Peo v. Mamo

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 31, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0020
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0020 Peo v Mamo 07-31-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0020 El Paso County District Court No. 12CR3842 Honorable Samuel A. Evig, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Louis Edward Mamo,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Grove and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 31, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Senior Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Krista A. Schelhaas, Alternate Defense Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Louis Edward Mamo, appeals the postconviction

court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction

relief following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The People charged Mamo with second degree murder, attempt

to influence a public servant, and two counts of child abuse for

shooting his wife in the head with a gun during an argument,

fleeing while leaving his two young children locked in a bedroom,

and then falsely telling the police that his wife had committed

suicide. Mamo’s defense at trial was that he fired the gun by

accident. At the conclusion of the trial, a jury convicted Mamo of

all counts.

¶3 The trial court sentenced Mamo to forty years in prison for

second degree murder, two years in prison for attempt to influence

a public servant, and two, one-year terms in jail for each of the

child abuse counts. The court ordered all of the sentences to be

served consecutively.

¶4 Mamo appealed the judgment of conviction, and a division of

this court affirmed the judgment but remanded the case for the trial

court to correct a clerical error in the mittimus. People v. Mamo,

1 (Colo. App. No. 13CA1478, Sept. 1, 2016) (not published pursuant

to C.A.R. 35(e)). Mamo then filed a Crim. P. 35(b) motion for

sentence reconsideration, which the trial court denied after a

hearing.

¶5 Thereafter, Mamo filed a timely pro se motion for

postconviction relief, raising two claims of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. The postconviction court appointed counsel, who filed

two supplements to Mamo’s pro se motion — the first supplemented

the original claims raised in Mamo’s pro se motion and the second

raised two new claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The

prosecution responded, Mamo replied, and the court held an

evidentiary hearing on the motion and supplements.

¶6 At the hearing, the postconviction court heard testimony from

a defense psychiatrist, Mamo’s two trial attorneys, the lead

detective, and Mamo. After the hearing, the parties submitted

written closing arguments. The court denied Mamo’s motion and

supplements in a detailed written order.

II. Discussion

¶7 Mamo contends that, contrary to the postconviction court’s

findings, the evidence at the postconviction hearing established that

2 his trial attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to

(1) investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing and

(2) engage in plea negotiations. We address and reject each of these

contentions in turn.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶8 “A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to effective

assistance from his counsel.” Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 76

(Colo. 2003). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, the defendant must establish that (1) counsel’s performance

was deficient, meaning it fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

the defendant, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687-88 (1984); Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1062-63 (Colo.

2007). A postconviction court must reject an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim if the defendant fails to demonstrate either

deficient performance or prejudice. See People v. Aguilar, 2012 COA

181, ¶ 9.

3 ¶9 We review the denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion after a hearing

as a mixed question of fact and law. People v. Corson, 2016 CO 33,

¶ 25. We defer to the postconviction court’s factual findings but

review de novo the court’s ultimate conclusions regarding

performance and prejudice. See Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d

800, 807-08 (Colo. 2009); People v. Sharp, 2019 COA 133, ¶ 12.

The postconviction court determines the weight and credibility to be

given to the testimony of witnesses in a Crim. P. 35(c) hearing.

People v. Hardin, 2016 COA 175, ¶ 39. Accordingly, “[w]here the

evidence in the record supports the findings and holding of the

postconviction court that presided over an evidentiary hearing, the

judgment will not be disturbed on review.” People v. Wardell, 2020

COA 47, ¶ 27.

B. Abandoned Claims

¶ 10 As a threshold matter, any claims that Mamo raised in his

postconviction motion and supplements but did not reassert in this

appeal are abandoned. See People v. Osorio, 170 P.3d 796, 801

(Colo. App. 2007).

4 C. Mitigation at Sentencing

¶ 11 Mamo contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to present sufficient mitigation evidence at sentencing. In

particular, Mamo asserts that he suffered from significant

childhood trauma and had a substance abuse disorder, and that

there is a reasonable possibility that he would have received a less

severe sentence if counsel had presented this information at

sentencing.

