assault, first degree burglary, and attempted first
degree murder.
IV. Sentencing
¶ 42 March contends that the trial court committed several errors
that affected his forty-eight-year prison sentence. We perceive no
basis to reverse.
A. Advisement on Sentence Enhancements
¶ 43 March first argues that, contrary to Crim. P. 10, the trial court
never advised him at his arraignment about the crime of violence
sentence enhancement charges that he faced.
¶ 44 But March didn’t designate the arraignment transcripts in his
designation of record, thus foreclosing our review. See C.A.R.
10(d)(3); People v. Shifrin, 2014 COA 14, ¶ 39. Even after March
supplemented the record (after the People pointed out the
arraignment transcripts were omitted), no transcript of the
arraignment appears in our record. Without the arraignment
transcripts, we must presume that the trial court properly advised
March of the sentence enhancement charges or that such
advisement wasn’t necessary under the circumstances. See LePage
20 v. People, 2014 CO 13, ¶¶ 15-16 (describing presumption of
regularity, including the appellant’s duty to present a record that
discloses the alleged error). Indeed, a minute order dated June 2,
2022, reflects both that March waived reading and advisement of
the charges and that he appeared with counsel. See Crim. P. 10(e)
(“If the defendant appears with counsel, the information or
indictment need not be read and no waiver of said reading is
necessary.”).
B. Consecutive Sentencing
¶ 45 Next, March asserts that the trial court erred by imposing
consecutive sentences for his attempted first degree murder and
first degree burglary convictions. According to March, the
prosecution contended at trial that all charges arose from a single
event.
¶ 46 “When a defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the
decision to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences is within
the sound discretion of the trial court.” People v. Rodriguez-Ortiz,
2025 COA 61, ¶ 84. But the court’s discretion is restricted in
certain circumstances. For example, under section 18-1.3-
406(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021, which applied to March’s offenses, the court
21 must “sentence a person convicted of two or more separate crimes
of violence arising out of the same incident so that his or her
sentences are served consecutively rather than concurrently.”2
Because March’s attempted first degree murder and first degree
burglary convictions both qualified as crimes of violence, see § 18-
1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(B), (2)(a)(II)(B), (H), C.R.S. 2021, the court had no
choice but to impose consecutive sentences.
¶ 47 Moreover, even putting aside section 18-1.3-406(1), a trial
court is generally required to impose concurrent sentences only
when the defendant is convicted of multiple crimes based on
identical evidence. § 18-1-408(3), C.R.S. 2025. In this case,
March’s attempted murder and burglary convictions weren’t
necessarily based on identical evidence. Evidence regarding March
copying the victim’s key, the stools blocking her apartment door,
and March’s protection order, for example, was generally relevant
only to the burglary charge. By contrast, evidence regarding
March’s deliberation and intent to kill the victim, while necessary
for the jury to convict March of attempted first degree murder,
2 This provision is now codified at section 18-1.3-406(1)(b), C.R.S.
2025, and applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2023.
22 wasn’t essential to the burglary charge. See People v. Muckle, 107
P.3d 380, 383 (Colo. 2005) (“[T]he mere possibility that the jury may
have relied on identical evidence in returning more than one
conviction is not sufficient to trigger the mandatory concurrent
sentencing provision.”).
C. Proportionality
¶ 48 March also argues that his forty-eight-year sentence is
excessive and disproportionate. March requested that the trial
court conduct a proportionality review but filed his notice of appeal
before the court could rule, thereby divesting it of jurisdiction. See
People v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 765, 771 (Colo. 1985).
¶ 49 We are a court of review, not first view. People v. Spomer,
2025 COA 39M, ¶ 43. Given the case’s current posture and
because inquiry into the specific facts and circumstances of
March’s crimes may be necessary, see Wells-Yates v. People, 2019
CO 90M, ¶ 69, we decline to address March’s proportionality
arguments in the first instance and conclude they are better
addressed during the postconviction stage. See People v. Session,
2020 COA 158, ¶ 51; see also People v. Crawley, 2024 COA 49, ¶ 7
23 (“A proportionality challenge implicates the constitutionality of a
sentence and is thus cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c).”).
D. Victim’s Request for Leniency
¶ 50 Finally, March argues that the trial court failed to give the
victim’s request for leniency at sentencing “appropriate weight.” In
requesting leniency, the victim told the court that the events
described at trial were “taken out of proportion” and that March
was a “great father” and a “good man.”
¶ 51 Although victims have the right to be heard at sentencing,
§ 24-4.1-302.5(1)(d)(IV), C.R.S. 2025, a defendant’s ultimate
sentence rests with the trial court’s “wide discretion,” subject to
constitutional and statutory restraints. People v. Walters, 632 P.2d
566, 567 (Colo. 1981).
¶ 52 We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s sentence.
Because his attempted first degree murder and first degree burglary
convictions qualified as crimes of violence, the court’s sentences of
thirty-two years for the former (a class 2 felony) and sixteen years
for the latter (a class 3 felony) both fell within the permissible
statutory range. See § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), (8)(a)(I), C.R.S.
2025. Moreover, the trial court heard the prosecution’s domestic
24 violence expert testify that victims of domestic violence often recant
or minimize their abuser’s crimes. Given this, we can’t say that the
trial court abused its discretion by declining to give the victim’s
statement more weight.
¶ 53 Accordingly, we perceive no error in the trial court’s sentence
that requires reversal.
V. Disposition
¶ 54 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.