23CA1894 Peo v Manchego 12-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1894 El Paso County District Court No. 22CR6327 Honorable Jessica L. Curtis, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Anthony Andrew Manchego,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 4, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Claire Pakis, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Anthony Andrew Manchego, appeals the district
court’s restitution order. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Manchego pleaded guilty to second degree assault as part of a
three-year deferred judgment and sentence agreement. As part of
the written plea agreement and stipulation for deferred judgment
and sentence, the parties agreed that (1) Manchego would pay “all
restitution within the term of [his] original sentence” and (2) “the
People [would] submit the proposed amount [of restitution] within
42 days of sentencing.”
¶3 On February 27, 2023, the district court accepted the parties’
agreement, finding that Manchego’s plea was “knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.” During the sentencing portion of the hearing, the
prosecutor asked the court, pursuant to the agreement, for forty-
two days to file the restitution request. The court asked if there was
“anything from the Defense . . . ?” Defense counsel responded,
“Um, no thank you,” and Manchego added, “No, I’m content with
the situation, Your Honor.” The court entered the deferred
judgment and sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. The
court also ordered the amount of restitution “to be finalized in the
1 next 91 days” with “the prosecution to bring forward any requested
restitution within 42 days.”
¶4 Thirty-eight days later, the prosecution filed a motion
requesting $13,219.70 in restitution to reimburse the Crime
Victims Compensation Board (CVCB) for payments it made on the
victim’s behalf for his medical expenses. Manchego filed an
objection to the restitution amount and requested a hearing.
¶5 After two continuances, both of which were requested by
Manchego’s counsel and granted without objection, the district
court held the restitution hearing. During the hearing, conflicting
evidence was presented concerning the CVCB records and the
amount of restitution sought by the victim. Based on this
discrepancy, the court granted defense counsel’s renewed request
for an in camera review of the records and found good cause to
extend the deadline for its determination of the amount of
restitution to be ordered.
¶6 As now relevant, the redacted CVCB records that were
released following the in camera review showed that all of the
victim’s medical treatments occurred on the date of the offense, and
the victim had submitted all of his documents for reimbursement to
2 the CVCB about two months before Manchego pleaded guilty and
was sentenced. Upon receipt of these documents, Manchego
maintained his objection to the restitution amount. However, the
district court found that the prosecution had satisfied its burden to
prove restitution and ordered the full amount of restitution
requested, $13,219.70.
II. Discussion
¶7 Manchego contends that the district court lacked the authority
to impose restitution because the prosecution failed to present its
restitution information before the entry of the order of conviction
despite such information being available before the sentencing
hearing.
¶8 Based on the supreme court’s recent decision in Johnson v.
People, 2025 CO 29, we conclude that Manchego waived his right to
appellate review of this issue by his actions in the district court.
Accordingly, we won’t consider the merits of his contention. See
People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 40 (“[W]aiver extinguishes error,
and therefore appellate review.”).
3 A. Standard of Review
¶9 We review de novo whether a claim is waived. Richardson v.
People, 2020 CO 46, ¶ 21.
B. Manchego Waived His Statutory Right
¶ 10 Every order of conviction “must include consideration of
restitution.” § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2025. To determine
restitution, the district court “shall base its order for restitution
upon information presented to the court by the prosecuting
attorney.” § 18-1.3-603(2)(a). Under the law applicable at the time
of the district court proceedings in this case, the prosecuting
attorney was required to “present this information to the court prior
to the order of conviction or within ninety-one days, if it [was] not
available prior to the order of conviction.” § 18-1.3-603(2)(a), C.R.S.
2023.1
¶ 11 In People v. Johnson, the supreme court interpreted the
statute at issue and held that the right provided for in section 18-
1.3-603(2)(a) — to have restitution determined at sentencing if the
1 Effective May 30, 2025, section 18-1.3-603(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025,
requires the prosecution to submit restitution information to the court before the order of conviction or, if the information isn’t available then, within sixty-three days.
4 amount of restitution is available to the prosecution before that
time — is a statutory right that can be waived. Johnson, ¶¶ 25, 27.
