Peo v. Madrid

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 29, 2025
• Docket: 22CA1690
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

22CA1690 Peo v Madrid 05-29-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1690 City and County of Denver District Court No. 13CR5260 Honorable Christopher J. Baumann, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

John J. Madrid,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Brown and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 29, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Katharine J. Gillespie, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Mark G. Walta, Alternate Defense Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, John J. Madrid, appeals the postconviction court’s

order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2015, a jury convicted Madrid of nine counts of sexual

assault on a child. The trial court sentenced him to an

indeterminate term of nine years to life in prison.

¶3 On direct appeal, a division of this court affirmed the

convictions. People v. Madrid, (Colo. App. No. 15CA0690, May 4,

2017) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶4 In late 2018, Madrid timely filed a Rule 35(c) motion, asserting

various claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and

requesting the appointment of postconviction counsel.

¶5 In February 2019, the postconviction court ordered

postconviction counsel to respond within forty-nine days as to

whether it intended to represent Madrid. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V).

After the forty-nine-day deadline had passed, postconviction

counsel responded and requested an additional 180 days to

supplement Madrid’s pro se motion “if necessary.” The court

granted the extension. At postconviction counsel’s request, the

1 court extended the deadline two more times, making the

supplement due in March 2020. But postconviction counsel missed

the March 2020 deadline, filing neither a supplement nor a request

for more time.

¶6 Nearly two years later, postconviction counsel supplemented

Madrid’s pro se motion. Though the supplement fell well outside

the court’s extended March 2020 deadline, it didn’t acknowledge

missing the deadline or offer an explanation for doing so. In

response, the prosecution argued that the supplement was

untimely and that the court should deny the pro se motion without

a hearing because the claims lacked merit.

¶7 In a thorough written order, the postconviction court declined

to consider the untimely supplement and denied Madrid’s pro se

motion without a hearing.

¶8 On appeal, Madrid contends that the postconviction court

erred by (1) not questioning the effectiveness of postconviction

counsel and (2) denying his pro se motion without a hearing.

II. The Untimely Supplement

¶9 Madrid argues — for the first time on appeal — that the

postconviction court erred by not considering “whether ineffective

2 assistance by postconviction counsel constituted excusable neglect

or justifiable excuse” for the untimely supplement.

¶ 10 But it’s undisputed that Madrid never argued to the

postconviction court that he received ineffective assistance from

postconviction counsel or that postconviction counsel’s conduct

constituted excusable neglect or justifiable excuse.1 And claims

“not raised before the district court in a motion for postconviction

relief will not be considered on appeal of the denial of that motion.”

DePineda v. Price, 915 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo. 1996); accord People

v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34. Thus, Madrid’s claims regarding

postconviction counsel are not properly before us, and we will not

consider them for the first time on appeal. See Cali, ¶¶ 35-37

(refusing to consider ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

claim raised for the first time on appeal); People v. Tennyson, 2023

1 Insofar as Madrid says the postconviction court erred by not sua

sponte raising, developing, and resolving these claims, he directs us to no authority — and we aren’t aware of any — that required the court to do so. Cf. People v. Valdez, 178 P.3d 1269, 1274-75, 1278- 79 (Colo. App. 2007) (postconviction court properly considered whether postconviction counsel’s delay amounted to ineffective assistance or constituted justifiable excuse or excusable neglect after those issues were raised by the postconviction court and developed by the parties).

3 COA 2, ¶ 43 (refusing to address justifiable excuse arguments

raised for the first time on appeal), aff’d, 2025 CO 31.

¶ 11 Because Madrid otherwise agrees that postconviction counsel’s

supplement was “unquestionably untimely,” the postconviction

court properly declined to consider it.2 See People v. Marquez, 2020

COA 169M, ¶¶ 23-25 (concluding the postconviction court didn’t err

by refusing to consider a supplemental Rule 35(c) motion filed more

than two years after postconviction counsel was appointed).

III. The Pro Se Motion

¶ 12 Next, Madrid contends that the postconviction court erred by

denying his Rule 35(c) motion without an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 13 A postconviction court may deny a Rule 35(c) motion without a

hearing if the allegations are bare and conclusory; the allegations,

even if true, do not warrant relief; or the record directly refutes the

2 Because the postconviction court properly refused to consider the

untimely supplement, we needn’t address the court’s conclusion that the supplement was procedurally barred because postconviction counsel filed it after the three-year window for collaterally attacking Madrid’s convictions had passed. See People v. Duran, 2025 COA 34, ¶ 26 (“[W]e may affirm the postconviction court’s order on any ground supported by the record . . . .”).

4 allegations. People v. Duran, 2025 COA 34, ¶ 15; see also Ardolino

v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003).

¶ 14 We review de novo the denial of a Rule 35(c) motion without a

hearing. Duran, ¶ 15.

¶ 15 Madrid contends only that the court was required hold an

evidentiary hearing on his pro se motion because “there was a

preliminary determination that [his] claims of ineffective assistance

of trial counsel were sufficiently meritorious to warrant

appointment of counsel.” But the fact that the court appointed

postconviction counsel to supplement Madrid’s motion doesn’t

mean it was later required to hold a hearing. See People v. Segura,

2024 CO 70, ¶ 26 n.8 (“Even if, upon an initial review, the court

declines to deny [a Rule 35(c)] motion outright, it may subsequently

resolve the motion without a hearing after any arguably meritorious

claims pursued by postconviction counsel have been fully briefed.”).

¶ 16 Beyond this single point, however, Madrid doesn’t explain how

or why the postconviction court erred by denying his ineffective

assistance claims without a hearing. He simply asserts — without

any argument — that his pro se “motion set forth sufficient facts to

warrant” an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of

5 counsel claims. We don’t address undeveloped and conclusory

arguments. See Duran, ¶ 14 n.3 (explaining that appellate courts

don’t address undeveloped arguments); see also People v. Wallin,

167 P.3d 183, 187 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to address

arguments presented in a perfunctory or conclusory manner).

¶ 17 To the extent Madrid asserts that a hearing was required

“given the facts alleged in the untimely” supplement, we disagree.

Having concluded that the postconviction court didn’t err by

refusing to consider the untimely supplement, we necessarily reject

Madrid’s claim that the untimely supplement “compelled” the court

to hold an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 18 Madrid has therefore presented no basis to reverse the

postconviction court’s ruling.

IV. Disposition

¶ 19 We affirm the order.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.