Peo v. Long

Opinion

25CA1013 Peo v Long 08-20-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1013 Adams County District Court No. 03CR1246 Honorable Jeffrey Ruff, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Matthew Jacob Long, Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI

Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Grove and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 20, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Matthew Jacob Long, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.

¶1 Defendant, Matthew Jacob Long, appeals the order denying his most recent postconviction motion. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2003, Long pleaded guilty to aggravated second degree kidnapping and attempted sexual assault. As part of a plea agreement, he stipulated to a sentence in the aggravated range between sixteen and forty-eight years. The district court imposed a controlling thirty-year prison sentence. Long didn’t directly appeal.

¶3 In 2006, with the assistance of counsel, Long filed his first postconviction motion. As relevant here, Long argued under Crim. P. 35(a) that his second degree kidnapping sentence was illegally aggravated because the charge was not a crime of violence and the district court didn’t make findings sufficient to justify the aggravated sentence. The district court denied the motion and a division of this court affirmed, holding that the district court had discretion to sentence Long as it did and properly aggravated his sentence. See People v. Long, (Colo. App. No. 07CA0430, July 31, 2008) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)) (Long I).

¶4 In 2020, Long filed a pro se postconviction motion under Crim. P. 35(a). He again argued, as relevant here, that his second degree

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kidnapping sentence was illegally aggravated because the offense wasn’t a crime of violence and the district court failed to make findings of aggravation. The district court denied the motion. Long appealed the court’s denial but then subsequently sought dismissal of his appeal, which this court granted.

¶5 Two years later, Long filed another pro se postconviction motion under Crim. P. 35(a). He argued for a third time, as relevant here, that his second degree kidnapping sentence was illegally aggravated because he wasn’t convicted of a crime of violence and the district court failed to make findings of aggravation. The district court denied the motion and a division of this court affirmed. See People v. Long, (Colo. App. No. 22CA0694, Sep. 28, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Long II). The division held that Long’s claim was both an untimely illegal manner claim and barred by the law of the case doctrine.

¶6 In 2024, Long filed the postconviction motion at issue here, again alleging that his second degree kidnapping sentence was illegally aggravated because he wasn’t convicted of a crime of violence and the district court failed to make findings of aggravation. The district court denied the motion, noting that Long

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had filed the same or similar motion on “no less than three prior occasions.” The court also found that Long expressly agreed to a sentence in the aggravated range and the sentence was legally imposed “based upon these facts.”

II. Discussion

¶7 Long contends, as he did in his postconviction motion, that his sentence was illegally aggravated because his second degree kidnapping charge isn’t a crime of violence and the district court failed to make findings of aggravation. He also asserts his sentence should now be corrected because it is an illegal sentence that can be corrected at any time, and not a time-barred illegal manner claim. Because we conclude that Long’s motion was barred by the law of the case doctrine, we affirm the court’s order.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 The legality of a sentence is reviewed de novo. People v. Bassford, 2014 COA 15, ¶ 20. We similarly review de novo whether a prior ruling is law of the case. People v. Misenhelter, 214 P.3d 497, 500 (Colo. App. 2009), aff’d, 234 P.3d 657 (Colo. 2010). We may affirm a court’s ruling on any ground supported by the record. People v. Manyik, 2016 COA 42, ¶ 69.

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B. Analysis

¶9 Long’s motion is precluded by the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule under which “prior relevant rulings made in the same case are to be followed unless such application would result in error or unless the ruling is no longer sound due to changed conditions.” People v. Tolbert, 216 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo. App. 2007) (quoting People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 758 (Colo. 1999)). In Tolbert, a division of this court concluded that applying the law of the case doctrine to Crim. P. 35(a) strikes the appropriate balance between jurisdictional considerations unique to motions raising illegal sentence claims and the problem of postconviction proceedings becoming a cycle of “perpetual review.” Tolbert, 216 P.3d at 5 (quoting Leske v. Golder, 124 P.3d 863, 865 (Colo. App. 2005)).

¶ 10 We agree with the People that Long previously raised — and fully and finally litigated — his claim concerning the illegality of his aggravated sentence and the sufficiency of the district court’s findings. Long I and Long II both previously rejected these very claims. Long I, No. 07CA0430, slip op. at 4-6; Long II, No.

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22CA0694, slip op. at 5-7. This determination is law of the case, and we see no reason to depart from it.1 See Tolbert, 216 P.3d at 5.

¶ 11 To the extent Long raises a due process claim in his reply brief concerning the destruction of DNA evidence, CBI reports, and other physical evidence, we decline to address it. The substance of this claim sounds in Crim. P. 35(c), see People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 2006), and Long did not advance it in his postconviction motion. See DePineda v. Price, 915 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo. 1996) (“Issues not raised before the district court in a motion for postconviction relief will not be considered on appeal of the denial of that motion.”).

¶ 12 Last, to the extent Long asserts there is an error in his mittimus concerning his attempted sexual assault conviction, we disagree. The mittimus correctly reflects that Long pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault, a class 5 felony, and was sentenced to

1 In his Reply Brief, Long cites an unpublished opinion issued by a

division of this court, People v. Ruybal, (Colo. App. No. 22CA0799, Dec. 14, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). Unpublished opinions have no precedential value and should not be cited in an appellate brief in this court. See Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 40.

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three years in prison, to be served concurrently to his thirty-year sentence for aggravated second degree kidnapping.

III. Disposition

¶ 13 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE BERGER concur.