¶ 12 At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Leah Brar, a defense expert in

forensic psychiatry, testified concerning several sources of trauma

from Mamo’s childhood. She testified that when Mamo was born,

he was addicted to opiates and because his mother and father were

unable to raise him, he was raised by his grandparents. Dr. Brar

testified that when Mamo was a young child his grandmother died

of bone cancer, he suffered a traumatic brain injury after accidently

being hit in the head with a baseball bat, and he witnessed his

father’s girlfriend stab his father during an argument. She also

testified that when Mamo’s grandfather developed dementia, Mamo

went to live with his father. During this time, Mamo’s father lived

with a woman who had a daughter Mamo’s age. When the two

5 children would stay with the little girl’s father, the girl’s father

sexually molested both of them.

¶ 13 Dr. Brar testified about Mamo’s mental health history and

substance abuse history. She explained the effects of the various

substances Mamo was using at the time of the offense, as well as

their interactions with one another, and opined that he was

impaired by alcohol and had a “strong clinical suspicion” that he

was also intoxicated by benzodiazepines.

¶ 14 Dr. Brar diagnosed Mamo with post-traumatic stress disorder,

alcohol use disorder, benzodiazepine use disorder, cocaine use

disorder, and cannabis use disorder, and she opined that if he had

been evaluated around the time of the trial, he would have received

these same diagnoses.

¶ 15 Mamo testified similarly to Dr. Brar concerning the trauma he

experienced as a child. He testified that his trial attorneys never

asked him about his childhood or background, but he did tell them

about the substances he took at the time of the offense.

¶ 16 Mamo’s trial attorneys testified that it wasn’t yet the regular

practice of their office to employ social workers to evaluate a client

prior to sentencing, although it could happen under “extraordinary”

6 circumstances.” Rather, the common practice at the time was to

interview family members or request records, depending on the

defendant’s circumstances. Both of Mamo’s attorneys recalled

interviewing Mamo’s family and one of his attorneys remembered

requesting some of his records, although she couldn’t recall which

ones. His attorneys testified that it was their office’s common

practice at the time to have conversations about their client’s

background or childhood, although neither remembered doing so

with Mamo.

¶ 17 Rejecting this claim, the postconviction court observed that

although this mitigation evidence wasn’t presented at the

sentencing hearing, Mamo’s attorneys did present some mitigating

information through various witnesses and Mamo himself. The

court also noted the trial court’s focus on Mamo’s prior domestic

violence incidents involving his wife and the substantial aggravating

factors about Mamo’s conduct before, during, and after the

homicide. Finding that there was “no evidence that more mitigation

would have changed [the trial court’s] focus” and “[n]othing

presented could change those [aggravating] facts,” the

7 postconviction court concluded that “even if the Defense presented

[this] mitigation, it would not have mattered.”

¶ 18 “An unreasonable failure to conduct a mitigation investigation

can constitute the grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel.”

Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1065. However, we agree with the

postconviction court that there isn’t a reasonable probability that

the outcome of the sentencing hearing would have been different if

trial counsel had presented mitigation relating to Mamo’s childhood

trauma and substance abuse at his sentencing hearing.

¶ 19 As the postconviction court noted, none of this mitigating

information would have changed the aggravating facts the trial

court relied upon in fashioning its sentence. The trial court noted

the prior incidents of domestic violence, “which culminated in [the

victim’s] death.” The trial court reflected that Mamo’s actions after

killing his wife — leaving his two young sons for hours locked alone

in their room while their mother lay dead in the next room, taking

only his dog with him — was “unconscionable and unimaginable.”

And the trial court questioned the sincerity of Mamo’s expressions

of remorse.

8 ¶ 20 Moreover, the postconviction court relied on the testimony

provided by one of Mamo’s trial attorneys that the trial court was a

“harsh” sentencer and they expected a harsh sentence if the jury

found him guilty. The record supports these findings. Mamo’s

attorney testified that the trial court was on the “more severe” side

of sentencing, and while the court was “fair,” she expected “a harder

sentencing” in a case like this, “where you have someone who’s no

longer with us.”