The waiver of a statutory right must be voluntary, but it doesn’t
need to be knowing or intelligent. Id. at ¶ 26. Waiver may be
demonstrated through explicit words or actions, or it may be
implied. Id. A waiver may be implied “when a party engages in
conduct that manifests an intent to relinquish a right or privilege or
acts inconsistently with its assertion.” Forgette v. People, 2023 CO
4, ¶ 28. Moreover, when the right at issue is statutory, the actions
of counsel are relevant because “[c]ounsel may waive a defendant’s
statutory rights.” Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 16; Johnson,
¶ 26.
¶ 12 In Johnson, the supreme court found a voluntary waiver of a
subsection (2)(a) claim when (1) the defendant signed a plea
agreement and stipulation for deferred judgment and sentence,
agreeing both to pay restitution and permit the prosecution to
provide restitution information to the district court after the
sentencing hearing; (2) the defendant told the court that he
understood and agreed to the terms of the agreement; and (3) the
court found that the defendant had entered his plea knowingly,
5 intelligently, and voluntarily, and it was not the product of undue
influence or coercion. Johnson, ¶¶ 28-30.
¶ 13 Factually, Manchego’s case is not meaningfully
distinguishable from Johnson, as Manchego concedes. Like
Johnson, Manchego signed a plea agreement in which he agreed to
pay “all restitution within the term of [his] original sentence.” See
Johnson, ¶ 28. He also signed a Stipulation for Deferred Judgment
and Sentence, agreeing to let the prosecution have additional time
to provide restitution information to the district court — forty-two
additional days. See id. During the combined providency and
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23CA1894 Peo v Manchego 12-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1894 El Paso County District Court No. 22CR6327 Honorable Jessica L. Curtis, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Anthony Andrew Manchego,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 4, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Claire Pakis, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Anthony Andrew Manchego, appeals the district
court’s restitution order. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Manchego pleaded guilty to second degree assault as part of a
three-year deferred judgment and sentence agreement. As part of
the written plea agreement and stipulation for deferred judgment
and sentence, the parties agreed that (1) Manchego would pay “all
restitution within the term of [his] original sentence” and (2) “the
People [would] submit the proposed amount [of restitution] within
42 days of sentencing.”
¶3 On February 27, 2023, the district court accepted the parties’
agreement, finding that Manchego’s plea was “knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.” During the sentencing portion of the hearing, the
prosecutor asked the court, pursuant to the agreement, for forty-
two days to file the restitution request. The court asked if there was
“anything from the Defense . . . ?” Defense counsel responded,
“Um, no thank you,” and Manchego added, “No, I’m content with
the situation, Your Honor.” The court entered the deferred
judgment and sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. The
court also ordered the amount of restitution “to be finalized in the
1 next 91 days” with “the prosecution to bring forward any requested
restitution within 42 days.”
¶4 Thirty-eight days later, the prosecution filed a motion
requesting $13,219.70 in restitution to reimburse the Crime
Victims Compensation Board (CVCB) for payments it made on the
victim’s behalf for his medical expenses. Manchego filed an
objection to the restitution amount and requested a hearing.
¶5 After two continuances, both of which were requested by
Manchego’s counsel and granted without objection, the district
court held the restitution hearing. During the hearing, conflicting
evidence was presented concerning the CVCB records and the
amount of restitution sought by the victim. Based on this
discrepancy, the court granted defense counsel’s renewed request
for an in camera review of the records and found good cause to
extend the deadline for its determination of the amount of
restitution to be ordered.
¶6 As now relevant, the redacted CVCB records that were
released following the in camera review showed that all of the
victim’s medical treatments occurred on the date of the offense, and
the victim had submitted all of his documents for reimbursement to
2 the CVCB about two months before Manchego pleaded guilty and
was sentenced. Upon receipt of these documents, Manchego
maintained his objection to the restitution amount. However, the
district court found that the prosecution had satisfied its burden to
prove restitution and ordered the full amount of restitution
requested, $13,219.70.
II. Discussion
¶7 Manchego contends that the district court lacked the authority
to impose restitution because the prosecution failed to present its
restitution information before the entry of the order of conviction
despite such information being available before the sentencing
hearing.
¶8 Based on the supreme court’s recent decision in Johnson v.