¶ 21 Nor are we persuaded that the trial court was given “no

opportunity” to consider any mitigation at the sentencing hearing.

The postconviction court found, and the record confirms, that the

defense offered evidence and argument in favor of mitigation at the

sentencing hearing. Witnesses spoke on Mamo’s behalf, Mamo

expressed sorrow about what had happened, and his attorneys

asked the trial court for a lenient sentence. True, the trial court

wasn’t provided with the same mitigation that was presented at the

Crim. P. 35(c) hearing. But, as the postconviction court noted, no

evidence was presented to suggest a reasonable probability that

Mamo would have received a lesser sentence if this additional

mitigation had been presented at sentencing.

9 ¶ 22 Given the strength of the evidence against Mamo and the

aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court, the evidence he

presented at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing wasn’t sufficient to

undermine our confidence in the outcome of his sentencing

hearing. Hence, there is no reasonable probability a different

outcome would have occurred had trial counsel presented

additional mitigation concerning his childhood trauma and

substance abuse history. Because we conclude that the

postconviction court was correct in finding that Mamo failed to

prove prejudice, it didn’t err by denying this claim.

D. Plea Negotiations

¶ 23 Mamo contends that his trial attorneys failed to engage in plea

negotiations and didn’t provide his “substantial mitigation,” which

was presented at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing, to the prosecutor to

help secure a plea bargain. He asserts that if counsel had engaged

in plea negotiations as described, there is a reasonable probability

that the prosecution would have made an offer more favorable than

the sentence imposed, and that he would have accepted this offer.

¶ 24 The Strickland test applies to claims that defense counsel

provided ineffective assistance in the plea-bargaining process. See

10 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012); see also People v.

Delgado, 2019 COA 55, ¶¶ 1, 7. And under certain circumstances,

the failure to pursue plea negotiations may amount to deficient

performance. People v. Sherman, 172 P.3d 911, 913 (Colo. App.

2006). But counsel doesn’t provide ineffective assistance simply by

failing to engage in plea negotiations. Id. Rather, a postconviction

court must consider “the particular facts and circumstances of the

case” to determine whether “counsel’s failure to initiate plea

negotiations fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id.

¶ 25 Mamo’s trial attorneys testified that they didn’t remember an

offer or plea bargain in this case, rather, they recalled that Mamo

“was pretty set on trial from the very beginning,” he wasn’t

interested in talking about an offer, and this case “looked like a trial

case pretty early on.” His attorneys also testified that they both

reviewed the file and didn’t find any notes reflecting requesting or

receiving an offer.

¶ 26 Mamo testified at the hearing that he “didn’t want to go to

trial” and wanted a plea disposition “more than anything.” He

testified that he “begged” his attorneys for a plea bargain, but they

were dismissive of his request, telling him that the district attorney

11 “wasn’t willing” to give him a plea offer and “being charged with

second-degree murder was a deal in itself.”

¶ 27 Weighing this conflicting testimony, the postconviction court

concluded that “Mamo did not testify credibly on this point.” It was

the postconviction court’s prerogative to weigh this conflicting

testimony; we can’t and won’t second guess its conclusion. See

People v. Williams, 908 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Colo. App. 1995) (“The

weight and credibility to be given the testimony of witnesses in a

Crim. P. 35(c) hearing is within the province of the trial court and

when there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the

court’s findings, its ruling will not be disturbed on review.”).

¶ 28 Further, the postconviction court found that the prosecution

didn’t extend an offer in this case and, “based on the strength of the

evidence,” it had “little incentive” to do so. This finding is also

supported by the testimony at the evidentiary hearing. As

previously discussed, the evidence against Mamo was strong, and

trial counsel testified that they didn’t recall, and their files didn’t

indicate that the prosecution ever made a formal plea offer.

Because the postconviction court’s findings are supported by the

record, we defer to them. See Corson, ¶ 25. And if the prosecution

12 was unwilling to make an offer, trial counsel couldn’t have

performed deficiently by failing to engage in plea negotiations. See

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012) (“[A] defendant has no

right to be offered a plea, . . . nor a federal right that the judge

accept it . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).

III. Disposition

¶ 29 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.