People, 2025 CO 29, we conclude that Manchego waived his right to
appellate review of this issue by his actions in the district court.
Accordingly, we won’t consider the merits of his contention. See
People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 40 (“[W]aiver extinguishes error,
and therefore appellate review.”).
3 A. Standard of Review
¶9 We review de novo whether a claim is waived. Richardson v.
People, 2020 CO 46, ¶ 21.
B. Manchego Waived His Statutory Right
¶ 10 Every order of conviction “must include consideration of
restitution.” § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2025. To determine
restitution, the district court “shall base its order for restitution
upon information presented to the court by the prosecuting
attorney.” § 18-1.3-603(2)(a). Under the law applicable at the time
of the district court proceedings in this case, the prosecuting
attorney was required to “present this information to the court prior
to the order of conviction or within ninety-one days, if it [was] not
available prior to the order of conviction.” § 18-1.3-603(2)(a), C.R.S.
2023.1
¶ 11 In People v. Johnson, the supreme court interpreted the
statute at issue and held that the right provided for in section 18-
1.3-603(2)(a) — to have restitution determined at sentencing if the
1 Effective May 30, 2025, section 18-1.3-603(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025,
requires the prosecution to submit restitution information to the court before the order of conviction or, if the information isn’t available then, within sixty-three days.
4 amount of restitution is available to the prosecution before that
time — is a statutory right that can be waived. Johnson, ¶¶ 25, 27.
The waiver of a statutory right must be voluntary, but it doesn’t
need to be knowing or intelligent. Id. at ¶ 26. Waiver may be
demonstrated through explicit words or actions, or it may be
implied. Id. A waiver may be implied “when a party engages in
conduct that manifests an intent to relinquish a right or privilege or
acts inconsistently with its assertion.” Forgette v. People, 2023 CO
4, ¶ 28. Moreover, when the right at issue is statutory, the actions
of counsel are relevant because “[c]ounsel may waive a defendant’s
statutory rights.” Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 16; Johnson,
¶ 26.
¶ 12 In Johnson, the supreme court found a voluntary waiver of a
subsection (2)(a) claim when (1) the defendant signed a plea
agreement and stipulation for deferred judgment and sentence,
agreeing both to pay restitution and permit the prosecution to
provide restitution information to the district court after the
sentencing hearing; (2) the defendant told the court that he
understood and agreed to the terms of the agreement; and (3) the
court found that the defendant had entered his plea knowingly,
5 intelligently, and voluntarily, and it was not the product of undue
influence or coercion. Johnson, ¶¶ 28-30.
¶ 13 Factually, Manchego’s case is not meaningfully
distinguishable from Johnson, as Manchego concedes. Like
Johnson, Manchego signed a plea agreement in which he agreed to
pay “all restitution within the term of [his] original sentence.” See
Johnson, ¶ 28. He also signed a Stipulation for Deferred Judgment
and Sentence, agreeing to let the prosecution have additional time
to provide restitution information to the district court — forty-two
additional days. See id. During the combined providency and
sentencing hearing, Manchego told the court that he understood
and agreed to the terms of the plea and deferred judgment
agreements. See id. at ¶ 29. And the court found that Manchego’s
plea was “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” See id. For these
reasons, we conclude that Manchego voluntarily waived his
statutory claim under section 18-1.3-603(2)(a) that the prosecution
should have provided restitution information that was available to it
before the entry of the order of conviction. He waived his claim
explicitly in the terms of his plea agreement and stipulation for
deferred judgment and sentence, and also implicitly by assenting to
6 the court’s order at the combined providency and sentencing
¶ 14 As noted, Manchego doesn’t argue that Johnson is
distinguishable; instead, he contends that it was incorrectly decided
because these facts support forfeiture, and not waiver. But as
Manchego correctly concedes, we are bound by Johnson. See
People v. Harmon, 2019 COA 156, ¶ 3 n.1 (the Colorado Court of
Appeals is bound by the holdings of the Colorado Supreme Court).
¶ 15 Accordingly, because Manchego voluntarily waived his section
18-1.3-603(2)(a) claim, we affirm the district court’s restitution
order.
III. Disposition
¶ 16 The restitution order is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.